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ABSTRACT
Japan’s imperial history and its narrow self-interested post-WW II policies caused much 
animosity in Eastern Asia, yet its improved relations in the region from the 1980s 
onwards, even when assessed from a critical perspective, demand scholarly attention. 
This dissertation finds improved relations a result of Japan legitimating its regional 
hegemony. The critical theories of Gramsci (1937) and Habermas (1976) applied within 
intemtional relations suggest legitimation of hegemonic power at the international level 
only occurs when providing ‘global public goods’—defined metaphorically with the 
UNDP’s modification of Kindleberger’s (1986) work—such that post colonial states 
achieve rapid economic development to close the rich-poor gap as understood by 
Strange (1950). Analogous to the enabling notion of Sen’s (1974) “positive freedoms,” 
such ‘public goods’ are needed by states to enable nationalist projects of development, 
and as such their delivery is seen by Murakami (1996) as the responsibility of 
hegemonic powers of the day. In order to assess ‘global public goods’ the dissertation 
deploys Susan Strange’s (1988a) framework of ‘structural power.’ Within the 
knowledge structure, it is shown that Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda’s 1977 doctrine 
successfully guided policy towards improving regional relations in Eastern Asia. On the 
economic side, the Fukuda Doctrine provided ‘global public goods’ in knowledge by 
deploying Japan’s own experience of ‘developmentalism’ for the Eastern Asian region 
thus countering neo-liberalism of the “Washington Consensus,” while it also assisted in 
the transfer of appropriate and absorbable technology. The provision of ‘global public 
goods’ over the 1980s put Eastern Asia on course to catch-up with industrialised nations 
as Japanese firms, aided by a rising yen, went on to invest in the region. These firms 
began to transfer production bases from Japan, such that by the end of the 1990s each of 
these post colonial states saw their manufactured exports leading to economic growth 
rates that put them on a path to catch-up to Japan and other industrialised nations in 
time. In military security terms, Japan continued its pacific and defensive military 
posture thus calming a volatile region to enable economic development. Tokyo also 
pushed for collective regional security, while tacitly supporting the upgrading of post 
colonial Eastern Asia’s own defence capabilities. The implications of the dissertation 
are that Japan’s success in improving its regional relations places it in the international 
system as a responsible self-interested power to be emulated by other powers interested 
in a peaceful world, thus contributing to scholarship in international relations, 
development and history.
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demands.
Chapter Two clearly identifies ‘public goods’ as a result of the failure of collective 
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mind Aristotle’s advocacy of its use in discourses and in the sense of George Lakoff s 
(1992) “conceptual metaphor.”1 Arguing that liberal views of legitimation overlook 
how ‘public goods’ actually benefit the bourgeoisie, the chapter justifies the critical 
focus on legitimation. Finally, the chapter shows that by combining the insights of 
Gramsci (1937) and Habermas (1976), legitimation of hegemony can be understood to 
be at the core of why powerful actors provide metaphorically understood ‘global public 
goods,’ suggesting the crucial basis for improved relations between the powerful and
the less powerful. In this it goes beyond Ikenberry and Kapuchan (1990) to focus on 
Rapkin’s (2001) insight on the distributional concerns of post colonial states in Eastern 
Asia and Higgott’s (1998) concern with how the political is ignored in mainstream 
Western literature on the region.
Following this, in Chapter Three, the changes added show that the notion of ‘global 
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Habermasian) legitimation. It is shown that metaphorically idealised ‘global public 
goods,’ when critically understood, reflects the need for such a category of goods by 
post colonial states as told by the UNDP’s Global Public Goods: International 
Cooperation in the 21- Century (Kaul et al 1999) volume. It also shows that weak 
provision o f ‘global public goods’ will lead to legitimation crisis for hegemonic powers.
With little change, Chapter Four picks up on the theme of legitimation of hegemony 
with the subtle changes in the 2X2 matrices (Diagrams 1-4) showing different paths to 
economic development. Chapter Five (formerly chapter Six) picks up the economic 
argument of ‘global public goods’ along with Chapter Six (formerly Chapter Seven).
Then, a shortened Chapter Seven, (formerly Chapter Five), focuses on the contributions 
of the pacific nature of Japan as upholding regional stability, thus representing another 
metaphorical ‘global public good’ in the structure of security. It makes the case for 
legitimation of regional hegemony by presenting a minimal security threat to 
neighbouring states and avoiding a destabilising arms race.
Finally, the conclusion has been re-written to focus on the implications and the 
contributions of the dissertation. After a brief summary of the importance of the theory 
of “legitimation of hegemony,” it discusses the implications of Japan’s role in Eastern 
Asia in relation to the US and China. Using the theoretical language of the dissertation, 
it focuses on the 1997 economic crisis in the region to consider the strategic situation. It 
shows the crisis was caused by failed provision public goods within the financial 
structure by the US, China and Japan, and that the situation provides the counterfactual 
to Japan’s previous ‘global public goods’ role in the region. Then it argues that the 
eventual containment of the crisis with Japanese help was a return to Japan’s ‘global 
public goods’ role. Finally, the conclusion addresses the dissertation’s original 
contribution in five main areas.
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Introduction
One reality of human history is surely rule by the powerful, so much so that “rule” has 
come to imply “power” and vice versa. It is, however, a reality that the rulers 
themselves comprehend the need to justify their power, while the ruled warily balance 
support and resistance. Like the study of politics concerned with power and rule at the 
domestic level, international relations scholarship has concerned itself mainly with the 
study of international order, and thus with the powerful states that shape this order. In a 
special 1989 Millennium Journal of International Studies issue on Japan that addressed 
such concerns, one of the most influential US scholars of the post-WW II era, Robert 
Gilpin queried “Where does Japan fit in?” The “sudden” emergence of Japan, he 
reasoned, might provoke the hostility of other nations, whose “relative power and status 
is threatened,” no doubt referring to the late 1980s xenophobia in the US.2 While 
Western academic literature was concerned with Japan, so too was its influential media. 
As this Economist article mused,
Over the next decade China's economy could double in size; North and South 
Korea may reunite; debt-burdened America will be increasingly less willing 
to keep its troops overseas maintaining Asia's peace; and the Asian arms race 
may accelerate. Such probabilities will create tensions—and the tensions will 
become dangerous if Japan, the region's leading economic power and biggest 
military spender, remains either mistrusted or misunderstood, or both.3
The historical reality is that Japan did not “suddenly” emerge, as suggested by Gilpin
(1989), but had in fact been a leading player in international affairs ever since its 
demand for equal treatment as a “Great Power” in the beginning of the 20 century. 
Indeed by this point it too had become a colonising power—much to the dismay and 
anger of thinking Asians, who had once sought inspiration in the country’s successful 
resistance against Western colonialism.4
Both the work of Gilpin and that of mainstream Western journalism suggests Japan’s 
renewed importance in the East and Southeast Asian region, or, as is developed here, 
the Eastern Asian region—particularly among the post colonial states of Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam.5 These changes in 
Japan’s relations require scholarly attention, particularly in terms of the relationship 
between international politics and economics (Strange 1979). Only then can we 
properly place Japan in the international system in terms of its relative and structural 
power noted by Strange (1988a), and also in terms of its success in justifying its
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position of hegemony vis-a-vis post colonial Eastern Asia. Thus, this work contributes 
to both international relations and international political economy by focusing on how a 
regionally hegemonic Japan improved relations in Eastern Asia in the last two decades
t liof the 20 century after it had been reviled in the region in the first two decades 
following WWII. The dissertation addresses Japan’s improved relations in Eastern Asia 
using a theoretical framework constructed around the idea of legitimating hegemonic 
power, where legitimacy ultimately depends on the provision of metaphorically 
understood ‘global public goods’ such that the gap between post colonial and post­
imperial states narrows.
This introduction, which elaborates on the summary offered above, is organised into 
three sections. Part I addresses the historical context of anger at colonial and imperial 
powers in general and then focuses on anger towards Japan in particular. Part II shows 
changes in Eastern Asian perspectives on Japan, setting the stage for the dissertation’s 
research question on understanding Japan’s improved relations in the post-WW II era as 
a way of answering the question “Where does Japan fit in?” Part III describes how each 
chapter is organised to achieve the objective of the dissertation, namely to understand 
Japan’s changed post-war relations in Eastern Asia.
I JAPAN’S OLD RELATIONS IN EASTERN ASIA:
REVILED FASCIST-IMPERIALISM
Post colonial peoples’ suspicion of “Great Powers” may be traced to the pre-modem 
raison d ’etre for militarisation and colonisation: the control of trade and resources 
(Kawai 1973). Such pursuits emerged with the Portuguese voyages of “discovery” in 
the 15th century and were then perfected with near monopolistic control by British firms 
by the early 19th century with the help of warships. European colonialism was 
eventually halted by the backlash of an anti-colonial US in the Americas, and in Eastern 
Asia by a fast-rising Japan, acutely aware of the colonial humiliation of China and India. 
Ironically, the end of European expansion opened the way for US and Japanese brands 
of colonisation. Under the guise of the Monroe Doctrine (1823) the US expanded its 
control over the Americas (Windsor 1976). After rigorously studying events both east 
and west of its fortuitously isolated location, by 1895 Japan had also joined the league 
of colonisers, beginning with its acquisition of Taiwan from China. In 1905 Japan
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defeated Imperial Russia, annexing part of Sakhalin Island. By 1909-10 it colonised 
Korea, stopping Russian expansion south, and so Japan joined the self-labelled “Great 
Powers” at the table to bargain over control of the world’s people and resources.
With the “Great Power” status that came after re-negotiating the unequal treaties 
enforced by Europeans, Japan enjoyed a period of internal progress with greater 
democracy and international prestige. However, unhappy over naval quotas in 1922 that 
threatened to make Japan a second-class power by setting the country permanently 
behind the US and Britain, the military again assumed a larger role in politics (Taft 
1921, Ishimaru 1935, Carr 1939). Following several diplomatic confrontations between 
Japan and the Allies, by 1931 the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) invaded Manchuria 
leading to war with China. The country subsequently entered into a fascist alliance with 
Germany and Italy following a complete take-over of power by the military in the early 
1930s (Wildes 1934). In response to the US oil embargo, Japan entered WW II, 
proceeding to occupy Eastern Asia and extending its reach as far south as Indonesia.
After WW II the ambitions of “master races” in Germany, Japan, and elsewhere were 
laid bare, their lack of humanity exposed by the non-violence of Mahatma Gandhi, 
whose civil disobedience initiated the break up of the largest of all empires. India’s 
success encouraged others to seek freedom from colonial rule. In this the “wretched of 
the earth” (Fanon 1963) were to face extreme violence and manipulation, particularly in 
Africa, given the reluctance of many elite Europeans to relinquish very profitable 
missions of “civilisation.” Thus towards the end of the 20 century, post colonial states, 
having won their formal freedom in bloody wars, maintained their suspicions of former 
colonial powers. Indeed most of these peoples remained suspicious of Europe in 
particular. Those from Eastern Asia also had reason to be wary of Japan, while those of 
First Nations (or native American) extraction in the Americas understood the brutal 
reality of US “interests.”
In Eastern Asia, the politics of anger directed towards Japan was evident following the 
US-sponsored San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, when the original principles of the 
document were ignored in the face of Cold War pressures (Kesavan 1971). Prior to the 
conference in San Francisco, affected Asian countries, with the exception of China, 
India and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), had declared war reparations a minimum condition
3
for the resumption and normalisation of relations with Japan.6 Post colonial Eastern 
Asian countries were, however, unable to gain what they considered to be just 
compensation because of the reversal of US policy favouring substantial reparations. 
The US abruptly changed from promoting the cause of Eastern Asian countries during 
WW II in the Rooseveltian spirit of anti-colonialism, to adopting a de facto pro-colonial 
approach in the interests of the Western anti-Communist alliance. This meant the US 
reneged on its promise to de-industrialise Japan and hand over industrial plants as 
reparations to Eastern Asia. Instead, Washington chose to promote a rapid Japanese
O
recovery in order to stave off communism within Japan and Asia more generally.
Given the gap between expectations about reparations prior to San Francisco and events 
after the advent of war in Korea, Eastern Asian politics continued to be characterised by 
anger towards Japan up until the late 1970s. In Eastern Asian eyes, Tokyo gained from 
the Communist threat in Asia as this facilitated Japan’s re-entry into the region even in 
the absence of a proper “apology.”9 In their view, Japan had not truly earned the right to 
be part of the region, having avoided compensation in kind measured in terms of 
economic development, as suggested by Depedencia-type intellectuals Manglapus 
(1976) and Constantino (1972, 1989 & 1991). Anti-Japan sentiment reached a feverish 
pitch as Japanese businesses, supported by the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI), came to lead what was seen as a dramatic recovery of Japan’s 
economy. East Asians tended to see this recovery as having come at their own expense, 
via Japan’s access to their markets, cheap labour and raw materials. Pent-up frustrations 
with Japan’s material successes in the face of continuing poverty in Eastern Asia 
eventually lead to the explosion of anti-Japanese sentiments in the early 1970s, 
especially in Thailand and Indonesia (Unger 1989 & 1993).
Japanese policy was inadequately pro-active in addressing Eastern Asian anger in the 
1960s and early 1970s. Official efforts from Seoul to Singapore kept alive negative 
memories of Japan in the region via national curricula and state-owned media, while 
private efforts contributed in the form of scholarly and journalistic works.10 This effort 
continued well past the 1970s, when the reasons for despising Japan dwindled to issues 
of history rather than present behaviour. Neo-Dependencia intellectuals such as 
Constantino (1989:1) of the Philippines, who observed, “The growing Japanese 
presence in the main sphere of our national life is increasing cause for concern among
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thinking Filipinos,” gave narratives of Japanese domination.11 Writers and journalists of 
Asian origin living in the West, such as Iris Chang (1997), also contributed to such 
narratives as they re-visited the atrocities committed by the IJA in places like Nanking. 
There were also those who, incapable of shedding Orientalist research programmes, 
promoted an image of Japan that was untenable given the transformations occurring 
both within that country and the region more generally.12
Significantly, the most alarming chapters in Japan’s history in the region are continually
given life by a minority of right-wing Japanese, who still fight to exclude the facts of
1 ^past Japanese militarism from school texts. Problems within Japan are not overlooked 
in the region, as Eastern Asians are taught to reflect on them while dismissing the 
advent of more positive policies after WW II. Such memories, preserved in museums 
and written into folklore by undemocratic regimes needing an outside threat to justify 
their hold on power, have a tendency to linger.14 Yet, by the 1980s Japan’s relations in 
the region of Eastern Asia had changed for the better, indeed it had even become 
acceptable to turn to Tokyo for regional leadership (Phagaphasvivat 1992, Watanabe 
1995, Poh Ping 1995a and 1995b, Preston 1995 and Wan & Pharr 1996).
II JAPAN’S POSITIVELY CHANGED RELATIONS IN EASTERN ASIA: 
FRom REVILEment TO REGIONAL LEADERSHIP
One of the most remarkable events of the post-WW II era is surely the improvement of
Japan’s relations with its Eastern Asian neighbours in the last two decades of the 20th 
century to levels of normalcy now taken for granted. Not only is Japan no longer reviled,
in the 1990s it has even become the leading nation in Eastern Asia from which a great 
deal is expected. Perhaps the most revealing evidence of this transition comes from the 
changing attitude of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, 
and most notably from the shift in position of Singapore’s former Prime Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew. At a Kyoto symposium in 1992, he remarked that in the post-Cold War 
geopolitical global situation, “Japan will not find military aggression either necessary or 
profitable. So by all reason and logic, there should be no fear of a Japanese return to 
military aggression” (Furukawa, 1993:46). Interestingly, these remarks were made less 
than a year after he had expressed opposition toward a Japanese minesweeping 
operation in the Persian Gulf on the grounds that such a precedent would lead to a
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revival of militarism in the country. Also in 1992, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir 
bin Mohamad proposed the formation of an East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) to 
shift from a state of dependence on the US for regional security to an intraregional 
defence framework independent of the US in which Japan would play a major role. He 
went further, arguing that Japan should again play a military role in the Eastern Asian 
region. In fact, he told Japanese Prime Minister Murayama during his visit to Southeast 
Asia in August 1994 that Japan should end its “apology diplomacy” and assume a more 
overt leadership role in promoting peace and prosperity in Asia (Hall 1995:24).
In light of such a transformation, the question of Japan’s improved relations must be 
understood, for only then can we properly place this major power within the 
international system. As recent history has shown, particularly after the 1970s, Japan is 
important not only for the region of Eastern Asia, as the Economist suggested, but for 
the entire global economy as Gilpin (1987) has argued, adding the notion of the rtichibei 
economy to the lexicon of international political economy.15 Thus, the matter of 
understanding Japan’s place in the international system becomes of paramount 
importance for the discipline of international relations, which must also address post 
colonial societies in a more rigorous manner than has so far been the case. To truly 
answer Professor Gilpin’s question as to where Japan fits in and thereby address the 
nature of Japanese power, Tokyo’s positively changed post-war relations in Eastern 
Asia must become a concern for mainstream international relations scholarship focused 
on issues of hegemony.16
In a region with several thousand years of recorded history, such as Eastern Asia the 
changed relationship between Japan and its early to mid^O* century victims is 
profoundly significant. That Japan could have improved its relations in the region is 
especially remarkable given that regional governments used to use “Japan-bashing” as a 
way to deflect attention away from problems within their own countries. From the 
1980s onward, Eastern Asia’s new regimes and governments have resumed normal and 
increasingly co-operative relations with Tokyo unimaginable in the period up to the 
1970s. While perpetuating Japan’s negative image in recent times with their work Asia 
in Japan’s Embrace, even Hatch and Yamamura (1996) have been unable to ignore the 
fact that, since the dramatic burnings of effigies of Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei in the 
1970s, Japan’s reputation has dramatically improved to the extent that:
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• In 1989 virtually all o f Asia’s heads of states would converge on Tokyo to 
attend the funeral of the late Showa emperor.
• In 1990, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahatir bin Mohamed would call for a 
Japan-centred East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) without the “Caucasians.”
• In 1992, Thailand would lead ASEAN states to support Japanese legislation 
allowing its forces to be dispatched abroad for the first time since WW II.17
When one contrasts the period before 1980 with that which followed, the positive 
changes in Eastern Asia’s relations with Japan can be gauged by the ever-rising quality 
of diplomacy and economic activity between countries. After decades of strained silence 
and contact limited to regional events and some bilateral efforts, the inter-governmental 
understandings that have developed between Tokyo and Eastern Asia since the 1980s 
are extensive and growing deeper by the year, according to the Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs’ Diplomatic Bluebook series covering the period in question. Indeed, 
following the 1970s, stable relations with Tokyo became the first or second most 
important item on the agendas of many states in Eastern Asia. In tandem, private 
economic ties grew to historical heights, as Japan re-joined the region to the extent that 
there is now a regional production system geared to compete with the world outside. 
These improved relations were to become undeniable in the 1990s, when Japan came to 
be seen as the leader of choice in the region, praised for its quiet way of “leading from 
the back” (Rix 1989 & 1993), or alternatively, “leading with stealth” (Drifte 1996).
Frequent bilateral and multilateral contacts point to a consultative relationship between 
ASEAN nations and Japan.18 In fact, Tokyo’s continuous consultations with most 
Eastern Asian nations have become more or less institutionalised, with Japan taking an 
active role even at the ministerial level in the now familiar ASEAN meetings.19 Thus, it 
would be reasonable to expect that contacts away from the public’s eyes should roughly 
resemble those at the official level, or even supersede them. When one considers the 
sheer magnitude of Japan’s private commitments to Eastern Asia, it becomes clear this 
relationship is one that has enormous potential for Track II-type initiatives in the most 
sensitive areas, including military security.20 The potential for Track II-type initiatives 
is even more pronounced as many of the region’s officials have close ties to government 
officials 21 Confirming the use of Track II means, Japan’s relations in Eastern Asia have 
reached full diplomatic maturity, leading to positive outcomes.
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At the civil society level, surveys in Eastern Asia show a general appreciation of Japan 
that presents a sharp contrast to the vehemence of past rejection. As a result, in the last 
two decades thousands of Japanese tourists have set aside their qualms about visiting 
the region.22 Japan’s changed status is manifested in surveys undertaken by Japanese 
agencies, and suggested by polls in Eastern Asian states such as Singapore, where one 
might expect negative views, given the brutal actions of the Imperial Japanese Army 
(IJA) during WW II against the now dominant Chinese population. Interestingly, a 
recent survey of Singapore youth shows that an increasing number would prefer to be 
either Western or Japanese were they to have a choice 23 In a national television drama 
in the Philippines, high school students conducted a mock public trial in which the 
“Second Invasion” by Japan was judged to be benign.24 The evidence of changed status 
comes out most clearly when Japan is compared with other major powers, such as the 
US and China. A study of Malaysian urban middle-class attitudes by Zakaria and Chan 
(1984) on the aggressiveness of foreign powers revealed that Japan was ranked below 
the Soviet Union, Vietnam, China, the US, Australia and Indonesia, in that order.25
More telling than surveys indicating Japan’s positively changed relations in Eastern 
Asia is the evidence from the younger generation, particularly their emulation and direct 
consumption of Japanese pop culture. In the 1980s, new trends from karaoke to 
pachinko to Asian style pop music were observed in Tokyo, Seoul, Bangkok, and 
Manila. The most compelling evidence of Japan’s new relations comes from South 
Korea, subjected to Japanese colonialism in its most brutal form since 1909. 
Recognising relations with Japan had improved in 1998 the South Korean government 
lifted its ban on Japanese cultural imports just before the first jointly hosted Soccer 
World Cup in 2002.26 The Economist notes that in 2000, Japanese films in South Korea 
had jumped to 10 % of market share 27 Even China, despite its vigilance in ensuring 
negative views of Japan, has not escaped Japanese influence.28 In the past, the spread of 
Japanese pop culture through Asia did not typically translate into hard export earnings 
mainly because of piracy, but the upsurge in revenues in the late 1990s suggests a sea 
change at the political level, with lower barriers and restrictions to Japanese cultural 
exports. As the Economist notes, black markets and piracy were a result of “Japan’s 
brutal colonisation of Asia in the 1930s and 1940s,” which led regional governments to 
officially block contact. However, new interest in changing access to Japanese culture
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suggests a shift within Eastern Asian society that nationalistic cultural ministries can no 
longer ignore. “For those Eastern Asians who grew up on Tom Cruise, MTV and Levi 
jeans, the unsteady steps of today’s youth in Taipei and Hong Kong must be a strange 
sight,” suggested the Economist, noting, “As their businesses are bought out, 
restructured or wired for the Internet age, older generations are feeling America’s 
influence more than ever. Yet it is not to the West that their children are turning for 
their music, books, comics, and television programmes: it is to Japan.”29
By the 1990s, Japan had improved its relations with much of Eastern Asia. Eastern 
Asian students in Japan recounted that anti-Japanese feelings in their countries were the 
preserve of older generation with direct experiences of the horrors of war. In contrast, 
these students pronounced themselves open to seeing changes within Japan never 
imagined possible by their parents. Significantly, their stories dovetail with accounts of 
Japanese in Hitachi, Tokyo, and other places opposing right-wing elements. Needless 
to say, there are sub-regional variations. The opinions of Southeast Asian students are a 
contrast to those of South Korean students, who speak with authority of the hardships 
their parents and grandparents underwent during the era of Japanese colonisation.31 Yet, 
even the South Koreans are not as sceptical about the Japanese as one might expect, 
given the recent history of negative press on Tokyo with official backing.32
The characterisation of Japan as having bad relations in the Eastern Asia compared to 
the US overlooks change in the region. Furthermore, the undercurrent of opinion in 
mainstream media such as the Economist suggesting that Japan is “untrustworthy” is 
risky unless part of a broader comparative analysis of post imperial and hegemonic 
powers. Such comparative work is strangely scarce, with US hegemony seemingly 
preferred, hence one can reasonably ask: are there trustworthy hegemonic powers? If 
the answer is affirmative, which are they, and how can we determine that they are so? 
Within international relations, questions of trust are as difficult to answer as those of 
intention, if not more so, as intent can at least minimally be surmised based on careful 
analysis of military spending, levels of government accountability, recent militarism, 
etc., whereas no serious literature exists on states’ “trustworthiness.” Orientalist 
insinuations of a peoples’ “trustworthiness” or lack thereof are at best naive and at worst 
racist.
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Ill THE QUESTION OF UNDERSTANDING JAPAN’S IMPROVED 
RELATIONS IN EASTERN ASIA
The question of Japan’s improved relations in post colonial Eastern Asia is of 
fundamental importance to international relations, which is concerned with solving the 
problem of war. It is a question that will be answered in this dissertation by paying 
attention to how powerful capitalist states maintain the international system in their own 
interests. Do post-imperialist states wield power for the benefit of all, as the “post” label 
suggests and liberal advocates might require them to, or is power used to further 
imperialist ambition as in the past, though more carefully camouflaged? Are post­
imperialist hegemonic states able to deliver on promises of making the international 
system fairer, and are they willing to create policies that close the economic gap 
between themselves and post colonial states? Only by attempting to systematically 
answer such questions can we begin to understand international relations in the world as 
a whole, including those “others” from post colonial states. In the hermeneutic tradition, 
this dissertation addresses these questions by examining Japan’s improved relations in 
Eastern Asia in the last two decades of the 20th century.33 It does so with the help of a 
theoretical framework built around the idea of legitimating hegemonic power via the 
delivery of metaphorical ‘global public goods.’
One might expect that a hegemonic power with imperialist tendencies would find itself 
reviled and resisted, as we have seen both throughout history and in the present, as 
argued by Michael Cox (2002). In contrast, we might expect that hegemonic missions 
that seek to redress historic wrongs would positively alter ties with post colonial 
societies. Focus on legitimation allows critical consideration as to how and why a 
hegemon delivers so-called ‘global public goods’ in an anarchic international system. 
Arguably, a critical reading of history and a reasonable understanding of material 
interests suggests that the legitimation of hegemonic power in the context of the 
capitalist international system can only occur when ‘global public goods’ are provided 
to post colonial societies such that they achieve rapid economic development and ‘catch 
up’ to the living standards of industrialised nations.
The dissertation assesses Japanese provision of ‘global public goods’ in the areas of 
knowledge (including political and economic ideas and technology), military security, 
finance and production/consumption. It finds that Tokyo’s improved relations in Eastern
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Asia are a result of Japanese policy designed to assist and enable nationalist policies of 
rapid economic growth in the region. Significantly, this turn in Japanese policy came in 
response to vocal demands from Eastern Asian leaders and was skilfully translated into 
policy terms by Japan’s left-leaning think tanks, especially, the Ajiken or the Institute of 
Developing Economies (IDE). Japanese government policy was also supported by 
Japan’s multinationals, especially after the emergence of threats to their regional 
investments in the 1970s.
IV ORGANISATION OF THE DISSERTATION
In Chapter 1 it is shown that current international relations theory cannot adequately 
account for change in Japan’s regional relations from the pre-1980s politics of anger to 
the post-1980s period of positive relations. Marxist-inspired Dependencia-type 
observers argue that Asia is in “Japan’s embrace,” making no allowances for any 
genuine change in the quality of the relationship between a colonial power and post 
colonial societies. In contrast, liberals are overly optimistic, ignoring relative material 
gains and instead focusing on absolute gains while assuming that changes in relations 
are simply a natural result of laissez faire or the mitigation of anarchy by international 
institutions. In the face of the polar idealism of these two pillars of international 
relations theory, realists consider Japan’s positively changed relations largely irrelevant, 
proposing that any change is best explained by US-led alliance politics against Chinese 
and Soviet sponsored aggression that included other Eastern Asian nations in the fold. 
While this view may be useful for students of power politics, realism, particularly its 
North American reading, misses the historical relationship between Japan and smaller 
post colonial states. The chapter concludes by pointing to the need for an approach that 
understands and explains positive changes in international relations between a formerly 
brutal imperial power and its victims, suggesting the work of Gramsci (1937) and 
Habermas (1976) warrants more careful attention given that their non-deterministic 
approaches take agency seriously.
The core of the dissertation’s theoretical argument appears in Chapters 2 and 3. In order 
to contest the cavalier use of the term ‘hegemony’ within the discipline of international 
relations, where little attention is paid to sociological work on the notion, Chapter 2 
considers the writings of Antonio Gramsci (1937) and Jurgen Habermas (1988,1996).
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Chapter 2 argues for the non-deterministic use of hegemony, defining the concept at the 
international level as the power to provide what can be metaphorically seen as ‘public 
goods’ so as to win consent, in addition to the power to simply coerce, thus making it a 
process of conscious struggle to win the “hearts and minds” of followers via strategies 
that respond to at least their historical material demands.
Following Gramsci (1937) and Habermas (1988, 1996) in their method (over Popper’s 
positivism and separation of facts from norms), Chapter 2 argues for the use of their 
mode of criticism in assessing Japan’s relations in Eastern Asia, or indeed any 
relationship between a hegemonic power and other states in the international system. It 
is shown that for Gramsci, the operationalisation of hegemony explained the absence of 
Marx’s predicted revolution in Western liberal democracies. With material conditions 
improving enough to allow the middle class to emerge as a majority seeking to maintain 
their gains, the bourgeoisie were able to maintain their rule through domination of 
intellectual space via not only an economic ideology of absolute gains, but also culture, 
with both constitutive of identity and hegemony. Rather than take such democracy for 
granted (without reference to the original material within liberalism) or as irrelevant (in 
the Marxist sense of capital ultimately being triumphant), and to underpin the 
importance of material gains for consent, Lockean ideals of democracy are reconsidered 
in terms of ‘public goods’ provision.
‘Public goods’ are understood as a result of the failure of collective action (Olsen 1971) 
in the real world, and thus this concept is deployed as a metaphor—keeping in mind 
Aristotle’s advocacy of its use in discourses and in the sense George Lakoffs (1992) 
“conceptual metaphor.” 34 This focus on ‘public goods’ allows for a clearer 
understanding of the relationship between state and society in terms of the material 
goods required for the legitimation of state power. It thus becomes possible to foresee 
that a failure to provide ‘public goods’ such that material divides are deepened would 
lead to a legitimation crisis in the manner suggested by Jurgen Habermas (1976).
It is argued that since in the international arena democracy has no formal franchise, the 
normative qualification of the reality of hegemony is best approached via the 
Habermasian notion of legitimation, where legitimacy can be won only when the 
material gaps between post-imperial and post colonial states are narrowing. The chapter
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shows that by combining the insights of Gramsci (1937) and Habermas (1976), 
legitimation of hegemony can be understood to be at the core of why powerful actors 
provide metaphorically understood ‘global public goods,’ suggesting the crucial basis 
for improved relations between the powerful and the less powerful. In this it goes 
beyond Ikenberry and Kapuchan (1990) to focus on Rapkin’s (2001) insight on 
distributional concerns of post colonial states in Eastern Asia and Higgott’s (1998) 
concern with how the political is ignored in mainstream Western literature on the region.
Chapter 3 operationalises the legitimation of hegemony going beyond Kindleberger’s 
(1986) idea of ‘international public goods’ to use ‘global public goods’ by the UNDP 
that focuses specifically on the needs of post colonial states. The chapter goes on to use 
the analogy of “positive freedoms” drawn from the work of Sen (1974 & 1993) and 
Berlin (1969) to allow us to focus on the need for ‘public goods’ that enable capitalist 
economic growth. It makes the case that given the imperial powers’ historical 
unwillingness to provide ‘public goods’ for colonies to develop politically and 
economically, post colonial states seeking rapid development logically followed 
socialism rather than colonial capitalism. However, the Cold War led to the spread of 
capitalism, with the leading capitalist economies providing ‘global public goods’ to 
ensure the success of their preferred system, particularly in the frontline countries 
bordering communist states.
It is argued that where a hegemon provides ‘global public goods’ such that catch-up 
development is possible, the legitimation of power at the international level can be 
achieved. ‘Global public goods’ were more or less defined by Kindleberger (1986), and 
refined to reflect post colonial states interests in work by the UNDP. Chapter 3 provides 
criteria to assess legitimation in the international system by arguing that this can only be 
accomplished if the leading advocates of a particular international political and 
economic system meet post colonial states’ goals of rapid development to those levels 
achieved by the leading states themselves. It ends by suggesting how Strange’s (1988a) 
framework of structural power is useful for organising the evaluation of ‘global public 
goods,’ with the caveat that the knowledge structure must precede security, finance and 
production, which follow each other in a logical sequence with the last manifesting in 
the real economy.
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Chapters 4 through 7 assess the evidence supporting Japan’s provision of ‘global public 
goods.’ Chapter 4 considers the structural nature of Japanese knowledge shaping 
Eastern Asia by understanding the region’s ‘developmentalism’ in terms of ‘global 
public goods’ provision as argued by Murakami (1996).35 In addition to demonstrating 
how ‘developmentalism’ informs the region’s financial and production structures, it 
shows that Japan’s own military security is tied to regional economic development. In 
addition, the chapter points to the serious commitment of Japanese academics to 
studying the region starting in the 1950s, and discusses the importance of this 
knowledge for the operationalisation of “developmentalist” policies in Eastern Asia. 
Arguably, the emergence of “Look East” policies in many of the region’s states 
cemented Japan’s positive relations in Eastern Asia by the late 1980s.
Chapters 5 and 6 address the economic side of the ‘public goods’ provision necessary to 
supplement and enable individual national policies. Much has been written in the 
development policy literature in terms of post colonial states’ agency by Haggard
(1990), Wade (1990) and Amsden (1989, 1994 & 1995). At the structural level, 
Japanese provision of ‘public goods’ in the financial structure of Eastern Asia is 
understood in terms of counter-cyclical lending, functioning as lender of last resort, and 
playing a role as the region’s currency stabiliser. This financial role is explored, and 
Japanese overseas development aid (ODA) and foreign direct investment (FDI) are 
considered. In addition, there is a discussion of the manner in which the Plaza Accords 
enabled Tokyo to underwrite US efforts against the communist bloc while providing for 
the rapid development of Eastern Asian economies in the late 1980s. In the 1990s, 
Japanese liberalisation gathered speed, making this country even more important as a 
provider of ‘global public goods.’ As a result, Japan integrated Eastern Asia within its 
production and market structure, thus ensuring rapid development, and especially the 
upgrading of the export sectors of those regional economies to higher value added 
sectors. The ensuing increase in the rate of economic growth, which was such that the 
region could aspire to ‘catch up’ with the industrialised nations, provides the final 
economic clue necessary to understand the legitimation of Japanese power, thus 
explaining its positively changed relations in the region.
Finally, Chapter 7 assesses Japan’s provision of ‘public goods’ in Eastern Asia since the 
late 1970s in the area of military security. It is shown that Japan has preferred to
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promote regional concepts of security in co-operation with other states rather than 
deploy a large military of its own despite pressure to the contrary by the US and Japan’s 
own military. Arguably, this is a non-coercive policy that is the core of any form of 
consent to Japanese re-engagement in Eastern Asia. Tokyo has gone further by tacitly 
supporting the region’s collective self-defence capabilities through its strong economic 
support. Japan’s strictly non-militaristic stance entails reliance on Eastern Asian states’ 
forces to protect its own vital air and sea lanes, a move that has cemented regional 
confidence in Japan.
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Chapter 1
Japan’s Improved Relations in Eastern Asia: A Problem for the Pillars of
International Relations Theory
Japan’s campaigns in the Korean peninsula between 1592 and 1598 ended in defeat at 
the hands of Chinese and Korean forces. Then, with the encroachment of proselytising 
Europeans put to the sword, Japan turned inward, with the Shogun banning contact with 
the ‘barbarians’ save the trade-minded Dutch. The grand isolation of the Edo period 
(1603-1867) provided Japan with a false sense of security, even as it fell behind in 
industrialisation and military impetus (Sen 1983 & 1984). However, following its 
forced opening to the outside world in 1854 by a US naval armada, Japan’s 19th century 
response to Western colonial power left it virtually seething with imperialist desire, as it 
aspired to ‘catch up’ with the “Great Powers” rather than face the fate of other great 
civilisations at the hands of foreign colonialists. After a period of rapid industrialisation 
and militarisation during the early part of the Meiji Period (1867-1912), military success 
at the dawn of the 20th century against Imperial Russia allowed Japan space to develop 
wider imperial ambitions. By mid century it had subjugated or occupied entire peoples 
in the Eastern Asian region reaching from Korea and Manchuria in the North to 
Indonesia in the South, thereby earning their enmity.36
With the end of WW II and the onset of the Cold War, Japan’s reintegration into Asia 
was initiated via the Colombo Plan.37 During the early years of the Cold War, its contact 
was limited to ensuring absolute gains via trade. However, mutual economic gains and 
fear of communism were insufficient to displace ‘relative gains’ concerns and historical 
anger towards Japan. Indeed, by the early 1970s violence prompted by Japan’s near 
mercantilist regional presence pointed to the country’s worsening reputation with its 
neighbours. Mounting dissatisfaction could be traced to the relative gains enjoyed by 
Japan, leading to its rapid rise to prosperity, as symbolized by its ability to host the 
Olympics in 1964 while the rest of the region languished in poverty. Not only that, 
Japanese style gains were not seen as forthcoming in other countries desperate to gain 
post colonial dividends. However, by the early 1980s Japan’s positively changed 
relations with Eastern Asia, with suggestions of leadership in the region by the end of 
the decade by Rix (1989), marked an absolute about-turn in Japan’s regional relations, 
and with it in Japan’s larger presence in the international arena.
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It is reasonable to hypothesise that the improvement in Japan’s relations with Eastern 
Asia in the post-1980s period compared to the previous one was due primarily to the co­
operative modus operandi adopted by Tokyo when dealing with Eastern Asia from late 
1970s. In contrast to the period between the 1950s and 1970s when Japan acted without 
adequate regard for the economic needs of Eastern Asia, from at least 1977 onward 
successive governments in Tokyo acted reactively, and even deferentially, to the politics 
of Eastern Asian anger by making overt political and economic concessions (Rix 1989). 
Indeed, Tokyo has assisted Eastern Asian countries in achieving their ambition of rapid 
economic growth, as witnessed by the increasing application of Japanese models of 
‘developmentalism’ in Asia (Wade 1990, Haggard 1994 and Amsden 1989, 1994 &
1995). However, the understanding that changes in Japan’s relations with Eastern Asia 
have come as a result of Tokyo’s commitment to addressing regional relative gains 
demands has not yet made its mark in international relations. Dominated by the three 
pillars of liberalism, Marxism, and realism, international relations theory has yet to 
adjust to account for relative gains achieved by post colonial states as a key basis for 
positively changed relations with hegemonic powers.
Section 1.1.0 shows that ideas of Dependencia do not undermine Japan’s positively 
changed relations, as the region lacks a comprador bourgeoisie allied to Japanese 
capital. Section 1.2.0 argues liberalism in its current forms cannot account for Japan’s 
positively changed relations either, as under this paradigm acceptance is assumed in 
political and economic transactions, and not conditional on post colonial states’ relative 
gains aim of catching-up with the colonial metropole nations. Section 1.3.0 explains 
how realists make the case that the emergence of China has allowed Japan to play a 
more central role as a balancing power, thus allowing it to develop de facto positive 
relations with Eastern Asia. It is argued that although balances of power in the region 
are indeed important, this view cannot address Japan’s positive regional relations 
independent of China, as a result of the success of Japanese policy in meeting regional 
demands for proper reparations for imperial aggression in Eastern Asia. The chapter 
concludes by proposing the need to improve upon the current state of theory in 
international relations in order to account for improved relations between post-imperial 
hegemonic powers and post colonial states. It suggests that one path to this end draws 
upon the work of Gramsci (1937) and Habermas (1976).
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1.1.0 ACCEPTING THE “SECOND INVASION” BY JAPAN:
D EPEN D EN C ES  PUZZLE In EASTERN ASIA
For Marxist-leaning scholars, the improvement in Japan’s relations with Eastern Asia 
can only be attributed to manipulation or coercion. The Dependencia school of Frank 
(1969), Cardoso and Faletto (1979) and Evans (1979), for example, takes a pessimistic 
view of relations between the post-imperial “core” and post colonial “periphery.”38 
Their work has established an important critique of “core” capitalist states and their 
domination of the emerging post colonial states of the “periphery.” Their argument, 
based on the Latin American experience, suggested development in the “periphery” was 
dependent on the core in such a way that it would remain perpetually underdeveloped. 
Their focus was on Latin America’s continuing reliance on primary commodities for 
exports and lack of growth in manufactures due to under-investment and the repatriation 
of profits. Further to the left, yet more cynical voices proposed the “de-linking” of 
exploited states from the core as the only way forward (Amin 1985a).
However, in Eastern Asia Dependencia arguments fail, as governments persuasively 
exercised their sovereignty in the pursuit of self-interest, and have achieved growth 
rates frequently hailed as nothing short of “miraculous.”39 The situation in Eastern Asia 
is different in many ways from that of Latin America, and is particularly so with respect 
to regional hegemonic power, as Japan’s relationship with the region is substantially 
different from that of the US with Latin America.40 The difference is significant, as 
several of these Eastern Asian states have chosen to “look East” towards Japan despite 
the legacy of Japanese imperialism, while the US presence in Latin America has tended 
to provoke resistance. Understanding these situations requires a more in depth 
examination of international politics than is offered by dependency and related views.41
Sub-section 1.1.1 discusses the problems with the Dependencia argument of dependent 
under-development, which is critical of Japan’s role in Eastern Asia, illustrating that it 
cannot be reconciled with the reality of accelerated development of the region via 
exporting value-added manufactures to the world assisted by Japanese-based keiretsu. 
Subsection 1.1.2 examines the assumptions driving general dependency theory, which 
are arguably historically and regionally specific to Latin America. Subsection 1.1.3 
argues that a neo-Marxist critique of Japan’s role in Eastern Asia is moot, as Eastern
18
Asia is rapidly developing its partnership with Japan, much to the puzzlement of those 
proposing the relevance of a general theory of dependency.
1.1.1 Eastern Asia in Japan’s “embrace”: myopia of the latest dependency view
Implying an Eastern Asian version of Latin America’s Dependencia style domination 
by the US, Hatch and Yamamura (1996) have argued that East Asia is in Japan’s 
“embrace.” They argue that Japanese firms—often with the help of their government— 
have built networks of production that have not only effectively “embraced” the Eastern 
Asia region, but also “excluded” Anglo-Saxon and European firms. They suggest that 
the Japanese business and government elite alike utilise a complex web of production 
networks that offer them strategic control of technology. Hatch and Yamamura (1996) 
make the case that since 1985 there have been qualitative changes in this post colonial 
versus post-imperial international relationship, which have meant a shift away from the 
more traditional neo-colonial domination. Because of this, they argue, Japan has moved 
away from the extraction of energy and other raw resources and the selling of 
manufactured products to the subjugated economies in Asia, and has instead made these 
economies an organic part of its extended cross-border production base through the 
control of critical technology and parts.
Hatch and Yamamura propose that the lauded export-driven growth of the Asian Tigers 
took place firmly within the context of a new form of Japanese domination.42 As such, 
these achievements are pejoratively referred to as those of “paper tigers,” because, it is 
held, their “industrialisation” was “technology-less,” and their development was captive 
to the needs of Japanese capitalism. Hatch (1998) further asserts that the dependency on 
Japan is so extensive that Japan’s economic malaise was the primary cause of the 1997 
regional economic crisis. 43 This deterministic and somewhat anti-Japanese 
interpretation of Japan’s re-integration in Eastern Asia is also articulated by David 
Arase (1995), who discusses the “buying power” of Japanese aid, thereby implying the 
manipulation of consent (Cohen 1989).
Critics of the Eastern Asian model fail to adequately acknowledge the rapid gains the 
region has made relative to industrialised nations, with the participation of Japan. This 
is odd, because several respected scholars seriously interested in economic development 
have applauded Eastern Asian growth, with some acknowledging its origins its
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emulation of the Japanese model (Krueger 1985, Wade 1990, Haggard 1990 and 
Amsden 1994 & 1995). Other experts in the key areas of human resource training and 
technology transfer go further to directly acknowledge Japan’s extensive involvement in 
Eastern Asia (Lawler & Atmiyanandana 1995, Moore & Jennings 1995, and Capannelli
1996). Significantly, high growth rates in Eastern Asia were dependent on manufactured 
and processed exports from the region to the markets of the G7 countries. This has 
allowed movement towards higher value-added manufactured goods, and meant 
important gains in technology, while educational investments have allowed for 
increasing absorptive capacity and home grown technologies, as is the case with Taiwan 
and South Korea.
Despite economic growth in Eastern Asia, critics of Japan base their interpretations of 
the region on Dependencia-type assumptions drawn from Latin American cases. They 
assume that all post imperial centres exploit the post colonial periphery, even though in 
Latin America this was contingent on the presence of a comprador bourgeoisie (allied 
to the metropole). However, in the case of Eastern Asia critics fail to see that a parallel 
class tied to Japan was notably absent. This absence is due to the reality that, as 
nationalism followed the defeat of Japanese forces, elements of a comprador 
bourgeoisie leaning towards Japan were forcibly removed from Eastern Asia.44
In Eastern Asia, Dependencia ideas are not useful because of the absence of a pro- 
Japanese bourgeoisie engaged in promoting Japan’s interests over their own national 
interests. The Eastern Asian region instead has a nationalist bourgeoisie (or one in the 
process of formation with the denationalisation of industry, such as in China and 
Vietnam), which is well protected from competition. This is in line with Japanese 
‘developmentalism’ in the Meiji and post-war eras, emulated in Eastern Asia in a 
manner reminiscent of Japan’s emulation of the key aspects of Friedrich List’s (1841) 
prescriptions for German catch-up vis-a-vis England.45 The nationalist bourgeoisie in 
Eastern Asia was more likely to keep the Japanese out, or to see them as unwelcome 
competition, unless there were substantial relative gains to be made for their own 
projects 46 Indeed, such nationalist elements initially encouraged regional resistance to 
foreign presence in the 1970s, prompting attacks on new Japanese concerns with the 
aim of “domesticising” them. This type of politics encouraged joint ventures with the
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Japanese in Indonesia and Thailand (Unger 1989). Similar patterns of joint ventures also 
occurred in other places in the region, especially in Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia.47
1.1.2 Dependencia: assuming manipulation by Empire
The mistakes of Dependencia scholars in Eastern Asia are understandable, as even the 
Latin American originators of these ideas failed to emphasise the importance of the 
cultural ties of the comprador bourgeoisie to the “centre” or “core.” In Latin America 
this class was naturally Western-oriented, as they were themselves of European descent. 
The comprador bourgeoisie was thus not only a class in Marxist terms, but also one 
driven by racist beliefs in the inferiority of those of non-European origin. Unfortunately, 
race is a category of analysis that is missing in international relations theory, subsumed 
within ideas of nationalism. This mistake is made even by Marxist-oriented scholars, 
who might be expected to be more sensitive to the issue of exploitation. At least within 
international relations, their approach accords little space for analysis related to race, as 
this category is considered irrational or unimportant, or at best simply too awkward to 
include in academic discourses.
Marxist-oriented work is driven by assumptions about capital that impose upon it an 
anthropomorphic character of maximising gains regardless of the national interests of 
capitalists in different places. When applied to international politics, the Leninist (1917) 
version of Marxism that heralds the internationalisation of anthropomorphic capital is 
not undermined in the Latin American case. There, the sources of capital came from 
“core” European and US sources with the comprador classes of the periphery united in 
common cause. Thus after nearly a century of the Monroe Doctrine, the notion of 
dependency gained credence as the US began to dominate the region as the single most 
important source of capital in the post-WW II period 48 These sources of capital were 
further driven by the necessity of extracting raw materials for US and European 
factories, in some instances for very long periods of time, given that labour in the core 
was naturally disinclined to relinquish its livelihood to early forces of regionalisation 
and globalisation. Therefore, Dependencia scholars quite understandably argued that 
Latin America’s relationship with the industrialised “core” was one of long-term 
exploitation, with no change in sight.
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The Latin American tradition of writing on Empire has evolved in a region blighted first 
by European and then US political and military intervention. Latin American scholars 
dealing with economic growth have termed the region’s growth “dependent 
development” and many see the region as part of the US “empire.” Intentions of empire 
were also clearly evident in this case, as Washington’s Monroe Doctrine made little 
effort to conceal its originators’ determination to guard America against the incursions 
of the British and other imperialists. With the Cold War era and the rise of the Truman 
Doctrine, this policy continued under the guise of halting the spread of what were 
ostensibly pro-Soviet regimes.49 The analytical validity of Dependencia-style theory on 
Latin American was grounded in a particular era of neo-colonialism, in a particular 
space aided by a particular class at the periphery, specifically one that supported the 
interests of the metropole over national ambitions. However, empirical observations 
drawn from the Latin America case form the basis of certain assumptions of 
dependency theory more generally:
• all post-imperial centres are considered to be the same as the metropoles of 
Europe in terms of exploiting the post colonial periphery;
• all post colonial states are considered to be part of the periphery and assumed to 
exercise little agency; and
• all bourgeoisie classes within post colonial states are considered servants of 
foreign capital.
Typically, these assumptions are presumed to be applicable to all centre-periphery 
relations. Certainly the continuing reality of relations between Latin America and the 
powerful Western countries, and also Africa and Europe offer little to contradict these 
assertions. In such cases the key link has been the comprador bourgeoisie, which has 
offered its allegiance to Europe and/or the US rather than champion post colonial 
interests.
In Latin America the parasitic comprador bourgeoisie have had, and continues to have, 
close ties with Europe and the US. Latin Americans of native and African origin are 
more likely to be destitute, and to live the wretched lives described by novelists such as 
Gabriel Garcia Marquez and Carlos Fuentes.50 The Latin American comprador 
bourgeoisie has had and continue to have very little to share in terms of national interest 
or nationalism with native “children of lesser gods.” As such, Latin Americans of
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European heritage historically participated in maintaining capital outflows. Their 
affinity for offshore bank accounts and expensive Western imports was not typically 
balanced with adequate exports due to adverse terms of trade (weakening prices for raw 
material exports) and protectionist measures enacted by Western “core” powers. The 
class differences between those of European descent, who occupied positions of power 
and prestige, and those of native and African descent, who lived on the margins of 
political and economic society, are thus rooted in the racist history of colonisation. 
These societal trends continue today and are clearly indicated by the extraordinarily 
wide income disparities observed in countries such as Brazil. This reality is replicated in 
most of Latin America, where subjugated non-Europeans have survived at the margins. 
This “illegitimate” comprador bourgeoisie rule was perpetuated and deepened by the 
ideological cleavages created by the Cold War. In its bid to support conservative 
regimes in the region, the US supplied and trained Latin American military and 
paramilitary forces that brutally subdued resisting native populations. Not surprisingly, 
the trend continues with periodic outbursts of unrest and anti-Americanism.51
The general applicability of Dependencia ideas to all post colonial states is questionable 
as contexts differ greatly. It is important to recognize that Dependencia scholars, whose 
focus was on Latin America, had many unique realities to contend with that were not 
generally applicable to Japanese involvement in Eastern Asia. When considering 
Constantino’s (1989) idea of Japan’s “second invasion” of Eastern Asia, Dependencia 
scholars must acknowledge the absence of a comprador bourgeoisie allied to Japan. In 
the absence of these elements, the region’s elite and nationalist bourgeoisie were able to 
articulate their own interests and gain economically from their relationship with Japan 
in relative terms, as suggested by national growth rates that were typically more than 
twice those of the industrialised core. Under the circumstances, attempts to caste Japan 
as an exploitative core country are not convincing in the case of its relations in Eastern 
Asia, although there may be some specific relationships in the region that could indeed 
be understood within this framework.
1.1.3 The Dependencia paradox: Development via modern Japanese “empire"
Eastern Asia’s rapid development over the last three decades of the 20th century is 
captured by the shift in scholarship within a critical tradition. For example, writing on 
Malaysia in 1986, K.S. Jomo found development uneven and crisis prone, but by 1994
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he pointed to rapid development with the influence of Japan. In 1996 he explained 
development in terms of the policies of the local state, and still later in 1998, such 
development was traced to local industries and firms.52 Dependencia scholars should 
not ignore that Japan’s late 20th century role in Eastern Asia is not similar to those of 
US and Europe in Latin America and Africa respectively. While appreciating the well- 
intentioned recognition of exploitation and powerlessness in Eastern Asia by scholars 
such as Arase (1995), Hatch and Yamamura (1997) and Hatch (2000), one must ask 
that they be cognisant of regional differences. They must not dismiss nationalistic 
agency focusing on relative gains from post colonial societies without comprador 
classes. Japan’s reintegration in Eastern Asia has not led to dependent 
underdevelopment, but instead to accelerated development in the region. The reality of 
Japan’s role in Eastern Asia may thus come as something of a revelation for 
Dependencia scholars (Evans 1998). Indeed, economic growth in Eastern Asian states 
has taken place with a degree of equality unseen in other post colonial states (Haggard 
1990, Wade 1990, Amsden 1994 & 1995), and most certainly not in Latin America, 
home to the greatest divisions between rich and poor, European and non-European, in 
the world.
The general acceptance of a Japanese role in Eastern Asia at the level of society 
provides a striking contrast to the anti-Japanese feelings in the region even as late as the 
1980s. In contrast to the violence against Japanese property in the 1970s, in the 1990s 
protestors no longer targeted Japan. During the 1997-98 financial crisis there was 
overwhelming evidence that Eastern Asian governments blamed the US, which 
promoted a nakedly self-interested Anglo-American form of laissez-faire economics 
favouring powerful actors in the market.53 At this time Eastern Asian society at large 
also saw the Chinese diaspora as more loyal to China than to their adopted states in the 
region; as a result elements in those countries used the turbulence of the crisis to either 
savagely attack or cynically extort from ethnic Chinese property holders. In contrast to 
the blame accorded to the US, the attacks on Chinese property, and the last episode of 
anti-foreign feelings in the early 1970s (when Japanese was at the top of the “hit list”), 
in the Asian crisis of 1997-98, not a single Japanese firm was attacked or under threat. 
If anything, the complaint was that Tokyo was not “standing up” to Washington on 
behalf of the region, a criticism made most vocally by Mahatir bin Mohammed, the 
outspoken Malaysian prime minister.
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1.2.0 LIBERAL RE-INTEGRATION VIA COMMERCE:
NEGLECTING JAPANESE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY POW ER
Classical liberals might see Japan’s positively changed relations in Eastern Asia as a 
“normal” occurrence in the world of international exchanges among rational peoples 
interested in absolute gains. From this perspective, positively changed relations between 
post-imperial and post colonial states are assumed to be part of mutual and absolute 
gains from commerce. Neo-liberal institutionalists, cognisant of realist criticism, might 
also argue that regional and international institutions played a key role in allowing 
Japan to achieve positive relations in the region. Other liberal theories may also make 
the case that as Eastern Asia democratises, feelings of animosity are bound to decline. 
Others more cognisant of the importance of non-coercive power might also argue for 
the importance of “soft power” based on the transmission of culture in explaining 
Japan’s improved relations with Eastern Asia.54
Despite its claim to variety and intellectual nuance, liberalism in any form ultimately 
relies on explaining positive Japanese relations in Eastern Asia in terms of international 
economic exchange based on self-interested ‘absolute gains’. As such, liberals 
downplay the importance of ‘relative gains’ in the practice of international relations. 
Consequently, they fail to account for the growing anger directed at Tokyo as trade and 
investment links overwhelmingly favoured Japan from the 1960s to the 1970s, leading 
to Japanese growth rates of nearly 10 % during that period. Liberals neglect the 
importance of relative gains for post colonial states despite the importance of this factor 
as the raison d ’etre for the independence movement and the subsequent creation of 
“new” states. They therefore fail to appreciate how Japan might wield power 
responsibly in the context of regional demands for a post imperialist era of growth and 
prosperity in the post colonial periphery—a scenario that could properly account for 
Japan’s positive relations in Eastern Asia in the late 20th century. Crucially, liberals fail 
to understand the role of coercion and power in an anarchic setting, which cannot be 
mitigated by international institutions. This is because, in reality, hegemonic powers 
dominate these same international institutions (Strange 1982 & 1994). By ignoring the 
controlling and coercive side of hegemony and in assuming the consensual side, based 
on even minimum absolute gains, liberals altogether miss any deliberate normative 
exercise of Japanese power in international relations.
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Sub-section 1.2.1 provides a liberal account of Japan’s positive relations in Eastern Asia. 
Subsection 1.2.2 addresses the liberal claim of “perpetual peace” via commerce, in the 
context of increasing anti-Japanese feelings in Eastern Asia as Japan gained in relative 
terms. Subsection 1.2.3 examines the liberal neglect of both Japanese economic 
structural power and the importance of power in general.
1.2.1 A liberal account of Japan’s positive relations in Eastern Asia
Liberal ideas that could explain Japan’s improved relations in Eastern Asia are derived 
from Kant’s belief in the fundamental freedom of the individual, as stated in his 
Critique of Practical Reason (1788). Kant did not regard this freedom as the lawless 
freedom of anarchy, but rather as the freedom of self-government, the freedom to 
consciously obey the laws intrinsic to one’s nature as a rational being. Thus, in his essay 
Perpetual Peace (1795), Kant advocated the establishment of a world federation of 
republican states, which would all live in peace. However, Kant’s ideas did not gain full 
currency until Richard Cobden (1804—1865), the British economist and statesman 
known as the “Apostle of Free Trade,” promoted liberal ideas of international peace 
based on self-interest, implied in the concept of laissez-faire,55 Despite his contribution 
to empire, Cobden’s opposition to continuing imperial British foreign policy cost him 
his seat in Parliament in 1857, suggesting that while laissez-faire was useful for the 
industrialists seeking foreign markets, it was at odds with the coercive manner in which 
Britain rose as an imperial power by using its fleet to literally capture new markets.56 
Karl Polanyi (1944) later wrote on how this era of laissez-faire laid the foundation for 
world war, as other European powers sought to ‘catch up’ to Britain (List 1827, 1841 & 
1844). In spite of this negative prognosis regarding the consequences of liberal 
economics, in the 20th century laissez-faire has been promoted as a panacea in the work 
of those such as Milton Friedman, giving birth to many US-based policy advocacy 
institutions that eventually challenged the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the 
“embedded liberal” order (Ruggie 1996 & 2002). Though he did not overtly advocate a 
“perpetual peace,” Friedman did believe in the relationship between free trade and 
freedom, thereby making the common mistake of ignoring the realities of the power and 
agency of countries dissatisfied with the international system.57
For liberals the improvement in Japan’s relations in Eastern Asia is an illustration of 
liberalism gone global, yet another indication of the “end the history.” According to this
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perspective, with the increased international exchange of ideas, culture, and goods, and 
the rise of regional democratisation that has taken place, it was logical for Japan to 
develop better relations in Eastern Asia. Liberals would point out that following W W II 
Japan’s commercial relations were increasing, such that by the 1960s it had not only 
regained its share of the region’s market to pre-war levels, but had even exceeded these 
by pushing out Western competition.58 While Japan exported manufactured goods to the 
region, Eastern Asia exported raw materials to Japan—an interaction well explained by 
David Ricardo’s work on comparative advantage (Kojima 1971 & Belassa 1977). These 
exchanges for mutual gain were the basis for the liberal argument for a reduction of 
tensions in Eastern Asia, including in the case of relations between Japan and its 
wartime victims. Those liberals who consider democracies accepting of each other (i.e. 
as not having the drive to go to war with each other due to the veto effect of civil 
society) might see Japan’s positive relations as a result of increasing democratisation in 
Eastern Asia. If the these two liberal arguments fail, Keohane (1984) and the followers 
of neo-liberal institutionalism would argue that international institutions would mitigate 
Japan’s power to allow the pursuit of absolute gains commerce.
1.2.2 Liberal “perpetual peace” and the problem of power politics and hegemony
Liberalism fails to address Japan’s improved relations in Eastern Asia independent of 
the assumption that co-operation on the basis of mutual gains will lead to “perpetual 
peace.” Indeed, with increased post-war trade and social interaction between Japan and 
Eastern Asia, by the early 1970s anti-Japanese sentiments had grown rather than recede 
in the manner perdicted by liberal theories. Even as democracy gained ground early in 
the 1960s and 1970s criticism of Japan increased, leading to violence against Japanese 
property. With democracy regional demands for a better standard of living increased. 
Eastern Asians correctly perceived that Japan was benefiting relatively more from 
existing trade and investment links, while their own industrial sectors remained 
underdeveloped without adequate capital investment. Japan was especially criticised for 
its early post-war predilection for using the region both as a source of raw materials and 
a captive market for manufactures. Furthermore, it quickly become evident that the 
Japanese had a demonstrably higher standard of living compared to other Eastern 
Asians, who experienced only slow increases in their welfare. Thus the commerce of 
mutual gains did not translate into harmonious relations, as countries focused on relative
27
and fairer gains from international trade and investment in the region. The rise of 
democratisation in Eastern Asia allowed this criticism to spill out into open anger.
While continued co-operation in the form of trade and investment between Japan and its 
Asian neighbours from the 1950s through to present times could be explained in part by 
Liberal institutionalists such as Keohane (1984), the reality is that international 
institutions are an intervening variable at best. The neo-liberal institutional position 
minimizes the domination of international institutions by powerful countries. Keohane 
(1984) et al assume consent between disparate actors without considering the issues of 
power within the international institutions framing negotiations. This myopia is not 
surprising, as liberals tend to assume consent whenever choices are made, as suggested 
by the work of Dahl (1961). The work of Bachrach and Baratz (1962 & 1970), and 
especially Lukes (1974), suggests that this liberal neglect of power is rooted in the 
neglect of structural considerations. -
Most crucially, the rise of post-war anti-Japanese sentiment in Eastern Asia that 
culminated in violence against Japanese property in the region in the 1970s suggests 
that consent cannot be assumed to accompany mutual material gains from commerce. 
Liberal theory incorrectly assumes a priori that such exchanges are consensual, and 
therefore explains relations between colonial and post colonial states in benign terms. 
Liberals are unwilling to commit themselves to evaluating these historically exploitative 
relationships in terms of:
• the fairness of the international system, as capitalism has not distributed the 
gains from trade in the manner desired by post colonial states
• just compensation for the construction of this unequal system during colonialism 
and the Cold War
• the fear felt by post colonial societies seeking change when faced with modem 
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in the hands of post-imperial hegemonic 
powers who use them to horrific effect, as in Vietnam.
Given their failings, liberal theories must take into account two factors when addressing 
international relations in Eastern Asia:
(1) Power matters when engaging powerful nations: In Asia, international and 
regional institutions have risen after interaction between countries of disparate
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power. Asian institutions reflect this power, as they are built around a powerful 
actor, or continue with the blessing of one. When considering attempts at 
international/regional economic institution building such as Asia-Pacific 
Economic Co-operation (APEC), it should be noted that they would not have 
been possible without the presence of Japan. In support of APEC, former 
Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser noted that in a “world of trading 
blocks, there are only two options for small and medium-sized nations in Asia 
and the Pacific. They can go it alone or form a trading and economic association 
with Japan. This second option should be pursued vigorously.”59 In a similar 
vein, regionalisation within Eastern Asia via EAEC was advocated by Mahatir 
bin Mohammed, the Malaysian Prime Minister, to counter the threats posed by 
“fortress Europe” and the cosy North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). His vision of EAEC included Japan at the centre. Liberal 
institutionalists might point to small countries uniting to form new international 
institutions fostering “South-South” co-operation. However, this is only a partial 
solution, as post colonial societies must still depend on Japan or the US to 
enable economic rapid growth. Australian Prime Minister Fraser’s outright 
dismissal of the option that excludes Japan in any regional agreement is a clear 
indicator of how policymakers in even richer nations view such efforts.
(2) When international institutions do not matter: The independent role of 
international institutions is undermined by the absence of a correlation between 
signing major multilateral investment conventions and new foreign direct 
investment from the main providers—Europe, Japan and the US (See Table 1 
below). Singapore, for example, has signed only one major convention yet has 
managed to attract more investment than the Philippines or Sri Lanka, both 
signatories of all four major conventions. This lack of a positive relationship 
between the signing of conventions and investment flows is contrary to neo­
liberal institutional expectations, as powerful nations such as Japan will invest 
based on their specific objectives. Conventions and international regimes and 
organisations are important for smaller investors to safeguard investments. 
However, Japan, the leading investor in Asia, can worry less on this front, as any 
negative actions against Japanese capital, such as nationalisation, will only result 
in the decrease of investment in the host economy.
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TaM ^l^T^£e^^C hange^i^nvestm en^olic^i^sia^l97S^5
Country Unilateral declarations 
{’70s & ’80s} 
(pro-invstmnt.)[ttl ’90]
Recorded
bilateral
agreements60
’70s+’80s=
Multilateral accords 
effective in ’70s & 
80s61
Type of government, regime, institutional arrangement setting 
background for policymaking and implementation during the period.
Bangladesh {18} + )[25] 00 + 06 = 06 None Military dictatorship to fragile democracy
China {64} + )[66] 00 + 25 = 25 None Communist Party rule moving towards pragmatism
India {34} + )[38] 00 + 00 = 00 CREFAA Parliamentary democracy
Indonesia {29} + )[38] 04 + 00 = 04 All four Military rule
Malaysia {31} + )[31] 05 + 06= 11 ICSID, PCPP Single party rule with weak opposition parties
Pakistan {07} + )[07] 01+04 = 05 ICSID, MIGA Swings from fragile democracy to military dictatorship.
Philippines {17} + )[19] 01 + 03 = 04 All four. Dictatorship to fragile democracy
Singapore {15} + )[28] 06 + 02 = 08 ICSID Single party rule with weak opposition parties
South Korea {16} + )[17] 06 + 06 = 12 All four. Military dictatorship to fragile democracy
Sri Lanka {06} + )[07] 01 + 16 = 17 All four. Parliamentary to presidential democracy
Thailand {22} + )[26] 02 + 04 = 06 ICSID, CREFAA Monarchy to parliamentary to military rule?
Vietnam {07} + )[07] 00 + 00 = 00 None Socialist dictatorship moving towards pragmatism
Sources: World Investment Directory 1992—Asia and the Pacific, Volume 1 (New York: United Nations, 1992).
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Liberalism accepts at face value the post WW II relationship between post imperial and 
post colonial states as consensual rather acknowledge it as an object of inquiry in a 
world where benign relations are rare. This neglect of power together with a willingness 
to assume consent as implicit in transactions of mutual convenience ensures that liberal 
views are uncritical of international relations practice. It leaves them to explain Japan’s 
positive relations in Eastern Asia as a consequence of commerce mitigated by 
international institutions and further enhanced by global and local democratic processes. 
Since liberal assumptions take consent as a given in economic exchange, its proponents 
cannot address historical power politics, especially when dealing with relations between 
large and small entities with bitter histories, where issues of power and relative gains 
are most salient. Ultimately, the liberal omission of power relations makes it difficult to 
assess Japanese capitalism from the perspective of post colonial Eastern Asian states 
and to understand their desire to address the economic disparities between themselves 
and a post imperialist Japan.
1.2.3 The liberal neglect of Japanese economic structural power
Actors within international trade and finance comprehend Japan’s economic power well. 
The tripling of the value of the Japanese yen in relation to the US dollar over thirty 
years is one indication of this strength (see Chart 1).
Chart 1: Japanese Currency Appreciation: (JPY) vs. US dollar (USD)
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[Source: PACIFIC Exchange Rate Service, University of British Columbia.]
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This appreciation is an indication of the long-range trajectory of the strength of Japan’s
/ ' 'y
production structures and its emergence as a regional hegemon. Japan has enjoyed a 
pre-eminent position in international finance and economics since the 1970s, when its 
trade surpluses and returns from investments abroad began to accumulate. This strategic 
long-term assessment of Japan runs counter to short to medium-term economic 
indicators, such as the collapse of the Japanese stock market, the Nikkei, from its late 
1980s speculative “bubble.” Suggesting structural effects, this collapse was a harbinger 
of things to come later in the 1990s. With the strength of the yen, Japan’s external assets 
as a percentage o f nominal GDP (See Chart 2) grew from 20 % in the early 1980s to 
60 % by 2000.
Chart 2: External Assets and Liabilities
[
Source: Ministry of Finance.]
Japan’s net assets reached 20 % of GDP even when the economy was undergoing 
structural change, experiencing growth rates as low as 1-2 % between 1990 and 2000. 
Indeed, net assets have been on the increase in the late 1980s through the 1990s, as 
Japan’s investments abroad have meant the repatriation of profits not reinvested in the 
host economy or invested in another state.63 The rising trend of Japan’s net external 
assets presents a contrast to the stagnation of the Japanese economy, particularly in 
terms of the impact on other nations. These external assets suggest Japan’s financial 
structural power affects other states. Even after the decline from the heights of the late 
1980s, Japanese banks hold a significant portion of world assets. After a decade long
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economic crisis at the end of the 1990s, Japan can still claim over 25 % of the worlds’ 
banking assets. In Chart 3. we see the leading role of Japanese finance in the breakdown 
of international bank assets by nationality.64
Chart 3: International Bank Assets of Major States
[Source: Bank of International Settlements65]
The long-term salience of the financial structural power of Japan is indicated by private 
savings over 20 % through decades (Chart 4).66
Chart 4: Japanese Savings Investment Balance 1970-1997
Private in vestm en t  Private sa v in g s  * Private surplus eneral g o v t  def ic i t
[Source: Ministry of Finance.]
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The data suggests that Japan will continue to dominate the world financial system for 
some time. With the competition offered by Japan’s low interest rates, only mechanisms 
such as the Basle Accords, which set an 8 % capital reserve requirement, could prevent 
Japanese banks from dominating international finance.
However, there are troubling indicators that the Keynesian stimulus used in Japan since 
the end of the “bubble” economy in 1989 may well be overused, as long-term 
government debt has steadily grown to absorb savings.67 That is, Japanese government 
bonds (JGBs) soak up funds that might otherwise be available to finance development 
elsewhere. As Chart 5 shows, Japan’s gross debt has reached the level of Italy, at nearly 
120 % of GDP by the year 2000. However, the government’s major domestic creditors
/TO ___
hold more than 80 % of outstanding bonds. The long-term economic data still suggests 
that Japanese power is substantially greater than is commonly understood by those who 
refer to Japan’s “growth problem.”
Chart 5: Gross Debt G7 Nations
Japan 
-  France
Germany
_______
[Source: Ministry of Finance.]
While international economics tools allow us to recognise Japanese power within 
international political economy, liberal international relations specialists are unable to 
come to grips with such power. The liberal neglect of structural power in finance, and 
hence lack of interest in Japanese power, means that these scholars overlook concerns
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central to international relations. Proponents of liberalism do not adequately address the 
insecurity of post colonial states in their interactions with post-imperial states in the 
economic sphere, where power is exercised often and with impunity. Consequently, 
proponents of laissez-faire are unable to understand the relationship between post 
colonial states, and hegemonic or post-imperial states. Historically, powerful actors 
have been important in the international (or regional) economy: they have used coercion 
to promote specific ends, and even entire economic systems, such as capitalism. 
Adopting a liberal mode of analysis blinds us to the spread of capitalism in each stage 
of colonial hegemony: Holland in the 17th century, then Britain in the 18th and 19th 
centuries and the US in the 20th century (Helleiner 1991). Liberalism cannot address 
how British imperialism forced open foreign markets at a time when its fleet was the 
most powerful in the world. The Dutch and British coercively promoted forms of 
laissez-faire as it benefited them. The US case was similar, as it too used force to spread 
capitalism. The history of this forced spread of capitalism for the benefit of “core 
states” is neglected by liberal thinking. While post-imperial states’ geopolitical empires 
have indeed shrunk in terms of land, the legacy of their dominance is still felt today, as 
these countries wield power disproportionate to their size and enjoy living standards 
illegitimately gained from the fruits of empire.
In this historical context of imperial domination, late 20th century Japanese actions in 
Asia, specifically its acquiescence to some post colonial states’ demands, points to a 
need for a new understanding of international relations since Tokyo’s actions are not 
typical of how powerful nations behave. When investigating the relationship between 
Japan and post colonial states in Eastern Asia in the period after the 1980s, there are 
signs that power matters. It is, however, necessary to think about how it matters in a 
different way, and to consider how certain ways of wielding power may be less negative 
than generally realised. It is in considering precisely such issues that an explanation 
emerges for the improvement in Japan’s relations with Eastern Asia.
1.3.0 MISSING THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSENT TO POWER:
REALISM AS ONLY COERCION
Given the problems associated with Marxist and liberal approaches to international 
relations, it should not be surprising that realism tends to dominate the discourse on
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Eastern Asia. Indeed, Kang (2003) concurs that realism dominates the discourse to such 
an extent that challenging its explanatory power is unwise. For realists, who are 
concerned with power and the relative gains that affect it, the positively changed 
relations between Japan and Eastern Asia are uninteresting in and of themselves. Realist 
scholarship has instead focused on whether power for Tokyo has meant displacing one 
of the other major powers, the US or China, and what this has meant for the US-Japan 
or nichibei alliance.69 Thus when realists are pressed to explain Japan’s positively 
changed relations with the post colonial states of Eastern Asia, they argue that without 
the US, Japan would never have been welcomed back into Asia. They then point to the 
increasing threat presented by China in the region as a cause for improved relations with 
Japan. They argue that “balancing power” to contain China is the most important aspect 
of regional order, and leads to post colonial states “band-wagoning” with the US and 
Japan. In subscribing to this view, realists ignore the domestic origins of Japan’s 
positive relations in Eastern Asia. Under the circumstances, they miss the significance 
of domestic norm-governed policy, and also reactive Japanese policy towards post 
colonial Eastern Asian states’ demands.
Subsection 1.3.1 presents the most plausible realist perspective for understanding 
Japan’s positive relations in Eastern Asia: the notion of balancing power against a 
Chinese threat. Subsection 1.3.2 demonstrates the problems with modem, especially 
North American realism’s research based on negative assumptions about human nature. 
Subsection 1.3.3 makes the case that Japan’s positively changed relations with Eastern 
Asia are a puzzle for realist thinking, which is typically confined to power politics.
1.3.1 Playing the China card: ignoring a changed Japan
The growth of Chinese power is of great importance for regional security in Eastern 
Asia. Since WW II, China has warred with Western allies in Korea and India, and had 
several skirmishes with Vietnam. Recently, China has occupied islands in the Spratlys, 
which are also claimed by a number of ASEAN nations, and threatens to use military 
force to gain control of Taiwan.70 These events took place while Beijing used force 
within the territorial boundaries under its control, as with the ongoing tragedy of Tibet 
since 1950 and the Uighur unrest in Xinjiang. Beijing is also cognisant of the desires of 
Mongolians from Inner Mongolia (which is under Chinese control) for re-unification 
with Mongolia proper. There is also doubt over Beijing’s desire to assist rapprochement
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between the Koreas.71 One can speculate that without China, the despotic regime in 
Pyongyang might have collapsed sooner, well before it posed a nuclear threat to the 
region. Beyond this, Western powers argue that Beijing’s sales of nuclear and missile 
technology to the Middle East and Pakistan represent a violation of non-proliferation 
norms.
Realists insist that Japan’s role in Eastern Asia must be seen in terms o f its contribution 
to balancing Chinese power, thus reducing positive relations between Japan and Eastern 
Asia to a matter o f strategic convenience.72 China’s militarism together with its large 
military and economy and presence as a permanent seat on the UN Security Council 
makes it formidable. Furthermore, realists frequently point to the professional fighting 
force that was one of the “four modernisations” Deng Xiaoping implemented when he 
came to power in 1978.73 The Dengist reforms have placed emphasis on modernisation 
and the construction of the Chinese navy and air force, in particular with new 
technology and quick-strike forces that have regional reach. To confirm this shift in 
policy since the Tiananmen Square crackdown of 1989, realist methods highlight that 
Beijing has increased spending on modem weaponry. Military spending (see Chart 6) 
has increased in tandem with economic growth, strongly suggesting that over the 
medium to long term China will evolve into a power second perhaps only to the US.
Chart 6: China: Defence Spending 1983-2000
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Almost mirroring Japan’s 1 % of GDP ceiling on defence spending, in the 1990s China 
has lowered its spending to less than 1.5 % of GDP (See Chart 7). However, given the 
low cost of personnel compared to Japan, and also given the rapid growth of its GDP, 
there is a real increase in Chinese military spending as suggested by Chart 6. This figure 
is, however, criticized as being too low, given the lack of transparency of Chinese data. 
Even with conservative estimates, it is the Yuan value increase accompanied by the 
modernisation of military capabilities that concerns realists.74
Chart 7: China—Defence as Portion of GDP
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The re-emergence of China at the “centre of the world” is perhaps too strong a 
conclusion to endorse. Nonetheless, barring its disintegration, the world’s most 
populous country will likely play the pivotal role in Eastern Asia in the 21st century, 
displacing Japanese power of the 20th century. The 55 million Chinese overseas, who 
form one of the world's great economic engines, will be part of this effort as they pull 
China into modernity. As the Economist notes,
however distressing China's politics have been, overseas Chinese have 
always felt the cultural and linguistic pull o f the Middle Kingdom. ‘The 
family spirit elevated to national scale’ is how one Hong Kong businessman 
puts it. Deng Xiaoping has managed to cultivate this spirit among the 
overseas Chinese, and it has already borne much fruit in the form of 
universities, hospitals, and high-risk investments provided for the mainland 
by overseas-Chinese businessmen.75
Deng's reforms enabled China to achieve high rates of economic growth over two 
decades. For liberals, this suggests a desire for integration into the world, rather than its
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domination, given that these reforms have been very dependent on foreign trade and 
investment as engines of development.76 Realists, however, would be alarmed that 
Western and Japanese firms can only watch as the overseas Chinese exploit their 
contacts to secure the safest and most lucrative of opportunities. As the Economist notes, 
on average, the overseas Chinese population’s return on investment is four times higher 
than those in Southeast Asia.
Many realists are particularly concerned with the emerging pattern of trade, as China is 
gaining relatively more than the US.77 For realists such as Gilpin (1989), who are 
concerned with preserving US power, the relative gains made by China—the 
competitor—should be more worrying than those gains made by allies Germany and 
Japan. From a near balance on its trade account in 1983, when it had just begun to trade 
with the US, China achieved a surplus of $80 billion in 2000. China’s trading gains 
came directly as a result of its surplus with the US. (See Chart 8).
Chart 8: China—Exports, Import and Trade Balance 1983-2000
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Given the threat China poses to US interests as well as those of smaller Eastern Asian 
countries, realists would argue that Japan’s positively changed relations in the region 
are a result of balancing Chinese encroachment. For realists, the focus on the Chinese 
threat, especially in the strategic South China Sea in which the Spratly Isles lie, means 
that Eastern Asian countries have an interest in containing Beijing and thus making 
common cause with Japan. However, the realist view can only assume that Japan’s
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changed relations are mainly based on the Chinese threat, in part because they have no 
theoretical means to address the phenomenon of positively changed Japanese relations 
in themselves, independent of the balance of power. This realist oversight is confirmed 
if one stops to consider that the Chinese threat was more significant from the 1950s to 
the 1970s when an activist Beijing government attempted to spread Maoism via armed 
means that included support for Pol Pot’s genocide, and prior to that, the occupation of 
Tibet and support for insurgencies in Southeast Asia. At that time, rather than band- 
wagoning with Japan in a classic balance of power game, Eastern Asian governments 
remained highly suspicious of Tokyo. With Japanese firms rapidly expanding their 
presence in the region after the 1950s, and former Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) 
soldiers returning in brand-new business suits, there was sufficient anti-Japanese 
sentiment to provoke attacks on Japanese property in the region (Constantino 1989).
1.3.2 Why North American realism fails: problems with universal coercion
Realism, especially in its North American incarnation, explains the conducive strategic 
environment for improved relations between Japan and post colonial Eastern Asia. 
Realism cannot, however, explain why relations improved at a particular point in 
history or suggest which mechanisms drove the process. This apparent void is typically 
filled by assumptions of state behaviour based on further assumptions about human 
behaviour. The first problem with such assumptions is the transition from the individual 
to the state level of analysis without adequate justification. This leads realists to assume 
that state behaviour can be modelled on human behaviour, a conclusion that is highly 
problematic. This faulty assumption is further compounded when realists rely on a 
pessimistic understanding of human nature, as articulated by Thomas Hobbes, in a 
chapter titled “Of the NATURALL CONDITION OF MANKIND, as concerning their 
Felicity, and Misery.” As Hobbes noted:
... in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrell. First,
Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory. The first, maketh men 
invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third, for Reputation. The 
first use Violence, to make themselves Masters of other mens persons, wives,
children, and cattell; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a 
word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, either 
direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in their Kindred, their Friends, their 
Nation, their Profession, or their Name. (Hobbes 1662:62)
Hobbes denied people are naturally social beings, and instead argued that they are all 
“basically selfish” and are motivated primarily by a desire for power and “fear of
others,” such that the state of nature is a state of war. Thus, without an all-powerful
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sovereign to rule them, their lives would be “poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” These 
pseudo-scientific rationalisations of human behaviour are based on but one particular 
culture at a single point in time. Clearly, Hobbes (1666) was influenced by the 
anarchical developments of his own day, particularly the English civil war. He was, 
moreover, influenced by the new system of physics devised by Galileo and others, 
concluding from their investigations that only matter exists, and that everything that 
happens can be predicted in accordance with exact, scientific laws.
Realist international relations scholars borrow Hobbes’ (1666) pessimistic idea of 
human nature based on selfishness and power-seeking behaviour and apply this 
individual level of analysis to the state level, thereby committing similar pseudo­
scientific mistakes. Too many of these scholars argue that states are ultimately in 
competition with each other, and are willing to use coercion to achieve their ends. North 
American realists in particular, utilise aspects of Machiavelli’s (1515) work to advocate 
the importance of coercion, which is a contrast to the realism of Carr (1939), whose 
analysis of the punitive sanctions on Germany following WW I showed that it was 
necessary to understood the interests of “the other”, especially in terms of their 
perceptions of right and wrong.
Indeed, a clear reading of Machiavelli’s talented prince suggests that he resorted to 
consent as the modus operandi with coercion a last resort. In the immediate post-WW 
II era, Realist scholars did attempt to understand war better. In Man. the State, and War 
(1954), Kenneth N. Waltz made one of the most important contributions to realism, 
arguing that while the “third image” describes the framework of world politics, without 
the “first” and “second images,” there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine 
policy. As such, the “first” and “second images” describe the forces in world politics, 
but without the “third image” it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their 
results. This excellent early view was driven by an appreciation of the costs of war, and 
it reflected a desire to put an end to it. Unfortunately, the explorations of the second and 
third images have not been thorough enough to truly understand the roots of conflict. 
With the Cold War, pessimists saw a world of “war of all against all,” and so 
Morganthau (1956) argued that peace is never a permanent feature of the international 
system. In his work he drew upon the views of both Hobbes (1666) and Machiavelli 
(1515), presenting man as pursuing only self-interest and self-preservation. This view of
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realism was to become the dominant strand among North American realists in the field 
of international relations. So much so that, by the late 1970s, security and the “national 
interest” had become synonymous. Krasner’s (1978) unconvincing advocacy of a 
“national interest,” which is essential to make the realist case at the international level, 
is based on the idea of an anthropomorphic state able to pursue interests despite the 
preferences of even the most powerful local actors, such as oil firms. Waltz’s (1979) 
work, which attempted to systematise realism, would not have been possible without 
anthropomorphosising the state and attributing to it Hobbesian proclivities. As Justin 
Rosenberg (1994) notes, these views miss that states can be seen as parts of the ‘empire 
of civil society’ within which they originated and on which they depend.
North American realists offer parsimonious narratives of international relations with an 
eye to providing prescriptions grounded in US interests. However, this apparent 
parsimony is constructed through a narrow and selective reading of history that extends 
to sanitizing the history behind the creation of their own state from the spaces inhabited 
by others. Such scholars are therefore unable to address the reality that their 
international relations have centred upon the construction of a modem empire that has 
met with resistance. North American realism has thus been pseudo-scientific, and thus 
similar to Hobbes’ understanding of the world and party to his failure to comprehend 
both the roots of conflict and the possibility of peace. This is not to deny realism all 
explanatory power, but rather to argue that realism, especially in its North American 
guise, is limited to questions of power politics of how the US can dominate, offering a 
deterministic agenda in which a just peace can never be imagined.
The practice of realism in statecraft, i.e., the use of Morgenthau (1956), now in its sixth 
edition, to teach diplomacy, and indeed the entire idea of teaching diplomats a particular 
selective history, can leave us with no acceptable balance between praxis and social 
“science.” With no actual moral or normative ends to pursue, even with careful 
reasoning, realism becomes practice. This is evident when we consider how North 
American realists’ selective readings of European military history have influenced the 
central assumptions in their theory of international relations. This type of work 
unscientifically neglects consensual relations and castes long periods of peaceful 
exchange as being merely anomalous. In this manner, North American realists have 
over-emphasised coercive relations to the point of excluding notions of consent in
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relations between hegemonic powers and post colonial states. Arguably, realism as 
parlayed by US scholars is a self-perpetuating cycle of fear. They refuse to understand 
the possibility of progress, and the importance of “the other” in fostering stability and 
peace. While it may be useful in the face of a real threat, when confirmed by valid 
intelligence, this perspective risks fostering new fears on the basis of imagined threats, 
leaving us in the dystopia of perpetual fear.
When the realist position is extended to include the world, the neglect of consent as well 
as periods of peace becomes even more questionable. Realists ignore the reality that 
democratic societies have a tendency to assert forms of veto over the costs of going to
70war too easily, particularly with other democracies. As such, realism ignores the social
thorigins of a state’s foreign policy, when in the late 20 century these origins are 
important given the veto power that civilians, particularly women, have over issues of 
war. Realists are hard pressed to explain how Japan has for the past 20 years resisted 
US pressure to fully rearm, so as to take up a greater burden of the defence of Eastern 
Asia in the way that Germany has done in Europe. As Thomas Berger (1996) argues,
rather than seeking to become great powers in an increasingly multipolar 
world, Germany and Japan seem to be doing almost the precise opposite—  
clinging to a small power role that they have arguably outgrown. Nowhere 
was the persistence of German and Japanese anti-military sentiments more 
plainly evident than during the 1991-1992 Iraq war. Despite massive 
diplomatic pressure from the United States, and although their foreign policy 
establishments believed that a decisive show of military support was 
necessary, the Kohl and Kaifu governments seemed almost paralysed by the 
events of the Gulf. In the end, the two countries did furnish impressive sums 
of financial aid, but domestic political pressures prevented them from 
sending even token military forces to the region. Not only did Germany and 
Japan fail to take a more activist international security role in the Gulf, but 
they damaged their credibility with their major allies.80
Since the Gulf War, after much internal debate and pressure from the US, Germany and 
Japan have slowly begun to remove legal barriers to increased participation in 
international peacekeeping. Germany’s defence spending was robust over the course of 
the Cold War. Japan’s military spending is considerable (1 % of the world’s second 
largest GDP makes it so). However, from there the comparison deviates. While 
Germany did, as Berger notes, refuse a role in the Gulf War, it has nevertheless re- 
emerged as the key Western European power in military terms, while Japan has refused 
a similar role in Eastern Asia. Arguably, the post-Cold War German policy of insistence 
upon recognising Slovenia was not exactly benign, as it helped to initiate the bloody 
break-up of Yugoslavia. When the opportunity presented itself, the Luftwaffe dropped
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lethal munitions on its old enemy Serbia with little hesitation. In contrast, Japan has 
stayed out of such problems of state disintegration, as with the recreation of a colonially
01
imagined East Timor from the larger imagination that is modem Indonesia. 
Significantly, the Japanese have yet to shoot in self-defence in their peacekeeping 
missions. Yet, relentless US pressure will likely push Japan into situations of armed 
conflict in the future, but only very reluctantly, as the debate over the possibility of 
deployment to Iraq in 2003 has shown.
1.3.3 A realist puzzle: integrating with a re-arming formerly belligerent power
Realists believe the US-Japan relationship to be fragile, as Japan has gained relatively 
more than the US over most of the post-war era.82 While most fears have so far proven 
to be unfounded, from a realist perspective the behaviour of Eastern Asian nations in
o o
developing closer interdependent ties with Japan would be somewhat puzzling. 
According to these scholars, during periods of peace states are supposed to prepare for 
war and are fearful when their neighbours are arming, especially when re-arming after 
losing a war, as with Japan. Therefore, realists should perceive a Japanese threat that 
Eastern Asians would do well to be wary of, and thus be extremely conscious of 
balancing. Yet, operationally, Japanese presence has not been resisted. Could it be then, 
as some realists insist, that “alliance” politics, led by the US, made Japan a “new ally” 
of the Eastern Asian states facing the Chinese threat? Indeed, this scenario is close to 
what occurred during the early stages of the Cold War, when Tokyo was swiftly 
rehabilitated in order to play its part against Bolshevism. However, these actions alone 
cannot adequately account for Japan’s positively changed relations in Eastern Asia. One 
might indeed see a US-chaperoned re-introduction in the immediate post-war period 
between 1951 and 1964, the subsequent course of which, especially in the post-1980s 
era, can only be understood by delving deeper into the complexities of this relationship.
Understanding Japan’s positively changed relations from the early 1980s onwards is 
thus cmcial to the further theoretical development of international relations. As Japan 
has built up its armed forces, gradually extending its reach with alliance-based 
responsibilities, the region’s post colonial states have officially voiced their concerns 
somewhat mutedly. Significantly, this rhetoric has not been supported by meaningful 
actions. Indeed, after some consideration, Eastern Asian governments have instead 
endorsed the Japanese actions, with opposition only coming from right-wing sources.
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Confirmation of Japan’s positive relations in the region came in 1997/1998, at the peak 
of the regional crisis, when the most volatile of countries—Indonesia—turned anti- 
Chinese (as it had during anti-communist purges in the 1950s), but not anti-Japanese. 
As the economic crisis of 1997/98 worsened in Thailand, Malaysia and South Korea, 
some even turned anti-Western, but again not anti-Japanese.
While realists have done well to place power at the centre of analysis in international 
relations, they find it difficult to provide a rich picture of Eastern Asian dynamism as 
domestic politics is “black boxed.” Thus, in the 1990s, realists lose credibility when 
they explain positive Japanese-Eastern Asian relations as a consequence of a Chinese 
threat. In reality, despite the rhetoric sponsored by interested parties, self-appointed 
experts on Japan, and sensationalist newspapers in Asia and the West, concern about 
Japan’s militarism has faded despite the increased military capabilities it has accrued. 
As Alagappa (2001) argues, the region has moved away from confrontation to forms of 
diplomacy and even co-operation. These changes have gone so far that defence analysts 
have now begun to consider how Japan might help police the region, or how Japan 
might join the UN Security Council as a permanent member.84 Indeed, as will be 
discussed later chapter, over the past decade Japan has been under increasing pressure 
to participate and make sacrifices militarily to maintain international order. Despite the 
rhetoric of “being suspicious of Japanese intentions,” more and more Asian states have 
opened themselves to Japan in areas of security co-operation at the “highest level.”85 
The question remains, how and why?
Conclusion: ASSESSING JAPAN’S RELATIONS IN EASTERN ASIA: 
CONSIDERING THE LEGITIMATION OF HEGEMONY
Failure to address questions about Japan’s improved relations in Eastern Asia would no 
doubt result in researchers spending a great deal of time debating the nature of Japan’s 
“normal” role. Indeed the likelihood is that left unchallenged, “normality” might well 
be imposed on Japan by the discipline of international relations itself. By advocating 
that Japan rearm to their specification and thus become “normal,” “realists” might well 
risk destroying a peaceful international order in Eastern Asia. Should this happen, we 
will surely see more works on Japan informing us that peace is only possible through 
preparation for war. Such work would neglect a separate reality—namely, that peace
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can be won by addressing historical grievances, especially of the material kind. 
Fortunately we can imagine this separate reality without Don Juan and the influence of 
peyote: as Carlos Casteneda (1971: 16-17) discovered, “Looking” refers to the ordinary 
way in which we are accustomed to perceive the world, while “seeing” entails a very 
complex process by virtue of which a man of knowledge allegedly perceives the 
“essence” of the things of the world. While it will need a philosophical treatise to 
connect seeing with understanding, it is acceptable to merely suggest that we will need 
to adapt a more hermeneutic method to explore hegemonic power at the international 
level in terms of the conditions needed for its legitimation.
Why have post colonial states in Eastern Asia improved their relations with Japan in the 
late 20th century? Arguably, explaining or understanding the positive change in Japan’s 
relations in the region in the post-1980s world compared to the 1951-71 period involves 
challenging the dominant theories in international relations. Various strands of 
liberalism, Marxism, and realism view international relations that do not fit their 
respective moulds with unrelenting scepticism, pitting international relations theorists 
against each other, yielding a most unfruitful result. Upon closer examination, it 
becomes clear that Japan’s positively changed relations in Eastern Asia only fit in with 
parts of each pillar, thus allowing each to claim some explanatory power. However, the 
assumptions of these mainstream theories lead to deterministic conclusions of either 
eternal coercion/manipulation by realists and Marxists, or mutual consent leading to 
perpetual peace by liberals. Hence, in order to be methodologically independent of 
assumptions concerning meaning, international relations theorists must emphasise both 
coercion-manipulation and consent as possible outcomes. They must also be amenable 
to empirical verification, as suggested by Habermas (1992) in his debate with Popper.
The most fruitful path to explain and understand Japan’s positively changed relations in 
Eastern Asia is to challenge the deterministic assumptions of coercion/manipulation in 
realism/Marxism and those of consent inherent in liberalism. This can be accomplished 
by seeking theory that offers criteria against which these assumptions can be tested. In 
this regard, the work of both Gramsci (1937) and Habermas (1976) is particularly useful. 
The Gramscian (1937) notion of “hegemony” was originally developed to understand 
why revolution did not overwhelm Western liberal capitalist nations, thus giving 
insights on consent. The Habermasian (1976) problem of a “legitimation crisis”
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involved an attempt to understand the weakness of consent in these same liberal 
capitalist states after the withering away of the welfare state promoted a world of 
growing inequity once again. When “hegemony,” which is constituted with 
coercion/manipulation and consent, is considered together with “legitimation crisis,” it 
is clear that we are in an environment in which the need for constant validation of 
power is a dynamic path closer to reality. This path enables us to draw on the work of 
two of the most important thinkers of the 20th century in an attempt to understand the 
international order, though with certain caveats as the domestic and international are 
different levels of analysis with different assumptions. For research on the causes of 
Japan’s positively improved relations with its neighbours, such a path suggests more 
valuable insights than do the partial views provided by the three pillars and their sub­
theories.
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Chapter 2
Understanding Power Normatively in the International System: Legitimation of 
Hegemony via the Metaphorical Notion of Public Goods’
With trade flows not benefiting post colonial states, Susan Strange (1950) warned of the 
widening gap between the poor and the rich. Compared to the efforts to re-build and 
integrate Europe, post colonial states’ calls for aid to spur their development—the 
raison d'etre for their independence—have met deaf ears. The demands of the G77 
have largely been ignored by wealthy nations, and are the responsibility of weak 
international organisations such as the UNDP. Where pledges have been made—for 
example, the 0.7 % of GDP for development aid—they have not been implemented. In 
this context, relations between the rich and poor have consistently worsened (Frank 
1969, Amin 1985a & 1985b, and Frank & Gills 1993). In Asia, however, post colonial 
states have viewed their common colonial power, Japan, with decreasing hostility from 
the 1980s onwards. Despite anti-Japanese rhetoric, states in the Eastern Asian region— 
barring China and North Korea—have drawn closer to Japan than could ever have been 
imagined at the San Francisco peace conference of 1951. From Indonesia in the 
Southwest to South Korea in the Northeast, these countries enjoy close relations with 
Tokyo, with leaders going so far as to suggest “looking East.” How did such relations 
improve, despite Japan’s imperial past, and regional hegemonic present?
To answer the question of improved relations in general, one might look to international 
relations theory. However, the discipline focuses on powerful states and their objectives, 
paying little attention to how to improve relations with post colonial states and societies. 
In light of the assumption driven theoretical impasse described in Chapter 1, the closest 
scholars have come to fully accounting for the relationships between the most powerful 
states and weaker ones, is through using the language of hegemony. In employing the 
language of hegemony, leading scholars have emphasised verified coercion (Gilpin 
1987), verified manipulation (Cox 1987), and unverified consent (Keohane 1984). 
Disagreements between scholars, who rarely engage each other as we saw in Keohane 
(1985b), show us that verification of consent is a non-issue. This leaves us with two 
crucial questions for international relations. Firstly, without a theory verifying consent, 
how can one begin to interpret facts that might show it? Secondly, without a stringent 
set of standards for verifying consent, how can one be certain it is not merely
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manipulation? If the idea of hegemony in international relations is to be theoretically 
useful, it must show us when, where, how and why power is used with constraint. This 
will allow us to explore cases of improved relations between a former colonial/imperial 
power and its historical victims, as with Japan and Eastern Asia, contributing to the 
development of a discipline more focused on ending war.
While international relations theorists consider hegemony by referring to classical texts, 
only Gramsci (1937) delivers a total work on this concept which provides reasons for 
consent, or following “leaders.” Hence, a better understanding of hegemony, and 
especially its more precise deployment at the international level, is required. In 
considering this, it is clear that the intellectual domination that Gramsci (1937) argued 
underpinned hegemony at the domestic level does not exist at the international level—at 
least in so far as post colonial states and societies are concerned, as shown by the 
emergence of the G20, anti-globalisation movements and even terror networks. Given 
the vehement quarrel over wealth disparities, it becomes necessary to focus even more 
on the material aspects of hegemony from the perspective of post colonial states without 
falling into the determinism of Marx (1873). One starting point would be to make 
hegemony a function of relative material gains (and losses) by post colonial states, 
which requires us to move beyond Gramsci’s (1937) domestic level work, and in this, 
Habermas’s (1976) insights suggest that for hegemony to be legitimated, historical post 
colonial demands for narrowing the material gap have to be met.
In what follows, section 2.1.0 explores Gramsci’s (1937) work on hegemony, showing 
that in addition to intellectual domination and leadership, he saw consent and 
democracy could be verified in capitalist societies when the working classes gain 
materially, thereby suggesting Habermasian (1976) legitimation for the provision of 
‘public goods’ by powerful actors. Section 2.2.0 suggests such metaphorically idealised 
goods are a result of collective action failure (Olsen 1971), and then considers how 
liberalism misses that public goods benefit the bourgeoisie, thus requiring critical focus 
on legitimation. Section 2.3.0 shows that by combining the insights of Gramsci (1937) 
and Habermas (1976), legitimation of hegemony can be understood to be at the core of 
why powerful actors provide ‘global public goods,’ suggesting the crucial basis for 
improved relations between the powerful and the less powerful.
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2.1.0 NON-DETERMEVISTIC HEGEMONY:
GRAMSCI’S CRITICAL CONSENT AND COERCION
As Fontana (1993:206) notes, in Aristotle, and in contemporary Greek political 
understanding and practice, a “hegemon” was seen as a ruler whose power is based on 
the interests and consent of those over whom power is exercised. If the hegemon is a 
state, the resulting political structure is a system in which the hegemonic state exercises 
leadership over consenting states. However, in international relations research, scholars 
find hegemony can mean leadership with emphasis on coercion (Gilpin 1987) or the 
ability to manipulate via control of production and ideology (Cox 1987, Gill 1990 & 
Gill, et al 1993) on one hand, and benign forms of “leadership” and “authority” 
(Keohane 1984, Sato 1992 & 1996a & Cox 2001) on the other. Barring Cox (1983 & 
1987), Gill (1990) and Gill, et al (1993), the use of hegemony is bereft of any reading of 
socio-political theory concerning hegemony.87 However, Germain and Kenny (1998:3) 
convincingly conclude that even Cox (1983) and Gill (1993) have not paid attention to 
the great depth of the debate on Gramsci (1937):
Our principal conclusions are that the Italian school’s appropriation of 
Gramsci is far more conceptually problematic than they acknowledge, and 
that their use of his framework is difficult to sustain with respect to the 
scholarship devoted to his ideas.
For Germain and Kenny (1998:4) the principle reasons for the failure of the one “IR” 
attempt at using hegemony is rooted in three core questions:
(1) whether the reading of Gramsci on which this appropriation rests 
actually constitutes a viable interpretation of his work;
(2) whether his key concepts (from an IR point of view) can be 
‘internationalized’ in quite the way that the new Gramscians propose; 
and
(3) whether his concepts are fully adequate to comprehend the nature of 
social order in the contemporary period.
Certainly determinism ought not be part of any reading of Gramsci. Intellectual 
domination does not work well at the international level, and it is also clear that 
hegemony alone cannot describe the nature of the social order we are in, including the 
relationship between those in power and those without. In order to use hegemony, these 
fundamental questions have to be addressed.
However, we must allow for differences in interpreting Gramsci, a position that Cox 
(1983) and Gill, et al (1993) might take in their own defence. When it comes to 
Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, there are, as Fontana (1993: 1-3) notes, a plethora of
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“antagonistic” views. Typically, these views tend to adhere to one of roughly three 
schools:
(1) The orthodox Leninist School: Gramsci is seen as a Leninist who translates 
Bolshevik experience in Russia according to the conditions present in Italy. 
In effect this school equates Gramsci’s “egemonia” with Lenin’s 
(1917/1937) dictatorship of the proletariat.
(2) The anti-Marxist writers: Gramsci’s hegemony is seen as an all- 
encompassing conception of the world, and thus as a typical example of 
Marxist totalitarianism.
(3) The original Gramsci school: Gramsci’s work is seen as an original 
contribution to Marxist revolutionary thought. This school stresses 
hegemony as the moment of consent and moral-intellectual leadership while 
not de-emphasising or neglecting the moment of force or domination.
This dissertation begins to develop hegemony for the international level with the 
“original” Gramsci (1937) as a point of departure. It uses the concept to overcome 
deterministic analysis while not relying on his ideas of intellectual domination, thus 
allowing the concept of hegemony to cross of levels of analysis into the international. 
Leaving intellectual domination to domestic politics and ensuring a non-deterministic 
analysis, this work focuses instead on Gramsci’s work on how coercion and consent 
were built into the concept in such a way that either outcome was possible depending 
on the material conditions of the working classes. It then proposes to substitute 
Gramsci’s description of democracy at the domestic level with a more generic notion of 
legitimation first discussed by Weber (1968), but modified by Habermas (1976) to 
describe situations of consent, in order to move to the international level.88
Subsection 2.1.1 shows how Gramscian hegemony is contested, but still utilised more 
or less without means to either verify or falsify a more coercive or a more consensual 
type of hegemony. Subsequently, subsection 2.1.2 counters deterministic interpretations 
and uses of hegemony. It considers how Gramsci himself was interested in a method 
allowing falsification, and thus developed “hegemony” to include mutually falsifiable 
elements of coercion and consent, while also showing that to indicate its nature he 
qualified hegemony with the presence of democracy (or lack thereof). Subsection 2.1.3 
moves the debate to the international level, proposing that consent is essential for
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hegemonic states in the process of legitimation of power and must be understood 
theoretically and empirically in terms of relative material gains for post colonial states, 
rather than as reflected by formal elections, polls or surveys due to the possibility that 
these can be manipulated.
2.1.1 The original Gramsci: coercion and consent to be verified
Written in 1937, the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci remains to date the single 
most important work written on the notion of hegemony, making it essential for social 
scientists to refer to this text if they are to use the term. In prison, Gramsci (1937) 
puzzled over why liberal capitalist societies did not undergo revolution as predicted by 
Marx (1873). To address the nature of the capitalist system and the emergence of liberal 
democracies in the West, Gramsci developed Machiavelli’s idea of egemonia (Fontana 
1993). Thus the “original Gramsci school” allows us to be sensitive to data on coercion 
and consent. Hegemony specifically included coercion/manipulation and consent in 
order to provide the tools to assess relations between the hegemon and governed groups 
in terms of the degree of coercion and consent present, making it possible to conclude 
how much of each constitutes hegemony in a particular system.
While coercion is often clear enough, the issue of consent is not easy to understand once 
we get around to the task. For many critical scholars, consent is always manipulated 
and/or shaped by institutions captured by the powerful. In this vein, Holub (1992) 
argues that Gramsci saw the perpetuation of a predominant class through its control of 
the institutions of society:
The powers of a predominant class transcend the limits of what he calls the 
state or political society by extending to society at large, to civil society with 
its institutions schools, churches and the press, with its cultural organisations 
directing collective events and practices such as sports, theatre, leisure time 
and so forth. A predominant class produces and maintains power or, as 
Gramsci calls it, hegemony, via civil society, where a set of ideological 
practices guarantees the status quo anchored in political society, ultimately 
legitimising certain economic practices (Holub 1992:103). [My emphasis.]
Thus for Holub, legitimation, in which some consent is implicit, is based on a form of 
manipulation; it is manufactured in the way Noam Chomsky famously argues.89 
Holub’s reading does not show that Gramsci also allowed the understanding of consent 
in terms of agency by reasonably well-informed human communities in democracies. 
Gramsci did not ignore agency theoretically and a priori, instead leaving empirical 
research to verify the nature of hegemony and agency. Thus, in contrast to the original
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Gramsci school, Holub’s approach to hegemony exemplifies regression into the very 
Marxist determinism that the famous Italian prisoner fought to avoid. In this, Holub 
fails to adequately recognise at least two crucial factors in Gramsci’s work:
(1) The possibility of mobility between classes: Gramsci notes that disaffected 
classes would choose a system allowing them mobility over one in which the 
ruling classes are rigidly in place;
(2) Gramsci’s own organic nationalism: He was specifically interested in the 
emergence of an Italian socialism, which for him is organic, leading to his 
republican bent, beyond self-interest alone.
Both of these factors play a crucial role in Gramsci’s thought in terms of refuting 
determinism and reasserting the agency of the working classes, as well as pointing to 
how classes develop national sentiments through rites of entitlement, such as taking 
personal risk and going to war. In contrast, a deterministic view of hegemony leaves us 
with manufactured or socialised consent, or a variant of this argument at different levels 
of analysis. Aside from not taking choice or agency seriously enough, such determinism 
runs counter to the researcher’s obligation to deal with Popperian falsification at the 
extreme, or more reasonably, the Habermasian (1987, 1996) verification implicit in 
Gramsci’s (1937) method from the beginning, when he attempted to understand the 
falsification of Marx’s (1863) predicted revolution.
2.1.2 Non-determinism and critical thought: the importance of verification
Deterministic work is often a result of an inability to build a system of falsification or 
verification into one’s research. It promotes a limited vision of human agency, leaving 
us with no means to study social processes other than to either describe them or justify 
them with mechanical post hoc reasoning that seems very convincing, but which 
crumbles under careful scrutiny. Thus theorists or social scientists who are interested in 
agency and other possible outcomes suggested by counterfactuals, common sense, 
intuition, etc., must use methods that are non-deterministic, such that veins of theory 
extend deeper into society and its contradictions. In this vein, it is useful to understand 
some of the methodological points made by Gramsci (1937) and Habermas (1981) 
which present a contrast to the conclusions of Karl Popper (1935).
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In Gramsci’s method, hegemony was developed as a theoretically rich term to deal with 
the weakness of what he saw as determinist Marxism. With the use of consent as a 
possibility along with coercion, Gramsci allowed for the falsification of Marx’s 
prediction of impending revolution as discussed in his main works, including the widely 
read Communist Manifesto.90 Gramsci notes:
The methodological criterion on which our own study must be based is the 
following: that the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, 
as “domination” and as “intellectual and moral leadership.” A social group 
dominates antagonistic groups, which tends to “liquidate,” or to subjugate 
perhaps even by armed force; it leads to kindred and allied groups. A social 
group can, and indeed must, already exercise “leadership” before winning 
governmental power (this indeed is one o f the principal conditions for the 
winning of such power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises 
power, but even if it holds firmly in its grasp, it must continue to “lead” as 
well. (Gramsci 1937: 55, note 5.)
In Gramsci’s attempts to avoid the censor he used “social group” to mean “class.” 91 
For Gramsci the ruling classes maintain their position via domination with force, if 
necessary. However, to continue to rule, they can also seek intellectual and moral 
leadership. Thus, methodologically he was open to the idea that the led groups have to 
be convinced intellectually and morally to support the formation of a government and 
must also be satisfied with material gains so that they continue to support their 
government, as the work of hegemony is never done.
In order to evaluate these conditions Gramsci had to develop a method of verification 
that had a meaning criterion included, something that Karl Popper saw differently, but 
incorrectly, given the Habermasian criticism. In 1935, Popper, in his Logik der 
Forschung (or The Logic of Scientific Discovery, translated to English in 1959), pointed 
out the necessity of falsification in social science. Gramcsi, who likely did not have 
access to this work, also arrived at a similar idea independently. However, Popper took 
the famous positivist line by arguing that the meaning criterion should be abandoned 
and replaced by a criterion of demarcation between empirical (scientific) and trans- 
empirical (non-scientific, metaphysical) questions and answers. This criterion, 
according to Popper, is to be testability, or, in his own version, falsifiability; that is, 
refutability. Popper was impressed by how easy it is to supposedly verify all sorts of 
assertions—those of psychoanalytic theories seemed to him to be abhorrent examples. 
However, the decisive feature for Popper is whether it is in principle conceivable that 
evidence could be cited that would refute (or disconfirm) a given law, hypothesis, or
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theory. He argued that theories are often bold conjectures, and that scientists should be 
encouraged in their construction—no matter how far they deviate from the tradition. 
However, he also argued that that all such conjectures should be subjected to the most 
severe and searching criticism and experimental scrutiny. Thus for Popper, the growth 
of knowledge proceeds through the elimination of error; that is, through the refutation 
of hypotheses that are either logically inconsistent or empirically refutable.
While Popper’s demarcation of the empirical and metaphysical must be challenged for 
its extremes, his idea of falsifiability is nonetheless useful. Unlike Popper, Gramsci 
introduced the notion of falsifiability into his work by developing coercion along with 
its antithesis consent within the grander analytical concept of hegemony that gave 
meaning to the concept of power. Indeed, by developing the notion of hegemony with 
mutually falsifying meanings of coercion and consent, Gramcsi anticipated Habermas’s 
critique of Popper’s attempted division between science and metaphysics.
Habermas (1986:51) believed Popper’s “empirical-analytical science fails to do justice 
to fruitful theoretical developments in the social sciences from Durkheim, Freud, Mead, 
Piaget down to Chomsky.” In his view Popper clearly over-extended the 
methodological power of the negative in this theory of falsification (Habermas 1986:51). 
Thus Habermas argues that while falsification is indeed useful, it should not be over­
extended to the point where knowledge can only be advanced by showing what is not 
true for given problems. Instead he argued that falsification must go along with 
verification and reason to advance what we know. Also, Habermas saw that Popper 
does away with the context of both the discovery and the applications of social science 
theory (Habermas 1986:50-51). Context that includes both agency and structure gives 
reasoning more opportunity and thus encourages more useful hypotheses to verify if not 
falsify. Thus, while Habermas attacked the privileging of the sciences in the manner of 
the Vienna Circle to which Popper belonged, he did see the use of the idea of
QOverifiability as a necessary criterion for research. Also, in widening the discourse to 
address real world problems, Habermas (1986: 50) argues for approaches that aim
to enlighten people and groups in need of orientation of themselves and their 
social situation, the network of interests and the formative processes which 
make their activities possible, control them, and—in certain cases—subject 
them to pathological constraints.
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In essence, Habermas leaves us to ask what is the good society and how ought we to 
achieve it. This is in contrast to the idea that there are natural processes in society that 
science must somehow unearth. Which in essence brings attention to the false 
dichotomy between is and ought or “realist” and normative theory. For Habermas 
agency in pursuit of certain normative objectives is still important, even though it may 
be more or less constrained by structure. In making his case Habermas argues against 
Popper’s notion of positivism, which suggests that modem scientific knowledge and 
research are in some way objective and value free. For Habermas, science involves 
values and interests that have little to do with a disinterested pursuit of truth; thus his 
argument runs counter to the Enlightenment position that reason will banish myth, 
superstition, and tyranny, emancipating human society. Habermas suggests instead that 
the technologisation of society, and the growth of bureaucracy attendant to this, has 
merely served to maintain the institutions of the state while de-politicising its citizens. 
Reason and science have thus become tools of domination rather than emancipation. 
Yet, and this is absolutely cmcial, Habermas makes it clear that this need not continue 
to be the case, envisaging a time when reason and knowledge could work towards the 
practical improvement of society. Therefore, when considering the problems of 
international relations, the lack of consent within the discipline must be remedied in 
order to have a meaningful debate. This is especially the case when defining and using 
terms such as hegemony.
2.1.3 Defining hegemony: consent to ‘international public goods’ provision
As already noted the use of hegemony at the international level has focused on 
confirming its coercive aspects, as with Gilpin (1987), or its manipulative power via 
intellectual domination and control of the means of production as with Cox (1983 & 
1987) and Gill, et al (1993). Others have assumed consent to be implicit in hegemony 
thus needing no verification (Keohane & Nye 1977 and Keohane 1984). In the work of 
Gilpin (1971 & 1987), it was clear that he understood and operationalised hegemony in 
terms of ‘international public goods,’ given his assertion that other states benefit from 
US hegemony, in the manner suggested by Mancur Olsen (1971). Kindlerberger’s 
(1986) analysis within economic history suggested that the liberal international system 
was maintained by hegemonic power via provision of ‘international public goods.’ 
Since then many scholars have embarked on debating hegemony in terms of 
international public goods provision in the “major journals”, with debate revolving
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mostly around the problems of collective action. What is interesting is that almost all of 
these scholars are based among the G7 nations, and most fail to consider that their 
understandings of hegemony are based on a simple classical formula. In reality the 
international politics of hegemony are more complicated than that, particularly in a time 
when capitalism is the organising economic force and violence is no longer the 
monopoly of the state, in contrast to ancient times where the state was the only actor 
worth considering. Under the circumstances the classical simplicity hides much. The 
theoretical parsimony achieved by such simplicity is not worth the inaccuracies that 
emerge in the much more complex world of today. Thus a term as important as 
hegemony must have a more modem theoretical base that at least includes the economic 
system of the times. Such a view on hegemony is provided by Gramsci (1937) and those 
who use his work as a point of departure. Hegemony then has to be vigorously debated 
as an ongoing project, as the work of hegemony is never done. To accomplish this, 
insights must be drawn from sociology, where intellectual debates are usually deeper 
and well ahead of those in international relations, as we saw with Wendt’s (1987 & 
1992) writing on structuration, predated by in sociology by more than two decades and 
culminating in the work of Anthony Giddens (1984).
Thus far Gramscian (1937) hegemony has remained a rich term used at the domestic 
level in several disciplines with a degree of methodological theoretical robustness that 
addresses even the later concerns of Habermas (1988 & 1996). However, to be useful at 
the international level, hegemony must go well beyond the capacity to coerce and/or 
manipulate via intellectual domination and control of production. Consent is crucial for 
Gramsci as noted by Germain and Kenny (1998: 17).
Broadly speaking, hegemony is achieved within the sphere of civil society by 
consensual means, when a leading class sheds its immediate economic- 
corporate consciousness and universalizes (within the constraints of the 
national-popular character) its norms and values, thereby establishing a 
political and ethical harmony between dominant and subordinate groups.
In order to conduct research within international relations with a greater degree of 
accuracy, hegemony must include not only the capability to coerce, but also the 
capability to win the consent of those with less power. This means that research on 
hegemony must be deliberately multi-layered. Specifically, research must focus on:
(1) the capabilities of the hegemonic power in question (Strange 1988a),
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(2) the policies and responsibilities of the hegemonic power in question (Strange 
1987 & Murakami 1996).
(3) the attainment of a critical theoretical understanding of what will be acceptable
Q-3
for those with less power, as crass opinions might be well be manipulated.
(4) confirming whether or not weaker states—those post colonial states in focus 
here—have or are on a path to “catch-up development” that closes economic 
gaps of the sort seen by Susan Strange (1962).
(5) understanding what type of political processes will lead to favourable outcomes, 
rather than mere academic analysis (Strange 1981).
These steps are obvious in the academic career of Susan Strange (1949-1999), making it 
clear what scholars must do to achieve the goal of normatively driven research that 
recognises the limits of narrow self-interests in comparison to the enlightened version.94 
Following her concern in guiding US policy, we can expect that while the hegemonic 
use of coercion will elicit resistance, policies that address the demands and needs of 
post colonial states will elicit followers for the hegemon and therefore verify its claims 
to leadership. This sentiment is expressed best by Germain and Kenny (1998: 17):
A dominant class rules, but effectively with and over, rather than against, 
subaltern classes. Here we can measure the extent o f hegemony by the 
existence or absence o f social strife, and by the degree o f legitimation which 
the social order and body politic enjoy. [My emphasis.]
Beyond consent and the need to legitimate, hegemony can mean different things. As 
Ransome (1992: 132) has found, the concept is a variable definition rather than a grand 
theory. For him, the precise definition of the term tends to vary according to the 
particular issue which Gramsci addresses. Nevertheless, he finds three pre-conditions to 
understanding Gramscian hegemony:
(1) Hegemony is organic: as a description of process and evolution it is useful to 
consider the concept of hegemony as being essentially organic.95 Or as 
Ransome (1992) quotes Ralph Miliband (1982: 76): “Hegemony is actually a 
process of struggle, a permanent thriving, a ceaseless endeavour to maintain 
control over the ‘hearts and minds’ of subordinate classes. The work of 
hegemony, so to speak is never done.”
(2) Agency in hegemony: Ransome (1992: 132) suggests, “the agents of hegemony 
are conscious and reflective human agents.” Hegemony is not, therefore,
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something beyond the control of social agents as it is “created, maintained and 
reproduced by real individuals.”
(3) Hegemony as praxis'. Ransome (1992: 133) proposes that “hegemony describes 
a process of conscious intellectual reflection and synthesis, which leads to: (a) a 
greater understanding of material reality, and (b) to the development of a new 
form of political strategy and action. In this sense, hegemony is a form of praxis, 
a realisation through action of conscious, critical self-reflection.”96
Hegemony is a very complex description of the exercise of power, and as such a concise 
definition of the term eludes many. Therefore, Ransome’s insights are useful for 
research on hegemonic actors given that he is suggesting that Gramsci constructed a 
framework for different outcomes and uses. In light of the need to understand how a 
hegemonic power improves its relations with a less powerful actor whose central 
concern is its own material development—or more specifically how Japan’s improved 
relations with post colonial Eastern Asia—it becomes essential to define hegemony 
specifically. However, before doing so it is important to remind ourselves that in 
addition to Ransome’s concerns above, hegemony at the international level is 
operational via metaphorical ‘international public goods.’ These describe a residual 
category of goods coveted by weaker states, who then free-ride (Olsen 1971, 
Kindleberger 1986, Gilpin 1987). With these caveats in mind, hegemony is defined as 
the power to provide what can be metaphorically seen as ‘public goods’ at the 
international level, so as to win consent, in addition to the power to simply coerce, thus 
making it a process of conscious struggle to win the “hearts and minds” of followers via 
strategies that respond to at least their historical material demands.
With this definition, it is possible to assess the tenor of hegemony in the hands of 
policy-makers within hegemonic states by considering from the beginning the material 
demands upon which post colonialism gained credence in the periphery a century ago. 
Thus, we can anticipate that policies of mere coercion in this day and age will be seen 
as tyranny and provoke resistance. We can also anticipate resistance to hegemons that 
engage post colonial states in forms of commerce where gains do not narrow the 
material divide between rich and poor. In striking contrast, the exercise of hegemony in 
a manner which meets the legitimate demands of potential followers will likely convert
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them into actual followers, leading to legitimation of hegemony, or in Gramscian terms, 
democracy.
2.2.0 UNDERSTANDING LEGITIMATION OF HEGEMONY VIA 
METAPHORICAL ‘public goods’ PROVISION
With hegemony needing to be legitimated, there still remains the task of how to 
characterise the actions of hegemony. Indeed using the “classical definition” of 
hegemony in more recent literature, Michael Cox (2002:55) defines it as “leadership,” 
leaving little room to characterise actions beyond pre-supposed positive descriptions— 
for what else can “leadership” be? This begs the question, who is being led and for what, 
and why should anyone follow? Fortunately, scholars engaging international political 
economy and international history suggest that hegemons are responsible for providing 
‘international public goods,’ a term which itself suggests that there is a reason to follow. 
As Richard Sherman and M. Scott Solomon (2001:1) argue in “IR Theory's Evolving 
Economic Metaphor,” such economic metaphors are rife within international relations 
and international political economy:
We distinguish metaphor from theory by the type of statements they make 
about reality: theories make claims about observable facts, while metaphors 
make claims about theoretical resemblances. To illustrate... A theory claims 
that international cooperation is more likely to occur among small groups of 
states than large groups, while a metaphor claims that international 
cooperation is a public-goods problem  (etc). While metaphor is distinct from 
theory, economic metaphor has influenced the development of IR theory in 
ways both overt and subtle.
‘International public goods’ are widely considered to be goods provided due to 
collective action failure (Olsen 1971). However, within the cannon it is a metaphor that 
is idealised to show how actions of hegemonic actors might benefit weaker players as 
originally claimed by Gilpin (1971). As Sherman and Solomon argue (2001:11) 
Kindleberger's analysis of the economic consequences of modem hegemony reframed 
the discussion of hegemonic stability in the metaphorical language of public-goods 
provision. For them this has been a productive way of posing questions about hegemony 
and its absence, as a large literature has emerged around the subject of hegemonic 
stability:
The economic metaphor clarified the collective-action problem behind the 
inter-war economic crisis of the early 20th century, inviting comparisons to 
the malaise of the 1970s and the apparent waning of American hegemony.
Two important consequences at the theoretical level were, first, an intensified 
interest in political economy among scholars in the realist tradition, and
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second, the emergence of a literature on the possibility o f providing 
international public goods through means other than hegemony.
While Sherman and Solomon are correct to suggest that political economy has finally 
come to be seen for its true worth, the use of ‘international public goods’ has served to 
highlight the liberal interest in cooperation, and further this agenda. However, the 
metaphor can be extended beyond this to focus on the idea of relative gains that 
underlies legitimation concerns a la Habermas (1976). That is, there can be a fruitful 
discussion of ‘international public goods’ which critically considers the need o f  a 
hegemon to provide these goods in order to justify its own position o f power. This 
discussion is absent from the literature as those who should make it—critical theorists— 
are loathe to use what they consider liberal epistemology. However, this need not be the 
case.
Certainly, aside from market failure leading to ‘public goods,’ the idea of exercising 
power for the ‘common good,’ or the ‘general interest,’ even if not actually achieved, 
has deep roots in various traditions of elite thought. In Western thought it can be traced 
at least as far back as Aristotle before it is picked up again in the enlightenment of
07Europe with the help of Arabic translations of Greek scholarship. However, the core 
of legitimation—the provision of ‘public goods’ to enable and enhance private 
actions—has remained much the same. The liberal tradition of thought on the 
legitimacy of governing groups was challenged by Marx’s critique of state provision of 
‘public goods’ as benefiting the reproduction of capital, creating two poles of thought. 
Marx’s deterministic perspective, which suggested that the state serves capital to the 
exclusion of the rights of workers, was challenged by the work of Gramsci (1937), 
which created fertile ground between the Liberal-Marxist poles. Gramsci showed that a 
degree of consent was possible in Western liberal democratic capitalist states i f  there 
was class mobility. Later, after being part of several intellectual debates and witnessing 
the successes of the middle classes in consolidating their gains in the welfare state 
before again seeing these gains under threat, Habermas (1976) went on to make the case 
that a “legitimation crisis” occurred when the class divide widened. It is reasonable then 
to infer that the provision of ‘public goods’ in a manner that narrows the material gap 
serves to legitimate hegemonic power. Closing this gap was a concern for Susan 
Strange when she wrote Point Four. Helping to Develop Half A World in 1950, and
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The Soviet Trade Weapon in 1959. This was to be theme in her work as she grappled 
with a variotion of the question: why follow?
In the discussion that follows, subsection 2.2.1 explores some of the literature on 
‘international public goods,’ pointing to the need to go beyond the traditional debates 
over their supply to focus on the demand for these goods because of their structural role 
in economic development. Subsection 2.2.2 offers a critique of liberal approaches to 
legitimacy, suggesting that according to this perspective ‘public goods’ were essentially 
meant for private profit maximisation, which fails to live up to the standards of critical 
consent. Subsection 2.2.3 explores the motivational factors of the wielders of power in 
some detail and argues that powerful actors seek to legitimate their power. Finally, 
subsection 2.2.4 shows that legitimation depends upon closing the material gap such 
that the rule of power holders can be considered in terms of legitimacy.
2.2.1 The metaphorical ‘public goods’ within liberal hegemony
Ideally, ‘public goods’ are those goods that are non-excludable and non-rivalrous in 
their consumption and which are provided by a capable power centre that is able to
Q Q
claim some authority as a result. However, pure ‘public goods’ are scarce, and are 
frequently a result of market failure (Olsen 1971)." Mancur Olsen’s (1971) work 
suggests that collective action problems can be solved by a small group or actor with 
the incentive to provide ‘public goods’ even by itself. As an academic concept that has 
gained wider currency in liberal economic thought, ‘public goods’ is a metaphor that is 
idealised to refer to a category of goods necessary for any capitalist system, local or 
global, which seeks stability and growth. While the idea of ‘pubic goods’ has a solid 
footing in debates within states, given the anarchy of the international system it would 
seem pointless to speak of such goods at this level. However, with Olsen (1971) arguing 
that ‘public goods’ are produced when one individual benefits more from the public 
good than it costs him or her to produce it, we can envision a situation where 
international and regional ‘public goods’ might be provided by major powers as has 
been suggested by Kindleberger (1986). Following Kindleberger (1986), Rapkin 
(1994:101) notes elements of ‘international public goods’ are needed for the capitalist 
system, including states, to operate, and that these essentially enable ‘free riding,’ which 
in turn is the solution to cooperation.
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Hegemony for liberal theorists, essentially becomes operational via the provision of 
metaphorical ‘international public goods’ to stabilise the system for absolute gains. 
Even when hegemony is not concentrated, each major power that possesses some of the 
attributes of a hegemon can contribute ‘international public goods’ to enable the system 
to function, as it is in their collective interest to maintain the status quo. Such 
cooperation among major powers is evident in the G7. Yet, when we read Gowa (1989: 
316-19) it becomes clear that the leading power in such situations is the one that acts as 
the catalyst for cooperation among capitalist powers to maintain the system. This is also 
the case if we follow Rapkin (1994:103) in understanding US—Japan relations and their 
role in the world.
The study of such “cooperation” and its benefits for the G7 is an area of interest 
primarily to liberals seeking to maintain the existing international order. In contrast, this 
study is concerned with:
(1) the hegemons’ need to legitimate its power and
(2) the need for ‘public goods’ by post colonial states in order to engage the system 
to ‘catch-up’.
These two points set the criteria for evaluating hegemony beyond claims of leadership 
that really tell us very little. Clearly, certain goods produced by a powerful state might 
also benefit others, thus leading to defacto ‘international public goods’ provision. In this 
situation it is also likely that the provider will thereby justify its power by claiming 
legitimate leadership. If successfully claimed, it is precisely such behaviour that serves 
to explain improvements in relations between major powers and post colonial states. 
Thus, while pure ‘international public goods’ do not exist, it is nevertheless useful for 
international relations scholars of a critical bent—such as those interested in the 
economic development of post colonial spaces—to employ the notion of idealised 
‘global public goods’ that the UNDP promotes in Global Public Goods: International 
Cooperation in the 21~ Century (Kaul, et al 1999). There are specific reasons for this:
(1) this concept can capture the essence of what is needed to stabilise the capitalist 
system and to achieve “co-operation” among capitalist states, an important 
concern for scholars writing in the Western academy.
(2) Secondly, and this rationale emerges only very rarely amid the international 
relations fraternity, the concept offers important insights into the ties and 
conflicts between the rich and poor.
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(3) Finally, the language of ‘global public goods,’ the agenda of the UNDP, allows 
insight into what post colonial states need.
When considering (2) and (3) above, or the perspectives of post colonial states, it is the 
deeper performance legitimacy, which comes from closing economic gaps by providing 
what is metaphorically known as ‘global public goods’ that ultimately allows for 
legitimation of hegemony.100 In contrast, it should be clear that a debate about co­
operation—whether achieved by a lone hegemon or by a hegemon backed by other 
major powers—is one that prevails among liberals concerned with maintaining a regime 
of international capitalism that benefits these same powers. For those on the outside of 
the G7 “listening in,” this matters little unless there are substantive relative gains to be 
had so as to make up for centuries of “lost time” under colonialism.
2.2.2 The history of liberal ideas of legitimacy: ‘public goods’ for private profit
It is not enough to simply speak of liberal notions of ‘international public goods’ and 
leave such enticing language for their narrow and self-interested purposes. Thus it is 
necessary to consider the history of ‘public goods’ and the legitimation of power. It is 
useful to begin with liberalism, which effectively sets the stage for the present day use 
of this concept in liberal economics, according to the dictates of which the state should 
enable private transactions whilst doing little address inequity in society. Initially, it was 
based on the accessibility of early ideas of those such as Aristotle (350 BCE), that John 
Stuart Mill (1848), John Locke (1689 & 1690), Max Weber (1868) and others 
developed the concept of legitimacy and emerged as key sources of liberal thought on 
the subject. Locke was concerned with formal government, as he challenged divine rule. 
He pointed to Rome, where between 70 and 79 AD Helvidius Priscus forcefully upheld 
his principle that the emperor should act only with the consent of the Senate. Locke’s 
(1690) theory of government focused on the monarchy in a new way for Christendom: 
he viewed governance by kings as legitimate if the people governed agreed that his rule 
served the common good—an important early reference to the concept of ‘public goods’. 
Ultimately, for Locke, legitimacy was derived from a combination of acceptance and 
consent by affected individuals, tacit as well as explicit, with compliance with formal 
rules, and recognition by other entities such as states and international bodies.
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Locke developed his ideas of legitimacy by vindicating the responsibility of 
government to the governed, the rule of law through impartial judges, and the toleration 
of religious and speculative opinion.101 A critic of the totalitarian state, his political 
theory was an express denial of the divine right of kings and the absolute power of the 
sovereign as contained in the doctrine of Thomas Hobbes. Locke insisted that all men 
have a “natural right” to freedom and equality, arguing that the state of nature in which 
men originally live is not as intolerable as Hobbes supposed, but simply gives rise to 
certain inconveniences which encourage men to band together to form society. Locke 
subscribed to the Aristotelian teaching, “not simply to live, but to live well,” and thus 
argued that political power must never be exercised apart from its ultimate purpose, 
which is the common good. In his Second Treatise of Government (1690/1948), Locke 
defined a limited purpose for political power, noting that it was:
a right of making laws with penalties o f death, and consequently all less 
penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the 
force of the community in execution of such laws, and in the defence of the 
commonwealth from foreign injury, and all this only for the public good.
[My emphasis.]
For Locke, the authority of a government derives from a binding contract between the 
rulers and the people. It is thus a limited power proceeding in accordance with 
established laws and directed to no other end but the peace, safety, and public good of 
the people. Locke’s ideas were useful in mitigating the tyranny of power, but at heart 
they represented a defence of the propertied—of elite men entering political contracts to 
preserve their life, liberty, and property—at a time when serfdom, slavery and 
misogyny blighted society.
The limits of Locke’s ideas of legitimacy became apparent even within his own time as
Rousseau's (1762) political doctrine addressed the need of the community upon which
the republique was to be built. Like Locke, Rousseau believed that the convention of
the social contract formed the basis of all legitimate authority among men, but his
conception of citizenship was much more organic and much less selectively 
100individualistic. Unlike Locke, for Rousseau the surrender of natural liberty for civil 
liberty meant that all individual rights—among them property rights—were to be 
subordinate to the general will. For Rousseau the state was a moral person, whose life 
was the union of its members, whose laws were acts of the general will, and whose end 
was the liberty and equality of the citizens. It followed that, when any government
65
usurped the power of the people, the social compact was broken, and not only were the 
citizens no longer compelled to obey, but they had an obligation to rebel. Rousseau's 
defiant collectivism was a revolt against Locke's systematic individualism: for him the 
fundamental category was not “natural person” but “citizen.” Rousseau’s critique leads 
to a better idea of the needs of society, including those not well off, and points to a 
better basis for consent and legitimacy than implied by Locke, who represented only a 
tiny minority.
Nevertheless, Rousseau’s (1762) critique missed the deeper implications of the limited
ownership of property. The defence of private property proposed by Locke as a central
role of “legitimate” authority meant that economic inequity was to be a hallmark of the
liberalism upon which capital thrived. Indeed, Locke expressly did not define
legitimacy in ways that were more stringent or critical—in ways that addressed the
rights of workers, who provided the surpluses for property holders, businessmen, and
industrialists, all of whom he identified with. Indeed, Locke’s own personal connections
101with the landed in Britain suggest his loyalty to their interests above all others.
Historical materialists following Marx (1873) thus saw a great injustice in liberalism 
from the early stages of capitalism up through Fordism to the current era of 
globalisation, where workers are for the most part disenfranchised and forced to 
compete with one another by selling their labour at a minimum price. In reality, Locke 
favoured a conservative social hierarchy with a relatively weak executive power, and 
defended the propertied classes against both rule by divine right and the radicals who 
would have emerged in a truly democratically representative system. Along with 
Rousseau’s concept of community, the materialist critique of Lockean liberalism is 
important as it sets out some specific conditions under which consent of the governed, 
and hence legitimation, can be imagined, whether at the domestic level or between 
unequal international actors tied together by global capitalist exchange.
2.2.3 Legitimation: why the powerful might provide ‘public goods’
Given the inequalities perpetuated by the liberal capitalist system with ‘public goods’ 
only stabilising the system for the rich, it is important to understand how legitimacy 
might be possible at all in the relationship between the state and its subjects, or, more 
widely, between those with power and those who are ‘price-takers,’ as is the case in the
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current lopsided international system. In this regard, it is important to note that modem 
understandings of legitimacy have had much to do with interpreting Max Weber’s 
theoretical contributions via the liberal lens. However, by reclaiming Weber, Rodney 
Barker (2001: 8-9) addresses the relationship between the powerful and the ‘price- 
takers.’ He proposes some principle strands of legitimacy in the growing body of 
literature on the issue:
(1) A normative assessment of legitimacy as a quality or possession of government.
(2) The study of popular attitudes towards and support for rulers as a basis for 
analysing and predicting regime stability, both at national and transnational 
levels.
(3) The intertwining of the first two to form a bridge or an alliance between “is” and 
“ought.”
(4) A focus on the powerful and their own need to legitimate their power.
Barker (2001:13) argues that a return to Weber has the additional benefit of allowing for 
a correction of a well-established misunderstanding of what Weber was attempting 
when he described legitimation. That is, Weber was not arguing that governments 
needed some quality called “legitimacy” in order to survive, nor that one of the things 
that governments sought was such a resource. Barker argues, rather, that Weber actually 
focused on the activity of legitimation, or of making claims to authority. This is 
confirmed when Weber (1968: 953) generalises about the “observable need of any 
power or even of any advantage of life, to justify itself.” As Weber (1968: 213) noted, 
experience
shows that in no instance does domination voluntarily limit itself to the 
appeal to material or affectual or ideal motives as a basis for its continuance.
In addition every such system attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief 
in its legitimacy. [My emphasis].
Thus, Barker has re-focused attention on the acts of legitimation or the making of 
authority. Indeed, Barker (2001: 14) develops a theory of legitimation taking account of 
the neglected claim of government, suggesting: “legitimation is a characterising activity 
of government... and the function of legitimation within the governmental sphere and 
its relationship with the structure and ethos of government.”
Barker’s (2001: 47) account of legitimation does not rely on the utilitarian desires of the 
powerful, as he notes that even Machiavelli’s rulers seek not wealth or material comfort,
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but prestige, greatness, and honour. Thomas Luckman (1997) makes a related point 
when he notes that legitimation involves “making sense of power” both to those who 
exercise power and to those who are subject to it. Barker (2001: 37) notes that in this 
sense, legitimation provides “answers to any questions about the ‘why’ of institutional 
arrangements” and as such is just as necessary to those in charge of such arrangements 
as those arranged by them. Barker (2001: 38) argues that the formation of institutional 
identities both justifies the exercise of power and describes the ways and ends of its use. 
He noted that Weber (1978: 213) argues, “according to the type of legitimacy being 
claimed, the type of obedience, the kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee 
it, and the mode of exercising authority, will all differ fundamentally.”104
2.2.4 Legitimation crisis and solution: importance of legitimacy
Ideas about the legitimation of power are useful for the analysis of Japan’s role in 
Eastern Asia in the post-1980s period, or indeed the US role in the global arena, as they 
help to explain why powerful states would choose to provide ‘global public goods,’ 
taking us beyond narrow ideas of simple gain, to include more complex reasons of self- 
interest, as pointed to by Olsen (1971). However, Weberian thought, while helpful in 
focusing on the actions of the powerful in terms of self-interest, is less useful when 
considering the interests of those that are ruled. Although Weber created a typology of 
pure forms of legitimacy—the traditional, the charismatic, and the rational—he did so 
without a theoretical understanding of what would be acceptable for the poorer sections 
of the population. Thus, Tony Porter (2001), writing on international legitimacy, makes 
the case that contemporary social scientific theorising has gone well beyond Weber's 
influential definitions. As noted by Beetham (1991:8-9), Weber's approach can be 
“criticised for the arbitrary, incomplete, and under-theorised character of this 
trichotomy and for his overemphasis on followers' belief in legitimacy at the expense o f  
more independent criteria [italics added].” Porter also notes that an approach that 
focuses solely on legality is also problematic since it obscures the question of why some 
laws continue to be accepted while others lose support, and thus does not consider the 
question of who makes those laws or address the issue of power. Accordingly, it is 
necessary to turn to the concept of legitimation as developed by Habermas (1976).
Well after Gramsci wrestled with why Western capitalist states did not collapse into 
revolutionary politics as predicted by Marx, Habermas struggled to understand the crisis
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tendency in capitalism and how this affected legitimacy. In his view, advanced- 
capitalist societies have a tendency to fall into legitimation difficulties.
Even if the state apparatus were to succeed in raising the productivity of 
labour and in distributing gains in productivity in such a way that an 
economic growth free of crises (if not disturbances) were guaranteed, growth 
would still be achieved in accord with priorities that take shape as a function, 
not of generalisable interests of the population, but of private goals of profit 
maximisation. The patterns of priorities that Galbraith analysed from the 
point of view of "private wealth versus public poverty" [9] result from a class 
structure that is, as usual, kept latent. In the final analysis, this class structure 
is the source of the legitimation deficit. (Habermas 1976: 73)
Habermas went on to propose that the rising level o f  disparity was directly 
“proportional to the growing need for legitimation.” He argued that a legitimation crisis
arises as soon as the demands for such rewards rise faster than the available 
quantity of value, or when expectations arise that cannot be satisfied with 
such rewards (Habermas 1976: 73).
He noted crises of legitimacy in the political system occur when people no longer 
support the existing party system and instead seek to form a new party with the aim of 
transcending the existing economic system (Habermas, 1976: 66). Habermas points to 
the rate of economic development of those in society not well off, and suggests that this 
rate must exceed society’s expectations or else the system may be challenged, with 
rising disparity assuring contestation and even revolution. In essence, it is only the
closing of the material gap between the poor and the rich that will allow legitimacy.
Thus, it is only actions that lead to the closing of this gap that can be seen as legitimate, 
and so legitimacy is tied to legitimation such that it is only the divisions between 
scholars of different schools that allow each of these issues to be treated separately. 
Accordingly, the notion of a “crisis of legitimation” can be used to understand the 
connection between legitimacy and legitimation at a deeper level. Indeed, it is precisely 
at moments of crisis that we see more clearly that efforts at legitimation require the 
fulfilment of material conditions as demanded by the standards of a more critical 
legitimacy, as groups of people cannot simply be manipulated indefinitely.
Habermas argues that if we do not wish to fall back on theorems of economic crisis, 
governmental activity can find a necessary limit only in available legitimations.
As long as motivations remain tied to norms requiring justification, the 
introduction of legitimate power into the reproduction process means that the 
"fundamental contradiction" can break out in a questioning, rich in practical 
consequences, of the norms that still underlie administrative action. And such 
questioning will break out if the corresponding themes, problems, and 
arguments are not spared through sufficiently sedimented pre-determinations.
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Because the economic crisis has been intercepted and transformed into a 
systematic overloading of the public budget, it has put off the mantle of a 
natural fate of society. If governmental crisis management fails, it lags 
behind programmatic demands that it has placed on itself. The penalty for 
this failure is withdrawal of legitimation. Thus, the scope for action contracts 
precisely at those moments in which it needs to be drastically expanded.
(Habermas, 1976: 66-67).
As Habermas notes, the crisis of legitimacy occurs because powerful centres need to 
promise more than they can deliver to be elected, and then fail to deliver, particularly 
because of the difficulty of overcoming the rigidity of the class system, which can only 
be challenged by attention to the conditions of legitimation. Beetham (1991: 19) argues 
that for power to be fully legitimate three conditions are required:
its conformity to established rules; the justifiability of the rules by reference 
to shared beliefs; the express consent o f the subordinate, or of the most 
significant among them, to the particular relations of power."
For Tony Porter (2001: 1), this approach subsumes more traditional emphases on belief 
or law but also provides more basis for critical and independent examination. The 
critical, normative assessment of legitimacy is now an important challenge to liberal 
ideas. It is much more effective than orthodox Marxism, as it accepts the possibility of 
democracy under positive conditions of material gain and brings into focus the 
existence of a legitimation crisis when the conditions are negative.105 Leading this 
critical view, Gramsci (1937) accepted the state’s rule as democratic when economic 
conditions were favourable for the led group, rather than taking the deterministic line 
and pronouncing such gains impossible. This happens, Gramsci noted, when
the development of the economy and thus the legislation that expresses such 
development of the economy favour the (molecular) passage from the ‘led’ 
groups to the leading group. (Gramsci 1937: 56, note 5)
Thus, in his distinctly non-deterministic but materialist garb, Gramsci finds the basis for 
the legitimacy of leaders depends on their historical choice of economic systems and 
how these are managed so as to benefit the led. This action of attempting to gain the 
support of vulnerable constituencies in order to legitimate power is one that remains 
under-examined within international relations, as the discipline itself has traditionally 
served to legitimate US power rather than critique it from the perspective of price- 
taking states. However, work in international political economy centred on ‘global 
public goods’ can effectively challenge international relations to consider the 
international system in its totality and to recognize legitimation as a central project of 
major powers.
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2.3.0 A THEORY OF LEGITIMATING HEGEMONY VIA IDEALISED 
‘GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS’ FOR POST COLONIAL GAINS
We finally arrive at a means to resolve the question of improving relations between a 
reviled former imperial power and its post-colonial victims, or more specifically, 
between Japan and post colonial Eastern Asia. This situation can be understood 
adequately using a critical theory of legitimating hegemony via ‘global public goods’ 
delivered to enable catch-up economic development. We know that a metaphorically 
idealised concept of ‘international public goods’ exists in the literature of international 
political economy because of the search for global economic stability. The concept 
gained wider use following the work of liberal scholar Kindleberger (1986), who has 
suggested that historically hegemonic powers have stabilised the international system 
via ‘international public goods.’ In his view, failure to provide these goods led to crisis 
and slumps such as the Great Depression (Kindleberger 1973 & 1986). Hegemonic 
success in providing adequate ‘international public goods’ to avoid the repetition of 
another global meltdown suggests the validity of this view. It does not matter if this has 
been done by the hegemon alone as argued by Kindleberger (1986) or in concert with 
several powers as suggested by Walter (1993). Following this Ikenberry and Kapuchan 
(1990) sought to argue the case that such hegemonic action would confer legitimacy to 
the US. However, as the work of Rapkin (2001:377) suggests, such stabilisation alone is 
inadequate to legitimate hegemony, as distributional concerns of post colonial states 
must be addressed.
Legitimation fails because stabilisation does not guarantee narrowing material gaps as 
explained by Habermas (1976). Significantly, Mancur Olsen (2000) posthumously 
emphasised a similar trend with respect to the current maladies of globalisation. While 
such crises are separate to those stemming from contradictions within the capitalist 
system suggested by Marxist writers, they are still related to the political aspect of the 
stability-instability relationship that Karl Polanyi (1944) understood so well.106 Indeed, 
recent work by Nesadurai (1996) and Higgott (1998) on the crisis in Asia suggests 
liberal scholars overlook the political—especially as it reflects regional perspectives 
against US interference. While it is not adequately acknowledged, perhaps due to 
scholars from the US being closely associated with national economic goals as argued 
by Gore (1996a) and Higgott (2000), legitimating both capitalism and the hegemon’s 
own power is the primary task of the hegemonic power of the day.107 This is a political
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task, or an ideational battle, that will be resisted in Asian nationalist polities (Higgott 
1998:349).
This section elucidates a critical theory of legitimation of hegemony based mainly on 
the work of Gramsci and Habermas, though with underlying support from the life long 
work of Susan Strange, which is well summarised by Christopher May (2002). It ends 
by recognising that for both Gramsci and Habermas concepts of democracy and 
legitimation respectively were crucial in determining if a system could be capable of 
meeting the goals of its population. Given that their reasonable approaches 
acknowledge forms of legitimation under conditions where the advancement of poorer 
sections of the population is possible, it is important to assign them a central role in 
setting the standards for determining the legitimacy of political economy systems such 
as the one we live with today. Their ideas, when extended to international relations, 
make it possible to establish criteria for understanding forms of mutual acceptance 
between post colonial and colonial polities.
In 2.3.1 we will consider hegemony at the international level in the late 20th century in 
terms of both legitimation itself, and the claims and conditions that it requires, making 
the case for including the legitimation of hegemony within intemtional relations. Then
2.3.2 reassess the international system so as to understand how hegemony via ‘global 
public goods’ provision is legitimated vis-a-vis post colonial states. 2.3.3 addresses how 
Gramsican democracy is related to Habermasian legitimation to allow legitmation of 
hegemony at the international level.
2.3.1 The case for a theory of legitimation of hegemony in “IR”
The case for a theory of legitimation of hegemony in the discipline of international 
relations comes about by considering an international political economy perspective that 
can capture local and global politics without ignoring economics. Mainstream 
international relations omits the historical reality of colonised peoples’ struggle as it is 
typically conducted without an inclusive debate on what type of system is acceptable to 
post colonial societies. Recent textbooks attempt to rectify this problem (Brown 2001), 
however, even these attempts are inadequate as the subject is typically consigned to the 
periphery. In addition, it must be noted that as opposed to the voluminous literature on
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coercion and manipulation, ideas of consent in international relations have yet to be 
seriously addressed.
The neglect of consent in international relations, as shown in Marxism and realism, 
becomes glaringly obvious when one surveys concepts of hegemony. Gilpin (1987) 
emphasised the coercive abilities of hegemony to achieve relative gains. Yet he argues 
that the lesser states in the international system will obey the commands of the 
dominant state or states because they accept the legitimacy and utility of the existing 
order (Gilpin 1981:30). In contrast, Cox (1983:171) argues that hegemony is beyond a 
political order among states as it is an order within capitalism that links the social 
classes of different countries. For Cox (1987:172) hegemonic power is sustained by 
universal norms, institutions and mechanisms that set the rules. In the same vein, Gill 
(1990) points to the global dominance by the major states via the Trilateral Commission. 
In contrast to the realists and neo-Marxist writers, the idea of “benign” hegemony, as 
assumed by Keohane and Nye (1977) and Keohane (1984), merely attempts to justify 
US power from a liberal standpoint, and has become part of the legitimation discourse 
concerning US hegemony. Unsurprisingly, Keohane does not address the problems of 
material disparity arising under capitalist interaction between post colonial states and 
former imperial centres. He introduces ideas about the benign nature of hegemony, 
using concepts such as “complex interdependence,” within which consent to 
international economic and political actions yielding absolute gains is assumed without 
proper theoretical basis, even though, empirically, the goals of post colonial states are 
relative gains (in this case ‘catch-up’ with the rich nations).
As a result of neglecting Gramsci’s and Habermas’s rejection of methodological 
determinism, too many international relations scholars have shied away from evaluating 
the likes of Washington’s role in the global system in terms of what the followers might 
accept as legitimate or what they might see as US imperialism.108 Such questions 
particularly undermine the work of Keohane (1984) and Rosecrance (1986), who tend 
to ignore what is essentially a relative gains demand by post colonial states, and 
consequently do not empirically engage the core issues of power in international 
relations very convincingly. However, Gilpin’s (1987) and Cox’s (1987) approaches, 
which direct us to look for and verify cases of power politics and manipulation of 
consent respectively, also have problems. Their determinism fails to offer us new
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insights into power, and their approaches miss the rare events and periods of history 
where power is wielded with constraint, thus unnecessarily blinding us to the means 
needed to constrain, and indeed harness hegemonic power for the common good. As the 
theoretical path of research seeking cases of legitimation of hegemony is convincing, 
this leaves us to reassess the international system so as to understand how hegemony via 
‘global public goods’ provision is legitimated vis-a-vis post colonial states.
Even with many works divided along the lines of “explaining” or “understanding” 
international relations as suggested by Smith and Hollis (1990), the international system 
is proving to be far more complicated than major theories suggest. However, we can 
agree that empirically, naked coercion or war between hegemonic powers and post 
colonial states has been declining compared to the period of colonisation and the 
immediate aftermath of de-colonialisation.109 From the mid-20th century onwards, 
especially following WW II and the creation of the UN system, powerful states have 
sought to use power with some regard for international law, even if such law was often 
little more than a pretext. Thus, interactions between the powerful and the less powerful 
became more complex as the 20th century has progressed. In recent years, past invasions 
and colonisation have given way to indirect means of control and/or influence, and in 
some cases even a degree of equal engagement, as is the case, for example, between the 
US and Mexico, Japan and South Korea, and France and Algeria. Thus, it would seem 
hegemony remains the key concept in the analysis of these relations. However, given 
the problems encountered by Keohane (1984), Gilpin (1987), and Cox (1987) in their 
attempts to understand a particular type of non-territorial domination by the US in the 
post WW II era, it is essential that hegemony be qualified with legitimation.
2.3.2 Hegemony at the international level: legitimating power and legitimacy
Gramsci’s (1937) approach to hegemony offers us a useful tool with which to assess the 
contemporary use of power in the international system in terms of understanding 
legitimation of power from the material perspective of post colonial states and societies. 
Gramsci’s original insights on this subject make it possible to understand that consent 
within any system comprised of leaders and followers depends on whether the latter 
have assurance of passage to the economic conditions prevailing among the leaders, 
while not necessarily functioning as leaders themselves. Thus, we might say in 
scientific parlance that Gramsci succeeded in making these economic conditions
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dependent variables in his study of the ability of the bourgeoisie in Western capitalist 
democracies to maintain power. Crucially, he did so independent of what the citizenry 
might say in opinion surveys or elections that are, as Rodney Barker (2001:10) has 
suggested, open to manipulation. For Gramsci, consent to hegemony was situational and 
dependent on the relative material gains of the working class, in addition to intellectual 
domination. He thus provided researchers with a concept of consent to be worked 
through on a case-by-case basis, with the theoretical conditions for consent contingent 
on material interests.
As shown by Gramsci, hegemony is about both consent and coercion, which suggests a 
richer idea of international relations than is assumed by deterministic schools of 
realism/Marxism and liberalism. Gramsci’s original concept of hegemony is important 
given the persistence of hierarchy at the international level of analysis, where anarchy 
reigns despite the presence of a weak global Leviathan in the form of the United 
Nations. Within this anarchy, the most powerful states conduct policy ranging from 
bare-knuckled imperialism to forms of tolerance, and in some rare instances due to 
enlightened self-interest, genuine support for post colonial states and societies. This 
varying set of actions coupled with the possibility, if not reality, that elites in post 
colonial states often do make judgements with good information about the international 
system, suggests that in international relations powerful states are actually evaluated, 
thus earning good or bad reputations. Indeed, the pro or anti-American, Japanese, or 
German sentiments in the various parts of the world are a direct reflection of 
judgements regarding the current and past roles played by these major powers. 
Therefore, if we are to construct a better international society, the discipline of 
international relations must first fully address consent and related issues of legitimacy 
alongside manipulation/coercion such that the discipline advances knowledge that will 
improve the human condition.
Perhaps the most important lesson about hegemony at the international level is given by 
Gramsci (1937) himself, who notably did not argue for a deterministic theory of 
imperialism as did Lenin (1917). Instead, seeing that the state can act to safeguard the 
interests of its citizens, Gramsci followed Machiavelli in believing that Italy should 
become a stronger state, but sought a role for his country in keeping with the 
international socialist orientation of the times, as suggested by his opposition to the
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occupation of Abyssinia (Ethiopia). With these sentiments, Gramsci indicates that 
nations were not necessarily subordinate to capital at all times, and that he himself did 
not believe in a communist international that subsumed national interests. Thus, both 
Gramsci’s background and his actual political nationalism have interesting implications 
for hegemony at the international level, particularly when consent is, as Gramsci argues, 
independent of, and more important than coercion in practice, and is thus central to the 
assessment of hegemony.110
In the international system, hegemonic power with the potential to be resisted has been 
operationalised via the metaphorical language of ‘international public goods’ provision, 
as illustrated in the work of Kindleberger (1996) and Gilpin (1987). Their focus was 
confined to an analysis of how to make the system stable for the interests of the major 
capitalist powers, and they were concerned with the desire and ability of the suppliers 
of ‘international public goods’. However, when considering the demand side of ‘global 
public goods,’ hegemony must be also be operationalised within a template of what 
might constitute justifiable hegemonic actions both in terms of managing the world 
and/or regional economy and also in terms of addressing the effects of that economy 
both historically and in contemporary times on post colonial states. Hence, there is a 
need for a theory that suggests it is action leading to the improvement of the material 
conditions of the multitude that makes consent to the hegemon possible to imagine, 
invoking notions of democratic and legitimate forms of wielding power.
2.3.3 Closing material gaps: Gramsci’s democracy and Habermas’s legitimation
Following Gramsci, it is theoretically possible to envision a hegemonic power within 
the international system whose modus operandi is at times consent/consensus rather 
than coercion/manipulation, verified by whether or not improvement in material 
conditions narrows the gap between post colonial societies and former imperial ones. 
The verification process has not, however, been built into the concept of hegemony. 
Thus this concept must be qualified by the notion of democracy, as suggested by 
Gramsci (1937), or more accurately, with the ideas of legitimation as with Habermas 
(1976), who now writes within critical theory having also departed from the basic 
Marxian framework.
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That Gramsci himself was interested in democracy and that his work contributed to the 
understanding if not development of a post-liberal democracy is clear, as suggested by 
Sue Golding (1992).111 Gramsci himself set the specific theoretical condition that 
hegemony be democratic in order to explain why Marx’s predicted revolution in 
industrialised societies had failed to materialise. He created “hegemony” to include both 
coercion and consent, and went on to relate this to democracy, noting that:
Of the many meanings of democracy, the most realistic and concrete one in 
my view can be worked out in relation to the concept of ‘hegemony’. In the 
hegemonic system, there exists democracy between the leading groups and 
the groups, which are ‘led’, in so far as the development o f the economy and 
thus the legislation, which expresses such development o f the economy, 
favour the (molecular) passage from the 'led’ groups to the leading group. In 
the Roman Empire there was an imperial-territorial democracy in the 
concession of citizenship to the conquered peoples, etc.112 [My emphasis 
throughout.]
A deterministic method stifles research into possible consent leading to democracy that 
Gramsci himself saw as possible with the condition that material conditions improve for 
the working classes such that they can aspire to advance themselves to stature of voting 
middle classes in a democracy. Faced with what appeared to be consent in the capitalist 
Western democracies of his day, Gramsci devised an epistemology that could capture 
this situation in a non-deterministic manner on the basis of the material improvement of 
the working classes. He recognised that “led” groups of people willingly followed when 
the economic path presented to them allowed them passage to the “leading group.” Thus 
for Gramsci, Western democracy did not necessarily entail manipulation, or steering the 
consent of a people against their own material interests, per se. It is thus reasonable to 
suppose that he would not read all power relationships as hegemonic manipulation. 
Significantly, Gramsci realised that democracy was possible even among ethnically
i  i o
heterogeneous systems in the Roman Empire that provided the benefits of citizenship.
Gramsci allowed for the possibility of genuine consent within hegemony and used 
democracy to qualify this situation. In this manner, he remained open to possibilities for 
consent in other situations of leaders versus the led, as is the case with his views on the 
authority and leadership of Italian commander-in-chief, Luigi Cardona. The defeated 
Cardona is taken by Gramsci as the symbol of the authoritarian leader, who makes no 
attempt to win the “consent” of those he is leading.114 As Gramsci wrote:
For example: a company would be capable of going for days without food 
because it could see that it was physically impossible for supplies to get 
through; but it would mutiny if a single meal was missed as a result of
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neglect or bureaucratism, etc. This principle extends to all demanding 
sacrifices. Hence, after every disaster, it is necessary first of all to enquire 
into the responsibility of the leaders, in the most literal sense. For example: a 
front is made up of various sectors, and each sector has its leaders; it is 
possible that the leaders of one sector are more responsible for a particular 
defeat than those of another; but it is purely a question of degree—never of 
anybody exempt from responsibility (Gramsci 1937: 145).
Significantly, this Gramscian way of understanding, particularly with respect to how 
leaders and the powerful are evaluated by followers and the less powerful, is consistent 
with the work of Tilly on citizenship.115 For Tilly (1990 & 1996) and Tilly and 
Blockmans (1994) citizenship became a right of those men who were called upon to 
make the ultimate sacrifice of their lives in defence of the nation. He argues that in 
France, where this occurred first in terms of formally understood citizenship rights in a 
republique, the state became the key form of identity over all others. On the basis of 
their willingness to give their life for the state, French men were able to claim that they 
had a right to determine the composition of those who led the state. The crux of Tilly’s 
point is that the state provides the public good of security fo r  its citizens through its 
citizens, and this is the basis of state legitimacy.116 In this sense “the state and society 
are one and the same,” as noted by Gramsci (1937: 208). Both Tilly’s work on 
citizenship and Gramsci’s interpretation of consent within the concept of hegemony 
suggest that in domestic relations, where certain ‘public goods’ are provided such that 
material conditions improve, power is legitimated in the way suggested by a close
117reading of Jurgen Habermas notion of legitimation crisis (1976 & 1984).
In order to assess hegemony it is necessary to qualify it with the language of democracy 
as Gramsci did, but this is not ideal for international relations, where there is no formal 
democracy.118 Replacing Gramsci’s notion of democracy with the idea of legitimation 
developed by Habermas (1976) allows us to focus on power by bringing us to re-engage 
Max Weber’s work on the subject from the critical standpoint necessary to focus on 
consent realistically. Reflecting the state of 19th century German scholarship, Weber 
was concerned primarily with the illegitimacy of rulers, while Habermas, writing in the 
late 20th century, was concerned with state and society in terms of the weakening 
legitimacy of the state in the face of attacks on the welfare state. Regardless of 
differences in historical context, legitimation as used by both overtly implies a 
constantly evaluated power relationship, with democracy suggesting something more 
stable and formal that does not exist amid the anarchy of the international level.
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Significantly, legitimation as discussed by both scholars is also about praxis—it is a 
concept able to shed light on the agency of the powerful as well as those governed in 
terms of their interests. This allows us to understand why a hegemonic power might 
address the concerns of led groups. Thus, researchers verifying/falsifying the 
legitimation of hegemony must be vigilant for situations where the “hearts and minds of 
people” are both won and not won. Research must focus on the instruments of 
hegemony, which at the level of domestic politics is arguably best captured by the 
language of the provision of services, or more theoretically or metaphorically, ‘public 
goods’. At the international level it is the language of ‘global public goods’ which is 
most useful, given its focus on post colonial states’ demands.
Conclusion HEGEMONY AND THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER: 
CRITICAL FOCUS ON NARROWING MATERIAL GAPS
In order to understand a hegemon’s positively changed relations with post colonial 
states, this chapter draws upon the work of two insightful critics of agency in a 
structured setting of power who address crises of legitimation: Gramsci (1937) and 
Habermas (1976). The work of these two theorists, when carefully deployed, can be 
useful for the analysis of improving and worsening international relations in their 
dynamic form, and are among the ideas that periodically emerge from sociology to help 
us better understand social and political phenomena at the global level. It is clear that 
this more nuanced manner of understanding hegemony helps us to overcome the 
problems of determinism that prevail in international relations theory at present.
This chapter has argued that, in order to overcome current problems with the use of 
hegemony, at the international level this concept must be qualified by the notion of 
legitimation. Hegemony suggests a manner of wielding power in a way that might be 
more or less bearable for the led, while it does not by itself tell us if the led are 
achieving their basic material demands. Gramsci himself turned to the idea of 
democracy as signalling that demands might be met. However, in the case of 
international relations, we must turn not to indications of formal “democracy,” which 
are found only at the domestic level, but rather to the more generic Weberian concept of 
“legitimation,” which properly sustains the tension between those claiming authority, 
and those reluctantly following.
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Gramsci’s use of “hegemony” is especially helpful because he not only points to leaders, 
who intellectually dominate followers, but also considers the importance of coercion 
and consent in this process. In the study of international relations, Gramsci’s ideas are 
most commonly embraced when considering the subject of intellectual domination, as 
with Gill (1990). However, in an era where such domination is being resisted, 
Gramsci’s insights into the importance of coercion and consent in a material sense are 
extremely relevant, as he acknowledges the possibility of democracy when living 
conditions improve for the working classes.119 Gramsci’s suggestion of improving 
hegemony through improving material conditions is related to Jurgen Habermas’s 
notion of crisis when the gap between the classes widens. Habermas, who focuses on 
democratic societies, follows Max Weber in reminding us that power must be 
legitimated. In fact, with the tendency of capitalism to exacerbate the material divide, 
holders of power face legitimation crises. Drawing upon the perspectives of Gramsci 
(1937) and Habermas (1976), this work takes the argument to the international level in 
order to make the case that hegemonic states can only legitimate their power by closing 
the gap between themselves and the post colonial states.
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Chapter 3
Raison D’etre of ‘Global Public Goods’ Delivery in Eastern Asia: Legitimating 
Japan’s Regional Hegemony Under US Global Hegemony
As far back as 1950 Susan Strange outlined a growing gap between the rich and poor in 
the emerging global system, noting a decade later that the rich lacked the political will
1 9nto close this gap. The theories of Gramsci (1937) and Habermas (1976) applied to 
international problems suggest the widening of the gap is the source of the legitimation 
crisis facing hegemonic powers. Arguably, the lack of political will to close this gap by 
leading with the interests of post colonial societies undermines the legitimation of 
hegemony by powerful states such as the US and Japan. This chapter makes the case 
that it is essential to understand that post colonial societies and their governments are 
interested in relative material gains, as implied by their desire to catch-up to the 
consumption levels of post imperial states. As such, they see participation in the 
international system as a means to gain the rights promised under Article 2 of the
191Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These demands on the part of post colonial 
states, however “unrealistic” to the “realist” scholar of international relations, point to 
the direction in which policies must move for the successful legitimation of hegemony.
Hegemonic powers policy of providing ‘international public goods’ to stabilize the 
international capitalist system as referred to by Kindleberger (1986), has served to 
legitimate capitalism as well as the hegemon itself, with periodic crises representing 
failures of hegemony and capitalism. However, the world today is vastly different, with 
about 150 mostly post colonial countries, with their historical grievances of 
underdevelopment, forming an international community shaped by demands of the 
global capitalism forced upon them by hegemonic states. Thus legitimation at the 
international and regional level depends on whether the material conditions inherent in 
normative legitimacy are met, making it necessary to assess the hegemon’s delivery of 
‘global public goods’ against the criteria of enabling economic development within 
capitalism. To this end, as early as 1962 Susan Strange argued in the Year Book of 
World Affairs that post colonial states needed stability, access to capital and the markets 
of industrialised nations. This entails going beyond the creation of a stable global order 
suited for capitalism to the delivery of the UNDP’s ‘global public goods’ that enable 
catch-up development as shown clearly by the Kaul, et al (1999).
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In order to combine the theory of hegemonic legitimation with the practice of economic 
development, this chapter operationalises core ideas employed by Gramsci (1937) and 
Habermas (1976). Kindleberger (1986) has already tied “hegemony” to the delivery of 
‘international public goods,’ though he is less specific about the interests of hegemonic 
states. Thus, this chapter deploys the notion of legitimation to consider the interests of 
hegemonic states in justifying their power: the chapter goes beyond Kindleberger’s 
work to focus on the needs of post colonial states by using the UNDP’s 1999 version of 
Global Public Goods. It suggests that, on the demand side, in order for post colonial 
states to participate in the capitalist system one must turn to the analogy of Sen's (1974) 
“positive” freedoms that suggests ‘global public goods’ mitigate the anarchy of the 
market, allowing these states are able to develop via their own agency. Turning to the 
supply side, it is argued that ‘global public goods’ can be provided by hegemonic 
powers so as to legitimate their hegemonic role at the international level, as suggested 
by Murakami (1996). In order to explore the role of Japan in particular, the chapter 
draws upon Murakami’s (1986 & 1996) argument that responsible hegemonic powers 
must meet the demands of post colonial societies by providing ‘global public goods.’ To 
systematically assess ‘global public good, it is suggested that Susan Strange’s (1988a) 
framework of structural power be employed.
Section 3.1.0 presents post colonial states’ goals of rapid economic development and 
their implications for the minimum conditions for legitimating hegemonic power, and 
then discusses Cold War US hegemony, thus establishing the context of Japan’s 
regional hegemony. Section 3.2.0 examines weak post colonial agency using Sen’s 
(1974) work as an analogy, and then combines Kindleberger’s (1986) conception of 
‘public goods’ with that of the UNDP (Kaul, et al 1999) and Murakami’s (1996) plea 
for hegemonic responsibility such that post colonial states are given the best possible 
international system in which to develop, forming a synthesis for a deliberately 
idealised hegemony that might be legitimated via ‘global public goods’ delivery. 
Finally, section 3.3.0 makes use of Strange’s (1988a) framework of structural power— 
knowledge, military, finance, and production, which special emphasis on the role of 
knowledge in organising the whole—to methodically assess the ‘global public goods’ 
provided by the hegemon in the four main analytical areas.
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3.1.0 ENABLING POST COLONIAL STATES’ ‘DEVELOPMENTALISM’: 
CONDITIONS FOR LEGITIMATING THE POST-WWII ORDER
Upon independence, post colonial societies sought re-address for underdevelopment 
perpetuated under colonialism via catch-up economic development led by the state. 
After independence, when a degree of agency by a post colonial state was possible, 
socialism was seen to constitute the only way forward given that capitalism was but a 
continuation of colonial rule. As these events developed, during the Cold War, the 
notable exceptions were the “front line” states of Eastern Asia, particularly South Korea 
and Taiwan. The US, and later Japan, provided both these countries the ‘global public 
goods’ of security, finance, technology and access to substantial markets, thus 
guaranteeing capitalism would triumph over communism. However, in knowledge 
terms frontline states looked to Japan while resisting the US, which in this regional 
theatre chose to allow Japanese ideas to flourish.
In the discussion which follows, subsection 3.1.1 proposes that after independence, 
minor states participated in the international system with a view to developing their 
economies rapidly. Subsection 3.1.2 then argues that these countries initially chose a 
socialist road towards development as a result of their problems with colonial forms of 
capitalism that had left them under-developed. Lastly, subsection 3.1.3 shows how, 
during the Cold War, “frontline” post colonial states gained support from major powers 
that promoted forms of catch-up development in Eastern Asia.
3.1.1 Catch-up economic development: the raison d ’etre of post colonial states
A desire for achievement of material gains drove colonies to independence, signified by 
the ratification of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and as recently 
confirmed by the post-apartheid South African constitution.122 As Gore (2000) has 
noted, economic development is an “international practice carried out by many agents,” 
with the post colonial state making this its raison d ’etre. He proposes that
the essence of this practice is the mobilisation and allocation of resources, 
and the design of institutions, to transform national economies and societies, 
in an orderly way, from a state and status o f being less developed to one of 
being more developed. (Gore 2000:790)
Indeed, the domestic legitimacy of new governments of the periphery in Eastern Asia 
was reliant on the rapid delivery of economic goods (Stubbs 1995 & 2000). The 
governments of these newly independent societies found rapid development difficult to
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achieve, however. This was true in South and Southeast Asia, Latin America, and 
Africa, with the only exceptions in the early years of independence coming from South 
Korea and Taiwan, which succeeded due to the unique circumstances of the Cold War 
where the US and Japan provided public goods. Also their colonial heritage from Japan 
meant that the basic systems were already in place. Outside of rapidly growing Eastern 
Asia the legitimacy of the postcolonial states was generally undermined, with citizens 
dissatisfied with the slow progress and jealous of the wealth of those close to power, or 
in the “pockets” of the recently departed colonial powers. In this unstable setting, 
independence appeared to offer a choice of either following a planned economy, or 
opening up to invite the presence of the very colonial powers so recently driven out (see 
the 2X2 matrix below in Diagram P .
Diagram 1: Post colonial States’ “Choices”—Planned vs. M arket Economies
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In Diagram 1. each box represents a particular stage in the economic development of 
post colonial states with two paths to arrive at the desired stage of MEMD that won 
domestic consent and legitimacy. Languishing in the starting LELD position amid rising
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expectations guaranteed loss of legitimacy even for regimes that began with popular 
support, as often was the case with independence from colonial rule. Significantly, the 
MEMD position represents the situation in which Gramsci (1937) found legitimacy, as 
this was the democratic moment. This occurred in Western capitalist economies with an 
affluent middle class: such states were former colonial powers (even the US, having 
brutally colonised a vast land from sea to sea) still extracting rents from their historic 
control of international finance and trade, and still enjoying terms of trade set during the
1 71colonial era. It was in part the historically accumulated wealth within these colonial 
powers that allowed its citizens higher standards of living through the distributive 
policies of the state for a Rawlsian (1971) “original position” to be imagined post hoc. 
Therefore, legitimation at home was less of a problem for industrialised countries’ 
governments, although with the end of colonial privilege and rising costs tests even 
their legitimacy, as Habermas (1976) argues for Western states experiencing the decline 
of the welfare state.
It is crucial that we understand that post colonial societies are primarily interested in 
catching up to the levels of material well being enjoyed by industrialised nations, thus 
choosing socialism as the logical way to avoid underdevelopment. Historically, leaders 
of the periphery such as Nehru and Nkrumah galvanised people against colonialism by 
tying development to independence. These leaders and their societies believed that only 
independence would bring what they had been deprived of historically, and so they 
sought to ‘catch up’ with the living standards in the metropole countries. Unable to 
deliver on this promise, they faced a legitimation crisis and revolt within their time.
3.1.2 Socialism: the logical choice of post colonial states
The Cold War presented either socialism (following the USSR’s success in 
transforming feudalist Russia into a superpower in a relatively short time) or capitalism 
(as advocated by the US and its allies, but which had caused colonialism) as a means to 
future economic growth. This choice is presented in Diagram 1 to be one of two paths:
• LELD—>LEMD—>MEMD: This approach, which amounted to laissez faire , 
placed more emphasis on the market than on state intervention, which meant an 
acceptance of a society dominated by capital, hopefully with domestic loyalties. 
The colonial powers and the victors of WW II led by the US advocated this 
more liberal capitalist path, particularly given that capital had had the colonial
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history of location from these countries, and thus its loyalties were more or less 
assured.
• LELD—►MELD—►MEMD: While it was certainly an approach that attempted 
to de-link from colonial power, this represented a state planned system, which 
meant issues of equality gained in importance at the expense of enterprise and 
private ownership. It was a path advocated by Moscow in particular, but its 
variations meant different degrees of state involvement, usually dependent on 
the strength of domestic constituencies.
In terms of their agency alone, the choices for post colonial states were either a market- 
based or a state-led model, including the popular socialist one. In reality, there was little 
choice at independence: with the colonial capitalist exploitation still fresh in their minds, 
most post colonial leaders followed socialism or the state-led path. Socialist USSR, 
already a champion against imperial colonialism (and thus trusted), set an example. 
First by giving up its imperial concessions in China after the October Revolution, and 
then by rapidly developing to become a superpower. This gave confidence to the anti­
imperialist elite of most post colonial societies, and so economic planning gained 
credence, as with the Nehru-Mahalanobis plans in India. Encouraging the transition to 
forms of socialism, the governments of these post colonial nations also found the former 
Eastern bloc, led by the USSR, useful in terms of accessing technology and the means 
to defence. Thus, overall, conflict between capitalism and socialism during the Cold 
War took place mainly at the structural level as far as post colonial societies were 
concerned, as the prevailing bi-polar rivalry determined the nature of local conflict.
3.1.3 The “front line states” and US policy during and after the Cold War
It is fairly well known that “frontline states” developed under conditions of insecurity 
(Woo-Cumings 1995). Thus, as Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy (1988) write in 
“America's Quest for Supremacy and the Third World: A Gramscian Analysis,” the 
choices made by post colonial states have to be considered in the context of certain 
structural realities, especially the Cold War and the role of the US in the international 
system. As the Cold War gained momentum, the role of the Soviet Union increased 
within post colonial societies that were inclined to socialism, and thus US policy to 
these spaces turned hostile. Indeed, US policy overall, guided by the interests of capital, 
changed from supporting independence movements in colonised nations to supporting
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the colonial powers’ attempts to maintain control.124 This change in US policy led to the 
now famous (or infamous) NSC-68 Document, which laid out specific military and 
economic actions that had significant, negative implications for post colonial states’ 
attempts at socialist development. In military terms, the US sponsored wars against 
socialist regimes, and set about creating international and regional regimes that 
excluded socialist states wherever and whenever possible, as continues to be the case 
with Cuba. On the other hand, the US favoured capitalism and safeguarded the interests 
of capital by deploying its resources to co-opt regimes, as in South Korea, Indonesia, 
Philippines and Thailand. In other areas the US pushed for development guided by the 
modernisation school of Walt Rostow’s 1960 The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non- 
Communist Manifesto.125 Essentially, US policy created a Cold War system in which 
economic exchange and capital accumulation were encouraged in certain parts of 
periphery so as to prevent the spread of socialism.
Given the imagined threat of global socialism, the US shaped the post-war world, 
creating an “embedded liberal” order described by Ruggie (1982). In the US period of 
“leadership” referred to by Keohane (1984) and Ruggie (1982, 1994, 1996 & 2002), 
economic liberalisation by post colonial states was often carried out under severe 
duress: socialist countries were undermined directly or indirectly by military means, 
leading to civil wars and other forms of conflict. In Latin America, as with the case of 
Chile, US policy was exceedingly brutal against popular revolutions, with its advocacy 
putting these down by military force and later followed by the imposition of market 
principles. US strategy during the period was also executed via international institutions. 
US pressure via the Treasury Department was particularly heavy-handed during times 
of economic crisis: Washington frequently used the IMF and World Bank to bring about 
market-oriented reforms, as in the cases of Brazil and Argentina. By dictating the terms 
of the so-called “Washington Consensus,” it used its controlling power in international 
institutions to force reforms favouring laissez faire approaches. Nonetheless, during
the Cold War in Eastern Asia, the “front line” status of certain post colonial states 
allowed them room to escape the imposition of laissez faire, and indulge not only in 
import substitution industrialisation (ISI), but also benefit from the global public goods 
offered by the US. These included exports to the US market even from behind the 
protective tariffs of ISI and access to sources of capital and technology.
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With the Cold War the US quickly came to appreciate the necessity of making 
capitalism demonstrably successful. Thus, it allowed space for the creation of a model 
of capitalism described by Ruggie’s (1982) “embedded liberal compromise” that more 
or less tolerated local forms of capitalism. In Eastern Asia, the version of capitalism 
used became known as ‘developmentalism’ following Japan’s use of the model to 
rapidly rise Phoenix like, and this path focused on rapid economic development in the 
region over US ideological preferences of purely market-based growth. This 
‘developmentalist’ path was to emerge as a third route (see Diagram 2 where the double 
heads of the arrow symbolize the “pull effect” o f ‘public goods’ provided by the US and 
Japan with the push effect of state-led “developmentalist” policies).
Diagram 2: Consdering Agency and Structure in “Choices” of Economic Systems
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This third path was not purely laissez faire or socialist, and was made possible only 
because the US participated actively by providing military security, investments and 
markets to the post colonial societies under greatest threat from Soviet influence. 
Further encouraging the US in this direction was Japan, which sponsored a system of
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export-led and state-directed capitalism in Eastern Asia. Japan’s ideas of 
‘developmentalism’ were well refined, gaining in credence in Eastern Asia, just as the 
Soviet model gave the USSR credibility after WWII.
Achieving a model which blended state and market-led development initiatives over the 
longer term depended on whether a hegemonic power was willing to withhold demands 
for reciprocity, especially the liberalisation of trade rules that exposed post colonial 
states to forms of competition certain to undermine their drive for industrialisation. The 
rapid movement from LELD to MEMD or catch-up growth requires the “pull effect” of 
‘global public goods,’ which hegemonic powers can provide, as was the case with US 
hegemony during the Cold War period. However, the role played by the US in one of 
the most brilliant political compromises of the 20th century could not continue 
indefinitely as the costs were perceived to be too great, rendering alliances or 
international regimes crucial for Washington (Keohane 1984, Gilpin 1987, Ikenberry 
2002). Moreover, once the threats from the Cold War was had passed, concerns of 
“high politics” gave way to concerns of particular interest groups interested in the 
pursuit of profit. Thus, the choices made by the US deviated from its ‘global public 
goods’ role. Given the deeper lessons about capitalism’s proclivity towards crisis, as 
told by Kindleberger (1970, 1986 & 1987), this would render the system less stable. 
This was a move away from Ruggie’s (1982) “embedded liberalism” that ideologically 
allowed for state involvement in the market economy in the manner suggested by 
Katzenstein (1978), especially for small states. The movement away from providing 
‘global public goods’ became a move away from legitimating US hegemony.
3.2.0 BEARING THE COSTS OF ‘GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS’: 
LEGITIMATION OF HEGEMONIC POWER
The intellectual lead of Gramsci (1937) and Habermas (1976) allows us to recognize the 
legitimation of hegemony in the international system as well as the potential for crisis in 
this regard, depending on the policies executed. As the policies of powerful nations 
particularly affect post colonial states, the metaphoric language of ‘global public goods’ 
allows us to separate those actions that are useful for enabling rapid economic growth 
from those that are not. Thus, assessing ‘global public goods’ delivery to post colonial 
societies provides an important means to assess legitimation of hegemony. Traditionally,
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‘global public goods’ can be understood through the study of economic history, as with 
Kindleberger (1986), who argued that a hegemon acted as a stabiliser for the capitalist 
system during Pax Britannica and then Pax Americana. Towards the end of the 20th 
century, the UNDP has taken the idea of ‘public goods’ at the global/world level further 
by focusing on the needs of the post colonial states, and demonstrating the need for a 
wider understanding of such goods when markets fail. However, the UNDP approach 
still does not pinpoint the continuing need for a hegemonic role (Jayman 2000). Here, 
the more elaborate perspective offered by Murakami (1996) on the importance of 
Japanese hegemonic responsibility in ensuring economic development suggests that 
only the proper provision of ‘international public goods’ or more accurately, the 
metaphoric ‘global public goods,’ will be acceptable for Eastern Asian post colonial 
states.
Subsection 3.2.1 considers the implications of Sen’s (1974) “positive freedoms” for an 
enabling international level structure for post colonial states such that we consider the 
UNDP’s vision of global ‘public goods’ a crucial bridge between the classical work on 
‘international public goods’ and the demands for these now prevailing. In 3.2.2 the role 
of hegemonic actors in the provision of such goods is considered, and the ideas of 
Kindleberger (1986) and Murakami (1996) are synthesised in order to show how a 
liberal world economy compatible with post colonial states’ demands for rapid (catch­
up) economic growth requires a hegemonic power that provides ‘global public goods’ to 
legitimate its power. Subsequently, 3.2.3 deploys Murkami’s (1996) notion of 
“responsibility” for nations such as Japan to show how hegemonic powers attempt to 
legitimate their role by addressing issues of deep concern to post colonial states.
3.2.1 ‘Global Public Goods’: post colonial freedoms and enabling agency
Agency remains important even though its ultimate operability depends on the enabling 
nature of structural conditions (Dessler 1989). In illustrating this, it is useful to consider 
an analogy from the domestic realm. In Four Essays on Liberty. Isaiah Berlin (1969) 
argues for focus on “negative” liberty, that is, liberty in the sense of freedom from 
restrictions. Following Berlin, Amartya Sen (1974) separated “negative” and “positive” 
rights, with the former being important in enabling citizens to participate in a poverty 
stricken post colonial setting. As Sen (1974:313) argues, for post colonial societies the 
issues of economic minimums are fundamental because these standards are necessary to
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exercise rights, even to participate in the market. Sen points out that the two types of 
rights are inseparable in poor societies, asking if it is not more likely that economic 
well-being allows one the basic ability to exercise "rights” as opposed to "rights" being 
exercised independent of economic well being. He further argues that inadequate 
attention is paid to ideas behind positive freedom. Indeed, Sen challenges Rawls’s last 
line defence of liberalism in the Theory of Justice (1971)—the lexical ordering of the 
basic liberties over the difference principle—on the grounds that “negative” freedoms 
(what one is allowed to do) may be of no use if “positive” freedoms (what one can do) 
are not present. In this regard Sen (1974: 313) asks an important question: “Why is it 
important that I should not be stopped from doing something and—at the same time— 
unimportant whether or not I can in fact do that thing?” This question directly addresses 
the contradiction between Rawls’ two principles and the fatal problem with their 
ordering. Indeed capabilities are crucial in exercising one’s basic liberties—there would 
be no point in having basic liberties if one is unable to exercise them due to a problem 
with one's capability. Sen further argues that simple possession of a primary good may 
not, in itself, guarantee the capacity to use it. For Sen (1974: 323), capabilities “are 
directly valuable in a way that the possession of primary goods cannot be, since they 
evidently are means to some more human ends.” Hence, primary goods have to be 
valued accordingly. The question of individual capability poses particular problems for 
the capitalist state. Only the delivery of ‘public goods’ by the state in an effective 
manner allows individual freedom to be exercised universally, essentially helping to 
legitimate the authority of the state.
To move away from the analogy at the individual level of analysis, as presented by Sen 
(1974), and instead compare individual states in an anarchic international system, the 
same argument offered by Rawls would be pertinent. However, for Rawls, ‘Justice as 
Fairness’ starts with domestic justice and its requirements, including the ‘Difference 
Principle,’ and should not be extended directly to the global level. He chose not to 
extend his notion of justice abroad, and thus considered only the domestic realm of 
Western liberal democracies, even though within his lifetime post colonial states’ 
demands for a justice-oriented system were very well known, as with the demand for a 
New International Economic Order (NIEO). Whereas Rawls (1971) failed to carry his 
vision to the global level, Sen (1999) goes on to argue that there are a great many 
agencies that can influence global arrangements and their consequences, with some
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clearly “national” in form. These include the domestic policies of particular states (such 
as the US and Japan), and as well as the practice of international relations between 
states (contracts, agreements and exchanges) which operate through national 
governments (Sen 1999:121). Significantly, Sen also notes the importance of other 
actors acting across borders, referring to those NGOs, firms, social groups, and political 
organisations from “core” states that enjoy global reach and influence. For Sen (1999) 
ultimately justice is a global public good, though he is less clear about which actors 
would be providing this good.
We know that the historical hierarchy of states has left us with the legacy of particular 
orders, some of which have provided ‘global public goods’ for price-taking and post 
colonial states, while others have not. In the case of Rome, for example, we know that 
certain ‘public goods’ were provided: security from Barbarians, and a complex 
infrastructure, especially roads and aqueducts, coinage, a legal system, etc. Such ‘public 
goods’ were also in evidence in the aftermath of the WW II albeit in a much more 
sophisticated manner, as the US provided the ‘global public goods’ necessary to rebuild 
Europe and Asia via the Marshall Plan. When considering Asia, ‘global public goods’ 
provision by the US allowed rapid economic development in the 1950s and 1960s, 
especially for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
3.2.2 Understanding structure: ‘global public goods’ and capitalism
The actual provision of ‘public goods’ at the international level has preceded theoretical 
understandings of these goods. For example, the two oldest organizations within the 
United Nations system, the International Telecommunication Union (1865) and the 
Universal Postal Union (1875), were established to address the supply of ‘public goods’ 
at the international level (Ferroni & Mody, 2002). Canadian Louise Frechette, Deputy 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, notes that starting in the 1960s, and especially 
after the 1968 publication of Garrett Hardin's 1968 essay “The Tragedy of the 
Commons,” the concept of ‘international public goods’ was applied to world problems. 
However, the idea gained intellectual credibility within international studies only after 
economic historian Charles Kindleberger’s seminal article, “International Public Goods 
without International Government,” was published in 1986.127
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Action on the part of a powerful actor in the international system has been crucial for 
liberal capitalism to establish itself and also survive periodic crisis. Kindleberger 
(1986:7-9) argued that the achievement of a smoothly functioning liberal world 
economy less prone to cyclical problems of capitalism requires a hegemon or a leading 
power with economic strength and the power to provide ‘public goods’ so as to:
•  ensure peace and political order through its military pre-eminence, as did 
Pax Romana and Pax Brittanica
• maintain a relatively open market for distress goods and provide adequate 
supply to ease shortages. By providing access to its own market, the hegemon 
must reduce the threat of protectionism in the world economy that is 
occasionally a factor in other economies due to dire economic conditions.
• provide counter-cyclical, or at least stable, long-term lending to the world 
economy. By allowing capital outflows the hegemon thus becoming the major 
source of investment for the liberal system, including for developing countries.
• maintain a relatively stable exchange rate system. The hegemon prevents 
competitive devaluations to restore external equilibrium by ensuring the 
existence of short-term finance to allow internal adjustment.
•  act as co-ordinator for macroeconomic policies so that there is a lower 
degree of inconsistency between states.
• act as crisis manager of the international system.
While Kindleberger pointed to the British and US periods of hegemony, his work does 
not specifically suggest that the dominant power would act as a stabiliser, as this is very 
much a question of domestic and international politics. With the assumptions of self- 
interested states pursing absolute gains, liberals made the case that hegemony was in the 
interest of the leading power given the benefits of high growth in the world economy. 
Kindleberger (1986: 10-11) is both a realist and liberal when it came to ‘international 
public goods,’ as he considered both the needs of the international system and of the US 
in particular. Still, Kindleberger is best placed in the liberal camp, as for him the 
management of the world economy by the hegemon was to lead to stability and growth, 
in essence laying the groundwork for a Kantian (1795) “perpetual peace.” Mancur 
Olsen (1971), showed in his work The Logic of Collective Action: Public Good and the 
Theory of Groups that market failure would lead to ‘public goods’ provision by the 
actor for whom the benefits of these goods exceeds the costs incurred. Consistent with 
Olsen’s insights, realists see ‘international public goods’ provision as the preference of 
a hegemon interested in maintaining relative power disparities.
Despite Kindleberger’s work on historical hegemonies and Olsen’s thoughts on 
provision of public goods when the benefits outweigh the costs, in the 1980s and 1990s
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the hegemonic management of the liberal world economy was seen as unnecessary, as it 
was believed that states could co-operate to establish international institutions (Keohane 
1984 and Martin 1999). Following this, in the brave new world of liberal triumphalism 
after the Cold War, suggested by Fukuyama (1993) among others, younger scholars 
went further, suggesting that the case for hegemony was yet weaker given the 
multilateral interest in maintaining the liberal international system in the post-WW II 
era.128 Andrew Walter (1993) considered this a fatal blow to hegemonic stability theory 
(HST), and so one important “IPE” debate has thus been about the validity of HST as a 
“scientific” theory. Still this focus on hegemony—capacity, interests, and global 
stability—excluded the specific interests of post colonial states. Significantly, they 
overlooked normative issues of hegemony that lie at the core of Kindleberger’s 
concerns, and which the UNDP, charged with issues concerning economic development, 
has addressed in Global Public Goods (Kaul, et al 1999).
3.2.3 The supply and demand for ‘global public goods’
While academics debated the validity of hegemonic stability theory as a theory while 
neglecting its content of ‘international public goods’ in normative terms, the idea of 
global ‘public goods’ emerged via the UNDP, which is concerned with post colonial 
states’ demands for better international system.129 The 1999 UNDP perspective 
considers the demand side of the ‘global public goods’ equation including the interests 
of the poor, with less attention paid to the supply side. The UNDP understands that 
‘global public goods’ are crucial for post colonial states, and underlines the 
metaphorical importance of the language of ‘public goods’ for understanding relations 
between the hegemon and post colonial states. The inclusion of ‘global public goods’ is 
also essential if  we consider the voices of the old G77 and the new G20, as these 
organizations have defined parameters for an acceptable international system for post 
colonial states. Beyond that, the failure of capitalism to alleviate poverty will likely lead 
to its hegemonic sponsors being held accountable by non-state actors taking matters into 
their own hands.
Following Kindleberger, the UNDP finds ‘global public goods’ to be (a) non-rivalrous 
and, (b) non-excludable. If one state “consumes” the benefits of regional peace or law 
and order, this does not mean there is less peace for the other states to enjoy; hence, it is 
non-rivalrous in consumption. Similarly, it is difficult, almost impossible, to exclude the
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second state from enjoying the benefits of the pure international public good, hence it is
non-excludable. These features mean that the benefits of ‘global public goods’ are 
widely distributed and enjoyed by many; however, those same features contribute to the 
difficulties with supplying those goods, since:
They elicit patterns of behaviour that, from the individual agent’s viewpoint, 
are quite rational. Yet from a collective viewpoint—such as that of a local 
community, a nation or humanity as a whole—the result is suboptimal and 
can be disastrous. The two main problems affecting the provision of public 
goods are known in the literature as “free riding” and the “prisoner’s 
dilemma.” (Kaul, et al, 1999:6)
Since a state cannot be prevented from enjoying the benefits, the incentive is to “free- 
ride.” Thus, preferences are not expressed, which:
sends the wrong signal to suppliers. As a result supply and demand cannot 
reach equilibrium, public goods are under-supplied and resource allocations 
are suboptimal. Markets are not good at providing public goods. (Kaul, et al,
1999:6)
While economic theory has given us these ideas on the nature of ‘public goods’, the 
prevailing definition is too narrow, and must be used more loosely at the international 
level since pure ‘global public goods’ as such do not exist. For example, even peace can 
be excluded from a country and instead kept as club good for a select few, as is the case 
with US attempts to destabilise Cuba for five decades whilst the rest of the region is 
maintained free of conflict. Similarly, the access to US markets, such as that enjoyed by 
South Korea over the Cold War could be ended—with one stroke of the pen (with the 
signing of the North American Free Trade Area or NAFTA) Mexico gained preferential 
access to the US over South Korea.
Given the possible exclusion of some countries, pure ‘global public goods’ clearly do 
not exist. For this Kaul, et al, (1999:6) noted, “we need additional mechanisms such as 
co-operation.” However, it is fairly clear even with cooperation, historically hegemonic 
powers determined its actual form. Kindleberger (1986) himself prescribes: the system 
needs the hegemon to lead with the interests of maintaining it. Despite the impure 
nature of existing ‘global public goods,’ its idealised language is useful from a 
normative standpoint when considering post colonial states. This is so as ‘global public 
goods’ are needed by post colonial states, a fact that development economists such as 
Amartya Sen understand, as does the UNDP, whose authors make the same point in 
their exhaustive defence of the notion. They argue when ‘global public goods’ are 
ideally provided we should see economic development take place. This view at once 
places the burden of economic growth on post colonial spaces as well as upon
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hegemonic powers’ policy—it is thus a more comprehensive understanding of 
economic growth than those focused on post colonial states alone or the market alone.
Given the concern with demands of economic growth, the on-going debate between 
mainly US and British scholars about the validity of HST or that of a liberal regime 
based co-operation is moot. With the crucial importance of ‘global public goods’ for 
post colonial states at the international level, as shown by the UNDP volume, what is 
important is the possibility of supplying these. Then the focus is on the hegemonic 
power’s willingness to provide ‘public goods’ these even though the gap between itself 
and the post colonial states might close. It is this decision about whether or not to lead 
with an understanding of the interests of post colonial societies that is crucial for 
legitimating hegemony. Indeed, the very act of leading is proof of the hegemon’s desire 
to legitimate the relationship and this explains why hegemonic powers continue in their 
roles even after costs begin to mount, leading to speculation of a world after hegemony. 
We can thus interrogate US hegemony at the international level, while also questioning 
the role of Japanese and Germany hegemony at the regional level: how do these very 
powerful states act? How should we assess them?
3.2.4 Defining hegemony: responsibility, ‘global public goods,’ legitimation
Hegemony can now be more precisely defined as the power to provide what can be 
metaphorically seen as ‘global public goods’ at the international level, so as to win 
consent, in addition to the power to simply coerce, thus making it a process of 
conscious struggle to win the “hearts and minds” of followers via strategies that respond 
to at least their historical material demands. Susan Strange (1988a) conducted the 
crucial assessment of hegemonic power in the culmination of over 30 years of work 
offering deep insight on the role of hegemonic power. Rather than debate the validity or 
invalidity of hegemonic stability theory, she argued, US power wielded responsibly 
served to stabilise the post-WW II system, and in contrast, when wielded irresponsibly 
served to destabilize the international system.130 Following the 1971 departure from the 
Gold Standard, the US took the lead in creating a system with less stability, and also 
one characterized by growing wealth disparities. Given the yawning “North-South 
divide” that challenges the liberal imposition of the market, Japanese political 
economist Murakami (1996) saw the importance of bridging this gap or facing eventual 
chaos. Like Kindleberger, for Murakami the stability of the global economy was crucial,
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but the Japanese thinker went beyond this to include politics as well. When 
commissioned by the now famous Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) to 
study the role of Japan in the international community, Murakami proposed the need for 
responsible roles for Tokyo and Washington. He emphasised the political obligation of 
powerful nations to improve the conditions in the more numerous poor nations of the 
world or else face the consequences of a widening material gap (Murakami & Kosai 
1986: 43-110). He argued the “North-South problem” would be best solved by the 
“independent” development of the South (Murakami & Kosai: 1986: 124). In his view, 
this had to be facilitated via public and private economic and technological co-operation, 
and by the opening of developed markets and the prevention of the wide and rapid 
fluctuation in exchange rates. He advocated, moreover, that Japan should provide relief 
to victims of dire poverty and famine, while supporting forestation and other land-use 
programs.
Murakami’s notion of hegemonic responsibility is about self-interest when interpreted 
in the language of legitimation of hegemony via the provision of ‘international public 
goods.’ He is sanguine both about the liberal order needing hegemonic provision of 
‘public goods’ and about how the relative decline of the US role might well spell the 
end of liberalism. Proposing that the key relationship is that between the “hyper- 
Cartesian” US and the “hermeneutic” Japan, he finds that the Japanese polity must be 
made aware that they can no longer preserve their “comer of happiness,” by continuing 
the “developmentalist” path for themselves, and must instead adopt liberalism while 
tolerating the ‘developmentalism’ of emerging economies until these post colonial 
states ‘catchup’ (Murakami, 1996: 317).
The notion of responsibility is heartening, however the question of power, central to 
political science, must be factored in. In essence, we must move beyond notions of 
responsibility to address how the weak might bargain politically by consenting or not to 
the mle of the powerful, as it is here that we can realistically suggest why it is in the 
interest of hegemonic actors to continue to provide ‘global public goods.’ This leads us 
to consider the legitimation of power (Habermas 1976): going beyond Gramsci’s (1937) 
idea that democracy is possible when material conditions of the working classes 
improve, Habermas (1976:67) noted that democratisation, despite its possible ill effects
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on economic efficiency, “is needed to change the structures of power.” Beetham (1991: 
41) makes the following case:
An understanding of legitimacy helps explain, for example, why people have 
the expectations they about a power relationship, why institutions of power 
differ systematically from one type of society to another, why power is 
exercised more coercively in some contexts than others. Above all, it helps to 
explain the erosion of power relations, and those dramatic breaches of social 
and political order that occur as riots, revolts and revolutions. It is not just 
because these events are particularly dramatic and fateful that they interest 
the social scientist. As with so much else about society, it is only when
legitimacy is absent that we can fully appreciate its significance where it is
present, and where it is so often taken for granted.
While Beetham is clear about the need for legitimacy, he is not as clear on to how to 
understand legitimacy without relying on the perceptions of citizens. Reliance on the 
perceptions of citizens can be misleading, as they may be manipulated or have 
unreasonable expectations. Such exercises, in what amounts to opinion surveys, cannot 
be overly helpful in discussing legitimacy. Legitimacy is ultimately about the 
justification of a relationship of power. Thus, the critical focus on what the powerful do 
in the interests of those without such power must be the empirical basis of legitimacy, 
while their deeds can be understood in terms of legitimating their power.
Significantly, Gramsci and Habermas wrote on domestic level issues—the condition of 
anarchy that informs international relations makes the idea of democracy at that level 
absurd. Yet, we must not conclude domestic level theory, especially the critical work of 
Gramsci and Habermas, has nothing to tell us about relations between powerful states
and post colonial states in the absence of a formal global Leviathan. Indeed, the
existence of such relations in conditions of disparate power suggests that judgements on 
the nature of the powerful depend particularly on what the powerful do. Thus, the study 
of what the powerful do should not be based on assumptions, but on careful observation 
guided and interpreted by theoretical reflection. Students of international relations must 
recognise the rare moment when powerful states act responsibly, for only then it is 
possible to ask why a hegemonic state might attain positive relations despite its negative 
history, as is the case with Japan. The challenge is to identify what exactly transpires in 
these relations such that power is legitimated—that is, we need to theoretically 
construct what empirical data suggest the legitimation of power.
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3.3.0 THE FRAMEWORK OF STRUCTURAL POWER: LEGITIMATion OF 
HEGEMONY VIA ‘GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS’
In parallel to Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks (1937), this work on the relations between 
Japan with Eastern Asia puzzles over the successes of powerful states in achieving 
positive relations with the periphery. In States and Markets (1988a), Susan Strange 
developed a framework of structural power enabling just such research, she writes:
“Relational power, as conventionally described by realist writers of textbooks 
on international relations, is the power o f A to get B to do something [it] 
would not otherwise do... Structural power, on the other hand, is the power 
to shape and determine the structures o f the global political economy within 
which other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises and 
(not least) their scientists and other professional people have to operate.”
This structural power... means rather more than the power to set the agenda 
of discussion or to design (in American academic language) the international 
regimes of rules and customs that are supposed to govern international 
economic relations. That is one aspect o f structural power, but not all of it...
Structural power, in short, confers the power to decide how things shall be 
done, the power to shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, 
relate to people, or relate to corporate enterprises.” structural power lies with 
those in a position to exercise control over people’s security, mode o f  
production, distribution o f finance and the facilitation o f knowledge (Strange 
1988a: 24-26)
She discussed the concept of structural power in four main areas as conferring upon the
1^1holder abilities normal states do not have (see Diagram 3 below).
Diagram 3: The Logic of Legitimation in Capitalist Systems
Global Level o f Analysis
‘Global public goods’ (GPG) provision
• (knowledge) provides knowledge & technology for economic organisation/development;
• (security) provides security in the military area by armed and/or non-arms means;
• (finance) provides counter-cyclical lending and be lender of last resort; maintain stable 
exchange rates by co-ordinating policy in the area;
• (production) provides market for distress goods and means of production.
Global legitimation
Domestic Level o f  Analysis
Domestic ‘public goods’ provision
Domestic legitimation
For present purposes, the framework allows us to focus our attention on the most 
important structures and agents that legitimate hegemonic power, thus organising the
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domains of power within which ‘global public goods’ are provided. Thus it allows us to 
more systematically understand if powerful states such as Germany, Japan, and the 
US—the main promoters of the capitalist international system—follow their rhetoric 
and act to ensure the structural conditions most conducive to rapid development of post 
colonial societies.
We can assess ‘global public goods’ within each structure in terms of their adequacy for 
legitimating hegemonic power. Given the similarity of the operational logic of 
legitimation within capitalist systems at the domestic and international levels, 
assessment of legitimation between the governing and the governed is not as difficult as 
we might think. As Diagram 3 suggests, the notion of consent, met by providing ‘public 
goods’ is crucial in the process of legitimating any authority, including at the 
international level of analysis. Legitimation at the international level requires that the 
‘public goods’ be delivered such that the gap between the provider and those depending 
upon it closes.
Below, subsection 3.3.1 discusses how, given that epistemic communities dominate 
discourses on the nature of international order, the knowledge structure allows us to 
understand the nature of power, which agenda is dominant, and what actions make it so. 
An exploration of the security structure follows in subsection 3.3.2, as this structure is 
instrumental in defending the system in place while also providing the peace necessary 
for the international political economy to function. The financial structure is addressed 
in subsection 3.3.3, as its stability and health is crucial to the overall system. In
subsection 3.3.4, the production and consumption of goods and services are analysed
for their effect in terms of ‘global public goods,’ thus tying the real economy to theory.
3.3.1 Knowledge ‘public goods’: technology and organising economy and society
Susan Strange (1988a: 121) argues that while production and financial structures are 
important, the
“knowledge structure determines what knowledge is discovered, how it is 
stored, and who communicates it by what means to whom and on what 
terms... so power and authority are conferred on those occupying key 
decision-making positions in the knowledge structure.”
She argues that knowledge has become more important in the competition between 
states than their crude manpower or crude gun power, and therefore states compete for
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leadership through competition for the “place at the leading edge of advanced 
technology” (Strange 1988a: 134). Education and knowledge are thus highly political 
issues, having a strong impact on the actors in the international system.
Within the structural power framework values are not pre-supposed in the exercise of 
power. The framework makes the projection of values open to inquiry via its focus on 
the knowledge structure, which, as this work emphasises, is key to understanding the 
system as a whole. Miller (1994: 74) writes that the “articulation of any social value is 
the attempt to legitimate the quest for power,” and conversely, “the will to power must 
be accompanied by the articulation of a social value, or a set of values, if it is to assume 
a political quality.” In politics among nations, the corollary of Miller’s point is that 
powerful states might gain legitimacy in the eyes of post colonial states provided 
particular social values of importance to the latter are allowed to materialise. The 
knowledge structure allows us to see how this debate takes place, and to consider who 
imposes what on whom for what end.
For Susan Strange, the knowledge structure is constituted by the laws and actions that 
govern and regulate patents and knowledge flows, determining who can learn what, 
where, and when. This essentially means the hegemon’s control of the knowledge areas 
for its own exclusive use or for that of the many. The issues of patent rights and control 
of the international communication system through which ideas and propaganda are 
transmitted are key examples. But, much more importantly, the knowledge structure is 
also where the debate over what kind of international order is vied for takes place by 
exposing the contestants, their institutions, and laying bare their respective agendas. A 
knowledge structure approach is conducive to assessing how debate is created, and also 
how consensus about how power should be utilised emerges. It informs us about which 
actors are powerful enough to impose their system on international order and which 
actors assess that system based on which specific goals.
The Strangean notion of the importance of a “knowledge structure” fits well with the 
idea that “political behaviour is shaped by the dominant values of society, which in turn 
are the product of complex historical forces” (Miller 1994:13). Such a structure would 
house Miller’s “dominant values” and the “norms” emphasised by Katzenstein (1996a). 
In sum, when fully developed theoretically, the knowledge structure houses ideas
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shaping the values of the polity in question, particularly ones regarding whether society 
should be guided by the pursuit of wealth, social justice or security (Strange 1988a: 1-6), 
or a combination thereof. Essentially, as Strange has laid down for us with respect to 
international polity, the knowledge structure is crucial to understanding the role of 
hegemonic power in shaping international order. She leaves us to develop means to 
judge the international system from different perspectives, even from the perspective of 
post colonial states (Stopford & Strange 1992).
The hegemony of leading powers is most potent when it is underpinned by a knowledge 
structure that ties together each analytical aspect of power—knowledge, security,
1 o n
finance and production, and other minor structures. Hegemony is effective when this 
knowledge is able to guide policy by providing an understanding of the international 
setting of the times for each actor in the polity, while also conveying this domestic 
reality to those on the outside, as with Japan (Katzenstein & Okawara 1992). 
Empirically, the role of hegemonic power in terms of security and economics is still 
important, particularly in an Eastern Asia very much dependent on ‘global public 
goods.’ In Eastern Asia, it is clear from the work of regional scholars that the security 
provided by the US and Japan is the comer stone of a stable order in the region, 
enabling it to fend off Soviet ambitions and confront Chinese aggression.133 On the 
economic side, it is also clear that politics matter in Eastern Asia—despite ideas of a 
global market, firms from the leading capitalist states in the region still invest within 
their respective territories, hence maintaining production and its benefits within.134
3.3.2 Public goods in security: protecting economy and society
The rapid development and distribution of knowledge and globalisation more generally, 
enhanced by the progress of technology influences the security structure. Scholars in the 
US—from Kindleberger (1986) writing on economic history to Gilpin (1987) working 
within international relations—suggest that ensuring political order through military 
pre-eminence is a ‘global public goods’ role for hegemonic powers. This is perhaps 
second in importance only to that of the guiding ideas of knowledge itself. Depending 
on the knowledge structure of the day, providing security might also mean foregoing 
options that threaten neighbours and the community of nations, and thus avoiding an 
arms race. In this sense, it means providing historically vulnerable post colonial states 
military guarantees of not threatening them. This can be done in concert with other
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nations, for example, via United Nations-based peace guarantees, or via specific 
unilateral policies of assurance building through the non-proliferation and non­
ownership of weapons of mass destruction. And, as other threats loom, in, for example, 
the physical environment, it also means taking the lead in creating a sustainable planet 
by making sacrifices to maintain the global commons, such as accepting cuts in carbon 
emissions even at the expense of one’s own industry and providing advanced 
environmental technology to post colonial states.
Security is not only an end, but also a pre-condition to human activity that can be 
understood to some degree as economic and social. For the liberal international 
capitalist system to function smoothly, the security provided is essential. International 
peace allows nations the opportunity for mutually beneficial relations; at least 
theoretically, if one agrees with the ideas of those like Richard Cobden, who proposes 
that trade benefits all.135 Secondly, at the national level, particularly within post colonial 
states, peace also allows more expenditure on non-military areas such as education and 
health, thus enhancing citizens’ welfare and reinforcing the legitimacy of 
governments.136
3.3.3 Public goods in finance: funding economy and society
Susan Strange’s work has influenced recent study of the role of hegemonic powers in 
maintaining a stable international financial system.137 True to her predictions (Strange 
1986 & 1997) financial crisis have become more of an issue in the post-Bretton Woods 
era, as the hegemonic function has not been performed while liberalisation has 
continued unabated. As Kindleberger and Murakami have noted, the leading power 
must provide ‘public goods’ in the financial area. First, by providing counter-cyclical, 
or at least stable, long-term lending to the world economy, the hegemon becomes the 
major source of investment for the liberal capitalist system. Secondly, the hegemon 
must police a relatively stable exchange rate system, so it must prevent competitive 
devaluations to restore external equilibrium by ensuring the existence of short-term 
finance allowing for internal adjustment. Thirdly, the hegemon must act as co-ordinator 
for macroeconomic policies to lower inconsistencies between states.
It is also obvious that the preservation of the stability and flow of finance is even more 
crucial for capitalist development to occur in weakly institutionalised post colonial
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states. The hegemon’s control of these financial resources through its surplus gained 
over time gives it the power to either accelerate economic growth or hinder it, thus 
making decisions regarding finance an obvious factor with which to gauge legitimation. 
This means determining which states have access to capital and on what terms: 
essentially understanding the legitimacy of a hegemon providing finance at lower cost 
than the markets and encouraging crucial direct investment into post colonial states 
even when it hurts at home. Enhanced legitimacy occurs when the hegemon directs 
capital specifically for development, as is the case with concessional lending or grants, 
and also when private flows are encouraged with political direction and insurance 
guarantees unavailable via the market.
3.3.4 Public goods in production/consumption: enabling economy and society
The production structure is comprised of the laws and actions that allow movement of 
goods and services across boundaries and essentially determines what shall be made by 
who and for whom (Strange 1988a). This focus on production-consumption, which 
constitutes the real economy, allows for attention to Kindleberger’s requirements that 
the hegemon maintain a relatively open market for distress goods, while also allowing 
room to address Murakami’s idea that hegemons allow certain mature industries to 
relocate production to post colonial spaces to enhance industrialisation there. By thus 
providing access to its own market, the hegemon reduces the threat of protectionism in 
the world economy and also guarantees the rapid development of post colonial states.
The capitalist system relies on the market mechanism for distribution of products. Not 
only is the product important, but so too is its marketing, and thus the question of who 
produces what, where, and when, has a corollary in who controls the marketing of what 
is produced. For emerging post colonial economies both production and markets are 
problems in terms of what might be produced and how good can be marketed for the 
highest possible profit. Thus it is crucial to ensure the transfer of the means of 
production to post colonial states, in keeping with the much-advocated economic 
liberalism. Such transfers must take place, even if this means the “hollowing out” of the 
advanced country’s production base—for example, via provision of incentives to sunset 
industries such that they can locate to post colonial states. Equally, the guarantee of 
access to the largest markets (for example, liberalisation of domestic markets and 
removal of subsidies that block goods from post colonial states) for the sale of the
104
produced goods is necessary given that post colonial states have a weak domestic 
demand structure. Thus, the legitimacy of advocates of capitalism ultimately depends 
on whether the ideas they preach actually lead to rapid development.
Conclusion: ‘GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS’ PROVISION:
LEGITIMATING HEGEMONIC POWER
Current international relations theory—with the exception of those works that address 
hegemony in its Gramscian form—tends to be weak with respect to ideas of hegemonic 
power. Focus on the legitimation of power is important as the anarchic international 
system is actually ordered hierarchically, with key decisions made for all by a few 
hegemonic states (Gill 1990). Given the dominance of realist thought within 
international relations, many scholars privy to shaping its discourse have not adequately 
considered how, and under what circumstances, relations between powerful and less 
powerful states can be seen in terms of legitimation. The realist focus on inter-state 
relations is inflexible in an era when wars between states are becoming less of a factor 
in global politics (Kaldor 1997, 1998 & 1999), and also when non-state actors such as 
firms matter, either independently or as part of a state-firm bargain, as is often the case. 
In normative terms and in terms of realistically understanding the “other,” the sole focus 
on the state is cumbersome given the need to understand if the practice of international 
relations and commerce adequately addresses the demands of post colonial states, 
particularly as economic well-being constitutes the main source of conflict between 
hegemonic and post colonial states.
The legitimation of hegemony at the international level is not easily manipulated. In 
contemporary international relations, governments of even the weakest post colonial 
states have more room to make reasoned judgements than do vulnerable individuals in 
society susceptible to manipulation and psychological control. In addition, it has been 
shown by Krasner (1985) that some of these minor states can themselves affect change 
to the structures of power, while groups of such states which band together are even 
more effective. Legitimation of hegemony at the international level becomes a central 
concern for understanding the practise of international relations as this realm is ordered 
by liberal capitalism promoted by powerful states as though this economic path were 
best for all. Ultimately, the legitimacy of these hegemonic powers depends on how
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fruitful the capitalist system is for emerging/developing economies. This consideration 
is addressed in detail in subsequent chapters with regard to Japan’s role in rapid Eastern 
Asian development, in order to understand how relations might have improved for that 
country given its leading role in regional economic development, via what can be seen 
to be the provision of some of the ‘global public goods’ needed.
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Chapter 4
Legitimation of Japanese Power in Eastern Asia: the Legitimacy of Meeting
“Relative Gains" Demands
In many cases Article 9 of Japan’s constitutional guidelines has often been cited for its 
constraints on war making and its emphasis on peace. What is less well known is that 
the preamble to the constitution contains very carefully worded notions of international 
society that recognise not only peace, but also issues such as slavery and freedom from 
want:
We desire to occupy an honoured place in an international society striving for 
the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, 
oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all 
peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.
[Preamble of The Constitution Of Japan. November 3,1946.]
These carefully selected words, chosen by Japanese and US drafters, reflect their joint 
input, according to John Dower (1998). Significantly, the content of the preamble was
to be a harbinger of things to come from Japan, as it re-entered the community of
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nations. Indeed, the preamble can be said to represent an important key to 
understanding how Japan eventually managed to improve its relations in Eastern Asia.
The first step of re-entering into the community of nations was made when Japan signed
the San Francisco Peace Treaty, where it met opposition but also some support from
countries less affected by the atrocities committed by the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA).
Backed by India and representing Ceylon (Sri Lanka), J.R. Jaywardene quoted the
Buddha, noting that “hatred ceases not by hatred but by love” to propose rapprochement
1between Japan the region. Then after Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida’s proposal 
for an “Asian” Marshall Plan was rejected by the US, Tokyo regained regional links by 
pursuing diplomatic means via Ceylon. J. R. Jayawardene, the Ceylonese Finance 
Minister, advocated the Colombo Plan, which allowed Tokyo to provide credits to the 
region for the purchase of Japanese goods. However, the commercial success of this for 
Japan was not matched by diplomatic successes in the region. The rising disparity 
between Japan and Eastern Asia led to growing anti-Japanese sentiments, which only 
turned in Japan’s favour after the Fukuda Doctrine of 1977.
In order to understand the positively changed relations between Japan and Eastern Asia, 
this chapter addresses empirical aspects of Japanese engagement in the region. It first
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considers the Yoshida Doctrine, which initiated regional relations during the Cold War. 
This policy of convenient ‘self-help’, as represented by realism (Yahuda 1996), had to 
end as Eastern Asians saw Japan’s contribution to regional economic progress as 
minimal. The lack of material restitution to Eastern Asia by Tokyo was especially 
unacceptable given that prior to the San Francisco Treaty in 1951, Japan’s wartime 
victims had required the transfer of Japanese industrial plants as reparations (Tsuru 
1993). With monetary reparations provided via trade credits, Japan went on to benefit 
immensely from access to the region’s markets and labour as well as Eastern Asia’s raw 
materials, increasing the material gap between itself and the region. The ensuing 
backlash in Eastern Asia during the 1970s forced Prime Minister Fukuda to face Eastern 
Asia’s material demands interpreted by the Japan’s leading think tank on the subject, 
the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) or Ajiken, to move beyond mere economic 
aid to address core issues of industrialisation and ‘catch up’ economic growth.140 Thus, 
the overtly political 1977 Fukuda Doctrine—understood here in terms of the provision 
of ‘public goods’ to Eastern Asia, including advocacy of a doctrine of 
‘developmentalism’ for the region—guided Japanese policy towards meeting these 
material demands, assessed in detail in Chapters 5 through 7. Arguably, the provision of 
‘global public goods’ on demand meant Japanese power was deployed to legitimate its 
hegemony, and this accounts for its positive relations with Eastern Asia.
Section 4.1.0 suggests that the post-WW II Yoshida Doctrine of constructive relations 
in Eastern Asia can be understood adequately within realism, but that its inadequacies 
eventually required Tokyo to accede to regional demands via the post 1970s Fukuda 
Doctrine, which can be essentially interpreted as a regional hegemonic power’s attempt 
to provide ‘global public goods.’ Section 4.2.0 focuses on the workings of Japanese 
think tanks, especially the Institute of Developing Economies or Ajiken, emphasising 
how Marxist oriented economists within these institutions interpreted post colonial 
Eastern Asian goals for Tokyo bureaucrats, leading to more favourable policy 
acceptable via the Fukuda Doctrine. Section 4.3.0 shows that Japan under-emphasised 
its military role while advocating ‘developmentalism’ as the economic model for the 
region, thus showing how its ‘global public goods’ doctrine was operational in Asia and 
so providing the proof within the knowledge structure, leaving the financial, production 
and security structures to be analysed in depth in subsequent chapters.
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4.1.0 YOSHIDA’S “REALIST” POLICY towards EASTERN ASIA:
REAPING THE HARVEST OF REGIONAL RESISTANCE
Under US occupation and with a democratic system back in place, Japan’s leaders had 
to address strategic issues in a rapidly emerging post colonial international context. The 
astute leadership of Yoshida Shigeru, the first Japanese Prime Minister after WWII, led 
to policies that allowed Japan’s rapid recovery. Central to Japan’s policy was 
articulating an Eastern Asian foreign policy that had the goal of normalising relations 
with this crucial region, which had for decades constituted an important market. 
However, these policies, although explained by realism, did not adequately address post 
colonial Asian nations’ ability to reject renewed economic exploitation by the Japanese 
firms returning to the region throughout the 1960s and 1970s.
Japan initially ignored regional demands for economic development, while using 
regional resources and markets, resulting in an anti-Japanese backlash. This in turn 
required that Japanese policymakers more fully appreciate Eastern Asian demands. 
Prime Minister Fukuda then initiated the policy of actively assisting the region, a policy 
best understood in terms of the delivery of ‘global public goods’ that allowed the 
countries in the region to rapidly industrialise and develop their economies. This 
demand-driven policy, consistent with regional norms, aimed to reduce the gap between 
Japan and the region. Crucially, it constituted legitimate use of Japanese power, and was 
the cornerstone for Japan’s rapidly improved relations with the region in the 1980s.
Subsection 4.1.1 considers Yoshida’s post-WW II realist objective of rebuilding Japan 
to face Chinese and other external threats. Subsection 4.1.2 considers post colonial 
Eastern Asian demands for reparations from Japan, and the implications of these 
demands for confirming the normal relative gains drive of states. Subsection 4.1.3 
reveals the limits of Yoshida’s realism, considering how the role of Japan in Eastern 
Asia was undermined by the failure of Japanese policy to address the relative material 
demands of Eastern Asia.
4.1.1 Post-war objectives: the Yoshida Doctrine and realism
With the end of WW II, the Red Army, after allowing the US into what is now South 
Korea, was poised to take Japan’s northern island of Hokkaido in a gesture of quid pro 
quo with Washington. However, the US was uncooperative, and the direct Russian
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threat was allayed by the presence of US troops in Japan. In this context Yoshida 
Shigeru, diplomat and imprisoned peace advocate, became Japan’s first post-war Prime 
Minister.141 Despite contest between the superpowers, he quickly saw that Tokyo’s 
primary long-term problem was the angry, radical regime in Peking (Beijing), and 
became convinced that Japan needed to both fully recover from the war and mend 
regional relations. Yoshida was interested in engaging China, but found his way 
blocked by John Foster Dulles.142
Yoshida’s policy came to be known as the “Yoshida Doctrine.” Green (1998:10) argues 
that the doctrine centred on a close alliance with the US, minimal military rearmament, 
a focus on economic recovery, and accommodation of the broad views of a ruling 
conservative coalition. In his biography of Yoshida, Dower (1998:369) explains, “the 
re-consolidation and re-centralization of conservative authority during the Yoshida era 
was inseparable from the strategic settlement reached between the US and Japan.”143 
Green (1998:10) notes that the alliance with the US bolstered Japan with technology 
transfers, economic assistance, and markets for those conservatives focused primarily 
on economic recovery, while for “the hawks, the alliance provided a source of military 
technology, defence assistance, and political pressure for rearmament in the context of 
the Cold War. For the doves, the alliance provided a cap on that rearmament,” or in the 
words of one foreign minister, “an honourable watchdog” (obankensama) for Japan 
(Pyle 1996:59).
The circumstances under US occupation changed with the Cold War, allowing the re- 
emergence of Japan’s ill-fated Taisho era democracy and re-engagement with Eastern 
Asia. With the fascists of WW II facing war crimes tribunals, the Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers (SCAP) put the democratic conservative forces led by Yoshida 
into power. In this position, they cleverly dealt with the demands of labour by co-option 
rather than coercion, although SCAP had brutally put down massive strikes by Japanese 
labour in the past. However, this co-optation actually meant committing Japanese 
business to work in the interests of labour over the long term in exchange for the end of 
labour unrest. It essentially gave the relationship between labour and capital elements of 
consent as envisioned by Gramsci, and thus elements of legitimacy as considered by 
Habermas (1976), confirmed by the reality that rapidly rising wages led to Japan 
becoming the most equitable of industrialised societies. In this setting, Yoshida’s deft
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handling of Japanese foreign policy exploited opportunities presented by Cold War 
rivalry between blocs.
Thus Yoshida’s “economic” doctrine concentrated on more than simply wealth 
creation—it was a means to provide security to Japan, and thus the region, in 
competition with communist China and Russia. It could be understood with realism no 
doubt, but the tools and strategy employed were highly sophisticated.144 Yoshida noted 
that economics
represents a vital element in determining the political future o f Southeast 
Asia... If China under Communist control makes rapid economic progress, 
leaving the comparatively slow Southeast Asian countries far behind, there 
will develop a great margin between the Communist and non-communist 
states in Asia, enabling Communist China to place the whole o f Southeast 
Asia under her influence without resorting to arms (Cited in Saito 1990: 19).
In the aftermath of WW II, limited room for independent manoeuvre did not prevent 
strategic thinking on the part of Japanese leaders. Their efforts were marked by the 
fortuitous circumstances of the Cold War, which allowed Japan to escape complete de­
industrialisation via reparations and isolation from its natural markets in the region.
Following the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, which did not deliver the reparations 
demanded by Eastern Asia, Tokyo attempted to normalise relations in region in order to 
pursue the trade necessary for disposing of Japan’s finished goods. At this point Tokyo 
began to negotiate bi-lateral deals with Southeast Asian countries, including those in 
Indochina (Tamotsu 1984:288). Given the lack of proper reparations, Japan’s attempts 
at making amends in Asia were thwarted as Yoshida-led efforts for a formal rebuilding 
program in Asia along the lines of a Marshall Plan did not enjoy US support (Saito 
1990:19-20).145 Nonetheless, Tokyo did have sympathizers, as Nehru-led India and 
diplomatically assertive Ceylon (Sri Lanka) were attempting to fully re-instate Japan’s 
rights prior to San Francisco (De Silva 1995:38-40).
The South Asian nations’ attempt to bring Japan back into the Asian community bore 
fruit with the Colombo Plan, implemented in July 1951, with Japan joining in 1954 and 
securing access to Southeast Asian markets (Katada 1996: 13-14). The plan co­
ordinated technical and financial aid to underdeveloped members, with aid provided in 
the form of loans, grants, or commodities such as fertilisers, equipment, and consumer 
goods. Assistance was arranged bilaterally and it included training personnel, scientific
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research in agriculture and industry, consultative services, and financial aid, with efforts 
made to use training facilities within the recipient nations and to build up student 
exchange programmes. While these ideas were useful for post colonial states, Japan’s 
lack of economic power and commitment to gaining such power meant that it neglected 
its obligations to region, paying little attention to regional economic development.
The hot phase of the Cold War was to rapidly alter Japan’s fortunes in the face of US 
reluctance to continue to fund Japan’s post-WW II recovery.146 The Korean War 
hastened Japan’s re-entry onto the world stage, allowing its economy to regain much of 
its pre-war vigour as restrictions on Japanese production turned into orders for materiel. 
As the Cold War continued, Japan drew closer to the US and developed a regional 
outlook that fit well with US strategic objectives—a policy that it has yet to change 
even at the beginning of the 21st century. Further assisting Japan were strategic 
circumstances in Southeast Asia, where conservative regimes and Muslim communities 
were beset by communist insurgencies within, or falling dominoes from without (Stubbs 
1989, Sharma 1993: 17 and 111, and Rich & Stubbs 1997).
The US-Japan relationship was essential for the survival of conservative regimes in the 
region at a time when revolution was in the air. In this strategic setting, conservatives in 
South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand were forced to see 
Japan as a former enemy turned indispensable ally of the US. The importance of such 
strategic thinking was fully appreciated, as US military efforts required bases in 
Okinawa with access to materiel from factories around the Tokyo and Osaka industrial 
areas, which in turn depended on raw materials from the forests and mines of Eastern 
Asia. Thus, within a decade after WW II, Japan had taken the important step of 
establishing diplomatic and economic contact with the Asians it had previously 
colonised. Japan did so on terms that could not have been dreamed of at San Francisco 
in 1951, when Burma did not even attend in protest, and the Philippines and Indonesia 
only grudgingly accepted the eventual outcome (De Silva 1995: 38^10).
4.1.2 Eastern Asian demands for reparations: the relative gains drive
Prime Minister Yoshida presided over seven years (1946-47 and 1948-54) to shape 
Japan’s domestic institutions to promote economic success under the US security 
umbrella. Firms were required to follow the guidelines laid down by the Ministry of
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Finance (MOF) and Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). However, new 
industrialists opposed bureaucratic controls: indeed Mori (1989: 99-107) argues that 
Sony and Honda corporations succeeded by defying MITI’s (or the Japanese state’s) 
involvement in the economy. Nonetheless, without administrative guidance or 
obedience to MITI, Japanese firms not only stood to lose access to capital in Japan, as 
did fledgling Honda and Sony, but also to sacrifice the markets larger firms needed to 
dominate Asian production. By toeing the MITI line, Matsushita and Toyota and other 
large firms were able to rapidly extend themselves into Eastern Asia, and from that base 
they went on to regionalise and globalise production with relative ease, inviting a 
backlash.147 The involvement of the state allowed Japan to overcome the backlash. 
Indeed, the importance of the state in Japan’s developmentalist policies is demonstrated 
by the fact that to this day, Sony and Honda remain small players compared to the 
MITI-backed Japanese firms Matsushita and Toyota, both of which dominate their 
respective areas at a global level. MITI’s administrative guidance meant Japanese firms 
were required to adopt practices in Eastern Asia that complimented political goals, thus 
ensuring added security for direct investments. This meant, among other things, 
retaining Eastern Asian workers in times of economic recession.148 MITI involvement 
meant that Japanese firms had to take into account political factors, especially 
considering Japan’s history of aggression.
According to Price (2001: 81) Yoshida regarded Japan’s great mistake not as its 
aggression in Asia, but rather its alliance with the Axis powers and the ensuing conflict 
with the Anglo-American bloc:
As I have stated, and history confirms, ever since the opening of Japan's 
doors to the Western world more than a century ago, the basic principle of 
Japanese policy has been the maintenance of close and cordial political and 
economic ties with Great Britain and the United States. That Japan departed 
from this basic principle, and became allied with Germany and Italy, was the 
prime cause for my country being pushed headlong into a reckless war.
Given the Asian countries’ resistance to the terms of the peace treaty, Yoshida's 
accommodation with the US, particularly with their decision to go ahead with San 
Francisco Peace Treaty was in effect datsu-a ron or leaving Asia (to be with the West, 
as enunciated originally by Fukuzawa).149 Being with the West had its reward: most 
non-specialists on Asia overlook the fact that Japan escaped de-industrialisation because
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reparations were not carried out in the form originally envisioned, that is, by the transfer 
of Japanese manufacturing plants (see Table 2).
Tabl^2^SuccessiveJ^
Proposals by the US Date of Report
Removals of < 
prices): 
Industrial 
Equipment
in million of y
Military
Equipment
en in 1939 
Total
Pauley Proposal November 1946 990 1,476 2,466
Strike Proposal March 1948 172 1,476 1,648
Draper-Johnson proposal May 1948 102 560 662
Actual Removal Before removals were 
stopped in the Spring of 
1949.
none none 160
Source: Tsuru (1993).
By the 1960s the immediate task of re-building Japan was successful from its own 
perspective, marked by the catching up of its manufacturing to world-class levels once 
again, comparable to the achievements of the 1920s and 1930s when Japanese firms had 
successfully challenged Western firms. By the 1970s Japan’s dominance of 
manufacturing and exports was undisputed in Asia, and it had again displaced European 
goods in the region as in the 1920s. Meanwhile, Japan had opened the door to economic 
growth in the Eastern Asian region with its early raw materials-related investment and 
trade, however this was along the lines of the US relationship with Latin America and 
Europe’s relationship with Africa, and was thus not very legitimate in the eyes of post 
colonial intellectuals. This Japanese relationship with Eastern Asia was, in other words, 
neo-colonial, consistent with the Dependencia critique of Cardoso and Faletto (1979). 
However, the Northeast Asian part of the region (Taiwan and South Korea) received 
both Japanese and US preferential treatment because of their “frontline” status vis-a-vis 
the Soviet Union and China. Thus, both Taiwan and South Korea rapidly developed 
using the ‘global public goods’ offered to them. The relative lack of concern in Tokyo 
and Washington about slow development in Southeastern Asia at levels offered by the 
vagaries of the market meant that rising expectations in ASEAN nations were not met, 
leading to a legitimacy deficit for their combined hegemony. This allowed nationalists 
in the region to argue that Japan was again exploiting Asia. Such was the case in the 
Philippines in particular, with its Latin forms of political writing.
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The success of the Yoshida Doctrine, although explained by realism, could only go so 
far: Eastern Asian societies never truly forgot that Japan had not lived up to the ideals of 
reparations. And, of course, in the end there is no way for Japan to actually “leave 
Asia.” As Nobel laureate Oe Kenzaburo wrote of this legacy:
The Japanese have not reflected on the meaning of the defeat seriously. In 
short, we should have negated the entire modernization project and sought a 
completely new direction, but we didn’t. Japan as an Asian nation did not 
think of co-existing with other nations in Asia but again tried to outrun all the 
others. For example, Japan harvested a huge profit from the Korean War.
(Price 1997: 292).
While Korea and Taiwan have received special attention, the bitterness in Southeast 
Asia was especially intense given post colonial states’ demands for rapid economic 
development and the attainment of living standards achieved by colonial powers after 
decades of access to slave labour and cheap raw materials from the colonies. This 
bitterness was justified, as by the 1960s Japanese policy, dominated by MITI, continued 
to cater to its firms’ needs for markets and raw materials, adhering to the colonial and 
neo-colonial pattern. By the 1970s, with Japanese property in the region under siege, 
and with the US weakening its commitment to Asia following defeat to communist 
Vietnam, Tokyo was forced to end its relationship of realist convenience with Eastern 
Asia and was finally ready to address the demands of the region.
Underlying material demands for reparations were long-term economic goals for which 
Eastern Asia had initially turned to Japan for help in the pre-war years, but which had 
led to betrayal by the invading Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) rather than freedom from 
European colonialism. Therefore, demands by post colonial states for material 
restitution from Japan were grounded firmly in the history of the Japan-Eastern Asia 
relationship. The very bilious rhetoric of material demands from Tokyo was underlined 
by the historical reality that over the years the periphery had repeatedly been bled to 
serve the centre’s political and economic development, and Japan, an Asian country, 
had joined Westerners in exploiting the region. The large transfers of wealth left the 
unwilling donors of the periphery perpetually anaemic and angry; thus, after WW II and 
independence, the demands leading to the San Francisco Peace Conference were for 
reparations of Japan’s very means of production, which had not been ravaged by war 
(Tsuru 1993). However, as Table 2 above showed, reparations payments were more or 
less abandoned by 1948, and the relocation of the plants and equipment was stopped 
entirely in 1949. By 1951 the issue of reparations was re-opened with the aggregate
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obligations of Japan totalling only $1012 million, the instalments of which, as Tsuru 
(1993) notes, only accounted for 0.4 % of Japan’s national income and thus represented 
a very inexpensive way of redressing the grievances of Eastern Asians.150
4.1.3 Anti-Japanese sentiments: the myopia of ignoring Eastern Asian demands
The trajectory of growing anti-Japanese sentiments in Eastern Asia became apparent 
soon after the end of the Yoshida Shigeru era. Overcome by growing organisational 
factionalism surrounding the distribution of Japan’s gains, the governing Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) could not appoint effective prime ministers, with most not 
lasting longer than a year or two.151 This turnover undermined Tokyo’s political 
helmsmanship at the world stage even as Japan was becoming a regional, if not a world 
power. Yoshida’s policies of the early post-war years, which had originally led to the 
Colombo Plan, were not modified to meet the renewed demands of Eastern Asians 
consistent with the reparation principles of wars elsewhere, thus increasing 
dissatisfaction and resentment in the region.
Asian demands for reparations were not met, as noted, because of a desire on the part of 
the US to use Japan for the Korean War. As Japan failed to challenge Washington’s 
Cold War goals in order to fulfil Eastern Asian demands, it soon came to be perceived 
as exploiting the situation for its own ends. Indeed, Tokyo carried on in the region with 
Japanese firms gaining access to raw materials and export markets. This meant that 
while by 1964 Japan had gained its objective of rapid national income growth via heavy 
domestic investment—signified by the introduction of the first Shinkansen (or “bullet” 
train)—it did little in terms of investing in the infrastructure of the region. By the time 
Tokyo staged the Olympics that same year it was starkly obvious to the population in 
Eastern Asia that that Japan had benefited immensely from access to Eastern Asian 
resources while their own workers and economies had gained relatively less. It was also 
clear Japan’s admission to the OECD in 1964 and its signing of the International 
Monetary Fund, Article 8, marked its fu ll acceptance by the powerful members of the 
Western Alliance. For Eastern Asians, this acceptance came about despite the fact that 
Tokyo had done little to address unfulfilled demands for reparations.
By the 1970s, concern with Japan’s relative gains was widespread. A poll conducted in 
Indonesia revealed concern that Japanese businesses were using aid exploitatively:
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33 % of the 1945-generation were “worried” about the matter while 4 % were not
(Weinstein 1976: 262). Thus, despite not being as vehemently anti-Japanese as the
Koreans and Chinese of the time, those in Southeast Asian countries saw that rather
then making amends in the region, the Japanese instead made profits with tied aid that
ensured markets for Japanese firms. Southeast Asian intellectuals (Manglapus 1976;
Constantino 1989 & Constantino, et al 1991) were highly critical of Japan, while
Western observers such as Weinstein (1976) wrote of a relationship of dependency
similar to the malaise in Latin America. By the early 1970s, soaring Japanese surpluses
(despite a higher floating yen with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods agreements)
and stories of Japanese multi-nationals “extracting wealth” made Japan a prime target of
ill will in post colonial Eastern Asia. The “Second Invasion” of Japan was not viewed
favourably, and violence erupted against Japanese property (Constantino 1989). When
Japan recognised China in 1972, following US leadership, Taiwan retaliated by
blocking imports of Japanese autos.152 Later, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei’s visit
1Southeast Asia in 1974 prompted anti-Japan protests in Thailand and Indonesia. The 
rise of anti-Japanese sentiments in Southeast Asia signalled to Tokyo that business 
could not go on as usual for Japan.154 Such displays of ill will served to underline the 
necessity of responding to the suspicion and animosity of Southeast Asians and 
obtaining their consent by ensuring peaceful trade that supported catch-up Asian 
economic development. This was to be departure from the trickle down of the laissez 
faire approach advocated by the US. Thus the omni-directional foreign policy of Prime 
Minister Tanaka Kakuei, where Japan followed American foreign policies blindly, had 
to come to an end by the late 1970s, when policy began to reflect a new realism more in 
keeping with the changing times.
4.2.0 ANTI-JAPANESE SENTIMENTS AND EASTERN ASIAN DEMANDS: 
FUKUDA’S DRIVE TO LEGITIMATE JAPAN’S HEGEMONY
With the help of Japan’s own area specialists—tellingly many were of Marxist 
orientation, as will be shown in the next section—Japanese politicians, bureaucrats, and 
businessmen were made to understand that Japan had to become genuinely interested in 
Eastern Asian development if Japanese presence in the region was to continue without 
violence against Japanese property. After the riots against the Japanese presence, 
Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda made openly political policies in response to regional
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demands, advocating a rapid economic development strategy for Eastern Asia. This 
departure from the Yoshida Doctrine could no longer be understood by traditional 
realism, as it actually went so far as to address Eastern Asian economic needs while 
maintaining Japanese military forces at a bare minimum.155
Subsection 4.2.1 discusses the Fukuda Doctrine in terms of its ability to address 
regional demands. Subsection 4.2.2 considers the legitimation of Japanese hegemony 
via the communicative action of regional links or networks of elite business people, 
bureaucrats and academics. Subsection 4.2.3 addresses the crucial issue of the 
legitimacy of the Fukuda Doctrine, discussing how it met regional needs of rapid 
economic development via overtly political measures such as Overseas Development 
Aid (ODA) and Japanese foreign direct investment (JFDI) directed at Eastern Asia, 
leaving us to inquire how such ideas could have come about. This issue is then 
addressed in the subsequent section, 4.3.0, which considers Japanese think tanks.
4.2.1 The Fukuda Doctrine: addressing regional demands
Japan’s mild interest in development led to a reaction against its presence in Eastern 
Asia. In 1977 Takeo Fukuda, who had succeeded Miki Takeo as prime minister in 
December 1976, responded to this situation in a famous policy speech in Manila that 
laid out the basic philosophical framework for Japan's relationship with ASEAN, and 
thus also the rest of Eastern Asia, including Indochina and Northeast Asia. Prime 
Minister Fukuda outlined three basic principles that would constitute the guiding 
framework for the new relationship between Japan and ASEAN:
1. Japan, a nation committed to peace, was resolved to contribute to the peace 
and prosperity of Southeast Asia and would not take the path to become a 
great military power despite its economic and technological capabilities.
2. Japan, as a true friend of the countries of Southeast Asia, would do its best for 
consolidating the relationship of mutual confidence and trust based on "heart- 
to-heart" understanding with these countries and become an equal partner of 
ASEAN and its member countries. She was determined to co-operate 
positively with them in their own efforts to strengthen their solidarity and 
resilience.
3. Together with other nations of the like mind outside the region, Japan would 
aim at fostering a relationship based on mutual understanding with the nations 
of Indochina, and thus intend to contribute to the building of peace and 
prosperity throughout Southeast Asia. We all should recognise that the future 
stability and prosperity of the ASEAN area could only be assured within a 
framework of peaceful progress throughout Southeast Asia as a whole.156
The Fukuda Doctrine sought to maintain regional stability in Asia through economic 
means as well as through the traditional means of security co-operation. Other Japanese
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leaders have since followed this same doctrine, albeit under their own labels. Prime 
Minister Ohira Masayoshi (1978-1980) advocated a comprehensive approach to 
national security in the shadow of the US-Japan security treaty. With Japan’s power 
growing in the region, he saw that a vibrant industrial base, robust economy, beneficial 
export relationships, and an active foreign assistance program contributed to national 
security (Akaha 1991). He also led the “Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept” to 
establish of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) early in the 1980s.
Table 3: Progression from Yoshida to the Fukuda Doctrines
Yoshida Doctrine Fukuda Doctrine
Diplomacy • Characterised by realpolitik and 
great dependence on the US.
• Use link with friendly countries 
to further develop links with 
hostile states.
• Use multilateralism to position 
Japan in the international system.
• “Reactive” policies to Eastern 
Asia, a result of getting some 
distance from the US.
• Develop direct bilateral ties with 
meaningful interactions.
•  Continue with multilateralism, 
with Japan taking on more 
assertive roles within international 
institutions such as the World 
Bank.
Security • Rely on the US.
• Postpone development of Japan 
military.
• Strict anti-communist stance in 
line with US demands.
•  Continue to rely on US, but 
develop regional security forums.
• Develop defensive structure.
•  Increasingly co-operate with 
communist regimes despite US 
policy.
Economics • Focus on domestic economic 
development.
• Use regional economies for trade 
and investment ties.
•  Focus on domestic expansion.
• Continue trade and investment 
ties.
• Develop regional market with pro­
active policies.
• Accede to Eastern Asian relative 
gains objectives.
Culture • Some official cultural exchange.
• Japan isolated. The Japanese 
tourists mostly travelling to 
Europe and North America.
•  Rare Japanese programmes on 
TV in the region.
• Numerous cultural exchanges.
• Japan part of the region, with 
Japanese tourists obviously 
present.
• Japanese pop culture making it to 
the TVs and “walkmans” of the 
region.
In a departure from the ideas within Yoshida Doctrine—see Table 3 above—the Fukuda 
Doctrine eventually led to the launching of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
1 S7in 1989 and to various other forums in the 1990s, including those in security. The 
differences between the 1950s Yoshida Doctrine and the post 1970s Fukuda Doctrine 
played a fundamental role in positively changing perceptions of Japan in Eastern Asia. 
As argued by Yahuda (1996), the Yoshida Doctrine can be seen as being concerned
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with great powers: the US, Russia and especially China. According to this realist 
worldview, Japan’s relations with smaller Eastern Asian countries can be seen as a by­
product of the need for normalisation with economic growth to stave off communism. 
Donnelly and Stubbs (1996:169) point to the gradual “appreciation that communist 
insurgencies were undermined by increased employment and higher wages and that 
communist states were interested in sharing the growing economic prosperity of the 
region by developing better trading links with the ASEAN states.” However, after the 
violence against Japanese property by disaffected elements in Eastern Asian society, it 
became obvious that merely playing realist power politics was inadequate. Thus, 
winning heart and minds became important in a way not anticipated by realist theory, 
unless one deliberately includes within this tradition issues of consent and legitimacy 
raised by Gramsci (1937) and Habermas (1976) respectively.158 Whereas Yoshida used 
the Cold War to Japan’s advantage, as a realist would when dealing with strong and 
weak states, Fukuda had to react to the legitimation crisis left in the wake of such 
policies. Eastern Asians were interested in closing the material gap with Japan, and the 
course that offered legitimation for Japan had to address this issue. This was especially 
so as Japan had not actually paid the reparations as demanded for its imperial-fascist era 
aggression in the region.
At this juncture the Japanese government needed to act decisively, and in this the 
bureaucracy was aided by the knowledge base of Japanese area studies. Interestingly, 
the most prominent of these was set up by Marxist specialists sympathetic to post 
colonial Eastern Asian states, at the government sponsored Institute of Developing 
Economies (IDE) or Ajiken. Thus the Fukuda Doctrine had the full benefit of 
knowledge that true reconciliation with Japan’s colonial victims could only take place 
by leading the region’s rapid economic growth at rates that allowed living standards to 
keep rising with public demands, legitimising governments in the region. This growth 
eventually became famous as the “East Asian Miracle.”159 While it took place, Tokyo 
had to have the fortitude to entrust the region with the military security of Japan’s own 
crucial economic interests.160
4.2.2 Legitimation of Japanese hegemony via regional links
The academic debate on the development of Japanese policy in the post WW II era has 
been dominated by discussion of Japan’s lack of leadership initiatives. Yet these
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included the efforts of Japanese scholar Kiyoshi Kojima’s proposal for a Pacific Free 
Trade Area (PAFTA), the Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD), the 
Pacific Basin Economic Community (PBEC), the Organization for Pacific Trade and 
Development (OPTAD), and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC). 
These institutional initiatives laid the basis for countries in the region to cooperate with 
each other in dealing with economic affairs in time with the birth of the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum was the consequence these efforts. However, in 
the 1970s, with coopertation at the level of “talk,” the problems arising from reliance on 
Washington, including the Nixon shock of US rapprochement with China, and the 
growth of anti-Japanese sentiments in Eastern Asia, forced Japan to utilize available 
knowledge to address the region’s problems at their roots. Rather than go the way of a 
military build up, as was possible with Washington’s encouragement, Fukuda set out to 
address the root causes of anti-Japanese sentiments. Strengthening Japan’s position in 
the Asian region in reaction to possible US withdrawal, Fukuda announced his doctrine 
in Manila in August 1977.161
The Fukuda Doctrine, which acceded to demands from the region, successfully set the 
modified intellectual tone for Japan’s engagement in Eastern Asia in the last decades of 
the 20th century. In 2000, a Japanese minister stated:
Let me here offer a pledge to the leaders and peoples of ASEAN. My pledge 
is that the government and people of Japan will never be sceptical bystanders 
in regard to ASEAN's efforts to achieve increased resilience and greater 
regional solidarity. But will always be with you as good partners, walking 
hand in hand with ASEAN. The ASEAN heads of government, in our recent 
meetings, called Japan ‘an especially close friend’ of ASEAN. A true friend 
is one who offers his hand in understanding and cooperation, not only in fair 
weather, but in adverse circumstances as well. I know Japan will be such a 
friend to ASEAN.162
This speech in Singapore is just one example of the many formal and informal ways in 
which the Fukuda Doctrine bore fruit, strengthening Japan’s ties in the region and with 
ASEAN in particular. Significantly, many organisations have sprung up as a result of 
this doctrine. For example, Japan created the Southeast Asia Promotion Centre for 
Trade, Investment, and Tourism (SEAPCENTRE), an inter-governmental organisation 
between ASEAN and Japan. Japan has also enhanced cultural exchanges with ASEAN 
through the establishment of ASEAN Cultural Fund. Perhaps one of the most important 
regional organisations that address regional integration is APEC, which has it origins 
with a network of scholars of which the Japanese were leaders.
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One of the dozens of high level organisations with regional influence that exposes Japan 
to Eastern Asian needs and vice versa is the ASEAN Council of Japan Alumni 
(ASCOJA) with its meetings every two years (see Table 41.
Table 4: ASCOJA Conference 1977-2001
NUMBER YEAR CHAPTER/COUNTRY
1st 1977 Jugas, Singapore
2nd 1978 Persada, Jakarta, Indonesia
3rd 1979 Ojsat Bangkok, Thailand
4th 1981 Philfeja Manila, Philippines
5th 1983 Jagam Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
6th 1985 Jugas, Singapore
7th 1987 Persada Jakarta, Indonesia
8th 1989 Ojsat Bangkok, Thailand
9th 1991 Philfeja Manila, Philippines
10th 1993 Jagam Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
11th 1995 Jugas Singapore
12th 1997 Persada Jakarta, Indonesia
13th 1999 Ojsat Bangkok, Thailand
14th 2001 Philfeja Manila-Philippines
In 1974 Takeo Fukuda, who was then the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, realised 
the importance of the alumni. In June 1977, Japan alumni had the opportunity to 
establish the Council at Manila, Philippines with the support of the government of Japan. 
At that time, it was estimated that there were approximately 26,000 alumni members 
from five countries. In August 1977, the first ASCOJA meeting was held in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia. Since then ASCOJA members have met to discuss regional issues. 
The meetings have emphasised the increasing depth of the relationship at the now well- 
known “heart-to-heart” level prioritised in the Fukuda Doctrine. With time, the 
association has come to reflect more positively on Japan as a result of its ‘global public 
goods’ role. In a keynote address at the ASCOJA meeting in 2001, former Philippine 
Foreign Secretary Domingo L. Siazon, Jr. noted:
As former students in Japan, you can appreciate the positive role Japan has 
played in the industrialization of Southeast Asia. Thanks to investment, 
technology transfer, human resources cooperation and market access from 
Japan, the original ASEAN members have become important exporters.
Through export-driven growth, they diversified their economies, lessening 
their dependence on agriculture while modernizing their industrial and 
services sectors [emphasis mine].163
122
Given such network power allowing recognition of Japan’s public goods role in Eastern 
Asia as noted by Katzenstein and Shiraishi (1996), it is understandable how Japanese 
firms managed to overcome the setbacks of the 1970s attacks on their property. They 
did so with the assistance of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), with Japan’s Marxist area specialists at 
the IDE or Ajiken taking on a prominent advisory role with excellent policy papers on 
the needs of the region. Japanese firms also dealt with the animosity towards them 
through lower profile investments via joint ventures, as in Thailand (Unger 1989: 119). 
Such joint investment complimented the developmentalist drive of the elite and the 
nationalist bourgeoisie in Southeast Asia (Kesavatana 1989: 82-86). They addressed the 
post colonial state’s desire for rapid economic development, which was understood by 
the Marxist economists at IDE. The continued movement of Japanese firms into Eastern 
Asia gave them an opportunity to ease the prevailing anti-Japanese feelings there, with 
firms training a new host labour force, agreeing to higher wages, and improving 
working conditions (Koike & Inoki 1990; Chew, et al 1993).
4.2.3 Legitimation and the Fukuda Doctrine: meeting regional needs
From the 1980s onward Japanese policy towards Eastern Asia met regional demands for 
‘global public goods,’ leading even traditional critics of Japan to offer words of 
appreciation. For example, Singapore’s former Prime Minister and now Chief Minister, 
Lee Kuan Yew, carefully cultivated younger politicians, and according to one of them, 
Lim Hng Kiang:
Looking back, the Fukuda Doctrine was a very significant and explicit 
commitment whereby Japan pledged itself as a partner of ASEAN, in its 
efforts to achieve increased resilience and greater regional solidarity.
Although not explicitly stated, the Fukuda Doctrine was a response to the 
extremely precarious position of ASEAN countries after the fall of Indochina.
In other words, it was a strategic and political response to a political and 
strategic threat. In his 1977 speech, Prime Minister Fukuda also outlined the 
goal of a united Southeast Asia: o f peaceful and co-operative relations 
between ASEAN and Indochina. It was a bold vision only two years after the 
victory of communist forces in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. But today,
ASEAN-10 has become a reality.164
Thus, while the Fukuda Doctrine of 1977 can be seen as a continuation of the policy of 
eschewing Japanese militarism as promulgated under the Yoshida Doctrine, it went 
further to make Tokyo a more active partner in Eastern Asian economic development 
via concerted use of Overseas Development Aid (ODA) and Japanese foreign direct 
investment (JFDI) in an ODA—»FDI regime captured by the ‘global public goods’
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argument.165 This meant that Japan actually moved beyond the policies of the early post 
war years, explained adequately by realism, towards meeting material demands that 
were translated by the country’s Marxist-leaning area specialists and economists, so 
making Tokyo a responsible hegemon.
With the Fukuda era the grant component of ODA began to increase and recipients were 
allowed a greater degree of control. This was made easier as ODA followed the pattern 
set by war reparations, where Yen credits were used to give Southeast Asia a choice in 
what to receive from Japan. Under the circumstances Japanese aid increasingly became 
one of “self-help,” as the concerned governments were encouraged to propose areas of 
need, often in co-operation with Japanese firms that would bid for the implementation 
of the contract. The improved programs focused on key domestic ‘public goods’ in the 
area of infrastructure, such as power, roads, and seaports, and were followed by the 
1987 New Asian Industries Development Plan (NAIDP) among many others. 
Ultimately, legitimating Japanese hegemony depended on a political understanding of 
what was expected from Japan in Eastern Asia. The rapid spread of Ajiken’s ideas in the 
region was aided by Japanese ODA and further assisted by the region’s interest in 
Japan’s own very successful development experience (Arkasnee 1983: 24). These 
factors combined to lead the region to make rapid economic gains, and this was 
ultimately what allowed Japanese hegemony to be legitimate, thus explaining its 
improved relations in Eastern Asia.
4.3.0 THE ORIGINS OF LEGITIMATING JAPANESE HEGEMONY:
THE MARXIST FOCUS IN JAPAN’S AREA STUDIES
Since the early Meiji era, Japanese scholars and political leaders have made an intensive 
effort to understand the world beyond Japan, as with the Iwakura Mission to the West 
that spurred Japan to “Great Power” status by creating and emulating the useful 
institutions and dominant norms of the day. This tradition of study continued to include 
regional area studies resulting in the creation of a large body of scholars, making Japan 
the leading repository of knowledge about Eastern Asia. In the post war era this 
knowledge base was further developed with government sponsorship in order to 
accommodate the state’s need to understand the challenges facing Japan in the region. 
With the network of scholars in place in the region, Japanese ideas could also easily
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travel in the opposite direction, to affect policies in Eastern Asia. Indeed, Eastern Asia 
provides cases of networking between think tanks to propel new policy ideas into 
decision making at both a domestic and a regional level.166 The number of think tanks 
in Eastern Asian countries, are relatively small, however they are relatively powerful as 
they are well connected to their respective governments, garnering funding from that 
source. These think tanks had significant policy impact from the late 1970s onward, 
promoting Eastern Asian economic co-operation through the regional policy community. 
Thus the evolution of the regional economic idea has been a long process (Woods 1993). 
Its introduction onto the policy agenda of the states of the Asia Pacific region, and 
between the state decision making communities of the region, has been via the 
evolution of a regional ‘policy network.’167 What is interesting is the location of ideas 
for these ‘networks,’ and here it is becomes clear that Japanese efforts to inculcate the 
region with ‘developmentalism’ have succeeded, given their understanding of regional 
needs. Thus it comes as no surprise that Japanese knowledge in the region has served 
the region as an ‘international public good’.
Subsection 4.3.1 provides greater detail on some of the key issues mentioned above, 
exploring the formation and progress of the Institute for Developing Economies (IDE) 
or Ajiken. Subsection 4.3.2 explores the more academic Kyoto-based Centre for 
Southeast Asian Studies and “Comprehensive Chiki Kenkyu.” Subsection 4.3.3 points 
to the weakness of such focused research institutes, given the challenges of 
globalisation and the decline of commitments to post colonial states’ concerns within 
the new liberal international order favoured by the “Washington Consensus.”
4.3.1 Japan’s Marxist economic analysis and pro-Eastern Asian policy168 
To properly appreciate Japanese policy in the context of economic development in 
Eastern Asia it is first necessary to understand the role of two key institutions and the 
extent of their work. In particular, it is necessary to appreciate the Marxist origins of 
Japanese thinking on Eastern Asia. This subject has not traditionally captured the 
attention of foreign scholars, who typically criticise Japanese policy as inferior to 
Western aid policies, considering only the gains achieved by Japan and not those made 
by Eastern Asia (Arase 1995). Suehiro (1997) notes that in the post war era, popular 
ideas about Eastern Asia came from several Japanese institutions dedicated to studying
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the region, thus bringing home a profoundly important knowledge base. The two main 
institutions are:
(1) The Ajia Mondai Chosakai (Research Society for Asian Affairs), which was 
renamed in 1954 as the Ajia Kydkai (Society for Economic Co-operation in 
Asia) and then became the current Ajia Keizai Kenkyujo, or Ajiken. Known in 
the English language as the Institute for Asian Economic Affairs, it then became 
the Institute for Developing Economies or IDE. In 1998 it was put under the 
Japan External Trade Relations Organisation (JETRO).
(2) Kyoto University’s Tonan Ajia Kenkyu Senta (Center for Southeast Asian 
Studies).
Suehiro (1997) notes that these institutions developed a uniquely Japanese form of area 
studies, chiiki kenkyu, typified by a bias towards Asia as well as by a purposeful evasion 
of academic discipline. They were guided by a Marxist understanding of the world, and 
focused on understanding the developing world in Asia on its own terms. Although such 
institutions did promote useful policy which helped to guide and improve Japan’s 
relations in Eastern Asia, the focus of Japanese area studies was too narrow to address 
the strategic changes influencing capitalism that were to undermine ‘global public 
goods’ and precipitate crisis in ways suggested by Marx himself.
The most important think tank involved in Japan’s interpretation of, and policy towards 
post colonial Eastern Asia, is the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) or Ajiken. 
Based in the policy furnace of the Kasumigaseki district in Tokyo, Ajiken has 
influenced Japan’s policy towards Eastern Asia since the late 1970s. Suehiro (1997) 
argues that Japanese non-governmental research institutions like Ajia Mondai 
Chosakai/Ajia Kydkai were expected to generate economic co-operation initiatives with 
the transparent objective of winning friends and placating enemies. Research on 
economic conditions in Asia provided useful data for the government, particularly 
regional information of a technical (and ostensibly non-ideological) nature. In other 
words, as Suehiro notes (1997: 20):
although theories of national development were important to the Ajia Kydkai, 
its basic purposes were the collection, analysis, and distribution of useful 
political and economic information for policy-specific needs, including the 
development o f  trade and investment ties and the solution o f the reparations 
issue, both of them ultimately related to the nebulous category of keizai 
kydryoku or economic co-operation. In practice this meant that scholars were
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expected to go into the field or to get primary information resources and to 
distribute them; it further meant that researchers became experts on the 
regions under their purview, but that they were not ultimately tied to a 
specific academic discipline. [My emphasis.]
These government-funded organisations provided researchers from far-flung fields with 
the chance to build personal networks that would aid further research. It is clear that 
from the onset their work had geo-strategic and normative elements built in, considering 
the class-conscious nature of their work and its pro-Asia bias. For those unaware of the 
post-WW II dominance of Marxist scholars in Japan, the Asia-wide policies sponsored 
by Tokyo appeared to have much in common with the infamous “Greater East Co­
prosperity Sphere,” an idea used as propaganda by the Imperial Japanese Army to gain 
political advantage in Eastern Asia. With the US rehabilitation of Prime Minister Kishi, 
who was indicted at the end of WW II for war crimes, the connection to this imperial 
past remained fraught with tensions. Suehiro (1997:22) points out that Ajia Mondai 
Chdsakai/Ajia Kydkai’s guiding light Fujizaki,169
had close ties to former war criminal Kishi and could be seen as somewhat 
anti-Western in their political orientation. Kishi, for example, stood against 
what he viewed as the West’s desire for “democracy based on self-interest” 
and instead supported what he referred to as a “nation-based” political system.
These feelings were echoed by Itagaki, who was attempting to figure out 
ways to get the energy of post colonial nationalism fed into “modem” (or 
ostensibly productive) nationalism. Building off theories o f national 
development of such economists as Friedrich List, Itagaki and Fujizaki 
favoured “practical” research, which was also of course consistent with the 
orientation of Ajia Kydkai’s members from the financial world and the 
bureaucracy. In fact, a quick survey of authors as well as special themes of 
Ajia Mondai indicates detailed research on nation-building efforts, economic 
development planning, and the interaction between communism and 
nationalism in the region and in specific countries comprised virtually all of 
the content, and that the authors came from the financial world, the 
bureaucracy, the think tanks, the universities, the media, and other disparate 
sources.170 [My emphasis.]
With funding for research on Asia cut in the late 1950s, the leading voices of Ajia 
Kydkai sought to revive activities by adapting to the new emphasis on Asia implied by 
Prime Minister Kishi’s two regional trips in 1957, first to Burma, India, Thailand, 
Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and Taiwan, and then to South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaya, 
Singapore, Indonesia, New Zealand, and the Philippines later in the year. Suehiro 
notes that in planning the trips, Kishi and his cabinet decided to propose the 
establishment of this new research institute for the Asian economies, a concept that 
became the genesis of Ajia Keizai Kenkyujo, or Ajiken.
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Not surprisingly, MOFA and MITI fought over the role of the proposed centre, with the 
more powerful MITI winning control of it as a result of the political emphasis on 
economic gain for Japan. MOFA was left to govern the new Nihon Kokusai Mondai 
Kenkyujo, or, the Japan Institute of International Affairs. Despite being directed by a 
businessman put in place by MITI, from the onset the intellectual mindset of Ajiken was 
one that grappled with Southeast Asia on its own terms. Ajiken was formally established 
as a shadan hdjin (public association) in 1957, but its status was upgraded to that of 
tokushu hdjin (special public corporation, created by the government to pursue certain 
objectives) in 1960, at which point it was placed squarely in the middle of Tokyo 
politics. As it turned out, this Tokyo knowledge base played a key role in shaping 
Japanese understandings of Eastern Asia and thus how to address anti-Japanese 
sentiments there. Moreover, it was this institution that spread ‘developmentalist’ ideas 
within Asia itself, with its influential policy papers and role as host for scores of Asian 
researchers over four decades. It was the work of Ajiken that allowed understandings of 
‘developmentalism’ in the West, as their economists developed the original ideas of the 
World Bank’s 1992 East Asian Miracle report, the pinnacle of Ajiken success in 
challenging Anglo-American dominance within international organisations.
According to Suhiro (1997), Ajiken’s first president, Tohata Seiichi, formerly a 
professor emeritus at the University of Tokyo and an expert on agricultural economics, 
saw that Japan needed a new concept of chiiki kenkyu, or area studies, that would allow 
for country-by-country studies. Pre-war research, he argued, had been done when only 
when opportune for national policy, and so Japanese universities lacked any real system 
for chiiki kenkyu, except in the case of research on China. His desire for comprehensive 
studies—encompassing, among other things, “legal, political, religious natural, 
technical, ethnological, and ethnographic issues”—was so persuasive that it shaped the 
research style of Ajiken staff researchers, as evidenced by the large number of Ajiken 
experts dispatched to Asian countries to live for two or three years in the field in order 
to absorb everything they could about a given country. Indeed, it is useful to think of 
Ajiken’s conception of comprehensive field research as being absorption in a local 
culture with efforts to come to grips with existing conditions in any one country.172 Due 
to its ties to MITI and its research budget and materials, Ajiken’s research program 
affected not only its direct employees, but also those scholars asked to contribute to 
research projects. For example, when a number of important scholars came together to
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form a research association on economic development planning, they emphasised the 
economic co-operation and investment environments of each individual country.173
Suehiro notes that after 1965, Ajiken-based researchers became increasingly interested 
in the specific problems facing Asian countries, such as the structure of village society 
and land ownership. Even in these new projects, Professor Tohata urged his colleagues 
to use the chiiki kenkyu methods and at the same time suggested that they work from 
Japan’s experience as a late-industrialising country in order to grasp the special 
characteristics of Asian villages. When publications from this association began to 
appear, it was obvious that the scholars involved had heeded this advice, as the volumes 
tended to feature articles on the current conditions facing individual countries. This type 
of work has influenced even present research, as in the case of studies of the need for 
Japan to take on a more aggressive role in importing from the region.174
Suehiro argues in terms of wider influence of this perspective over time. Researchers at 
Ajiken had themselves been working in this Asia-centred framework since they were in 
their twenties or thirties, leading to a clear disposition towards deep immersion in 
current conditions rather than to any sort of disciplinary orthodoxy. This type of 
approach was often criticised, but ultimately, it meant that the impact of such thinking 
spread far beyond the walls of Ajiken. Not only do scholars who worked with Ajiken use 
the research methods favoured by the organisation in their own work, but also a great 
number of these researchers moved on to posts at universities. As of 1996, there were 
130 former Ajiken researchers employed by the nation’s universities, teaching chiiki 
kenkyu to a new generation of scholars (Suehiro 1997:24). In addition, scores of Asian 
researchers have gone through the study rooms and libraries of the Spartan settings at 
Ajiken. These Asian researchers have been instrumental in shaping policy upon their 
return to their own countries, forming institutes focused on Japanese-style development, 
or at least intending to.175 Although the trend of Ajiken research continues to be focused 
on Eastern Asian development, some Japanese researchers and academics are daring to 
suggest its relevance to Latin America as well (Hosono & Saavedra-Rivano 1998 and 
Saavedra-Rivano, Akio & Stallings 2001).
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4.3.2 Convergence to Ajiken: guiding Japan’s ‘global public goods’
The second research institution promoting chiki kenkyu was the Kyoto-based Southeast 
Asian Studies and “Comprehensive chiki kenkyu.” It began in 1959 and grew into the 
Tonan Ajia Kenkyu Senta (The Centre for Southeast Asian Studies) after scholars 
received a grant from the Ford Foundation in 1963.176 Away from the policy centre of 
Kasumigaseki in Tokyo, the Kyoto link is significant as it too eventually entered into 
practical policymaking to assist Eastern Asian economic development. While this 
institution initially began as another tradition of research along the lines of disciplinary 
work, it eventually came to focus on work of the sort that took place in Tokyo. Suehiro 
(1997) notes four features that distinguish the Centre from MITI-led Ajiken:
(1) Its membership, which was smaller than Ajiken’s, was composed almost entirely 
of scholars, rather than bureaucrats, politicians, and members of the financial 
world.
(2) Its research was directed not at policy but rather at issues better described as 
academic in orientation.
(3) Members of think tanks and Chiiki Kenkyu came from both the natural as well as 
human and social sciences, as demonstrated by the fact that affiliated researchers 
were scholars in departments as diverse as medicine, literature, law, education, 
pharmaceuticals, and geography.
(4) Unlike Ajiken, where most of the researchers had been trained in the Marxist 
tradition popular among Japanese economists and political scientists, the core 
members of the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, and natural scientists in 
particular, were scholars who demonstrated little interest in the Marxist 
approach.
Suehiro (1997) argues that according to the Centre’s version, which was formulated 
partially on the basis of American-style area studies, chiiki kenkyu, had to be based on:
(1) the unification of research and training organisations;
(2) comprehensive research based on interdepartmental co-operation;
(3) an emphasis on current issues more than on history;
(4) learning the language of the country one aspired to study;
(5) the development of discipline-based training;
(6) field surveys;
(7) the organisation of relevant source materials and bibliographies.
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He argues that, in particular, factors 1, 2, and 5 present a contrast to the Ajiken 
perspective, though the Centre’s method changed over time. For example, in the early 
years of field research in the 1960s, the Centre’s chiiki kenkyu group projects generally 
revolved around multidisciplinary studies of, for example, village life in Malaysia. 
Individual scholars from fields such as physical geography, medicine, sociology, and 
anthropology would work together to generate comprehensive surveys in what became 
known as the “core project method.” Similarly, the Centre would also sponsor 
individual researchers who hoped to focus on a given country like Thailand by 
completing a study within their own discipline, or the “individual project method.” 
Significantly, both of these approaches meant that information was shared between 
scholars from different disciplines.
During the 1970s, however, an increasing number of scholars, having developed new 
theoretical interests as a result of the productivity of the multidisciplinary methods, 
began to adopt arguments from different fields in order to supplement their work. 
Indeed, many came to work more closely together to write joint papers that effectively 
merged disciplines into more comprehensive studies of particular aspects of life in Asia. 
In other words, in contrast to its earlier “multidisciplinary” approach, the Centre’s 
method in the 1970s could best be described as “interdisciplinary.” Suehiro (1997: 25- 
26) notes this trend would accelerate in the 1980s
when Yano Torn, who had been the head of the Joint Research Planning 
Committee, argued that chiiki kenkyu ought to consider the fact that the areas 
under observation were generally developing countries, and that studies on 
them would likely be expected to yield useful advice and knowledge; in other 
words, mere academic pursuits might be sublimated to the need for practical 
knowledge. In order to forestall the collapse of broad academic pursuits, he 
argued that the Centre’s research ought to be designed to allow experts to 
grasp all aspects of life in their area of study, meaning that they ought to 
focus on “comprehensive chiiki kenkyu” or “general ecological studies” 
rather than on specific disciplines.
To the extent that chiiki kenkyu began to emerge as total immersion in a foreign culture 
rather than discipline-driven research, research at the Centre moved further away from 
the concept of “area studies” popularised in the US and Europe. Ultimately, this meant 
that research at the Centre began to resemble—in form if not always in content—the 
kind of chiiki kenkyu favoured at Ajiken. As its normative lens, it supported Marxist 
style concern for the development of Eastern Asia as the only viable foreign policy for 
Japan.177
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4.3.3 The domestic focus of chiiki kenkyu: vulnerability to systemic forces
Suehiro (1997: 26) suggests Japanese chiiki kenkyu will continue down the somewhat 
iconoclastic road it has been paving over the past decades. He notes (1997: 25-26):
perhaps the most interesting example of Japanese areas studies is by 
Tsuchiya Kenji, a political scientist who did his graduate studies in 
international relations at the University o f Tokyo. In his field work on 
Indonesia, Tsuchiya found that he was unable to grasp political science in the 
country without addressing the history of Dutch colonialism, ethnic reactions 
and ethnic movements, the Indonesian language, traditional music, art, and 
the like. He termed this comprehensive approach “culturism,” and his work 
Karutini no Fukei (Kartini’s Scenery) is a vivid symbol of his research style, 
in its description of the period of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia from the 
imagined perspective of an Indonesian woman. In a subsequent article in the 
journal Shiso, Tsuchiya argued that in chiki kenkyu, the researcher must be 
aware of and resigned to the need to ask unceasingly what chiiki kenkyu is 
and what is the basis of this existence, and that the only way that one could 
demonstrate this awareness was “to come face to face with the aporia of 
one’s own chiki kenkyu, to draw it to oneself, to make oneself [rather than an 
academic article—author] the ‘work’ (sakuhin) of one’s research.” In other 
words, for Tsuchiya, this was work as sociology, and the work produced was 
to transcend simple time/space categories by de-centring the researcher as an 
objective, external observer.
The institutional background of chiiki kenkyu is one of public think tanks aiming at 
policy-relevant research and at “group research” that has moved scholars towards more 
comprehensive approaches eschewing strict disciplinary or theoretical formulae 
(Suehiro 1997: 27). With this pedigree, the fundamentally changed situation in late 20th 
century poses problems for chiiki kenkyu on Asia. In the post-Cold War era, 
industrialisation, economic globalisation, and the development of more rapid 
telecommunications and increased information sharing has stripped away the “local” 
context. Without adequate research on the connection and interaction between the local 
and global, the policy prescriptions of such institutions were bound to be myopic.
The focus of Japanese chiiki kenkyu or area studies served to popularise Japan’s own 
experience in development, but more importantly it also encouraged Tokyo to 
understand the goals of nationalists in Eastern Asia, as only Marxist-oriented critiques 
could fully transmit the goals of post colonial peoples in their terms. Hence the method 
of total immersion into each culture in order to understand the world from the local 
perspective ensured that Tokyo policymakers could truly comprehend the aspirations of 
Eastern Asians. However, Japanese chiiki kenkyu, did not address capitalism at the 
international level, and thus failed to consider the effects of weakened state control over 
economic affairs in the face of globalisation due to deregulation and technological
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factors. Most importantly, these researchers did not observe that post WW II capitalist 
growth depended upon the ‘global public goods’ provided by the US, and so they failed 
to recognize that the lack of such goods in the post-Cold War era increased the
t *78likelihood that global capitalism would face a severe crisis.
The problem for Japanese scholars of chiiki kenkyu is that empirical knowledge, even 
the most thorough understanding of “local conditions,” cannot replace theoretical 
understandings or a more objective method of comparison that comes from willingness 
to study things outside of a particular regions as well. Moreover, a narrow focus on 
local perspectives cannot lead to structural perspectives. Without the ability to 
understand the local in relation to the global, chiiki kenkyu scholars missed broader 
systemic shifts that came to affect Eastern Asian societies. Such vulnerabilities came to 
mean that responses to emerging problems not could keep pace with crises. While it is 
by now both trite and misleading to speak of “globalisation” and the creation of a 
“borderless world,” chiiki kenkyu scholars simply could not grasp such ideas in time to 
provide early warning to the Japanese government about crises to come.179
Additionally, if, as Suehiro argues, we accept chiiki kenkyu as the absorption of specific 
knowledge about the present conditions of a given area, it becomes almost impossible 
for the discipline to transmit knowledge to other scholars or to the next generation of 
researchers. Current understandings suggest that there is no way for one to become a 
chiiki kenkyu expert without thoroughly immersing oneself in one’s subject, learning the 
language, living with the people, and getting to understand the society thoroughly as a 
participant, and this problematises one’s own place as an objective observer. He states 
that while there are no doubt benefits to this approach, it nevertheless presents 
something of a quandary when teaching students, given that little can be said besides, 
“Go there and learn”. Suehiro concludes that this results in scores of Japanese experts 
who thoroughly understand the region but who, in principle, are unable to do much 
more than provide some specific information on given issues for use in articles, policy 
papers, and the like, rather than to pass on genuine understanding to other scholars or 
students. “So rather than generating a large body of knowledge,” he suggests, “we are 
generating a large number of individual bodies of knowledge about Asia” (Suehiro 
1997: 27). He (1997: 20) argues
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the organization of knowledge for public purposes actually started to dovetail 
with a growing anti-theoretical or anti-establishment slant on the part of 
academics, and is leading us further down the road of—to borrow Clifford 
Geertz’s famous phrase—“thick description” rather than narrowly disciplined 
or theoretically productive work.180
Although Suehiro suggests that Japanese area studies have not been directed 
theoretically, in fact the very idea of approaching the post colonial periphery on its own 
terms is a theoretical stance par excellence. However, its weakness is its lack of regional 
and global orientation, and its consequent failure to appreciate the connections between 
the global/regional and the local.
Conclusion THE “LOOK EAST” EFFECT IN EASTERN ASIA: 
LEGITIMATION OF JAPANESE HEGEMONY
The role of Japan as a purveyor of “developmentalist” ideas in Eastern Asia resulted in 
the system spreading within the region, even to post colonial states with ties to Britain 
and Holland, but no historical links to Japan, as is the case with most ASEAN nations. 
The domestic political rationale for Eastern Asian ‘developmentalism’ lay in the 
structural limitations experienced by minor countries in the international capitalist 
system, as can be seen in Peter Katzenstein’s (1978) work on small European states “in 
the world market.” However, the structural limitations within the international capitalist 
system for post colonial states are much more challenging. Given Japan’s positive role 
at the structural level in providing the ideas that organised economy and security—what 
might be seen metaphorically as regional ‘global public goods’—these conditions could 
be mitigated to allow catch-up development.
As a result of Japan’s positive regional role, unlike in the early part of the post-war era 
between 1951 and 1971 when these countries were in political and military turmoil, in 
the last two decades of the 20th century it became clear that the Eastern Asians were 
both capable of designating Japan a leader, and being able to follow its lead. This was 
particularly obvious within the policy community, as Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister 
Y.A.B. Dato Musa Hitam stated in October 1982:
If we are going to learn and benefit as in fact we are doing now, we should 
learn from the people who are best in the field. That is the policy behind the 
“Look East” policy now in force (Cited in Abegglen & Stalk: 266).
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With the confirmation coming with several states informally or formerly adopting 
“Look East” policies, such praise in Eastern Asia must be considered beyond mere 
sloganeering. Japanese policymakers leading the ‘developmentalist’ drive in the region 
found in such public pronouncements a great deal of encouragement.181
In broader terms, the affirmation of Japanese policy may be taken as a sign of the 
successful legitimation of Japan’s presence. This legitimation was made possible by the 
provision of ‘public goods’ to Eastern Asia in response to regional demands to be on a 
path to ‘catch-up’ with the developed world. Confirming that Japan’s relations in the 
region have improved, the region’s leadership has called for greater co-operation on all 
fronts from the early days of ASEAN’s existence (ASEAN 1987a and 1987b), with a 
call for greater Japanese involvement growing louder in the 1980s and 1990s. In this 
new regional system, Eastern Asians are attempting to tie their economies even closer to 
Japan, floating ideas such as an East Asian Economic Group or Caucus (EAEG or 
EAEC) with Tokyo as leader. “Look East” has meant, in practical terms, modernising 
the region with market economies while also maintaining the guiding hand of the state 
along the lines pioneered in Japan.
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Chapter 5
Japanese ‘Developmentalism’ for Post Colonial States: Global Public Goods’ 
Doctrine for Rapid Economic Development
After gaining praise from Asians for its Meiji era resistance to colonialism, Japan 
became reviled by the 1930s as it sought to coercively establish a “Greater Co­
prosperity sphere” in Eastern Asia (Miller 1994:34). Defeat in WW II brought this 
brazen attempt at imperialism to halt. Following the war, the new government of Prime 
Minister Yoshida Shigeru in 1946 and its successors in the 1950 and 1960s failed to win 
over Eastern Asians via aid and trade, with Japanese firms in the region exploiting 
natural resources in ways that invited comparison to US and European forays into Latin 
America, Africa and Asia. Thinking Asians saw no advantage in ‘dependent 
development’ that mirrored Latin America (Manglapus 1976). The surge of Japanese 
activity in Eastern Asia was eventually challenged, leading to violence against Japan’s 
property and the political humiliation of its, as with Prime Minister Tanaka Kakui.
By the late 1970s Japan addressed the core concerns of Eastern Asians, as identified by 
Marxist economists at the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) or Ajiken, shaping 
the Fukuda Doctrine of 1977. Whilst continuing an epoch defined by the pacifist policy 
of the Yoshida Doctrine, the new Fukuda Doctrine represented a formalisation of 
Japan’s active participation in rapid regional economic development. As such, it 
involved promoting Japan’s own brand of ‘catch up’ development for the countries of 
Eastern A sia.182 This new doctrine advocated Japan’s successful experience of 
‘developmentalist’ capitalism for Eastern Asia in lieu of the laissez faire favoured by 
the US. Hence, ‘developmentalist’ knowledge became a metaphorical ‘global public 
good’. In essence, the Japanese government used its own experience of 
‘developmentalism’ to win “hearts and minds” in Eastern Asia.
In addition to Japan’s active role in promoting ‘developmentalism’ in Eastern Asia, 
South Korea’s and Taiwan’s example, which came about in the historical context of 
Japanese empire (Kohli 1994), became a model for other post colonial states in the 
region. Japanese developmentalist institutions created for the imperial war machine 
were well positioned to propel South Korea and Taiwan. While these institutional 
actions were crucial at the domestic level, their agency was enabled by active Tokyo
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involvement in a classic exposition of agency within the structure of Japanese regional 
hegemony. As Eastern Asian states adopted the ‘developmentalism’ encouraged by 
Tokyo, the success or failure of these ideas at rapidly delivering economic gain came to 
determine judgments about Japan’s regional hegemony.183
This chapter provides evidence of how Japan’s ‘developmentalist’ knowledge was 
utilised in Eastern Asia with Tokyo’s sponsorship, showing us how the regional 
approach can be very generally characterised as “governing the market” out of the 
“periphery” such that South Korea was to became an early example for the region 
(Wade 1990, Haggard 1990, and Amsden 1989, 1994 & 1995). Japan’s ‘global public 
goods’ manifested itself in two ways. First, its experience combined with its value as a 
role model of success for other Asian states made them willing to copy aspects of its 
‘developmentalist’ growth. For example, Atul Kohli (1994 & 2003) traces the Japanese 
lineage of Korea's ‘developmental state.’ Secondly, and more crucially, as confirmed by 
Robert Wade (1996), is Japan’s advocacy of ‘developmentalism’ for the region, 
particularly its support for various policy tools affecting what can be characterised as 
‘global public goods’ in the area of knowledge. The results of such propagation are 
obvious when surveying the region’s systems, and Kenichi Ohno (2001) argues that 
Eastern Asian results present a marked contrast to those of other postcolonial states with 
slow or stagnating economic growth.184 He points to diversity in ecosystem, population, 
ethnicity, religion, social structure, and political regime in Eastern Asia, as well as to 
the even greater diversity in GDP, per capita income, and economic development. He 
argues that despite these variations, Eastern Asia has had high growth rates sustained 
over long periods, noting that this has been associated with high savings and investment 
rates, active but managed openness to the external world, export orientation, 
industrialization, and general improvements in social indicators, particularly 
education.185
Section 5.1.0 address the role of ‘developmentalism’ from Meiji to Heisei, allowing us 
to understand the history of Japan’s modernisation as coming from the 19th century. 
Section 5.2.0 discusses the influence of Japanese ideas on the role of 
‘developmentalism’ in Eastern Asia. Section 5.3.0 delves into theoretical approaches to 
economic development and focuses on the role of the state in ‘developmentalism.’
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5.1.0 ‘DEVELOPMENTALISM’ FROM MEIJI TO HEISEIs
THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN JAPAN’S CATCH-UP DEVELOPMENT
It is important to understand Japan’s experience with ‘developmentalism’ beginning 
with the Meiji Restoration in order to comprehend how Japan became the example for 
the Eastern Asia region to emulate. Japan’s early post war years were devoted to 
rebuilding industrial capacity lost to war. Major investments were made in electric 
power, coal, iron and steel, and chemical fertilizers. By the mid-1950s, production had 
risen to pre-war levels (Tsuru 1993). Once released from the demands of military- 
dominated government, the economy, guided by the Japanese Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI), not only recovered but surpassed the growth rates of earlier 
periods. Between 1953 and 1965, Japanese GDP expanded by more than 9 % per year, 
manufacturing and mining by 13 %, construction by 11 %, and infrastructure by 12 %. 
In 1965, these sectors employed more than 41 % of the labour force, whereas only 26 % 
remained in agriculture. The mid-1960s ushered in a new type of industrial 
development as the economy opened itself to international competition in some 
industries and developed heavy and chemical manufactures. Whereas textiles and light 
manufactures maintained their profitability internationally, other products, such as 
automobiles, ships, and machine tools, assumed new importance. The value added to 
manufacturing and mining grew at the rate of 17 % per year between 1965 and 1970. 
Eventually, growth rates slowed to about 8 % and evened out between the industrial 
and service sectors between 1970 and 1973, as retail trade, finance, real estate, 
information, and other service industries streamlined their operations.186 As Chalmers 
Johnson (1982 & 1987) explains, this was Japan’s “miracle” under the guidance of 
MITI, and it was the leading case of the ‘developmentalism’ for other nations to aspire 
to. In what follows, sub-section 5.1.1 traces the historical roots of the Japanese 
experience of ‘developmentalism’. Subsection 5.1.2 explores the Japanese post-WW II 
experience with ‘developmentalism.’ Thereafter, subsection 5.1.3 discusses Murakami 
Yasusuke’s (1996) theoretical perspective on the Japanese experience of 
‘developmentalism. ’
5.1.1 The roots of ‘developmentalism’ in the Meiji Restoration
One can say the story of Japanese ‘developmentalism’ began with the dawn of the Meiji 
(enlightened rule) era and more or less ended with the onset of the Heisei era, which 
appropriately enough means “clarity and harmony.” The Meiji Restoration of the
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emperor and the subsequent turn to a more calculated response to aggressive Western 
encroachment by a modernised central government led to a more self-interested rule 
than had previously been the case. Japan not only managed to stave off colonisation, but 
also transformed itself into a major world power. After enduring a century of turmoil in 
order to ‘catch up’ with the West, Japan’s recent transition to the Heisei era signifies 
that in the last two decades of the 20th century the country has achieved clarity of 
purpose. Japan has promoted ‘developmentalism’ to Eastern Asia, and as a result gained 
both credibility and the improved regional harmony referred to in Japan’s constitution.
Yamamura, et al (1997) note that Meiji era governments adopted a ‘developmentalist’ 
philosophy, systematically intervening in the economy with a programme of “priority 
production,” industrial rationalisations, trade protection for “infant” industries, industry- 
specific subsidies, and encouragement of government-guided cartels among large firms. 
These policies were designed to promote or otherwise result in a high rate of savings 
among citizens and encourage investors and large firms to keep pace with the 
technology curve.187 Profit-motivated entrepreneurs pioneered in a range of industries 
established and managed profitable firms. Firms and financial institutions were led by 
able leaders trained in the new universities of the time, such as Hitotsubashi and Keio as 
well as older ones such as Imperial (now Tokyo) and Kyoto.188 These institutions made 
oligopolistic profits and built extensive networks of ownership and management. 
Nationalist bankers and businessmen—a good many of whom drew on a samurai 
lineage—were motivated to promote their collective interest and thus the national 
interest as well.
5.1.2 The Japanese post-WW II experience
Immediately after its defeat in WW II, Japan faced two major reforms while under US 
occupation: the dissolution of the zaibatsu and the redistribution of land. The zaibatsu 
dissolution—a US priority since it was believed that this would remove the influence of 
a segment of perceived militarism—seemed to end oligopoly within Japan. However, 
this did not prevent the Japanese government from allowing industrial conglomerates to 
re-emerge in the form of keiretsu, and to manage the competition at sustainable levels. 
Land reform certainly ended the feudal inheritances of Japan’s past, pushing the country 
into modernity by empowering a larger segment of the population.189 The large increase 
in the number of independent self-reliant farmers that resulted led to a more equal
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distribution of income and wealth, and to the growth of a domestic market (the size of 
which was above 80 % of GDP for the entire post WW II period) able to drive the 
Japanese economy forward. This in turn sparked a fierce battle among manufacturers to 
win market-shares, causing them to redouble their efforts to increase productivity as 
well as to penetrate world markets. In this sense, it was free competition within the 
domestic market between members of the main industrial groups that became the 
principle force behind the development of the Japanese economy. However, this is not 
to under-emphasise the importance of the immediate post war period, where access to 
the US market was supplemented by demand for materiel from the war in Korea. It took 
Japan a substantial amount of time to open up its own enormous domestic market 
economy, given the deeply embedded policies of ‘developmentalism.’ Businessmen in 
vigorous competition with each other, while supporting politicians financially, raised 
productivity in a well protected, closed system. As domestic manufacturers grew to the 
point where they could compete overseas, they were unleashed one by one on the 
international market. Politicians, operating under the prevailing structure of one-party 
and multi-faction rule by Liberal Democrats, endorsed and protected the system as a 
whole.
As Garon (1987) explains, the Japanese ‘developmentalist’ system in its modem form 
emphasised a balance between labour and management, guaranteeing calmer unionism. 
This was in contrast to the use of force by SCAP against these same labour unions in an 
effort to discourage their support of communist policies and in some cases a pro- 
Moscow path. Thus ‘developmentalism’ in its post WW II incarnation meant aspects of 
authoritarianism were softened in favour of democracy. Japanese policies were severely 
tested in the country’s highly fractious and partisan polity, particularly in the immediate 
post-war era as the radical left (proscribed since the early 1920) and the extreme right 
fought for power. Eventually, the radical left was outflanked by the conservative Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) policies. The LDP boldly addressed the issues raised by both 
labour and the peace movement with compromises enshrined in the spirit of the 
constitution. The extreme right became isolated on the fringes of the LDP, giving rise to 
the occasional Japanese foreign policy hiccup.190 The LDP thus managed to follow a 
“middle-of-the-road” conservative programme. The business elite in Japan was forced 
to consider the demands of labour with a seriousness not observed in most industrialised 
nations, barring perhaps West Germany. Compared to the pre-war period of
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authoritarian ‘developmentalism’ in Japan, from the 1960s labour gained guarantees of 
job security, low wage differentials between floor workers and managers (the lowest 
multiple among industrialised nations), healthcare and holiday packages. As the 
zaibatsu re-emerged in the form of the keiretsu, this highly significant labour- 
management compact was built in, constituting a crucial discontinuity with the military 
aspects of pre-war Japan. Indeed, the concessions made to the left went beyond 
traditional labour issues, to include provisions for a non-militaristic Japanese foreign 
policy, as shown in Chapter 7, with the military downgraded in status in relation to
i 191other careers.
The Japanese strategy of ‘developmentalism’ was effective as long as Japan was still in 
the ‘catch up’ phase as argued by Murakami (1996). With the ‘catch up’ phase over, 
and the primary task no longer being to import technology and systems from overseas, 
but rather to develop Japan’s own technology and systems. Remnants of 
‘developmentalism’ limited the growth of the Japanese economy with excessive 
bureaucratic regulation and interference which hampered innovation in technologies 
and systems. Furthermore, the “iron triangle” of politicians, bureaucrats and 
businessmen (that is, a coalition of minority vested interest groups) did not reflect the 
interests of the Japanese people as a whole in an era of wider franchise and genuine 
democracy. The “iron triangle” has degenerated, channelling profits and political 
advantages to coalition partners and becoming a hotbed of corruption and patronage. 
Moreover, the continuation of Japan’s ‘developmentalism’ well after the ‘catch up’ 
phase was widely seen as protectionism at best and mercantilism at worst, raising the ire 
of even friendly states. As the Japanese economy became more powerful, external 
pressure induced further movement towards liberalism, making it the largest or second 
largest market for all the post colonial Eastern Asian states and the US, while for China, 
Japan rapidly became the leading market.
5.1.3 Murakami Yasusuke and the Japanese experience of ‘developmentalism’
The work of the late, highly respected Professor Yasusuke Murakami of Tokyo 
University best assesses Japan’s experience with ‘developmentalism,’ translating it into 
a system with a beginning and an end, and defining its connection to hegemonic 
responsibility. Murakami’s final work (edited and translated into English by Kozo 
Yamamura in 1996) distils decades of research and thought. In the first volume of this
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two-volume work, Murakami challenged the classical view on modernization that sets 
democratic liberalisation as a precondition for industrialisation. He argued that, contrary 
to the notion of England as the “model” case of the modernization process, its “take­
o ff’ to industrialisation was actually induced by the state-led mercantilistic policies 
under absolute monarchy. In the second volume, Murakami developed a model of 
decreasing-costs to industry and justified what he called the ‘developmentalism’ of 
Japan and other East Asian countries not as an anomaly but as a rational strategy for 
exploiting the growth potential of decreasing-cost industries. In his work, Murakami 
defined ‘developmentalism’ as an economic system where a government intervenes in 
markets in order to promote industrialization when necessary over the long-term, in 
contrast with the classical system of laissez faire capitalism where government 
intervention is generally avoided altogether.
Murakami argued Japan’s ‘developmentalism’ could be characterised thus:
• first, its purpose was to ‘catch up’ with the level of industrialization in the Western 
front-runner countries.
• second, political dictatorship or authoritarianism induced industrialization based 
fundamentally on the market economy.
• third, the above was achieved by means of an “iron triangle” formed by bureaucrats, 
politicians and businessmen. Bureaucrats kept the domestic market closed, while 
importing technology and systems from industrialised countries, then conveyed 
these to the private sector through regulations and market intervention, thus 
promoting rapid industrialisation.
Arguably, these goals were possible as a result of some basic qualities within Japan also 
present to some degree in other societies in the region. In order to arrive at an 
understanding of Japanese political economy, Murakami and his cohorts first developed 
the idea of a multilinear evolution of human societies. That is, for them a social system 
was not closed, leading to a linear thesis such as Fukuyama’s (1993) final destination. It 
was instead open in the sense that society was conceived of as subject to changes in the 
environment, which is itself composed of nature and other societies. Murakami also saw 
that a social system might be regarded as a self-organizing system. His work influenced 
other scholars, particularly in Japan. For example, Hirayama (1994) finds that there are 
two distinct organizational patterns in Japanese history. First, he notes the hierarchical
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organizational pattern originating in the le-moto system, which is in the final analysis a 
result of Confucist values. The second is the network organizational pattern originating 
in the Ken-mon system of Japan’s middle ages. Hirayama argues that both patterns of 
organization are observable in Japan even today, and continue to affect Japanese 
politics and the management of concerns such as the economy. For example, both the 
hierarchy of Japanese politics and the network system affected the vigour with which 
Japan adapted the ideas of Friedrich List (1841) in the local context in order to organise 
the economy. Further assisting Japan’s successful adaptation of the Meiji reforms— 
especially the ‘developmentalist’ components—was the relative homogeneity in Japan 
that made religious, ethnic or linguistic cleavages unlikely. Thus when confronted by 
the ‘other’ in the person of US Admiral Matthew Perry (and his squadron of menacing 
“black ships”), homogeneity went some distance in forging a consensus among the 
Japanese that the nation needed to ‘catch up’ or face colonization and humiliation with 
the rest of Asia.
Certainly, Murakami has had his Japanese critics. For example, Yutaka Kosai (1994) of 
the Japan Centre for Economic Research (JCER) finds Murakami’s work does not 
exactly correspond to the realities of Japanese and East Asian experiences with 
economic development. He notes that Murakami (1996) argues that industrial policy 
helps to prevent excess competition in situations where costs are decreasing (thus 
allowing for profits for reinvestment elsewhere). Kosai finds Murakami exaggerated the 
importance of the period of decreasing cost, and hence the role of cartels in industrial 
policy. Nonetheless, despite not providing the most fitting explanation for 
industrialisation trajectories, Murakami’s general argument that government can help 
with industrial policy remains intact, and in recent times has been further supported by 
the work others, such as Michael Porter (1990). Anticipating the complaint of his major 
critics—that mercantilist practices will undermine the international system—Murakami 
goes on to propose a liberal world order in which ‘developmentalism’ in post colonial 
countries is tolerated, while governments of the hegemonic nations (such as Japan and 
the US) refrain from pursuing the same course and instead provide ‘global public 
goods.’ Arguably, Japan’s gradual liberalisation over the 1980s and 1990s has gone a 
long way in fulfilling such criteria.
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5.2.0 JAPANESE IDEAS AS AN ‘GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD’:
THE SPREAD OF ‘DEVELOPMENTALISM’ IN EASTERN ASIA
The economic and military successes of Japan influenced the political and economic 
direction of Eastern Asia, promoting aversion to the carte blanche acceptance of 
Western ideas ranging from liberalism to communism. ‘Developmentalism’ in Eastern 
Asia followed the Japanese model in separate waves, divided by historical circumstance. 
Formally encouraged in this direction by Japan, the countries of Eastern Asia with 
direct historical experience of Japan’s ‘developmentalism’—that is, Taiwan and South 
Korea—led the way. Southeast Asian countries formed the next wave, and in their case 
policies of ‘developmentalism’ were backed by extensive involvement on the part of the 
Japanese government (Rix 1989; Doner 1996; Johnstone 1997). In the 1990s, it became 
apparent that Indo-China had joined this list, led by Vietnam.
Not only has Japan had a demonstrative effect on Eastern Asia, but also in the overtly 
political era following Prime Minister Fukuda, as exemplified by the Fukuda Doctrine, 
Tokyo has actively assisted with the implementation of developmentalist capitalism. 
This active Japanese role, although mainly manifested in the behaviour of the state and 
firms, also incorporates society. This is seen in the two sub-sections below. Subsection
5.2.1 explores how Japanese ‘developmentalism’ is able to influence Eastern Asian 
nations to adopt a similar model, beginning with Taiwan and South Korea. In 5.2.2 we 
consider how Japan reactively advocated ‘developmentalism’ for Eastern Asia, and 
especially Southeast Asia, thereby legitimating its power.
5.2.1 The influence of Japan’s ‘developmentalism’ on post colonial Eastern Asia
Particular circumstances, ranging from wars to crises, affected the Japanese project of 
‘developmentalism.’ However, the systematic work of Japanese political economist 
Murakami Yasusuke (1996) challenged the “Washington Consensus” of laissez faire for 
all. This challenge was particularly pertinent to the unfairness of demanding laissez 
faire practices on the part of economically weak post colonial states, which could not 
participate in the market. Essentially, ‘developmentalism’ is a hybrid capitalist way of 
promoting economic growth with the “state as gate-keeper” (Pempel 1979). For their 
part, governments of post colonial states found their very legitimacy depended on 
delivering the better future promised at independence: their very survival thus depended 
on rapidly meeting pent-up demand (Stubbs 1994 & 2000). Under the circumstances,
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the ideas of ‘developmentalism’ were preached to states able to receive this message 
with relative ease. As Diagram 4 (reproduced from Diagram 3) shows below, 
postcolonial governments sought rapid movement from LELD to MEMD status.
Diagram 4: Considering Agency and Structure in “Choices” of Economic Systems
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In Eastern Asia, ‘developmentalist’ policies—those discussed by Haggard (1990), 
Wade (1990), Amsden (1989, 1994 & 1995) and others—which were pursued at the 
local level for the rapid movement from LELD to MEMD relied on external assistance 
for their ultimate success. Significantly, it was not only a local level exercise of political 
and economic wisdom implied by those focused on the domestic level of analysis. 
External assistance can be understood by perceiving the importance of ‘international 
public goods’ in the tradition of Kindleberger (1986), who argued that in previous 
periods of hegemony such goods allowed capitalism to function as a viable economic 
system. Cold War politics gave the US strong incentive to be an early post-WW II 
provider of ‘global public goods,’ especially in terms of access to US markets. 
Following the collapse of the Gold Standard with Nixon and weakness in US hegemony,
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Japan became an increasingly important purveyor of ‘global public goods’ in Eastern 
Asia, especially from the 1980s onwards. Japan’s contribution of ‘global public goods’ 
was especially significant in the realms of finance, production facilities, absorbable 
technology and access to its markets—all of which will be dealt with in detail in the 
chapter to follow. However, the most important Japanese contribution was in the area of 
knowledge, in terms of providing the public good of a ‘developmentalist’ philosophy to 
counter the US demand for laissez faire for post colonial states.
With the desire for rapid economic development implicit in drives for independence on 
the part of colonial states, Japanese economic success inspired regional moves to 
govern markets and draw East and Southeast Asian countries out of the periphery 
(Johnson 1982, Wade 1990, Haggard 1990, Amsden 1994, Yanagihara and 
Sambomatsu 1997). Influenced in the Meiji era by the writings of Friedrich List (1851) 
and his prescription for Germany, the Japanese model of state provision of a secure 
domestic political economy aimed at creating comparative advantage and targeting 
strategic industries has been copied with success in Eastern Asia. The idea of firms and 
banks working close together has also been carried over from Japan to the region, 
creating a dynamic manufacturing-based economy with less reliance on stock-markets 
for finance capital than in the Anglo-American model. These arrangements assist ‘catch 
up’ for the region’s states which stands in sharp contrast to Anglo-American ideas of 
organising capital, which require all countries to repeat the stages of development of 
mature industrialised nations with the idea that true ‘catch up’ is never actually possible. 
Naturally, as a result of the success of ‘developmentalist’ ideas in Taiwan and South 
Korea, other post colonial states in Eastern Asia have made the case that the Japanese 
model is useful for facilitating their own transitions to the MEMD level. Essentially, the 
Japanese political economic system of states-and-markets forms the core of the 
knowledge structure in Eastern Asia that addresses the need for ‘catch-up’ with Western 
colonial states.
‘Developmentalism’ is in a sense a logical, even natural, outcome of nations’ attempts 
to compete with other nations and/or defend against sieges by external forces. This was 
certainly the case in Germany’s national system phase, as envisioned by List (1841), 
when this country succeeded in overcoming its lateness to industrialisation and 
surpassed Great Britain. This was also the case with Japan’s ‘developmentalism,’ as it
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overcame the siege by Western warships and the accompanying “unequal treaties” it 
had been forced to accede to. Well into the 20th century, we see two more examples of 
‘developmentalism’ in Taiwan and South Korea, both of which were influenced by 
lessons of ‘developmentalism’ from the era of Japanese imperialism, and both of which 
were spurred on by the military siege from the north. These two transformations in post 
colonial Eastern Asia led other nations in Asia to consider forms of state intervention in 
the economy. ASEAN countries, especially Malaysia and Thailand, are well on their 
way, followed by Indonesia and Vietnam among others. ‘Developmentalism’ spread to 
less likely recipients with weaker institutions due to in part to the vigorous advocacy by 
Japan, which defied the 1980s “Washington Consensus” of the US Treasury, the World 
Bank and the IMF that insisted imposing the virtues of the Anglo-American model.
5.2.2 Advocating ‘developmentalism’ for Eastern Asia: Japan’s reactive policy
Spurred on by the Fukuda Doctrine’s overtly political agenda, which emerged in 
response to the attacks on Japan’s policies and its property in the region, from the late 
1970s Japanese policy-makers promoted ‘developmentalism’ for Eastern Asia in a 
highly systematic manner. Significantly, by the late 1970s interactions of post-WW II 
domestic and regional politics, aided by Japanese think tanks such as IDE/Ajiken, had 
promoted two key beliefs in Tokyo:
(1) that nations caught in poverty would be inherently unstable, and
(2) that Asian countries were more nationalistic than ideologically dogmatic.192
Seeing that most of the Eastern Asian regimes were attempting to emulate Japanese 
growth, Tokyo had little difficulty in encouraging these post colonial states to leam 
directly from Japanese experts. Japan’s economic success affected the incentive 
structures of other states in Eastern Asia, particularly from the early 1980s, with Tokyo 
beset by requests for assistance in human resource development, planning and 
institutional development among many other things.193 ‘Developmentalist’ practices 
helped these Eastern Asian post colonial governments to narrow the income gap within 
their societies such that they are among the lowest in the post colonial world. 
‘Developmentalism’ has been significant for the region in terms of how it has increased 
the rate of growth of economic development, such that the gap between the 
industrialized nations and themselves could narrow.
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In the post-WW II era, Tokyo bureaucrats helped form new Japanese and regional 
institutions such as IDE/Ajiken and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), enabling a 
knowledge structure that could better interpret the outside for political leaders while 
also transmitting Japan’s internal changes abroad.194 These actions meant that 
‘developmentalism’ would, despite origins in the Meiji period, continue to be relevant 
in the 21st century under the guidance of the powerful Ministries of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI) and Finance (MOF), and could even spread to Eastern Asia. This 
process of encouraging and supporting ‘developmentalism’ took place while Japan itself 
was moving away from the model, having recognized that ‘catch up’ had occurred.
Japanese policy delivered ‘global public goods’ in the area of knowledge under the 
influence of chiiki kenkyu or area studies that began in the early 1950s. Chiiki kenkyu 
served Japan well, enabling it to cope with the crisis of the anti-Japanese sentiments in 
the 1970s by transmitting Eastern Asian demands to Tokyo. Ajiken studies covered 
issues of concern to Eastern Asia from economic growth to environmental and cultural 
preservation. This allowed senior officials at MITI and MOFA to understand regional 
demands and diffuse negative sentiments against Japan in the region by providing the 
necessary ‘public goods.’195 At the same time, Japanese sogo sosha, or trading firms, 
with their long presence in the region had their own network for transmitting 
information about local conditions home.196
While it was true that by the late 1970s the emergence of a third way of conducting 
state-market relations in Japan induced leaders of Eastern Asia to follow suit, the actual 
“take o ff’ in many of the these places could not occur until Japan became heavily 
involved with implementing its Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) in ways that 
ensured Japanese direct investment, or the ODA^FDI regime. As a direct result of 
Japan’s role, specialised domestic institutions developed in each of these states in 
Eastern Asia, affording each government more control over economic levers than in 
systems operating in Anglo-American models. At the domestic level, these institutions 
were fashioned after Tokyo’s MITI, the Economic Planning Agency (EPA), and other 
relevant Japanese institutions (Doner 1996).
Significantly, diplomacy in Eastern Asia also involved Japanese firms. However, 
Japanese firms’ activities were more reliant on both governments than suggested by
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Stopford and Strange (1992) in their more general model. In many ways, the post- 
Fukuda era of meeting Eastern Asian demands can be best captured by Stopford and 
Strange’s (1992) idea of triangular diplomacy, modified to reflect Japan’s Eastern Asian 
realities below in Diagram 5.
Diagram 5: States-Firm Triangular Diplomacy in Eastern Asia
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With the encouragement of the Japanese government via ODA policies and supportive 
policies in Eastern Asian host states, Japanese investment benefited the region so that 
the movement to industrialisation demanded by post colonial nations materialised much 
sooner then would otherwise have been the case. In the economies where high growth 
was demanded, the Fukuda Doctrine’s essential response was to combine aid and 
investment in an O D A ^FD I regime. This response to regional demands helped 
legitimate Japan’s ties with its war time victims, as it proceeded to assist the rapid
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economic development of the region in a manner consistent with the original intent 
behind the reparations demands.197 Rix (1993:148) argues that the Fukuda Doctrine 
shaped the way policy was developed thereafter. Certainly Japanese leaders have not 
subsequently deviated from the doctrine’s basic tenet of economic development for the 
region. The Fukuda legacy has been firmly institutionalised, with Japan's leaders 
routinely being part of the ASEAN summit meetings and post colonial Eastern Asian 
issues having acquired a place at the top of Tokyo’s political agenda. This, combined 
with the regularity of prime ministerial level exchanges, has placed the broad 
parameters of aid to ASEAN into the realm of “gift-giving” diplomacy, removed from 
the strictly bureaucratic arena (Rix 1993:148-150). Beyond this Japan represents the 
region even in G7 forums, voicing regional concerns over issues such as the 
undesirability of carte blanche liberalisation, consistent with protecting post colonial 
states’ interests.
In spearheading ‘developmentalism’ in Asia, Tokyo championed the cause of the 
weaker Southeast Asian states in particular, but also supported other areas, whether in 
South Asia, Sub-Saharan African or Latin America. For example, aid levels to South 
Asia are significant with respect to infrastructure, while Japan’s interest in Sub-Saharan 
Africa is transmitted via the Tokyo International Conference for African Development 
(TICAD). In addition, Japan played a significant if  relatively unknown role in the 
resolution of the Latin American debt crisis, proposing the first Miyazawa Plan as a 
guideline for the now famous Brady Plan (Hamada 1995:156; Rapkin and Strand 
1996:21).
Of great ‘global public goods’ significance to post colonial Eastern Asia was Japanese 
activism in the important state vs. market debate, where Tokyo’s efforts paid off 
particularly in the World Bank (Rapkin and Strand 1996).198 The now famous 1993 
World Bank report on East Asia, which was funded by the Japanese Ministry of Finance, 
was a profoundly political document in which the World Bank reluctantly conceded that 
government intervention had played some role in economic development in East Asia. 
The Bank’s publication of the 1997 World Development Report: The State in a 
Changing World represented a paradigm shift in policy, as this institution began to take 
heed of more factors enabling economic development. Indeed, the dominance of
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Chicago’s neo-classical ideas of unfettered markets have been challenged, as evidenced 
by the remarks of the Bank’s president Wolfensohn (1997:4):
...nobody in this business—including the World Bank—has all the answers... 
our partnership with Japan is critically important. It is not just a financial 
partnership, but also an intellectual collaboration. This must draw deeply on 
Japan’s own experience as a country, with its extraordinarily successful use 
of aid in a development process that was fundamentally driven by self-help...
Curiously, almost arguing against Wolfensohn, Mark T. Berger (1999) makes the case 
that the report reflected the ongoing renovation of neo-liberalism,, grounded in the 
liberal notion of the state as neutral arbiter.199 He notes that the effort to accommodate 
state-centred approaches within the wider neo-liberal understanding of capitalist 
development apparent in the Bank's 1993 report on East Asia was even more apparent 
in the 1997 World Development Report: the State in a Changing World, which was 
launched with considerable fanfare at the annual IMF-World Bank meeting in Hong 
Kong in the middle of 1997. Whatever the labels attached, the agenda of the Eastern 
Asian states is to govern the market to move out of the periphery, and this is what is 
indispensable.
5.3.0 BRINGING THE STATE BACK AND ‘DEVELOPMENTALISM’:
ECONOMIC DEVELOMENT THEORY AT THE DOMESTIC LEVEL
For those from the progressive Western academy, successes with state-led development 
have meant an opportunity to challenge the orthodoxy of Anglo-American notions of 
political economy. Thus, the progressive ideas in Bringing the State Back In (1985), 
have now been complimented by numerous other works with a similar tilt but with case 
studies of Eastern Asia.200 Nonetheless, by and large, such attempts to influence policy 
were to fail in the face of the intellectual hegemony exerted by the ‘Washington 
consensus,’ which was shaped by the US government, led by the neo-classicists in the 
Treasury, followed happily by officials of the IMF and World Bank trained in Chicago, 
and superbly supported by their private sector colleagues in New York and London’s 
City.201 The imposition of severe conditionality by the IMF in Latin America and Africa 
over the 1980s and 1990s was broken only by events in Eastern Asia, where, in contrast, 
several post colonial states were successful with their state-led models of development 
precisely because of the absence of the ‘Washington Consensus’ and the provision of 
‘global public goods’ to the region. Indeed, these Eastern Asian success stories led
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Japan to directly challenge the ‘Washington consensus.’ Given the crucial importance 
of the Eastern Asia for Japan and the drastic difference between Japan’s goals and 
methods and those of the US, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) sponsored the 1993 
publication of the World Bank’s The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public 
Policy, a full-scale challenge of liberal economics in so far as its applicability to post 
colonial states was concerned.
Reflecting Japan’s activism, the 1993 World Bank report noted that the “The East Asia 
miracle” of achieving high growth with equity, was due to a combination of 
fundamentally sound development policies, tailored interventions, and an unusually 
rapid accumulation of physical and human capital. The making of the “miracle” was no 
simple matter, as the World Bank’s policy research report The East Asian Miracle: 
Economic Growth and Public Policy makes clear.202 It argues that numerous ingredients 
went into recipes for success in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Republic 
of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan (China), and Thailand. Significantly, these included the 
market-oriented aspects, but also state intervention. The Eastern Asian experience 
points to the tools needed by a country to join the regional production network:
(1) good govemment-business relationship, leading to “selective intervention” and 
export promotion
(2) income equality and shared growth and high savings and investment
(3) high levels of education.
To address the combination of state, market and ‘global public goods’ necessary for 
development, subsection 5.3.1 looks at how state behaviour holds the key to organising 
the economy in cooperation with business so as to achieve selective intervention. 
Subsection 5.3.2 addresses the role of the state in promoting high savings, investment 
and export promotion, while subsection 5.3.3 examines the issue of education, which is 
considered in terms of its impact on productivity and economic development.
5.3.1 State’s key role: selective intervention and government-business relations
It is by now well known that among late developing countries, the state often plays a 
“developmental” role in capitalist transformation (Johnson 1982 & Evans 1998). For 
Johnson, this means a govemment-business relationship, leading to “selective 
intervention” and export promotion. In most of these economies governments
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intervened—systematically and through multiple channels—to foster development, and 
in some cases the development of specific industries. Policy interventions took many 
forms. Policies to bolster savings, build strong financial markets, and promote 
investment with equity included keeping deposit rates low and maintaining ceilings on 
borrowing rates to increase profits and retained earnings, establishing and financially 
supporting government banks, and sharing information widely between public and 
private sectors. Policies to bolster industry included targeting and subsidising credit to 
selected industries, protecting domestic import substitutes, supporting declining 
industries, and establishing firm- and industry-specific export targets.
As a direct result of the ‘developmentalism’ adopted by post colonial Eastern Asian 
states, most of the region recorded a quarter of a century of rapid economic growth. 
This growth was seen in the rest of world as nothing short of miraculous, given that no 
other regional economy in history had grown so quickly. Correctly focusing on some 
aspects of ‘global public goods’ the Economist declared,
What has made emerging Asia's governments exceptional is that they have 
been economically enlightened. Many Asian businessmen would define 
enlightenment in one word: stability. Asia's strong governments have rarely 
flinched from taking tough measures to maintain macroeconomic stability.
Just as important, they have ensured that economic policies are predictable.
At the same time they have kept their economies in shape through controlled 
exposure to international competition.204
Missing the importance of structure and in keeping with domestic level explanations of 
liberal economics, the Economist added that the
gulf between emerging Asia and Latin America could be measured by rate of 
growth and income inequality. Over the past quarter of a century most Latin 
American countries tried to foster domestic industry by protecting it from 
competition. This protection was often paid for by discriminatory taxes on 
farming, thus impoverishing farmers. Asian governments realised, in the 
words of Lee Kuan Yew, that they 'must create an agricultural surplus to get 
their industrial sector going.' Rich and industrious rice-farmers have been the 
foundation of Asia's industrialisation. In Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and 
China, investments to make farming more productive were accompanied by 
radical land reform. The link with income equality is self-evident. The 
Philippines' failure to introduce serious land reform is the main reason why it 
is the sick man of South-East Asia and not an emerging economy.205
Unlike those forcing known economic models on Eastern Asia, the role of the state was 
significant for observers such as Wade (1990 & 1999), who noted that 
‘developmentalism’ recognised that governments had a role to play. It was also 
considered to be in some ways a natural response for governments that needed 
legitimacy at home (Stubbs 1995 & 2000). Indeed, the role of the state in promoting
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economic development in Eastern Asia went far beyond Smith’s (1776) idea of the state 
providing limited ‘public goods’ or Ricardo’s (1817) notion that the states accept static 
comparative advantage. Moreover, it exceeded even the role expected of a legitimating 
entity in Weber’s (1968) rationalisation of the state’s raison d'etre.
In Eastern Asia, the state assumed the role of guardian, providing necessary ‘public 
goods’. The state was everything in these planned economies, as relying on market 
competition in a developing economy without state intervention resulted in powerful 
actors dominating. The state nurtured domestic “infant” firms by providing subsidies to 
ensure survival in the face of outside competition, lifting these as industries became 
commercially viable. It was a partner in some ventures, while in others it was the
initiator and main owner. As a result, these countries came to rely “on manufactures
0(\(\rather than tropical agriculture as the path out of poverty.” In Eastern Asia, the state 
guaranteed even the relationships that joined foreign and domestic actors, by providing 
both with direct insurance for trade as well as unwritten assurances based on personal 
contacts between networks of known officials within institutions.
For “developing” counties, which are by definition on a “catch-up” path, the role of the 
state was far more crucial than in industrialised nations. This should be easy to 
understand, as waiting for the evolution of comparative advantage would be akin to 
taking the British road to industrialisation—long, dangerous and very dirty. In contrast, 
intervention in the market through the creation of comparative advantages has meant 
rapid advancement. Indeed, “late comer” nations have found state intervention allows 
for faster travel along the road to industrialisation. Indeed, the German and Japanese 
examples—where each went on to dominate their respective regions within 50 years, 
after they joined the race in the 19th century—are difficult to argue against, while South 
Korea and Taiwan achieved their potential in even less time.
5.3.2 Policies of ‘developmentalism9: high savings, investment and exports
Compared to the Western industrialised nations, post colonial states take a different 
path under developmentalist policies, and this is particularly the case in the area of 
finance. The Eastern Asian developmentalist model was not one based solely on market 
principles.207 Many Eastern Asia countries share features with Japan. For example, 
Eastern Asians save more compared to Western countries, with saving done mostly by
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households. These households use low-risk banks rather than higher-risk equities, 
similar to the Japanese postal banking system, which has deposits larger than all Japan’s 
commercial banks combined. Corporate investment is financed largely by loans from 
banks with lower interest rates than can be expected in a purely market system.209 Long­
term relations between firms and banks secured these high levels of corporate debt in 
Eastern Asia in a Japanese style keiretsu system, with the government standing ready to 
support both firms and banks in the event of shocks. Wade stresses that without long­
term relations, such shocks would lead to creditors calling in loans and liquidating firms, 
with larger settlements leading to a chain reaction 210
The World Bank has noted that Eastern Asian governments have attacked the problems 
of weak capital markets (and imperfect banking systems characterised by asymmetric 
information) through a three-pronged approach:
(1) Many created specialised development banks that were important sources of 
long-term financing for investment at early stages of development.
(2) During selected periods, some Eastern Asian governments used financial 
repression to aid the banking system or to bolster ailing industries; they worked 
to create the institutional foundations of bond and equity markets.
(3) Finally, with the recognition that most investment would come from retained 
earnings, governments encouraged the retention and reinvestment of corporate 
earnings.
5.3.3 Education, productivity, competitiveness and economic development
The World Bank notes that aside from the ability to sustain rapid growth with fairly
equal income distributions, the Eastern Asian Economies (that is mainly Taiwan and
South Korea, but also some of the ASEAN nations considered here) also differ from
other developing economies in terms of other factors traditionally associated with
economic growth. It argues that elevated rates of investment, exceeding 20 % of GDP
on average between 1960 and 1990, including remarkably high rates of private
investment, combined with rising endowments of human capital because of universal
basic education, tells a large part of the growth story 211 The World Bank argues that
these factors account for roughly two-thirds of the growth in Eastern Asia, while the
01 0remainder is attributable to productivity growth. In fact, productivity growth in 
Eastern Asian economies exceeds that of most other developing and industrial
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economies. This superior performance comes from the combination of success at 
allocating capital to high-yielding investments and success at catching up 
technologically to the industrial economies in areas such as electronics, high value 
textiles, canned goods, to mention a few.
Alice Amsden (1995:7) makes the case that late industrialisation has evolved on the 
basis of pure learning or borrowing technology that is already commercialised by firms 
in other countries. She argues that the general properties of industrialisation based on 
learning are different from those of an industrialisation based on new products and 
processes. Thus Amsden finds that the focus of late industrialisation is on making 
borrowed technology work, and adapting it in order to improve it. The strategic focus of 
the firm in late industrialisation has initially been on the shop floor, not the R&D 
laboratory, and the protagonist of the ‘catch up* story has traditionally been the 
production engineer. Hence, increasing productivity has been at the centre of 
‘developmentalism,’ making the government intrusive in a way that has not been 
identified in the past. This is further conformed by economists interested in the sources 
of Eastern Asian growth.213 Until now, the debate between such economists over East 
Asia has focused on the measurement issue, and the question has been about whether 
productivity growth rates were actually low. With the consensus on high productivity 
now emerging, Peter Robertson asks what allowed “East Asia to obtain productivity 
growth rates comparable with the OECD, when other developing economies in Africa, 
South Asia and South America, were languishing with zero or negative productivity 
growth.” 214 In his first answer, he and other scholars found that physical capital 
accumulation, achieved by raising demand for labour in the modem sectors of 
developing economies, has a significant effect on productivity growth, increasing the 
effective return to physical capital by around 30 % in many countries. They concluded 
that the productivity gains through labour reallocation are potentially a significant 
contributing factor to transitional growth episodes in industrializing countries. 
Interestingly, their work does not measure equivalent effects for human capital, which 
most Eastern Asian countries have invested in heavily with Japanese help. Japan, 
having perfected the late industrialisation path, has advocated this method to parts of 
Asia interested in listening. It has spearheaded the drive for productivity from the 1960s 
via the Asian Productivity Organisation (APO), a crucial point to be taken up in the 
later chapters on the subject of Japan’s ‘global public goods’ role in knowledge.
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In the early 1990s, literature on the ‘Asian Miracle’ offered a range of explanations for 
the remarkable growth record of the Asian “high performers,” but almost all the 
contributions agreed on the importance of education. In their analysis of ‘the key to the 
Asian miracle,’ Campos and Root (1996: 56), stressed Eastern Asian states “have 
invested heavily in education and, unlike many other developing countries, have 
concentrated on primary and secondary schooling. They argued that the share of the 
educational budgets allocated by these states to basic (primary and secondary) 
education is significantly higher than the share allocated by other developing countries, 
but in contrast, tertiary education has been left largely to the private sector.” 
Furthermore, the World Bank’s 1993 report argued that:
in nearly all the rapidly growing East Asian economies, the growth and 
transformation of systems of education and training during the past three 
decades has been dramatic. The quantity of education children received 
increased at the same time that the quality of schooling, and of training in the 
home, markedly improved' (World Bank 1993:43).
The report stressed that most of the Eastern Asian economies had higher enrolment 
rates than would have been predicted for their level of income from a sample of over 90 
developing economies. Other studies from the World Bank have also stressed the 
improvements in both quantity and quality of education in the Eastern Asian Economies, 
where quality is measured by declines in repetition and dropout rates (Birdsall, Ross & 
Sabot 1995: 481). These authors point to the virtuous circle found in much of East Asia, 
where education stimulates growth and growth stimulates education. In addition, they 
argue that high rates of investment in education lowered inequality, which in turn 
further stimulated both economic growth and more investment in education. 
Furthermore, rapid growth in the highly performing Asian Economies has hastened 
demographic transition, allowing governments to increase the educational budget per 
student and thereby improve the quality of instruction.
There can be little doubt these views have become the orthodoxy. Indeed, it is now 
frequently asserted in the literature on educational development that the Asian tigers 
have created a “new model,” a key component of which is “forging newer, closer links 
between education, training, and economic growth” (Ashton & Sung 1997: 207). 
Ashton & Sung (1997: 207) argue that in the so-called Asian Tigers, “the relationship 
between education and economic growth has been much stronger, with the educational
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system and its output exhibiting a very strong and much closer linkage to the 
requirements of the economy.” Woo-Cumings (1995: 67) goes so far as to propose, “the 
Asian state in seeking to co-ordinate not only the development but also the utilisation of 
human resources involves itself in manpower planning and job placement and 
increasingly in the co-ordination of science and technology.”
Conclusion EASTERN ASIAN DEVELOPMENTALIST PRACTICE:
THE ROLE OF THE STATE OVER MARKET
The role of the state is by now a well-debated subject on two counts. First, stemming 
from the Marxist critique o f laissez faire , control of the state is seen as crucial for 
growth with equity. Secondly, the debate on the role of the state has at times concerned 
the efficacy of economic growth itself. State led ‘ developmentalism ’ as advocated by 
Japan reflects a mixture of both debates. In terms of priorities, the state does not just set 
them, but often acts as catalyst or even participant, motivated by nationalism. Japan’s 
adaptation of ‘developmentalism’ for itself is not accidental. Gellner's (1983) linkage 
between nationalism and industrialization was well articulated long ago by Friedrich 
List (1841), who considered it a condition for Germany to gain relatively vis-a-vis the 
UK. Significantly, Japan embraced List’s ideas during the Meiji period. Following the 
Taisho democracy of the early 20th century, the destruction of the remnants of feudalism 
under SCAP and the compromise between firms and labour overseen by the LDP, 
‘developmentalism’ had to mean growth with equity.
Under ‘developmentalism,’ the state provides material resources and management, and 
also promotes a developmentalist ideology which legitimates the modernization project, 
and thereby the state itself. Thus Japan’s promotion of ‘developmentalism’ for Eastern 
Asia must be understood as an attempt to legitimate its position in the region. 
Gerschenkron's (1962:29) emphasis on the important role of “an ideology of delayed 
industrialization” in breaking “through the barriers of stagnation in a backward 
country...to place its energies in the service of economic development” rationalises the 
Japanese and German experiences, and extrapolates them to other late comers. Thus, 
only by exploring the legitimation drives of powerful states can ‘developmentalism’ be 
understood better.
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Despite Japan’s agency in promoting ‘developmentalism’ in Eastern Asia, its efforts are 
all but ignored in the English language literature on the subject. This is especially the 
case when it comes to understanding the depth of the effort emanating from Tokyo’s 
IDE/Ajiken that allowed policy makers to understand post colonial states’ demands, and 
one might add, the consequences of not meeting these, given the violence visited on 
Japanese property in the region. One of the standard texts on Eastern Asian 
development by Stephen Haggard (1990) pays little attention to the actual role of 
Japanese scholars in promoting Eastern Asian ‘developmentalism’—indeed Haggard 
puzzles over the development trajectory of resource-rich Malaysia, but does not 
continue to ask the next logical question of why Kuala Lampur adopted the “Look East” 
policy.215 Even Robert Wade (1990), whose work won the American Political Science 
Award (APSA) award for the best work that year, did not quite understand the Japanese 
role, as it was only in 1996 that he dealt with it in his “The World Bank and the art of 
paradigm maintenance: the East Asian Miracle in Political perspective.”216
The present work connects the policy-making process in Tokyo with the decidedly 
politically left, pro-Eastem Asian orientation popular among the many Marxist social 
scientists in Japan. Arguably, it is high time to acknowledge the Marxist origins of 
Japanese area studies and the manner in which this influenced Japan’s foreign policy 
such that it moved away from myopic self-interest policies—accepted by realists 
believing in the omnipotence of military power—to policies that recognised the 
importance of even minor post colonial states and their ability to persevere with 
demands. Arguably, it is the clarity of this Heisei vision that has enabled Japan to 
acquire more friends and fewer enemies in Eastern Asia, in sharp contrast the situation 
during the years directly following the WWII.
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Chapter 6
Legitimating Japan’s Regional Hegemony in Eastern Asia: ‘Global Public Goods’ 
in Technology, Finance and Production for Rapid Economic Development
Japanese ideas of ‘developmentalism’ that offered resistance to the US goals of 
imposing laissez faire essentially played a ‘global public goods’ role in Eastern Asia, 
thus allowing latecomers to industrialisation to use ideas of ‘catch-up’ development 
effectively. ‘Developmentalism’ set the economic rules by which the region of Eastern 
Asia was to function and gain international recognition via the creation of the “East 
Asian economic miracle.” In some cases the process of engaging in ‘developmentalism’ 
was embedded early, as it was with South Korea and Taiwan, both long term colonies 
of Japan.217 In other cases these institutions had to be developed bottom-up and top- 
down, as with Southeast Asian states. Even though close study of the region of Eastern 
Asia suggests a strong Japanese role in the region, the literature on economic 
development itself has not acknowledged this fully.218 The dominant literature in that 
discipline suggests that the economic development of Eastern Asia has been mainly led 
by the governing actions of individual states in the region, as argued by Wade (1990), 
Haggard (1990) and Amsden (1994 & 1995) in the culmination of the research agenda 
of Bringing the State Back In (Evans, et al 1985). Certainly, these institutional lessons 
have debunked the Orientalist notions of the Asian Drama (Myrdal 1968), but more 
importantly they have also challenged ad-hoc neo-liberal ideas that have interpreted 
Eastern Asian success stories of the 1980s and beyond to suit a particular purpose.
In terms of the origins of the state-led model of ‘developmentalism’ in Eastern Asia in 
particular, these nationalist efforts were inspired by the example of Japan’s success in 
thwarting Western imperialism (Kohli 1994). Beyond such inspiration came the painful 
first-hand knowledge from Japanese imperialism itself, which left a legacy of useful 
infrastructure and institutions geared for industrialisation and economic development 
(Kohli 2003). However, one must move beyond this literature to better appreciate the 
activist role of Japan in fostering regional economic development in the late 20th 
century. Missing a level of analysis, Kohli’s (2003) most recent work still does not fully 
capture Japan’s role in Eastern Asian development as could be done by discussing its 
role in providing ‘global public goods.’
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Well beyond both inspiration and embedded ideas of ‘developmentalism’ was Japan’s
tlilate 20 century pacific re-engagement with post colonial Eastern Asia and its steady 
support for rapid industrialisation and development in the region. Japan’s deliberate 
inculcation of ‘developmentalist’ practises in Asia was not limited to transplanting ideas 
that the regions’ states were open to in any case. Indeed, Japanese policy in the last two 
decades of the 20th century extended to aspects of an enabling structure demanded by 
post colonial states. These can be understood in terms of ‘global public goods’ and 
assessed realistically using the Susan Strange’s (1988a) framework of the key structures 
of knowledge, security, finance and production, as her approach ties post colonial 
demands to their desire for an enabling structure, recognizing that it is not only agency 
that matters, but also the structure in which it is embedded. After the provision of ideas 
of ‘developmentalism’ to Eastern Asia, the ‘harder’ economic aspects of Japan’s 
provision of ‘global public goods’ offers evidence of very active efforts by Tokyo to 
legitimate its power, particularly from the late 1970s onwards under the auspices of the 
Fukuda Doctrine. Japan embarked on this course as it was considered necessary to meet 
material demands from the Eastern Asian region in order to improve poisoned regional 
relations. Unlike the military security side, where Japan had limited room to manoeuvre, 
the economic realm had a wide scope in terms of the impact of policy on other countries. 
Significantly, Japan’s efforts to legitimate its power in Eastern Asia have met with 
increasing success, and concurrent to this Japan’s relations in the region have improved.
To systematically understand Japan’s delivery of ‘global public goods’ in the economic 
realm, this chapter has three sections, which cover knowledge (technology), financial 
and production structures. Section 6.1.0 provides evidence for technology transfer via 
direct investment, concluding that Eastern Asia surpassed most other post colonial 
regions and even middle income nations even with Japan’s dated technology. Section
6.2.0 considers financial ‘global public goods,’ and provides evidence for the 
legitimation of Japanese power through examining the country’s role in recycling its 
surplus, acting as the lender of last resort in the region, and helping to co-ordinate 
macro-economic policies and maintain stable exchange rates. Section 6.3.0 presents 
evidence of ‘global public goods’ in the area of production, considering how Japanese 
firms shifted manufacturing to the region while Tokyo opened its market for Eastern 
Asian goods, with the sogo sosha distributing these within Japan.
161
6.1.0 LEGITIMATION AND ‘PUBLIC GOODS’ IN KNOWLEDGE: 
TRANSFER OF ABSORBABLE TECHNOLOGY FROM JAPAN
In addition to the defining role of knowledge in organising economy and society, one 
obvious component of the knowledge structure is technology itself. Thus in assessing 
the nature of Japan’s regional hegemony, one of the most crucial areas of concern is the 
transfer of technology from Japan to Eastern Asia. However, in this regard two 
observations are required:
(1) While technology as knowledge is self-evident, it is also misunderstood as 
something that is culturally specific and labelled with misleading terms like 
“Western technology.” In reality, the advancement of science has been inter- 
generational and trans-cultural, as suggested by historians and anthropologists, 
whose work can no longer be Eurocentric, given the evidence for diffusion of 
technology over time and space. Following this line of thinking, Japanese 
success in developing forms of modem technology, and the role of its well- 
funded scientists and technicians in shaping technology to meet local 
requirements, has shown the futility of thinking ethnocentrically about 
knowledge, while also showing how other cultures use and develop technology.
(2) Technology transfer is contingent on the absorptive capacity of post colonial 
states, and we can see this with Japan’s case. Driven by military challenges 
posed by Western imperialist powers, within 50 years of the Meiji restoration 
Japan was able to ‘catch up’ and move into the modem technological age 
achieving military parity. The successful diffusion of technology has depended 
on the presence of scholars, or at least artisans capable of understanding key 
concepts, and government with the correct policies.219 This line of reasoning 
suggests that the key to Japan’s success was a well-developed human resource 
base dating to the early 1800s and before. This allowed the rate of absorption of 
new ideas to be high enough that the local expertise necessary to take old ideas 
a step further emerged sooner, rather than later.
Having noted two problems with ethnocentric thinking and absorptive capacity that 
prevent clear thinking about the matter of technology transfer, it is useful to note that 
Japan’s success with science has led to the spread of similar institutions of science and 
technology in Eastern Asia. In areas where there was Japanese involvement via colonial 
organization of the economy, the rate of absorption of technology has been faster. This 
is the case with South Korea and Taiwan, both of which had access to higher education
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in Japan and faced Japanese organisation of the economy in their own territory during 
the colonial era.220 The South Korean and Taiwanese ability to absorb technology is 
however not easily replicated in Southeast Asia, with its historically weaker human 
resource base. In Southeast Asia formal education largely remained undeveloped 
outside religious functions until well after the end of colonial rule, when mass 
campaigns were launched. The historical lack of investment in education in Thailand (in 
contrast to the emphasis on religion) meant weak educational institutions for the modem 
era. Deliberately regressive colonial policies in the Philippines, Indochina, Indonesia, 
and to a lesser extent Malaysia, meant weak or underdeveloped educational systems 
there. However, since the end of WW II, in a manner consistent with an ‘global public 
goods’ role, Japan has encouraged Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, and also the 
Philippines and Vietnam to develop human resources, leading each to absorb 
technology faster. Rent-seeking Japanese firms too have played their part by training 
workers and sponsoring students, while their direct investment into these countries are 
at the core of technology transfer.
To understand the details of Japan’s ‘global public goods’ role in area of applied 
knowledge, subsection 6.1.1 addresses Japanese government efforts to transfer 
technology to Eastern Asia, showing how government-funded organizations trained 
students and how other knowledge was spread to increase the productivity of the region. 
Subsection 6.1.2 shows how Japanese firms managed technology transfer to Eastern 
Asia in a limited manner, with technology provided according to the level of absorptive 
capacity, as with the case of Malaysia. Subsection 6.1.3 suggests that even in the 
technology area Japan has managed to gain a legitimate role in Eastern Asia when 
compared to the other post colonial regions.
6.1.1 Japanese government and technology transfer to Eastern Asia
That said, outside the leading technologies, the Japanese government has assisted 
Eastern Asian nations in its drive to adopt modem technology through bilateral and 
multilateral programs. Japan’s efforts have mainly concentrated on improving the 
absorptive capacity of the recipients such that they can absorb transfers by private firms. 
While there are numerous institutions involved in technology transfer, it is particularly 
important to consider the Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA)/Association 
for Overseas Technical Scholarship (AOTS), and the Monbusho (the Japanese Ministry
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of Education), all parts of the official apparatus that delivers ‘global public goods’ in 
the applied knowledge area.221
Created in August 1974 under MOFA, Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA) 
is the leading institution responsible for implementing Japanese government-sponsored 
technical co-operation programs. JICA strengthened co-ordination between the 
governmental and non-governmental co-operative programs, organically combining 
financial co-operation with technical co-operation. JICA inherited the responsibilities 
previously assumed by the Overseas Technical Co-operation Agency (created in 1962) 
and the Overseas Emigration Agency (created in 1963). This organization has also 
absorbed and expanded parts of financing activities once the responsibility of the 
Overseas Trade Development Association, and implements the functions of the 
Overseas Agricultural Development Foundation. JICA has clarified the responsibilities 
of Japan Overseas Co-operation Volunteers (JOCV), defining the promotion and 
support required for co-operation activities of the youth. To address its responsibilities, 
JICA has about 1,200 staff members and the organization comprises 18 departments, 
four offices, and two secretariats. In its domestic out-reach it maintains 20 agencies in 
21 locations across Japan and 50 offices in regions around the globe, including Asia, the 
Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Oceania 222
In operational terms JICA is responsible for the technical co-operation aspect of Japan's 
ODA programs. Technical co-operation promotes the transfer of technology and 
knowledge that can enhance the “socio-economic development of the developing 
countries.” JICA carries out a variety of programs to support the “nation building of 
developing countries” through such technical co-operation. Its programs include:
(1) Technical Co-operation (Training in Japan, Dispatch of Experts,
Provision o f Equipment, Project-type Technical Co-operation,
Development Study)
(2) Dispatch of Japan Overseas Co-operation Volunteers (JOCV)
(3) Training and Recruitment of Qualified Personnel for Technical Co­
operation
(4) Survey and Administration of Grant Aid Programs
(5) Development Investment and Financing
(6) Support for Japanese Emigrants
(7) Disaster Relief
The program for technical training of overseas participants is aimed at key 
administrators, technicians, and researchers in developing regions, and involves the 
transfer of knowledge and technology required by individual countries. This is the most
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basic “human development” program implemented by JICA. Since the programme’s 
inception in 1954, it has grown steadily in scale and has become substantially more 
varied and advanced in content. As the reproduced Table 5 and Chart 9 below suggests, 
the number of total participants has grown steadily over time, with overseas participants 
making nearly half of the overall number, while few remained in Japan as immigrants.
Table 5: JICA and Pre-JICA Overseas Participants and Japanese Personnel
On Duty 
(1998)
Total
(1954-1998)
Overseas Participants 1,049 192,191
Experts 1,794 62,048
Survey Team Members 375 157,752
Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers 2,643 22,168
[Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Annual Report]
Chart 9: Number of Persons Involved by Program
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The program for the technical training of overseas participants enables a flexible and 
dynamic response by Japan, making it possible to provide essential aid on request. It is 
a program that facilitates urgent response to pressing issues such as financial crises (for 
example in Asia in 1997), support for the transition to democracy (in, for example, 
Cambodia) and ending ethnic strife (for example in Sri Lanka).223 It allows for a 
flexible response for maximum effectiveness and encourages the formation of links 
with other programs as well as the private sector (for example, Japanese firms) in
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responding to recipients’ needs. Significantly, JICA officials openly note that a
prominent feature of the technical training program is that, in contrast to other types of 
co-operation, it generally starts in Japan, benefiting its international relations in practice.
This is a program that is made possible due to the collaboration and 
participation of many people, including organizations and instructors, who 
directly teach the training participants, regional exchange organizations, and 
members of local communities. The program's activities are effective not 
only on the level of technical co-operation: they also serve to establish 
communities o f people who are knowledgeable and friendly toward Japan.
Conversely, training participants engage in exchange and friendship activities 
throughout Japan, thereby making their own contribution to fostering 
international understanding among Japanese people. [My emphasis.]
In terms of transfer of technology, JICA officials see several advantages to 
implementing technical co-operation in Japan. These include:
(1) enabling participants to see how new technology and approaches not 
available in the participants' own countries are actually put into effect, 
thereby increasing motivation;
(2) conveying Japan's own experience to the world; and,
(3) providing an opportunity for the exchange of opinions with training 
participants from other countries tackling similar problems, fostering the 
sharing of know-how.
While the number of individuals involved in Japanese programmes has risen, so too has 
the students, not all of whom are sponsored by Japan. What is remarkable is the number 
of students from Eastern Asia with increasing numbers as they absorb knowledge that 
they use in their home countries, especially in export industries.224
Table 6: Overseas Students, by Country/Region
Country 1990 1995 2000 2001
Total [Persons. As of May 1] 41,347 53,847 64,011 78,812
China 18,063 24,026 32,297 44,014
Korea, Rep. Of 8,050 12,644 12,851 14,725
Taiwan 6,484 5,180 4,189 4,252
Malaysia 1,544 2,230 1,856 1,803
Thailand 856 1,010 1,245 1,411
Indonesia 948 1,085 1,348 1,388
USA 1,180 1,087 1,044 1,141
Vietnam 46 204 717 938
Bangladesh 394 710 800 805
Philippines 479 433 477 490
Sri Lanka 148 285 429 471
Others 3,155 4,953 6,758 7,374
Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.
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Internationally and regionally focused institutions, funded mainly by Japan, have played 
remarkable roles too. The Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO), one of the 
leading agencies of MITI, has assisted in technology transfer in Eastern Asia. However, 
the more important role—given the importance of productivity for stable long-term 
growth, as noted by Amsden (1995)—has been played by the Asian Productivity 
Organisation (APO), headquartered in Tokyo with Japanese leadership.225
Created in 1961, the Asian Productivity Organisation (APO) is an intergovernmental 
organisation representing the needs of its members: Bangladesh, China, Fiji, Hong 
Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. The organisation oversees 
productivity development throughout its member states, and to accomplish this it co­
ordinates and assists individual nation’s productivity activities. According to the APO, 
these countries, through their respective national productivity organisations, work 
closely together “for mutual co-operation, economic progress, and a better quality of 
life for their peoples.” The APO receives assistance and support from many 
international organisations and institutions in the implementation of projects, but the 
majority of funds come from the Japanese government.
The APO sees itself as being in the vanguard of developing human resources by 
providing training and upgrading skills in both the public and private sectors. It does so 
by organising courses and seminars to upgrade skills in a wide range of fields including 
information technology, agricultural technology and biotechnology, small industries 
management, quality management, and environmental management. In addition to 
human resources development, projects reflect the strategic mix of APO activities to 
assist member countries in their productivity promotion endeavours. These projects 
address the need to devise policy measures for the development of small and medium- 
scale industries, including supporting industries such that they:
• produce higher value-added products
• provide the infrastructure necessary for attracting more investment
• create the necessary environment for facilitating technology transfer
Efforts are also made to help member countries to formulate long-term productivity 
goals and promotional strategies. In the area of agriculture and rural development, the
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APO has a number of programs that are of critical importance for public policy as well 
as for the further development of agriculture projects. They include:
• biotechnology applications,
• agriculture education systems,
• appropriate energy sources,
• information systems in rural areas
These areas of activity add a forward-looking dimension to development in rural areas 
and support efforts made by member countries to meet challenges in agriculture with 
increased productivity. APO publications enhance Eastern Asian productivity in general. 
Relevant mainly to manufacturing, they cover:
• Total Quality Control (TQC)
• Total Product Management (TQM)
• 5S—derived from the first letters of the Japanese terms for organisation (seiri), 
neatness (seiton), cleaning (seiso), standardisation (seiketsu), and discipline
(shitsuke)—campaign dedicated to organising the work-place, keeping it neat 
and clean, and maintaining the standardised conditions and discipline needed to 
do a good job.226
For example, the second edition of Ishikawa Kaoru’s 1986 work was on its 15th 
printing in 2000. This volume helps supervisors and line personnel to apply the on-line 
quality control techniques that revolutionised Japanese manufacturing. Another 
example is Shigeru Mizuno's Company-wide Total Quality Control, which provides
thorough coverage of all the elements needed for the implementation of quality control
0 0 1on a company-wide basis. Other lessons are also provided, as with the essence of 
Japanese design review, which is based on the belief that “two heads are better than 
one,” and that there are considerable benefits to be reaped from “getting things right the
0 0 Q
first time.” The emphasis in APO publications has changed over time, with recent 
attention to the process of design review, with a focus on current issues in Japanese
00Qdesign review and the sharing of practical expertise developed by leading companies. 
Innovative product development has also been featured with the APO, as the countries 
in the region have more or less surpassed all but a handful of the world’s leading 
nations in terms of production, and thus require new products in order to continue to be 
on the leading edge. JICA officials argue that the advantages of technical co­
operation projects involving the dispatch of experts are that they:
(1) enable appropriate development and dissemination of technology, i.e., 
technology which accords with local conditions;
(2) provide for provision of appropriate instruction while ensuring that 
technology is introduced and takes root in the recipient country;
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(3) enable suitable advice to be offered on setting up organizations and
institutions in accordance with each stage, from planning to
implementation;
(4) ensure maximum effectiveness while planning for co-ordination and 
links with aid from Japan and other donors;
(5) and finally, they make it possible to provide on-site aid with a clearly 
visible profile.
JICA has made an effort to be highly visible, with their actions suggesting deeper 
implications for the resulting relations between Japan and its imperial era victims. 
Participants have contributed to their own nations in various ways. While some have 
gone on to become national leaders, top-rank researchers and administrators, others 
have become involved in the dissemination of technology in farming villages far 
removed from national capitals. The effect of JICA in promoting Japanese relations has 
been cumulative, as suggested by the aggregation of contacts around Eastern Asia. Both 
Chart 9 and Table 6 provide a sense of the steady growth of this network.
6.1.2 Japanese firms and technology transfer to Eastern Asia231
While Japan’s legitimation of hegemony is strengthened by its role in technology
transfer, Japanese firms also contribute while their mail goal is of course long term 
profits. Thus the counterpart to the role of the state in Eastern Asian technology 
transfer and development is the role of firms in direct investment in the region. Business 
organisation, human resource training and technology transfer are all part of the 
knowledge equation that enables recipients to move to higher value added production, 
and thus more rapid growth patterns. Significantly, Japanese firms were particularly 
important as a means of influencing such aspects of Eastern Asia’s technological 
revolution. In this vein, Giovanni Capannelli (1996) notes that treating technological 
knowledge as an endogenous variable in the modelling of economic growth has greatly 
increased theoretical economists’ appraisal of the importance of FDI as a major channel 
for late starting countries’ process of technology development. He suggests that 
although emphasis is still placed on problems related to the investment and technology 
source at the expense of the recipient, this new field of research promises to yield many 
interesting results. It has been especially important in terms of providing a bridge, with 
many empirical studies stressing the importance of both knowledge creation and 
transfer via non-market mechanisms (Wong 1991, Yamashita 1991 and Palacios 1995). 
Capannelli notes that a remarkable characteristic of technology transfer is the fact that 
the successful implementation of the process is not only limited to a simple market
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transaction, as is the case with technology trade, but instead requires a certain amount of 
investment and interactive efforts from both the sourcing and the receiving agents. In 
other words,
a proper function for the achievement evaluation of technology transfer will 
necessarily include variables and conditions related to both sides of the 
process. However, the economic analysis of inter-firm technology transfer 
has mainly focused on the determinants of the transfer cost for the 
technology source, while those of the technology recipient side were 
generally taken as given. Nevertheless, the recent identification of the dual 
role played by R&D, both for the generation of new knowledge and the 
enlargement of the capacity to absorb the technology created by external 
sources and which is available from the environment, implicitly suggests that 
the proper implementation of a technology transfer process requires the 
simultaneous presence of economic convenience both for the source to 
sustain the cost o f  transfer, and for the recipient to invest in the enlargement 
o f its absorptive capacity.
Consistent with the traditional view of technology transfer, Capannelli’s study on 
Malaysia argues that there is plenty of room to improve policy for local sourcing by 
Japanese firms. However, he argues that a major reason for the low procurement ratio 
from local firms relates to the scarcity of local suppliers and to their relatively lower 
quality standard of production compared to that of more competitive Japanese (or third 
country) firms. With respect to external actors interested in promoting Eastern Asian 
development, Capannelli suggests that
Japanese government agencies, like the JETRO (Japan External Trade 
Organisation) or the JICA (Japan International Co-operation Agency), can 
undertake some concrete measures such as the implementation of transfer 
programs for specific technologies whose main applications have already 
followed the relocation of consumer electronics to Malaysia. The moulding 
technology for plastic injection operations is, for instance, an interesting field 
where Japan has already accumulated great knowledge and experience, 
which can not however be properly used domestically due to the hollowing 
out of the downstream industries.
While there remain still more actions for Japanese agencies to commit to, as suggested 
by Capannelli, the positive circularity of trade and investment favours economic growth 
as a result of the increased dynamism of the host economies and generates two distinct 
effects. The first of these is the direct inducement of employment, income, and export 
growth, which has been the focus of the previous section. The second consists of more 
indirect, but lasting benefits from the potential of technology transfer. Recent 
contributions to the literature have stressed the second aspect as one of the most 
fundamental ways to introduce new ideas and new information in developing countries 
and in turn to help the process of technological learning and development of local 
technological capacities (Romer 1993 and Ruffin 1989).
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Capannelli suggests that there is a great deal of scholarship on economic modelling and 
empirical research on FDI and international technology transfer that has produced 
interesting results on the determinants of transfer (Teece 1977; W. H. Davidson & D. G. 
McFetridge 1985; I. Horstmann, & J. R. Markusen 1987; Wang & Blostrom, 1992; 
Ramachandran, 1993; Suzuki 1993; J.G. Montalvo & Y. Yafeh 1994; Wakasugi 1995). 
However, analysis has mainly focused on the relationships between the mother 
company in the technology sourcing country and the local subsidiaries in the recipient 
country. Against this literature, Capannelli argues that older models fail to consider the 
effects of technology transfer through buyer-supplier relations between locally based 
foreign MNCs and the domestic firms in the recipient country, which is a common 
phenomenon with Japanese FDI, where joint-ventures often mean local partners both 
upstream and downstream. He notes that Japanese firms tended to increase their local 
procurement ratio the longer their production was relocated in Malaysia, observing that 
this situation led to higher local sales ratio and more stringent government regulations 
for local sourcing (Capannelli 1996:29). His insights support the general pattern of 
Japanese investment in mature areas such as Taiwan and Singapore, where small and 
medium firms supply Japanese MNCs, confirming the view that these governments are 
reaping the rewards of targeted educational policies over the 1970s and 1980s. As 
Capannelli (1996:29) notes:
during the last decade a growing number of joint-ventures between local 
partners and third country firms have been established, and those in the field 
of electronics, which are usually quite successful, are especially formed with 
Singaporean or Taiwanese companies that had already acquired long 
experience as suppliers of the Japanese MNCs in their own countries.
Moreover, it can be also argued that such a scarce presence of local firms has 
indeed facilitated the recent relocation from Japan of many small and 
medium suppliers, due to low entry barriers.
Capannelli’s work supports conventional wisdom on the very high procurement ratios 
between Japanese firms. The Japanese subcontracting system has traditionally favoured 
long-term relationships, and thus many Japanese parts suppliers have a strong incentive 
to follow the relocation of their customers, particularly to places such as Malaysia (or 
Eastern Asia) given the open-door policy for Japanese firms in those spaces.234 
Although the process of industry relocation is proceeding at a fast pace, with Japan 
enduring a “hollowing out” and a subsequent employment crisis over the 1990s, the 
technology adopted by the subsidiaries in Eastern Asia is inferior to that used by parent 
companies in Japan. Capannelli argues that this is due to the cost of technology transfer
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and the presence of a different economic environment in the host country, particularly 
with regard to the average level of the host employees’ technical skills and experience, 
and to the presence of weak economic infrastructure. In particular, the continuation of 
technology that lags behind Japanese standards is related to management of plant and 
equipment, areas requiring substantial knowledge and information processing abilities.
6.1.3 Problems of legitimation: technology transfer, absorption, and TRIPS
From the Meiji era onwards, Japanese sogo shosha, or trading companies, sought 
control of Japan’s trade and were relied upon to act as an information conduit for Tokyo. 
Their role eventually grew in Eastern Asia as a whole as Japan’s trading prowess gained 
momentum, mainly because of the success of the Imperial Japanese Army in 
conquering new regions. During the period of colonialisation by Japan (approximately 
1900-1945) the Northeast region of Asia served mainly as a source of raw materials. 
However, with the onset of W W II this area began to house industrial bases, particularly 
in the case of what is now North Korea. During WW II, Southeast Asia also supplied 
the Imperial Japanese Army. However, this period was not one where technology 
transfer was deliberately facilitated, and so any technology transfer that did occur was 
unintentional. Thus Northeast Asia, which has a longer history with Japan, has had a 
more mature relationship with Japanese firms, and Southeast Asia, which has had a 
shorter history, has had a less mature relationship with this former imperial power.
As Japan sought to improve its relations in Eastern Asia in the post-WW II era, more 
deliberate efforts at technology transfer were made by Tokyo. Indeed, this began as 
early as the 1950s, when several Japanese organisations were set up with precisely this 
purpose in mind. The gradual normalisation of ties induced by the Cold War led to the 
continuation of raw material supplies to Japan, while manufactured goods were 
imported from Japan. During this time, technology flows from Japan were very slow, as 
noted by those critical of Japanese investment. From the 1970s onwards, Japanese firms 
responded to regional demands with joint ventures with Southeast Asian firms (Unger 
1993; Ebina 1996). At times the local partner could be private, or even the host-state 
itself (Jomo 1994, 1996 & 1997). This FDI led to limited forms of technology transfer, 
as critics pointed out (Weinstein 1976). Starting in the late 1970s, particularly since 
with the Fukuda Doctrine, the Japanese government and host governments made more 
efforts to increase these transfers, particularly by emphasising education abroad for
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Eastern Asian students and by training workers at home with foreign help. Following 
this, from the 1980s onwards Japanese firms have used a great deal of in-house training 
to meet the higher standards of overseas and regional manufacturing, with some firms 
even bringing Eastern Asian workers to Japan for short on-the-floor training sessions.
Leading edge technology is held in Japan as it engages in what Walter Hatch (2002) 
notes is “rearguard regionalisation.”236 Ambivalence regarding the legitimacy of Japan’s 
role in the area of technology can be traced to ideas of immediate ‘catch up’ espoused 
by well-meaning critics. Thus, for Hatch (1998) technology flows have given rise to a 
form of negative dependency, even though it is obvious that enough technology has 
been transferred for Eastern Asian countries to race ahead of most other regions, 
including Southern and Eastern Europe, and even parts of the deep South in the US. 
Critics fail to understand that dependency on Japanese technology has not meant 
underdevelopment, as in Latin America under US hegemony following the Monroe 
Doctrine, or Africa under European domination. Confirming the positive relationship 
with Tokyo, Eastern Asians were eager to send their officials and students in larger and 
larger numbers to Japan. That Eastern Asia could be technologically independent in 
time is a possibility, as indeed South Korea and Taiwan have shown by surpassing 
Japan in some areas of innovation. However, this new independence has come about as 
a result of success of these two countries’ educational systems in turning out technicians 
capable of absorbing knowledge from abroad and creating new knowledge soon after, 
just as the Japanese did in the past. In contrast, Southeast Asians were only beginning to 
break into new knowledge sectors in the late 1990s. In this they were led by Singapore, 
particularly in the information technology area. Clearly, until their education systems 
are able to produce high science, these Southeast Asian nations will continue to lag.237 
As Capanelli (1996) notes,
although we can expect that a longer production experience and a different 
resource allocation in Japan imposed by the shift of comparative advantages 
will induce an increase in locally-based R&D activities, the basic knowledge 
and the core technologies are still maintained within Japan. To this regard, 
our findings indirectly confirm the “technological black box” hypothesis 
proposed by Yamashita, according to which the participation of the local 
staff on the final product assembly operations, and of the local firms in the 
provision of parts and components is still limited to simple technological 
tasks.238 In fact, as our theoretical framework suggests, the cost of transfer for 
the technology source is still too high, especially because the recipient side’s 
absorptive capacity is not developed enough. This may be referred both to the 
case of parts suppliers as well as to the level of the local staff technological 
skill.
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Even after considering the slower than desired technology transfer from Japan to 
Eastern Asia, the method and manner of the management and production of Japanese 
firms have benefited the region just as even limited access to Japanese technology has 
done. The state of Japanese knowledge influences regional labour-management 
relations, and has given rise to a management philosophy emphasising in-house training 
of top workers and long-term employment wherever possible (Koike & Inoki 1990; 
Morshima 1996; Lawler & Atmiyananda 1996).239
The production philosophy of many Japanese large end-goods producers, who have 
pioneered and perfected “just-in-time production,” “total-quality” and shop floor 
innovations/improvements, are used elsewhere (Humphrey 1996 & Roy Choudhry 
1 9 9 7 ) 240 The keiretsu approach to production, with state protection at the early stages, 
as noted by Abegglen and Stalk (1985) and Eccleston (1989), is also being used in 
South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, China and India among others. What is remarkable is 
the diffusion of older Japanese technology, especially to Southeast Asia, by targeted 
migrations with the assistance of MITI. This has meant a rapid gain in Southeast Asia’s 
ability to export manufactures, even in competition with Taiwan and South Korea. This 
movement of productive forces from Japan to Southeast Asia has integrated the region 
ever more tightly, as argued by Hatch and Yamamura (1996). This has ensured that the 
policies of MITI are crucial for Southeast Asia as well as for Japan.241
Governments that receive FDI have claimed that foreign firms, including those from 
Japan, have not transferred technology. While there is truth to this in 1970s and before, 
from the 1980s onwards, this thesis on technology transfer has been challenged at least 
with respect to Japan’s role in Eastern Asia. Japanese production technology, industrial 
organisation processes and human resource management led to the revamping of much 
of the world’s production centres in the 1980s and 1990s, and most of all in Eastern 
Asia. While Western firms studied and copied Japanese methods, Eastern Asia was a 
prime focus for Japanese firms as they built regional production networks. Even as 
Japanese firms attempt to use regional bases for production they have found it none too 
easy, as the capacity of the host to rapidly assimilate technology has not been good; yet 
they have persevered, delivering spectacular results. The improvement of Eastern Asian 
production with even older Japanese technology has helped the region to advance to an 
industrial production base from a predominantly agrarian and raw material base.
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Arguably, the legitimate use of Japanese power comes precisely from the gains made by 
Eastern Asia, which are quite remarkable when compared to Latin America’s dependent 
underdevelopment.
The transfer of technology in the early post-WW II era leading up to the 1980s took 
place in a time when there were fewer laws governing patent rights. As post colonial 
Asian countries in particular have managed to increase productivity and move to higher 
technology areas of production, they have faced increasing challenges from Western 
firms via the GATT-WTO regime of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS). Officially the 1986-94 Uruguay Round trade rules for intellectual 
property rights were portrayed as introducing order and predictability, and promoting 
the systematic settlement of disputes. There are seven area of intellectual property 
covered by the TRIPS agreement:
(1) Copyright and related rights
(2) Trademarks, including service marks
(3) Geographical indications
(4) Industrial designs
(5) Patents
(6) Layout-designs (topographies) of integrated circuits
(7) Undisclosed information, including trade secrets
The WTO claims that TRIPS is an attempt to eliminate difference in the way these 
rights are protected around the world, and to codify each according to common 
international rules. In theory, “When there are trade disputes over intellectual property 
rights, the WTO’s dispute settlement system is now available.” In practice, this rule of 
the law of the powerful has meant the post colonial states in Asia and other places are in 
a weaker position to move up the ladder of industrialisation and are therefore less likely 
to reap the material benefits of doing so. With the success of the Eastern Asian use of 
mature technology to capture markets, studies have considered intellectual property 
issues in the region, and some of the literature has criticized the protectionist tendencies 
of richer countries which are supported under TRIPS, though Japan is singled out as a 
model to be emulated.242 The effect of TRIPS on ‘developmentalism’ is thus of concern 
to these and other scholars interested in the development of post colonial states, while 
Japan is not considered a problem industrialised nation.243
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6.2.0 FINANCE FOR RAPID REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 
JAPANESE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS AND LEGITIMACY
Japan’s external assets have grown even in economic hard times, as shown by Chart 3 
in Chapter 1. However, by the mid-1980s, particularly after the Plaza Accords, Japan’s 
trade account no longer represented its entire current account surplus, as profits from 
investments abroad began to show early effects. The economic woes in Japan over the 
1990s lead to government debt levels of over 130 % of GDP, however it is not widely 
known that this debt was financed by domestic savings, with government deficit 
absorbing the private surplus (Chart 3. Chapter 1). Japan’s economic power has allowed 
it to provide ‘global public goods’ in finance, especially since the 1980s. By the 1990s 
Japanese savings accounted for roughly one third of the world’s total, making it the 
lynchpin of the global financial system as its recycled its surplus in order to keep the 
international capitalist system functional, particularly by keeping the US economy 
afloat by its purchases of US Treasury Bills (USTBs).244 These savings did not show 
signs of diminishing in the short term, as Japan continued to produce approximately 1 
of every 6 USD in the world economy. Even in times of recession, the country’s 
domestic savings rates have only gone up from the low 30% range to the mid 30% 
range (Chart 3L245 Indeed, between 1970 and 1995, Japan’s private surplus exceeded 
private investment except between 1973-74 and 1989-91 (Chart 3L With the Black 
Monday rescue of Wall Street in September 1987, Japanese intervention in the financial 
structure become important even for the US. This highlights how Japan’s savings were 
key to enabling the tax cuts in Washington that ultimately led to the recovery of the US 
economy in the 1990s despite record Reagan deficits. As Hamada (1995:152) shows, 
Japan’s purchases of US bonds also occurred via the City of London as Japan allowed 
Europe to act as its intermediary in recycling surplus funds.246
Playing the legitimating role of hegemon in finance over the last decades of the 20th 
century, Japan provided counter-cyclical funds to Eastern Asia via government projects 
such as Overseas Development Aid (ODA) as well as measures allowing private capital 
flows into the region by deregulating controls in Tokyo. Significantly, this role was not 
confined to Eastern Asia alone. Japan has acted as the lender of last resort to avert crisis 
situations in other regions, as was the case in the resolution of the Latin American debt 
crisis. Unfortunately it is not well known that Japan came up with the first Miyazawa 
Plan, which served as a guideline for the now famous Brady Plan (Hamada 1995:156;
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Rapkin and Strand 1996:21). In Eastern Asia, Japan was able to act as the lender of last 
resort via the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) when many of the region’s 
countries suffered from balance of payments problems that could not be addressed via 
the IMF, as with much of communist Indochina. Furthermore, low Japanese interest 
rates eased regional macro-economic adjustment and debt service by driving down the 
cost of money. Where possible, Japan also co-operated with G7 nations to manage 
movements in the currency markets, even though this was not always possible given the 
dominance of US domestic interests over the international agenda; for example, 
Washington used exchange rate manipulation to force Japan to impose voluntary export 
restraints (VERs). Stable currencies were essential for emerging economies, particularly 
for those countries that had pegged their exchange rate to the US dollar in order to trade 
in more predictable waters. By 1996, Tokyo was bolder and more coherent in its 
leadership, advancing the development of a “new international system” to enable 
economic security for all countries, and using its presence in the G7 to champion the 
causes of Eastern Asia in particular and developing countries in general (Sato 1996), 
thereby continuing to legitimate its power.
In order to illuminate the nature of ‘global public goods’ in the financial structure, 
aspects of Japanese policy affecting Eastern Asia are assessed below in subsection 6.2.1. 
In subsection 6.2.2 bilateral and multilateral efforts are further discussed in terms of 
their ‘global public goods’ policy role. In subsection 6.2.3 private flows, not 
traditionally part of the ‘global public goods’ language, as assessed in terms of their 
potential as another form of Japan’s engagement. In subsection 6.2.4, Japan’s 
ODA^FDI regime is shown to contribute to legitimating Japanese power through its 
ability to influence private investment from not only Japan, but also other wealthy 
nations.
6.2.1 Japan’s ‘global public goods’ in finance affecting Eastern Asia
Japan’s domestic decisions often affected countries in Eastern Asia, suggesting Tokyo’s 
structural power. Under pressure from Eastern Asian nations, Japan has become more 
aware of these effects and officials have, over time, made decisions at home while also 
considering the region, showing a ‘global public goods’ role. Key among these is the 
level of the Japanese exchange rate, which has increased in value against the US dollar 
after the end of the Gold Standard under Nixon. The gradual appreciation of the JPY
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against the USD aided Eastern Asian exports to and investments from Japan, as their 
currencies were pegged to the US currency until the early 1990s.247 The increasing use 
of the JPY as a regional currency signified a need for a more active Japanese policy, 
among other things to ease balance of payment problems. In the case of states that 
Tokyo had surpluses with, it used the Overseas Economic Co-operation Fund (OECF) 
to provide low interest JPY loans to ease balance of payment problems. Asian central 
banks' holdings of JPY as a proportion of their foreign-exchange reserves rose from 
13.9 % in 1980 to 17.5 % in 1989.248 Those Asian countries with large international 
debts balanced their debt load by diversifying from USD into JPY as well. Between 
1980 and 1988, JPY-denominated debt as a proportion of total debt held by Indonesia, 
South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand nearly doubled, to about 40 %. 
Bonds issued in JPY represented another way the Eastern Asian region benefited, as 
these issues came with Japanese government guarantees to attract Japanese savings into 
these instruments. The interest rates of the JPY bonds issued was higher than those 
issued by Japan, but effectively lower than bonds issued in USD, thus making it cheaper 
for the issuing government and profitable for Japanese investors wanting to avoid 
exchange rate risks. The risk borrowers undertook was low enough that even after 
paying for any appreciation of the JPY vs. the USD, they were still generally better off 
than when borrowing at commercial rates (Yamada 1998).
Interest in the international role of the JPY was first sparked during discussions 
regarding a new international monetary system in the wake of the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system, with the adoption of a floating exchange rate system in March 
1973. During this period, the US continued to suffer a secular decline in its global 
economic standing, thus encouraging a further decline in international confidence in the 
dollar. Simultaneously, Japan and Germany, helped along by currencies that were 
devalued, emerged from these shocks with renewed vigour to claim an increasingly 
important role in the global economy, generating growing interest in the international 
roles of the JPY and German mark. Japan’s power in the financial structure led to new 
legislation that effectively promoted cross-border monetary flow and access to Japanese 
capital.249 In December 1980, a thoroughly revised Foreign Exchange and Foreign 
Trade Control Law went into effect. In October 1983, the internationalisation of the 
JPY and the liberalisation of financial and capital markets became major policy 
objectives of the Comprehensive Economic Measures adopted by the government. Then,
178
coinciding with President Reagan’s visit to Japan, the Yen-Dollar Committee was 
established in November 1983 and eventually reached an agreement (in May 1984) 
concerning the further liberalisation of Japan's financial and capital markets, the 
internationalisation of the JPY, and the lowering of the barriers to access for foreign 
financial institutions participating in Japan's financial and capital markets. At the same 
time, “Current Status and Prospects for Financial Liberalisation and the 
Internationalisation of the Yen” was announced. This document systematically outlined 
specific approaches and measures for promoting the internationalisation of the JPY. 
Against the background of growing domestic and global interest in the 
internationalisation of the JPY, the Minister of Finance assigned the task of conducting 
deliberations on the internationalisation of the JPY to the Council on Foreign Exchange 
and Other Transactions. In March 1985, the Council submitted its report, which 
included the following measures for promoting the internationalisation of the JPY:
1. financial liberalisation (particularly the continued liberalisation of interest 
rates, and the further development and expansion of open short-term capital 
markets);
2. liberalisation of the Euro-yen market as the first step toward improving the 
convenience of the yen for non-residents; and
3. establishment of a Tokyo offshore market to facilitate Euro-yen 
transactions in Tokyo.
In response to these developments, steady progress was made through the second half of 
the 1980s and the 1990s in the program for financial liberalisation, including the easing 
and abolition of Euro-yen regulations. The Tokyo offshore market was established in 
December 1986 and continues to the present.250
6.2.2 Japan’s bilateral and multilateral ‘global public goods’ delivery
Japan’s bilateral and multilateral contribution in terms of the provision of ‘global public 
goods’ in the financial area is significant. With the Fukuda Doctrine, Overseas 
Development Aid (ODA) became a central part of a more active foreign policy from the 
1980s onwards (Orr 1990; Rix 1989). Officially, MOFA (1999) notes that ODA 
provision:
1. is an obligation that Japan must satisfy as the world's second-largest 
economy,
2. bolsters Japan's standing and credibility in the eyes of the international 
community, and
3. contributes to promoting the national interest of Japan, which depends on 
world peace and stability, particularly given Japan's dependence on imports 
of resources, energy, food, and other basic materials.
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Early Japanese aid was tied to goods and services provided by Japanese firms, though
by the late 1980s this type of component had dropped substantially, with Western firms
and firms from the host country also winning contracts. The degree of provision of tied
Japanese ODA was influenced by the MITI—MOFA rivalry, while it was co-ordinated
1with the private sector with some input from MOF. Such co-ordination was achieved 
with fewer problems than could have been expected, mainly due to Japan’s experience 
of reparations “payments” in the 1950s and 1960s, which was basically the provision of 
JPY credits for purchases of Japanese made goods, coordinated by MITI and MOFA.252
Japanese aid grew to be first or second highest in the world in USD terms by the late 
1980s and 1990s on the back of the Plaza Accords that doubled the valued of the yen 
transferring power from the US to Japan as argues by Murphy (1996). Nonetheless, 
Japan’s aid has hovered around 0.3 % of GDP, never reaching the 0.7 target for OECD 
nations, as promised. However, the Japanese focus on Asia has meant these nations 
have received the bulk of the ODA even in the 1990s, even when they have become 
relatively well off (Table 71.
(Exchange of note 
basis; ¥100 million, %)
1994
Amount Share
1995
Amount Share
1996
Amount Share
1997
Amount Share
1998
Amount Share
Asia 7,682 87.8 8,943 78.6 9,976 76.6 8,599 77.8 10,078 91.5
(ASEAN,
Cambodia) (4,260) (48.7) (5,083) (44.7) (5,137) (39.4) (4,062) (36.7) (7,308) (66.3)
O Middle East 346 4.0 1,103 9.7 747 5.7 478 4.3 383 3.5
o Africa 292 3.3 427 3.8 454 3.5 243 2.2 307 2.8
3 Latin America 329 3.8 765 6.7 1,814 13.9 1,347 12.2 96 0.9
Eastern Europe 71 0.8 97 0.9 39 0.3 368 3.3 152 1.4
Oceania and others 31 0.4 43 0.4 0 0.0 23 0.2 0 0.0
TOTAL 8,751 100.0 11,379 100.0 13,030 100.0 11,058 100.0 11,016 100.0
-1998
Source: Annual Report Tokyo: MOFA, 1999.
As noted, and to the dismay of emissaries from other regions, Japan’s ODA has been 
concentrated on Asia, consistent with regional demands for economic development. 
From about 1966 to 1998, the ten leading recipients were all in Asia (Table 8) much to 
dismay of countries elsewhere, particularly in Africa, where emissaries saw Japan as the 
“last hope” in solving catastrophic problems of development.
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Table 8: Japan’s ODA 1966-1998 (Asia, Oceania, & Middle East)
Area Countries
FY 1998 
Number Amount (Mil.) Share (%)
FY 1966 
Number
>-1998
Amount (\ 
Mil.)
Share (%)
Asia Afghanistan - - - 1 720 0
Armenia 1 5,399 0.5 1 5,399 0
Azerbaijan - - - 1 20,699 0.1
Bangladesh - - - 62 516,366 2.9
Cambodia - - - 2 1277 0
China 15 206,583 18.6 239 2,260,873 12.6
Georgia - - - 1 5,332 0
India 1 11,537 1 143 1,641,785 9.1
Indonesia 4 230,480 20.7 589 3,345,859 18.6
Kazakhstan 1 22,122 2 3 50,888 0.3
Republic of Korea - - - 91 595,971 3.3
Kyrgyz 1 5,250 0.5 5 23,347 0.1
Laos - - - 3 9,093 0.1
Malaysia 5 107,695 9.7 67 701,804 3.9
Mongolia - - - 7 29,987 0.2
Myanmar - - - 66 402,972 2.2
Nepal - - - 8 58,035 0.3
Pakistan - - - 68 644,664 3.6
The Philippines 14 157,011 14.1 223 1,608,706 9
Singapore - - - 2 1,181 0
Sri Lanka 4 26,102 2.3 75 461,461 2.6
Thailand 13 147,562 13.3 220 1,631,196 9.1
Turkmenistan - - - 1 4,505 0
Uzbekistan - - - 3 34,328 0.2
Viet Nam 9 88,000 7.9 56 506,374 2.8
Others - - - 5 12,492 0.1
Total 68 1,007,741 90.7 1,942 14,575,313 81.2
Oceania Fiji 1 2,287 0
Papua New Guinea 13 56,835 0.3
Total 0 0 0 14 59,122 0.3
The
Middle
East
Iran 1 38,614 0.2
Jordan 15 182,748 1
Lebanon 1 13,022 0.1
Syria 4 138,611 0.8
Turkey 20 347,103 1.9
Yemen 5 49,319 0.3
Total 0 0 0 46 769,417 4.3
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
As some countries in the region graduated, ODA began to shift outside the region, 
however when the economic development trend could not be sustained with the 1997 
financial crisis, as in 1998, ODA was redirected to Asia, giving it a 91.5 % share. By 
1998 Japan’s focus on Asia meant a cumulative total of JPY 14,575,313 million in
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ODA loans, or 81.2 % of the total from 1966 to 1988. As suggested by Table 9. the 
Japanese multi-lateral effort is also immense, as part of ODA is channelled via 
international organizations such as the UN and its agencies.
Table 9: Japan's ODA Through International Institutions
(Net disbursement 
basis; $ million, %) 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total grants to
international
institutions
(1) UN agencies
(2) Other agencies
418.3
378.2
40.1
540.9
501.4
39.5
524.0
483.6
40.4
695.8
648.7
47.1
660.1
602.4
57.7
657.7
593.2
64.5
758.8
678.1
80.7
826.7
744.0
82.7
780.4
701.6
78.8
689.6
616.5
73.1
697.0
627.9
69.1
Total capital 
subscriptions, etc. 
to international 
financial 
institutions
(1) World Bank 
group
(2) Other 
institutions
2.293.5
1,552.0
741.5
1,645.6
930.5
715.1
1,758.3
1,198.7
559.6
1.467.6
1,186.0
281.6
2,187.6
1,282.8
904.8
2,652.0
1,603.3
1,048.7
3,029.3
1,762.8
1,266.6
3,344.2
2,323.8
1,020.4
471.5
12.4
459.1
2,133.1
1,539.7
593.4
1,428.6
806.9
621.7
Grand total 2,711.8 2,186.4 2,282.3 2,163.4 2,847.7 3,309.7 3,788.1 4,170.4 1,251.8 2,822.7 2,125.6
Percentage o f  total 
ODA (%)
29.7 24.4 25.2 19.1 24.8 28.6 27.8 28.1 13.3 30.0 19.8
Notes: 1. As the figures in the table are rounded off, they do not necessarily add up to the totals. 2. 
Includes contributions to EBRD. 3. ODA to Eastern Europe and contributions to the EBRD have not been 
included in the calculations of percentage of total ODA. Source: Annual Report. Tokyo: MOFA 1999.
The G7 is an important forum in which Japan expresses views on behalf of the Eastern 
Asian region. In particular, Tokyo has sought to stabilise the international financial 
system in co-operation with the other leading powers in the G7 club. The percentage of 
all Japanese aid given through international organizations averaged 21.5 % in the two 
years 1996 and 1997. As in previous years, this was lower than the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) member average of 31.2 % over the period.
The Plaza Accords of 1985 that led to managed JPY appreciation made it possible for 
Tokyo to pull Eastern Asia faster on to the economic development track via increases of 
mutually reinforcing aid and investment. In the areas of both aid and investment, Japan 
replaced the US as the region’s key player. Officials of MOFA, MITI, MOE and to a 
certain degree the MOC and other Japanese ministries contributed to decisions that led 
to Eastern Asian countries receiving infrastructure building and technical assistance. In
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addition, these countries received soft loans to assist with balance of payments 
problems.253 Moreover, Japanese firms’ investments in the region led to a surge in 
exports from new plants, softening the foreign currency needs and also the debt burdens 
of the recipient nations. While Tokyo has focused on Asia, Japan’s positive role is also 
well recognised in Africa.254 African nations had a window of opportunity in this 
respect in the early 1990s when Japan shifted its focus away from Asia, however, with 
the financial crisis in 1997 the focus has again shifted to Asia.
6.2.3 Japanese direct investment: private flows as ‘global public goods9?
Japan’s private capital flows represent another means of recycling its surplus, and thus 
another method of ‘global public goods’ provision, even though this interpretation is 
viewed unfavourably by those adopting a purists’ perspective on ‘global public 
goods.’255 As Kindleburger (1986:2) notes, “There is something of a tendency today, 
at least in political science, to draw back and claim that such institutions as open world 
markets are not public goods because countries can be excluded from them by 
discrimination.” The argument for including capital flows is based on Kindleberger’s 
(1986:8) work. He suggests that they are part of ‘global public goods’ as they do meet 
the requirements of counter-cyclical flows. World foreign direct investment (FDI) has 
grown rapidly since the early 1980s and Japan has been the leader in FDI in Eastern 
Asia, recycling its surplus in this region as well as in other parts of the world. Indeed, 
from the early 1980s through the mid-1990s, the rate of increase of world FDI was 
higher than that of world trade. As a result of these developments, and given the 
scarcity of capital for the purpose, FDI is one of the most important means of financing 
the development of industries geared for export256
Besides economic theory based arguments, political factors are responsible for FDI 
flows, in particular when it comes to the political relationship between source and host, 
as it is this relationship that ultimately guarantees FDI. The political motives driving 
FDI in Eastern Asia are based on safety concerns in addition to the historical strategic 
decision to move Japan’s surplus with the US to Eastern Asia as a whole in order to 
strengthen these states against destabilizing societal forces. There are other crucial 
factors to consider, especially the actions of governments shaping the market. Indeed, 
FDI need not be made based on static notions of Ricardian comparative advantage, as 
these can be improved with sound policy on education, etc. Not only can governments
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improve the host’s desirability, but so too can firms which carry out long range plans. 
Ultimately much about FDI depends on politics, and specifically the stability conferred 
by sound relationships between the nations involved. When considering the provision of 
FDI by Japan’s recycling of its recurrent surpluses, a cyclical pattern can be observed in 
the 1990s as FDI tapered off with demand slowing down and Japan experiencing 
economic crisis at home (Chart 10).
Chart 10: Destination of Japanese FDI: Regional Comparison
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In the first half of the 1980s, investment increased—in part to enable Japan to avoid 
trade frictions with Europe and North America in the automobile sector—to reach just 
over $12 billion in 1985 (around 1 % of Japan’s GDP). In the second half of the 1980s 
FDI growth accelerated further showing the effect of the 1985 Plaza Accords that 
doubled the value of the JPY against the USD, but also a continuation of the demand for
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Japanese investment abroad, especially in Eastern Asia. Japan's FDI outflows for 1986— 
89 surpassed the country's total overseas investment for the entire post-war period up to 
1986. By the late 1980s, Japan was investing more abroad than any other country in the 
world, with its FDI growing to $67.5 billion (around 2.5 % of GDP) in 1989. Arguably, 
regional comparisons are important. The US has consistently received the larger share 
of Japanese FDI—in part because of political pressure on Japanese firms—and this has 
helped to balance the current account in the US. Over the 1990s FDI gradually 
decreased as Japan suffered economic crisis, but also as the sectors it had invested in the 
1980s were saturated, with the number of cases of investment declining throughout the 
decade (see Chart 1U.
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The saturation suggests that treating it as a ‘global public good’ is useful as Japan’s FDI 
served to meet regional and world demand. After domestic crisis in the early 1990s, 
annual outflows declined steadily, both in absolute terms and relative to GDP and fixed 
investment. However, FDI outflows recovered, spurred by the appreciation of the JPY 
in 1993-95. There have, however, been notable changes in the regional and sectoral 
composition of outbound Japanese FDI. During the 1980s, Japanese companies 
increased their investment in North America. Over this period, industrialised countries 
saw their share of Japanese FDI grow to more than 75 % of the total (the US alone 
received 50 % of total Japanese FDI), whereas developing countries (including those in 
Asia) saw their share drop from 50 % to about 25 %. During this time, Japanese 
overseas investment in the tertiary sectors—including finance, insurance, transport, and 
real estate—grew significantly, while the share of FDI in manufacturing and mining 
declined. However, for Japanese FDI in Asia, the share of electric and electronics 
industry in total manufacturing increased from 11 % in 1985 to 26 % in 1994, once 
again demonstrating that it was meeting the demands of the region.
While much has been made of Japanese direct investment, not enough is made of its 
effects in terms of the provision of so-called ‘global public goods’ and economic 
development. Consistent with Kindleberger’s (1986) ideas, this method of recycling 
Japan’s surpluses is important for development in Eastern Asia. In terms of value, 
Japanese FDI rose from 2.5 % to 3 % of domestic investment between 1982 and 1993 
(prior to 1982, Japanese FDI was heavily regulated and hence not as subject to market 
forces). By 1993, the stock of Japanese FDI abroad stood at $422.5 billion—almost 
fifteen times the $29.9 billion stock of FDI received by Japan, suggesting the degree to 
which Japan’s surpluses were recycled. In Asia in total, Japanese FDI increased from 
12 % in 1985 to 24 % in 1994.
6.2.4 The ODA^FDI regime: Japan’s use of financial power in Eastern Asia
Japanese ODA is metaphorically speaking an ‘international public good’ as argued by 
those within the UNDP volume, but particularly, Rajshri Jayaraman and Ravi Kanbur 
(1999).257 While providing Eastern Asia with much needed capital by recycling 
significant surpluses through the region, Tokyo went so far as to institute a regime of 
development finance and concessionary lending for projects that enhanced the ability of 
the region to compete for global FDI. Not only did Japan provide financial ‘public
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goods’ from private sources, but targeted aid at infrastructure that helped to channel 
direct private investment into productive, mainly export-oriented activity, the core of 
‘developmentalism.’ Japanese officials were not content to let the market take its course, 
and saw that some government intervention would allow the region as a whole to take a 
larger share from the global pool. The rapid foreign movement into Southeast Asia 
triggered higher wages, transfer of skills and higher demand, and this was instrumental 
for the high rates of growth experienced in the region (Tejima: 1996b).
Table 10: Summary of PDA Loans by Sector
(amount ¥100 million, share %) 1994 
A m t %
1995 
Am t %
1996 
Am t %
1997 
A m t %
1998 
Am t %
Agriculture, forestry, and 
fisheries
386 4.5 1,459 13.3 1,518 11.8 1,238 11.9 500 5.8
Agriculture and forestry 
(General Agricultural Development, 
Animal Husbandry and Forestry)
64 0.7 502 4.6 805 6.3 524 5.0 220 2.6
Fisheries
(Building Fishing Bases) 0 0.0 2 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Irrigation and water 
(Irrigation and Flood Control) 322 3.8 955 8.7 713 5.6 714 6.9 281 3.3
Mining and industry 349 4.1 77 0.7 96 0.7 397 3.8 351 4.1
Mining
(Petroleum Development, 
Development of Mineral Mines)
0 0.0 0 0.0 58 0.5 43 0.4 0 0.0
Industry
(Fertilizer Factories and Steel 
Foundries)
349 4.1 77 0.7 38 0.3 354 3.4 351 4.1
Economic infrastructure 5,956 69.7 6,969 63.8 7,450 58.1 7,056 68.0 5,372 62.5
Land transportation (Roads, 
Railroads, and Piers) 1,383 16.2 2,397 21.9 2,956 23.0 2,867 27.6 2,378 27.7
Maritime transportation (Port 
Construction and Ships) 375 4.4 840 7.7 166 1.3 564 5.4 452 5.3
Air transportation (Building 
Airports) 733 8.6 366 3.3 1,008 7.9 498 4.8 279 3.2
Electricity (Hydropower, Thermal 
Power, Geothermal Power and 
Power Lines)
3,232 37.8 3,134 28.7 2,884 22.5 2,816 27.1 2,129 24.8
Gas (Natural Gas Development) 57 0.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Communications (Telephone 
Facilities and Microwave Facilities) 176 2.1 232 2.1 436 3.4 311 3.0 134 1.6
Social infrastructure 
(Water and Sewage Facilities, 
Medical Facilities, Educational 
Facilities and Environment)
1,128 13.2 1,479 13.5 3,228 25.2 1,335 12.9 1,633 19.0
Structural adjustments (World 
Bank and Other Loans for 
Structural Reform o f  
Cooperative Financing, as well 
as Sector Program Loans)
278 33 248 2.3 103 0.8 320 3.1 740 8.6
Other (Export Promotion) 444 5.2 698 6.4 439 3.4 35 0J 35 0.0
Total 8,541 100 10,930 100 12,833 100 10,381 100 8,597 100
Excluding commodity loans and rescheduling, Exchange of notes basis. 
SOURCE: Annual Report 1999, Tokyo: MOFA and OECF.
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By the 1990s ODA loans were well targeted, reflecting Japan’s long-term policy of 
promoting investment-inducing infrastructure, developing human resources, and 
providing domestic food sources as well as the public infrastructure needed for civil 
society to properly function (see Table 10 above).
This Fukuda Doctrine-induced policy can be best understood as one of enlightened self- 
interest, and specifically as a means to legitimate Japanese power. Acting as the 
purveyor of ‘global public goods’ in Eastern Asia in order to enable capitalist growth in 
the region, Japan assisted rapid growth by creating a regime of aid-induced investment, 
or an ODA ►FDI regime. While Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) has been 
significant in assisting infrastructure projects and human resources development, and 
other improvements attractive to Japanese firms, what is not appreciated is that it has 
also played a significant role in luring other foreign investment in manufacturing that 
followed the Japanese into Eastern Asia in the 1980s, as evidenced by the emergence of 
“growth triangles” in the region.258
It is fair to say that while MITI’s interests lay in serving Japanese business, MOFA was 
interested in repairing relations with Eastern Asia in a manner consistent with the 
Fukuda Doctrine. The process of repairing relations was intensified in the 1980s, as 
noted by Wan and Pharr (1996:7), and was propelled in a direction which ensured that 
ODA facilitated direct investment by Japanese firms in Southeast Asia. The ODA ►FDI 
regime was especially important because it gave the Japanese government the 
opportunity to direct JFDI to developing countries of its choice. The Japanese 
government further supported the ODA ►FDI regime at the international level, with the 
creation of the Multilateral-Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) in 1985. Funded 
mainly by the Japanese government but based in Washington D.C. as part of the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) group, MIGA has played a role in 
encouraging foreign direct investment in developing countries, and must be seen as part 
of Tokyo’s efforts at the system level.259 It did not involve shutting out US or European 
investment, but rather concentrated on creating infrastructure such that the leading 
effect of Japanese firms enabled these economies to compete for foreign investment 
from Western countries as well (Katsuhisa & Akifumi 1996:384).
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According to Malaysian scholars Usmani and Rashid (2000) the literature on FDI 
suggests that there are three major benefits associated with foreign investment: 
technology transfer, job creation and export development. They argue that in 
postcolonial states, FDI is associated with economic growth for several reasons. They 
make the case that FDI provides technological and managerial know-how and brings an 
increase in the aggregate demand, the stock of capital for investment, employment, 
income, GDP and exports. Addressing the traditional critics of FDI, they argue that 
when a firm seeks to set up its business activities in another nation, it does so basically 
to increase its profits. To achieve this, it will outperform local and other international 
rivals; hence it will be very competitive, bringing in its best technology and managerial 
skills. This behaviour induces "spill over effects," forcing local rivals to do their best to 
increase their productivity in order to remain competitive. Ultimately, all of this leads to 
overall economic growth.
Several studies have assessed the relationship between FDI and growth. Hobday (2001) 
makes the case that the electronics sector proves to be a rich source of empirical 
material, both for understanding the processes of economic development and for 
illustrating the role of latecomer enterprise in engaging with and exploiting international 
production networks. In research conducted by Harrison (1994) it was found that MNCs 
have a positive effect on productivity, act as export catalysts, pay higher wages, are 
more energy efficient, and do not treat the host country as a "pollution haven,” though 
typically there is not much technology transfer. In research conducted by OECD 
(Thomsen 1999), it was found that integration into the global economy does not come 
through direct exports of foreign-owned firms only, but is also derived from the 
presence of foreign MNCs in sectors providing goods and services to exporters. For 
example, foreign investors have participated actively in the privatisation of utilities in 
Asia, particularly through “build-operate-transfer” schemes. Power shortages, which 
plagued growth in countries like the Philippines, have virtually disappeared with the 
help of Japanese foreign direct investment (JFDI). Although inward FDI does not 
represent the only option available to developing countries, it does represent the most 
efficient one for several reasons. Acquiring technological and organizational know-how 
is an expensive undertaking: given the shortage of capital, developing countries have 
few options that allow support for a viable and strong domestic sector.
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In his study, Pradeep Agrawal (2000), demonstrates the complimentary effect of FDI on 
investment, with FDI eventually leading to additional investment by host country 
investors several times larger then the initial FDI inflow. FDI inflows promote GDP 
growth by providing additional employment in economies with a surplus of labour, and 
improving technical know-how and human capital. Agrawal thus recommends that 
further FDI inflows be encouraged, though he does concede that FDI is not beneficial 
under all conditions, and hence suggests that Southeast Asian countries must drive a 
hard bargain with the developed countries during trade negotiations. It is essentially 
such demands that have led to JFDI playing a key role in the region’s export boom.
Although empirical studies on FDI are far from unequivocal, the World Trade 
Organization's review of case studies supports the view that FDI contributes to 
improving international competitiveness and economic growth in developing countries. 
Its major findings are:
(1) FDI and exports of the host-country are complementary to each other.
(2) MNCs spur growth of the exports of the indigenous manufacturing enterprises.
(3) Newer technologies are introduced, and competition is stimulated, resulting in 
increasing productivity.
(4) FDI has a substantial positive effect on macroeconomic growth and greater 
spillover effects, especially when the host country has abundant stock of human 
capital and skilled labour.
In their two-model study, Moran and Bergsten (1998) show that depending on the 
competitiveness of the industry and the economy of the host country, FDI can either 
help the host country break out of the vicious cycle of underdevelopment by 
complementing local savings and supplying more effective management, marketing and 
technology, or else lower domestic savings, drive local rivals out of business and 
substitute for imported inputs. New resources from Japan may relieve the bottlenecks 
that constraint development, raise efficiency, expand output, increase employment and 
wages and lead to higher economic growth in general. In contrast repatriation of capital 
may drain capital from the host country, while tight control over technology, higher 
management functions and export channels may actually prevent beneficial spillover.
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UNCTAD (1996) and OECD (1986) studies show that in a majority of cases FDI has 
positive effects, while in a smaller number of instances it decreases national income 
even when profitable for the investors. Findings suggest that the likelihood of each of 
these two different scenarios has typically depended on the host country's policies 
towards foreign investment. FDI, as in the case of joint ventures or licensing conditions 
with Japan, has brought capital, technology and management benefits as well as quality 
control, generating both direct and indirect spillovers. Moran and Bergsten (1998) 
suggest host countries must themselves take action to attract and utilize FDI in their 
development programs, as nationalist Eastern Asian states have done.
6.3.0 JAPANESE ‘GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS’: THE EFFICEINT SPREAD 
OF REGIONAL PRODUCTION AND MARKET ACCESS
The effect of security, finance and knowledge (technology) ‘public goods’ eventually 
manifests in the real economy in the form of conditions conducive for production and 
consumption of goods. The free movement of private firms and the opening of the 
Japanese market aided the region to gain access to production and markets in Japan, and 
in this sense Japan’s actions provide ‘gobal public goods.’ Ultimately, it is the rapid 
growth of production and consumption in Eastern Asia, aided by Japanese provision of 
‘global public goods,’ which underpins Japan’s ability to legitimate its regional 
hegemony in the economic area. Rapid growth in production for the world market in the 
region has allowed rising real wages, leading to the improved patterns of consumption 
necessary for domestic demand-driven growth to contribute to overall demand in a 
virtuous cycle. This trend in overall growth has been fast enough to allow some easing 
of the differences in living standards between Eastern Asia and the centre, particularly 
Japan, and the narrowing of this gap is precisely what makes Japanese regional 
hegemony possible legitimate.
In subsection 6.3.1, Eastern Asian production is linked to Japanese colonial times with 
the initial development of modem production in Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria. In 6.3.2 
the post-war shift in production from Japan to Eastern Asia leading to the ‘hollowing 
out’ of Japan is traced, and it is shown that this led to the rapid growth of Eastern Asian 
economies and to the narrowing of the material gap between the core and the periphery. 
In subsection 6.3.3, trends in regional trade are assessed together with the growing 
importance of the Japanese market, which has become either the first or the second
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destination of choice for Eastern Asian products. In subsection 6.3.4 it is argued that 
since the 1980s, Japan has become a leading purveyor of ‘global public goods’ in the 
realm of production and markets, providing goods essential for capitalist growth in 
Eastern Asia that have led to rapid growth and the lessening of regional disparities, 
thereby legitimating Japanese power.
6.3.1 Japanese firms and the development of Eastern Asian production
It might be said that the first centres of modem production in Eastern Asia outside 
Japan began under Japanese imperialism. This was indeed the case for Taiwan, Korea 
and part of China, all of which endured Japanese mle for decades. However, this was 
not true of Southeast Asia, because of the relatively short period of the Japanese 
occupation there. To begin with, Taiwan, or Formosa, was ceded to Japan by China in 
1895, after which point its industrialisation came about as a result of Japanese colonial 
mle. Unlike in colonies run by the Japanese military, Taiwanese feelings towards Japan 
have not been hostile. The effect of Japanese occupation there was to expand and 
modernise the Taiwanese economy quite rapidly. As WW II strengthened demand, 
Taiwan became a useful supplier to Japanese firms. In contrast, Korea’s by now well- 
known negative experience with Japan led to an altogether different track towards 
industrialisation under the Imperial Japanese Army, which organised production in 
Korea using brutal policies that included forced labour. However, like Taiwan, by WW 
II Korea was a crucial industrial supply centre for the Japanese war effort. Similar to 
Korea, Chinese industrialisation also has some ties to Japan. The creation of 
Manchukuo, which existed as a Japanese-dominated puppet state from 1934 to 1945, 
meant the industrial development of the region with Japanese investment, as it was to be 
used as a springboard for further militarist adventures. By the late 1930s, Manchukuo 
was transformed into the most industrialised region in China. After Japan's defeat in 
WW II, Manchukuo, or Manchuria, was briefly occupied by Soviet troops (1945-1946), 
who looted it as they withdrew. Despite this, the area remains China's industrial 
heartland. Although Japanese practices of forced labour and the pillaging of raw 
materials in Korea and China were obviously contrary to notions of consent and 
legitimacy, the knowledge imparted in the process was important for Eastern Asian 
industrialisation no matter how odious the idea is for the region’s victims.261 With the 
defeat of Imperial Japan in WW II, the physical and organisational structures of 
production that remained were utilized by the new regimes in the region.
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The return of Japanese firms to Eastern Asia after WW II followed historical colonial 
patterns, as Japanese firms sought sources of raw materials and markets for finished 
goods in the region. However, the return of Japanese firms to Eastern Asia occurred 
within the context of heated discussion about the atrocities committed by the Imperial 
Japanese Army and vocal demands for war reparations. Initially, direct investment in 
mainly raw materials production was hardly sufficient to play a role in legitimating 
Japan’s regional hegemony. However, as the governments of the region increased their 
demands for investment in the value-added sector, Japanese firms began to invest in 
areas other than the primary goods sector. Of course this took place in the context of 
Japanese firms seeking higher profits. However, it is clear that the demands from 
Eastern Asian nations themselves have made a difference. To understand the early 
actions of the Japanese government and firms in response to Eastern Asian demands, 
one must consider how:
• Tied-aid policies from the 1960s and through the 1980s gave Japanese 
construction firms access to infrastructure projects in Eastern Asia, and these 
fostered new business opportunities for other Japanese firms with greater 
intelligence of local conditions and demand.262
• Japanese firms relied on joint ventures to gain market share and diversify risk, a 
strategy that took off after anti-Japanese riots in the early 1970.
• Japanese firms used the MITI run programme of trade insurance with JETRO 
even conducting research and making the connections between the region and 
Japanese firms.
The post Fukuda era had taken these developments to an altogether different plain:
• Firms made use of incentives provided by the government in Tokyo, as they 
invested into the manufacturing sectors, thus showing us how much a powerful 
state can achieve when willing to encourage industrialisation of post colonial 
states. Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) that led to the ODA ►FDI 
regime meant excellent infrastructure for Japanese firms, whether this meant 
better roads, air and sea ports, steady power supply, etc.
• Firms embedded with the Keiretsu made new connections with host actors in 
Southeast Asia to initiate new business opportunities, thus ensuring additional 
Japanese involvement.
• Japanese FDI into production in Eastern Asia had the added guarantees of 
increasing their access to the Japanese market in addition to the access to the US 
market.
Finally, in this context we must consider that Japan itself was losing its firms to Eastern 
Asia, causing economic hardship at home. It demonstrated to some extent that it was
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itself moving to a laissez faire model while encouraging the region to grow via 
‘developmentalism’.
6.3.2 The 1990s “hollowing out” of Japan and Eastern Asia’s gain in exports
The effort by Japanese manufacturers to escape domestic unit-labour costs by moving 
production abroad has been labelled the ‘hollowing out’ of Japan, leading the country to 
rely on innovation in high technology, with small and medium enterprises playing a 
role.263 Earlier the Economist had noted, “Given the ever-rising JPY and its neighbours’ 
growing domestic markets, it is surprising that Japan's companies have remained so 
loyal to their home for so long.”264 Certainly, compared with its competitors, by the 
beginning of the 1990s Japan still made a high proportion of its products at home. 
Indeed, only 9 % of the Japanese manufacturing industry's total productive capacity was 
located outside Japan at the end of 1991. However, over the 1990s there has been rapid 
change as JFDI continued into Asia, in addition to North America and Europe, leading 
to the “hollowing out” of Japan.
Surveys of Japanese companies published in the 1990s by the Export-Import Bank of 
Japan confirmed the trend (EXIM 1992-1996): according to these, alongside the 
traditional goal of pursuing low labour costs, Japanese companies were motivated to 
invest in Asia so as to produce goods for local consumer markets. Tejima Shigeki, 
director of the Ex-Im Bank's overseas-investment division, notes that in addition to 
turning to China, companies were gradually shifting production away from relatively 
high-cost Malaysia and Thailand to Indonesia, the second-favourite country in the Ex- 
Im survey, and to the Philippines. Significantly, the investments of Japanese 
companies in Asia have been more profitable than those in the US and Europe. In the 
developed world, Japanese companies have often built factories as a hedge against 
protectionism. In Asia, by contrast, the main driving force has been the pursuit o f profit. 
Supporting such findings, a survey from 1992 by Mitsubishi Research Institute found 
that only 20 % of Japanese-owned plants that opened in America between 1985 and 
1990 were profitable two years after the start of production compared to 80 % of those 
in Asia.266
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Chart 13: Manufactured Exports in Eastern Asia
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During the 1990s, the integration of Japan with the other economies in Asia Pacific has 
been intensified by the process of industrial relocation occurring through a massive 
outflow of foreign direct investment (JFDI) in industries such as transport equipment 
and electronics. The appreciating trend of the JPY vs. the USD and the increasing cost 
of production in Japan have accelerated a shift in the structure of the country’s 
comparative advantages. In order to maintain or enlarge market shares, more labour and 
less technology intensive operations were transferred to more competitive locations, but 
mostly to Eastern Asia given the historical patterns and the incentives provided by the 
Japanese government. This occurred despite pressure on major Japanese MNCs to shift 
production to the sales markets for their products in response to political pressures 
induced by Japan’s huge trade surplus. The electronics industry is a leader when it 
comes to the movement of production into Asia, and also leads manufactured exports to 
the US, Japan and Europe.
While Chart 13 above clearly shows the surge in manufactured goods, it is useful to 
understand the trend in some detail in order to really appreciate the Japanese role. 
Capannelli (1996) finds that by the mid-1990s Mitsubishi Electronics made all its 
exportable video recorders in Southeast Asia. O f Matsushita's total overseas production 
at the time, Asia accounted for 61 %, up from 49 % in 1985. Matsushita has 52 
manufacturing operations in Asia, including seven in China. Electronics is the industry 
within the manufacturing sector that accounts for the largest Japanese FDI outflow 
during the last decade, and Malaysia is the preferred location for such investment. 
According to the figures provided by the Electronic Industry Association of Japan 
(EIAJ), as of March 1994 the presence of foreign affiliates of Japanese electronic firms 
in Malaysia amounted to 135 projects, or 22.7 % of the 596 in Asia, and 14.1 % of the 
world-wide total of 958 (Table l l ) .267
Table^l^IumbeiM)n?oreigi^ffIliate^>fJs^)anes^£Iect^^
Asia Total
Total electronics industry 596 958
Parts and components 385 563
Industrial goods 93 193
Consumer goods 169 285
Televisions 42 85
VTRs 23 47
Source: EIAJ 1994 Kaigai Houjin Risuto.
196
This movement has certainly stabilised Malaysia, and given more strength to its 
government’s pro-Japanese message of “looking East”. In terms of direct employment, 
the effects are not particularly significant as Japanese firms only employed slightly over
600,000 by 1994 (Table 12). The effects are more important when considering the 
impact on service industries reliant on these jobs, given that they were among the 
highest paid in the region.
Tabl^l2^mjglojmenU^Foreigi^ffiliate^fJa£anes^lectron^^
Asia Total
Total employment 477,386 646,510
Local staff 473,499 639,835
Japanese expatriates 3,887 6,657
Source: EIAJ 1994 Kaigai Houjin Risuto.
The shift of production away from Japan in the 1990s has followed the ODA ►FDI 
logic of providing the ‘global public goods’ necessary to stabilise markets in Eastern 
Asia. While the data from the electronics industry is suggestive of other manufacturing, 
from textiles through to transport equipment, the Japanese government has also been 
active in facilitating food production in Eastern Asia. It is important to remember that 
just as investment has a trade generating effect, so too does trade induce new investment. 
Such effects are due in particular to the possibility of establishing regional production 
networks, which make use of the different structures of comparative advantage present 
in the various countries. This linkage also explains out-flowing investment from South 
Korea and Taiwan (and more recently also from countries like Malaysia or Thailand) 
towards other less industrialised Asian economies, in order to relocate processes that are 
no longer competitive in their domestic environments. What is more telling is that a 
good portion of such intra-regional investment comes from Japanese firms, with, for 
example, Honda Thailand investing in Vietnam.
Following its entry into the Colombo Plan in 1954, Japan's co-operation in the 
agricultural field began with training programs for foreign personnel and the dispatch of 
experts offering technical advice and guidance on rice growing. Gradually, the scope of 
its programs expanded from rice culture to increased food crop production to include 
improved agronomic methods, livestock farming, horticulture, and forestry. With the 
passage of time, it diversified from technical enhancements in specific fields to
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improved food processing and distribution, the establishment of rural co-operatives and 
environmental conservation programmes, with greater emphasis placed on a more 
comprehensive approach embracing concepts of rural development. MOFA notes that:
In the 1980s, attention was focused largely on inequalities in regional 
development, for instance, between sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia.
Reflecting the international setting that prevailed at that time, the 
fundamental policy behind Japanese agricultural assistance placed priority on 
the pursuit of diversified forms of aid tailored to the developmental stage of 
each recipient. This approach was based on three perspectives: (i) that 
agricultural aid should contribute to the solution o f food-related problems in 
developing countries; (ii) that agriculture has a crucial role to play in helping 
developing economies achieve sustainable growth; and (iii) that a stable 
global balance in food supply and demand can translate into a stable supply 
of food for Japan.
Many countries in Eastern Asia, for example, the Republic of Korea and Thailand, have 
been working to diversify their agricultural output since the end of the Green 
Revolution. As one of several projects designed to support that drive, Japan 
implemented the Maize Quality Improvement Research Centre Project (project-type 
technical co-operation, 1989-1992) in Thailand, and since then has supplied financing to 
farmers as a means of spurring community development and creating opportunities for 
employment. In Indochina (Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia), Japanese projects have 
been implemented to help build irrigation facilities and other elements of agricultural 
infrastructure and to test and disseminate improved crop strains and farm techniques, as 
for example with the Grant Aid Project for Improvement of the Facilities and 
Equipment of the Faculty of Agriculture, Can Tho University in 1994. Japanese 
assistance to China has been guided by the priorities of improved farm productivity and 
has focused on projects that help to alleviate poverty in the country's inland provinces. 
In South Asia, Japan has provided assistance for poverty alleviation programs based on 
improvements in food self-sufficiency.
Tokyo has taken on more grassroots oriented projects in the 1990s, and has placed 
priority on expanding assistance to active NGOs. This is particularly true in the field of 
agricultural aid, as here NGOs are entrusted to assure direct benefits to farmers and 
other members of rural society through aid for enhancements in social infrastructure and 
services. In particular, emphasis has been placed on the leadership of local citizens as 
agents of development. In addition to conventional technology transfers, Japan has 
sought to provide aid for projects in participatory development powered by the initiative 
and ability of local citizens. In line with the fundamental philosophical ideals behind the
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Rome Declaration, Japan provides food aid as an emergency countermeasure against 
hunger, actively assists developing countries in their efforts to expand domestic food 
output, and earmarks aid for environmentally sustainable forms of rural development.
6.3.3 The growth of the Japanese market for regional products
After WW II, the recovery of the Japanese economy was made possible by the demand 
created by the Korean War. Over the 1950s and 1960s, Japan ran surpluses with its 
trading partners. While Japan exported more than it imported, both exports and imports 
remained between 7 % and 15 % of GDP (Chart 14).
Chart 14: Exports and Imports of Goods and Services
[Source: Ministry of Finance.]
With the growth of imports keeping pace with Japan’s economic growth, and with 
barriers to imports coming down, Japan began to provide Eastern Asia with the ‘public 
good’ of access to its markets.268 Patterns of trade show a long history of Japanese 
involvement in Eastern Asia. The adaptation of a capitalist economy in the Meiji era led 
to direct competition with Western powers for markets, and subsequently to the 
partitioning of China into spheres of influence. Japan’s own trading firms provided a
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successful counter to Western traders, with Mitsubishi busan being the leader in what 
was then a classic imperial game. With the end of WW II, and suppression of the 
zaibatsu by SCAP a different form of conglomerate, or keiretsu, emerged as Eastern 
Asian nations hosted Japanese firms. With the rise of the keiretsu, Japan regained its 
pre-war production trends in the post WW II period. By the 1960s it enjoyed a growing 
trade surplus and its population began to enjoy increased purchasing power. The demise 
of the Gold Standard led to the appreciation of the JPY over time from over 300 to the 
Dollar to nearly 100, and with this came a surge of Japanese purchasing power (See 
Chart 15). In this context the share of Eastern Asia has grown to about 20 % of Japan’s 
imports.
Chart 15: Japan's Imports From Major States and Regions
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[Source: Ministry of Finance.] (Customs clearance basis; weight in yen terms)
A gradual lowering of barriers to imports made Japan the second most important market 
for many Eastern Asian nations and, if resource trade were counted, the most important
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market for some Eastern Asian nations and Australasia. It was also a key market for the 
US and Canada.269 The shift of Japanese production abroad also stimulated imports 
from overseas affiliates, propelling growth in the share of manufactured goods in total 
imports. One study shows that a higher stock of Japanese FDI has permanently affected 
imports: between 1990 and 1995, outward FDI may have increased Japanese 
merchandise imports by around 10 % (Bayoumi & Lipworth 1997).
As Capanelli notes, there are three major categories of trade created by the transfer of 
Japanese manufacturing operations to Asia Pacific in the post 1980 period:
(1) Capital goods: As parent companies usually undertake greenfield investment 
that requires the purchase of machinery and other equipment not generally 
available in the new locations, in the majority of cases this is sourced in 
Japan.270 Accordingly, this kind of trade will likely be more concentrated in 
the earlier periods after the investment.
(2) Intermediate goods: These involve the creation of closer backward and forward 
linkages with the local and the regional industries. In fact, the typical production 
process for a finished good in the automotive or electronic industry involves 
several stages, from the manufacturing of parts and components to its final 
assembly, operated by different production units with specific technological 
competencies. As a consequence, trade is generated to the extent that such 
production units are located in different countries. The amount of trade is 
related to the degree of technological sophistication of the intermediate 
goods.271
(3) Final goods: In this case, the trade creation effect depends on various cost and 
demand structures, as well as on the industrial and commercial policies adopted 
by each country. In Japan, for instance, the import of labour-intensive goods 
from Asian Pacific neighbours has been largely favoured by the process of 
industry relocation and by the gradual elimination of non-tariff barriers. 
Nowadays, for example, standardised consumer electronic goods, like radios, 
colour televisions, or video-tape recorders are to a very large extent imported 
from those Asian countries where the Japanese makers have transferred their 
production plants. The category of trade in final goods has been fostered by the 
growth of per-capita Asian income that has raised the demand, especially from 
other countries within the region.
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Trade between Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, the ASEAN five, Australia and New 
Zealand grew from 33% of the region's total exports and imports in 1980 to 37% in 
1989 without posing a threat to other regions.272 Bilateral trade between Asian countries 
and Japan, for instance, grew rapidly in the second half of 1980s. According to Frankel, 
intra-regional trade has been led by a surge in Japanese manufacturing investment in 
Asia Pacific and trade has created an incentive for further investment, with positive 
effects on regional economic growth (MOF 1993, Petri 1995 & Yamashita 1995). 
Interdependence between trade and investment is a result of particular industrial 
relocation processes carried out by Japanese firms leading to regional clustering, or 
local specialisation of production. This process has been favoured to a large extent by 
the strong bilateral connections of the Japanese government, especially MITI, within the 
region. In addition, multilateral development cooperation programs have also been 
implemented as a result of APEC initiatives spearheaded by the Japanese and Eastern 
Asian governments. These mechanisms confirm that the Japanese government did not 
only rely on the market, but led the way in the region by a policy understood in terms of 
‘global public goods.’
6.3.4 Legitimating Japanese power: production and markets
The shift of Japanese production into Eastern Asia has been at the core of the region’s 
export boom and emerging consumerism in the last two decades of the 20th century. The 
results of Capannelli’s study suggest that the process of industrial relocation in 
consumer electronics, for example, is occurring more intensively in terms of production 
than technology transfer within the same firm, or from the parent company in Japan to 
the local subsidiary in a country like Malaysia. While the technological flows could be 
hastened with better investment in education in the Southeast Asian states, as in the East 
Asian states, the transfer of even simple tasks has led to direct investment that has 
rapidly moved the sub-region towards industrialisation. These results imply that after 
the massive inflow of FDI, which has produced large benefits in terms of production, 
export, and employment creation, states such as Malaysia must proceed to a further 
stage of the industry relocation process, where the diffusion of technologies introduced 
by foreign companies is promoted through specific efforts to enlarge local absorptive 
capacity. The trend line is promising for even the weakest of the Eastern Asian 
economies, as Korea and Taiwan have moved ahead to challenge even Japan in some 
areas, while Malaysia is showing signs that it will soon do the same. As Japanese firms
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move more of their production into the region, not only in electronics, but also in areas 
such as the automobile industry, opportunities for further diffusion will be viable 
provided weaker economies make use of them.
To better understand the role of Japan in the development of production and 
consumption in Eastern Asia in the 1980s and beyond, it is necessary to adopt a 
historical perspective. The development of Japanese productive capacity over time, 
particularly since the Meiji era, placed basic units of Japanese business in a position to 
influence events in Eastern Asia. By the early 1900s, Japan was an important player, 
which was, alongside the major powers, able to influence the industrialisation of 
colonial possessions in Eastern Asia consistent with its military ambitions as argued by 
Sen (1983 & 1984). This early 20th century relationship with Eastern Asia was based on 
power politics alone, with no regard to Eastern Asian aspirations for freedom from the 
humiliation and brutality of colonisation and their desire for the economic development 
necessary to enjoy the fruits of freedom. After WW II, Japan’s role in Eastern Asian 
industrialisation was to become markedly different, given that Japan was under the 
obligation to make amends for the extremes of its imperial rule in the region. The 
Colombo Plan ensured trade between Japan and most of Asia, and following this direct 
investment by Japanese firms created regional production networks that enable rapid 
industrialisation in the region. Thus, the growth in wealth in Eastern Asia was assisted 
by the Japanese government as well as Japanese firms that, particularly after the Fukuda 
doctrine of 1977, led to a reduction in tension in the region. In the 1980s and 1990s the 
rapid growth of the region’s manufacturing capacity on the back of Japanese FDI and 
also the new consumerism made possible with earnings from exports to the US and 
reverse exports to Japan ultimately made Japanese hegemony more legitimate.
Conclusion ‘GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS’ AND DEVELOPMENT
The objective of improving Japanese relations in Eastern Asia in the post WW II period, 
the raison d ’etre of Tokyo’s post-WW II foreign policy, was finally achieved in the 
1980s with initiatives inspired by Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo. The Fukuda 
Doctrine, which prioritised peace and stability in Eastern Asia, was underpinned by 
peaceful actions and reinforced by attempts to promote economic opportunities for the 
region. Such measures are understood as constituting metaphorical ‘global public 
goods,’ particularly when considering the demands from post colonial states. The
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demand for such ‘public goods’ can be appreciated when one considers colonial 
peoples’ historical desire for long denied development and the insecurity dilemma 
experienced by post-colonial societies upon independence as a result of the Cold War. 
Since the emergence of the Fukuda doctrine, Japanese policy has increasingly affected 
not only the regional system, but also the international system as a whole, with Japan 
successfully legitimating its power.
With reference to the knowledge structure, Japan both provided the ideas necessary to 
organise a peaceful order in the region and supported them with a commitment to 
addressing the deeper concerns regarding economic development such that the gap 
between post colonial states and affluent nations gradually narrowed. Japan also found 
ways to impart technology essential for the industrialisation of the region.273 It was 
proposed that Japan’s metaphorically understood ‘global public goods’ provision in the 
financial structure allowed counter-cyclical lending to Eastern Asia. Officially, it acted 
as lender of last resort with government sponsored activities of the OECF 
overshadowing the IMF in Eastern Asia, while its ODA ►FDI regime meant that the 
funds from its burgeoning surpluses over the last three decades of the 20th century were 
recycled through the region. Japan also attempted to maintain stable exchange rates by 
co-operating with the US where possible, while it encouraged better macro-economic 
policies via its actions in the G7 and its network of policy advisors in the region. When 
considering ‘global public goods’ in the structure of production, evidence revealed that 
Japan has transferred production to Eastern Asia while gradually opening its markets to 
the region’s exports. This has contributed to the dynamism of the region’s production 
trajectory, while also helping to develop the regional market. With the sogo sosha 
distributing regional products in Japan and around the world, Eastern Asia has benefited 
from being part of the Japanese production network.
The rapid growth in Eastern Asian production for the world market has helped increase 
real wages, leading to improved consumption in the region essential for domestic 
demand driven growth. Thus, when considering Japanese policy since the Fukuda 
Doctrine, it becomes clear that Japan has contributed to lessening the differences in 
living standards between Eastern Asia and the centre. In doing so, Japan has succeeded 
in legitimating its hegemony in the Eastern Asia, which accounts for its improved 
relationship with the region.
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Chapter 7
Legitimating Japan’s Regional Hegemony in Eastern Asia: ‘Global Public Goods’
via Pacifism
The oft-quoted Jacob Viner (1948) argued that power accompanies plenty as a key 
objective of foreign policy. However this insight is all too frequently used to simplify 
the objectives of major powers for all time and space.274 In the early 20th century, 
empire building was vigorously opposed, with two latecomers to this enterprise, Japan 
and Germany, defeated and loath to use military power again. Instead, they chose to 
exert power with diplomacy, economic aid and other means more acceptable to friend 
and foe alike.275 Wiser for its past excesses, Japan in particular has come to realise that 
its regional hegemony could only be legitimated by addressing post colonial demands. 
Japan has met these demands with its ‘global public goods’ role that enables catch-up 
development and provides a non-threatening military.
Japan’s adherence to its peace constitution and its promotion of rapid economic 
development in Eastern Asia’s post colonial states have largely been understood simply 
as singular events in history with no meaning attached. Relatively less attention has 
been paid to the crucial regional and international political and economic consequences 
of these events, while there has been a fair amount of interest in regional anger over 
Japan’s wartime crimes and also the importance of the US role in Japan’s peace 
constitution. Many students of international relations contribute to this singular 
historical understanding, leaving only those writing from the perspective of domestic 
politics, such as Katzenstein (1996) and Hook (1996), to point to the importance of 
society in sustaining pacifism and consequences of Japan’s pacific posture.
Whilst Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution is famous, it is not typically understood as 
a ‘global public goods’ contribution to the construction of regional peace.276 In part, this 
oversight of the implications of Japanese pacifism has been due to dominant and 
interested US scholarship 277 This tendency also owes much to the importance that the 
dominant Western academy accords to periods of war in Europe, which are taken to 
constitute the important historical experience to be of universal relevance. In so far as 
Asia is concerned, as Muthiah Alagappa argues (1998, 2001 & 2002), such myopia has 
resulted in a general neglect of Asian origins of theory. This state of affairs has arguably
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resulted in underestimating Japan’s very significant contribution to international, and 
especially, regional order, much to the frustration of Japanese policymakers and 
academics alike (Shinoda 2003:3). Japan represents an important example of this 
process in Eastern Asia, provided its experience is unveiled from the shrouds of popular 
history and used to help with regional problems beyond Eastern Asia.
Accepting the nature of globalisation and its effects on economic development, Kaul, et 
al (1999) argue that ‘global public goods’ are crucial for the economic development of 
postcolonial states.279 Of these, security is perhaps the most crucial, as Buzan (1983), 
Job, et al (1992), Betts (1993) and Neuman (1998) suggest the insecurity dilemma in 
post colonial societies are much more acute than generally realised.280 The chapter 
considers the implications of Japan’s military abeyance for regional peace and 
cooperation, arguing its contribution to ‘global public goods’ in security using the 
notion of ‘global public goods’ to give substance to the Weberian (1968) concern with 
legitimation. It does so by arguing that legitimation at the international level within the 
security structure is possible when a hegemonic power adopts a pacifist doctrine. 
‘Global public goods’—identified by Kindleberger (1986) as necessary for a stable 
capitalist system—are provided to followers of hegemonic powers. However, this work 
goes beyond Kindleberger’s stipulation of the need for coercive power to maintain the 
‘international public good’ of peace by arguing that order might be maintained by a 
pacifist doctrine. The chapter concludes that the implication of Japan’s role in helping to 
create relative peace and prosperity has been to legitimate its hegemonic power in 
Eastern Asia, thus allowing it political space to participate in the region at levels of 
normalcy never imagined after defeat in WW n.
Section 7.1.0 delves into Japan’s very popular military abeyance (over the push for 
militarisation) showing the rationality behind the idea of obtaining security via an 
alliance with the US, multilateralism and a doctrine of pacifism. In 7.2.0 an analysis of 
Japan’s pacifism provides the basis for understanding the country’s ability to legitimate 
hegemony in Eastern Asia, as these smaller states prefer a stable regional system, and so 
it is shown that there are strong elements of legitimation from pacifism that requires 
Japan to depend on the region for the safety of its own merchant shipping.
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7.1.0 JAPAN’S LATE 20th CENTURY MILITARY ABEYANCE: ‘GLOBAL 
PUBLIC GOODS’ IN SECURITY VIA MULTILATERALISM
Beginning with its membership in the Colombo Plan and United Nations, Japan has 
followed a strong multilateralist line on providing ‘global public goods’ in security. It 
became a member of the most important international and regional forums and using 
them whenever possible to enhance regional security. Tokyo has also promoted bilateral 
and multilateral security dialogues, exchanges, and co-operation to address regional 
security. Examples of such efforts include the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia- 
Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) summits, Japan-ASEAN, and ASEAN+3 
(ASEAN plus Japan, China, and Republic of Korea) meetings.281 This emphasis on 
multilateralism both directly and via bilateralism is both understandable and deliberate. 
Like other states that do not belong to the superpower category, Japan prefers larger 
group settings. Thus for Japan, the most comfortable form of meeting its international 
obligations as a major industrialised power with a regional hegemony is by providing 
security via a multilateral approach.
As Green (1998: 35-36) notes, security multilateralism is a theme emphasised in the 
Japanese Diplomatic Blue Book and in numerous commissions and study group reports 
in Japan, such as the 1994 Prime Minister’s Advisory Panel on Defence Issues 282 He 
suggests that multilateral security co-operation is an attractive notion in Japan because:
• it implies legitimacy for the use of the Japanese Self Defence Forces (JSDF) 
abroad
• it can provide confidence building for new security initiatives such as the 
Guidelines for Defence Co-operation
• it allows Japan to put pressure on China, North Korea, and other regimes 
without inviting direct bilateral confrontation
• it gives Japan a hedge against possible US withdrawal (abandonment)
• it gives Japan a forum to balance against US unilateralism (entrapment)
• it gives Japan a forum to support the US in non-military ways
• it confers prestige and missions on Japan’s foreign policy and defence 
bureaucracies
• Japan has already successfully led from behind in the creation of APEC and 
the ARF
• it allows all sides of the security debate to agree on something, even if  their 
visions are quite different.
Green (1998) sees multilateral institutions as relatively low risk for Japan, as they are 
essentially non-militaristic. Significantly, gains in prestige via multilateralism allow 
Japan to legitimate its power. In Asia, especially with the Vietnamese case, Japan’s
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Track II bilateral role supports its multilateralism. As the overall effect of such efforts 
legitimates Japan’s regional hegemony, we are thus able to understand how Japan 
improves its regional relations to near normalcy.
Below, in subsection 7.1.1 security cooperation in Japanese multilateralism and 
regionalism is discussed in terms of the contribution to ‘global public goods.’ In 7.1.2 
evidence of successful Track II bilateral and multilateral roles of Japan in Asia is 
presented as further evidence of Japan’s support for regional stability. Then, in order to 
contextualise pacifism, 7.1.3 considers the realities of Japanese military expenditure, 
which strongly suggest capabilities for self defence.
7.1.1 Japanese multilateralism and regionalism: towards security cooperation
The earliest manifestation of Japan’s policy preference towards multilateralism was its 
role in the United Nations (Drifte 1990 & 2000). Over the last three decades, Japan’s 
commitment to the UN and a ‘global public goods’ role has been signified by its 
willingness to become the second leading financial contributor to this organization. Its 
share has increased over time, to reach over a fifth of the UN’s assessments (Table 13).
Table 13: Ratio of Assessed Contribution to the United Nations (%)
Country 1946 1957 1968 1978 1989 1992 1995 1998 1999 2000
USA 39.90 33.30 31.60 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
Japan - 02.00 03.80 08.60 11.40 12.50 14.00 17.98 19.98 20.57
Germany - - - - 07.70 08.10 08.90 09.63 09.81 09.86
France 06.30 05.70 06.00 05.80 06.30 06.00 06.30 06.49 06.54 06.55
Italy - 02.10 03.20 03.40 04.00 04.30 04.80 05.39 05.43 05.44
UK 12.00 07.80 06.60 04.50 04.90 05.00 05.30 05.08 05.09 05.09
Russia 06.60 14.00 14.60 11.60 10.00 06.70 05.70 02.87 01.49 01.08
[Source: United Nations Secretariat, Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy 
Analysis, Statistical Division, New York, USA.]
Although leading nations funding the United Nations have traditionally wielded their 
influence to secure key appointees of their choice, Tokyo has not typically pursued such 
narrow objectives, choosing instead to fill positions in keeping with its publicly popular 
pacific strategy.283 In the UN, Japan frequently concerns itself with human rights issues, 
and, when domestically permitted, peacekeeping.284 In the area of human rights, the 
Japanese approach focuses on alleviating situations rather than on punitive sanctions.
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Japan’s role has grown as it has begun to address military roles in international 
peacekeeping operations (EPKO). In 1992, the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) report, 
Japan’s Role in the International Society, made the case that Japan should increase its 
United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs) and become more assertive when 
addressing regional security issues.286 Thailand’s decision to spearhead ASEAN’s 
support of a Japanese UN peacekeeping unit in Kampuchea (Donnelly & Stubbs 1996: 
183) shows the degree to which there is recognition that Tokyo is expected to do more 
on the security front then simply bankroll the efforts of others. Nevertheless, it 
subsequently took over a year for Japan to pass a law allowing commanders to give 
orders to soldiers to fire in peacekeeping operations—previously, such action was the 
responsibility of the individual soldier. In the face of societal discomfort with any signs 
of militarism, the traditionally anti-military Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Japan 
Communist Party (JCP) opposed the passage of changes to the existing law in the Diet.
When the UNPKO law came into operation in 1992, a leading newspaper noted, “This 
shows that the awareness of the nation’s political nerve centre in Nagatacho is 
approaching the standard of global common sense.”287 It editorialised:
Putting the United Nations at the centre of the efforts to solve major 
international problems is one of the pillars of Japan’s diplomacy.
Participation in UN peacekeeping operations is Japan’s responsibility in 
contributing to global peace and stability. It is in line with the spirit of 
pacifism enshrined in die Constitution. Whether they are in the ruling or 
opposition camps, political parties are responsible for improving and 
strengthening the system of the nation’s contribution to UN peacekeeping 
operations.
Tokyo has also pursued a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (Drifte 1998 & 
2000), having more or less retained its non-permanent seat on the Council since the 
early 1980s. While sceptics might see this support as being merely “bought,” even 
they must acknowledge that Japan’s presence has guaranteed the very existence of the 
UN, given that the US was in arrears for years. Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, 
Japan’s second longest serving post-war leader (1982-1987) led the factions within the 
country seeking a permanent seat Japan’s in the UN Security Council. Unlike those 
opposed to Japan being a close partner of the US in the UN, he saw multilateralism as a 
viable alternative to going it alone in terms of taking on global responsibilities. 
Nakasone realistically reasoned, “If Japan were to go nuclear, there would be massive
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destabilising repercussions worldwide, along with a disastrous effect on the Japanese 
economy.”289 He implicitly understood the nature of Japan’s abeyance to be in the 
‘global public good’. Seeing that Japan and Germany had been playing a major role in 
the new world structure, his prognosis was that the UN would continue to be the prime 
vehicle for world peace and that its mechanisms could indeed prevent turmoil in 
international relations. To further underscore Japan’s commitment to regional peace 
during Nakasone’s tenure, the Showa Emperor, Hirohito, apologised for the colonial era 
expressing “sincere regret” for the “unfortunate” events of the past (Gordon 2003: 297), 
though it appears that this apology is not accepted by all.
Japan’s desire for UN Security Council membership is been tempered by its desire for 
genuine multilateralism in keeping with the General Assembly’s aversion to US 
unilateralism. Significantly, Japan’s UN missions have been of the non-offensive type. 
For example, to soothe feelings in Washington and not offend the Arab world during the 
Persian Gulf crisis of in 1990-1991, Tokyo contributed heavily in monetary terms. 
Following criticism from the US, Japan dispatched SDF personnel abroad, but in light 
of concerns expressed by both the Japanese public and the inhabitants of Eastern Asia 
more generally, it did so only after laying out strict rules of engagement.290 After 1992, 
Japan participated in peacekeeping operations in Cambodia (UNTAC), Mozambique 
(ONUMOZ), in Angola (UNAVEM), El Salvador (ONUSAL), and the United Nations 
Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) where its ‘public goods’ role was not 
contested but instead more was asked of it. In June 1998, PKO collaboration rules were 
further revised due to changes in UNPKO activities. Among the changes are rules 
regarding the dispatch of personnel to supervise elections, material assistance, and the 
usage of arms. Showing just how well Japan’s ‘public goods’ reputation has traveled, in 
2004 the BBC noted “Japan's deployment of troops to Iraq has been controversial at 
home, but it has been greeted with high expectations in Iraq.” 291
Regional co-operation forms another important part of Tokyo’s multilateralist 
strategy.292 In Japan’s move to regional multilateralism in the 1990s, ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) was one option. Japan has continued to champion the idea of collective 
security in Eastern Asia under the ARF, with the intensity of its efforts increasing in 
times when the US seems to drift towards China, as during the Clinton administration. 
As opportunities for bilateral visits and exchanges at the summits have increased, Tokyo
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has diligently sought to anchor the region’s nations to the bedrock of ARF. It has also 
pushed to enlarge ARF: for example, Japan has invited Pakistan to join India within this 
organization (ARF 2000). While ARF is widely seen as merely a “talking shop,” it 
nonetheless offers opportunities for consultation at the highest levels. Japanese officials 
are conscious that the Asia-Pacific region has no institutionalised regional mechanism 
related to security comparable to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) or the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Europe.293 To date, in 
real terms, regional stability has been maintained via bilateral security agreements 
centred on the US, as officials within ARF themselves recognise (ARF 2000). Given the 
possibility of US withdrawal, as contemplated during the Clinton era, it has become 
increasingly important that regional efforts be established to ensure long-term peace in 
Eastern Asia, and Japan has vigorously pursued this goals via both bilateral treaties and 
fledgling institutions. Certainly, Japan’s efforts have been important for the promotion 
of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in the Asia-Pacific region. Japanese actions 
have helped to develop bilateral and multilateral security dialogue, and as such have 
constituted a major contribution to regional peace and stability, which are essential 
‘global public goods.’
7.1.2 Track II bilateral and multilateral roles of Japan in Asia
Many of Japan’s efforts to provide ‘global public goods’ via multilateralism would be 
for naught if  not for Track II efforts that ensure agreements made public are reached 
beforehand behind the scenes. Dialogue has taken place and continues to develop in 
organisations such as the Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia Pacific 
(CSCAP) and the Northeast Asia Co-operation Dialogue (NEACD). These Track II 
meetings are playing an important role in Confidence Building Measures (CBMS) in the 
Asia-Pacific region (ARF 2000). There has been steady progress in Eastern Asia with 
respect to peace and stability, and Japan’s bilateral efforts to promote multilateralism 
should neither be missed or misconstrued as traditional bilateralism, where a more 
powerful actor often works to ensure multilateralism is undermined. Japan’s success in 
this area includes countries in Indochina. It is also employing this method with Burma 
and North Korea, even though in the case of the latter the challenges are immense.
While not generally known, Japan’s role in encouraging Vietnam to join the ranks of 
ASEAN stands as one of the most successful of Tokyo’s Track II efforts to date, having
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since set the precedent for other situations in the region.294 Japan’s policy of 
engagement with Vietnam took place despite US sanctions against the Indochinese 
nation. When the Thai Prime Minister questioned Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda over 
the wisdom of engaging Vietnam diplomatically, his reply was indicative of the 
Japanese approach to security in its totality. For the Japanese leader, engagement of 
Vietnam achieved important political objectives:
I can understand your anxiety. However, if destitution and poverty continue 
in the three Indo-Chinese nations, those three countries will rely on the big 
powers all the more. What will happen in such a case? At the present time 
Vietnam is trying to reconstruct itself with its own efforts, without relying on 
big powers. After all we should not be in confrontation. We should abide by 
peaceful co-existence (Cited in Khamchoo 1988: 245).
Public opposition to militarism in Japan as well as concerns expressed by smaller states 
prevailed to calm ASEAN and Eastern Asia, allowing the region’s economic growth to 
progress. This was especially true following the chaotic situation created in Indochina 
by a paranoid US government, as the architect of US policy, Secretary of State Robert 
McNamara, himself later admitted.295 Thus, it is not surprising that key Japanese 
policymakers argue that the sum total of Japan’s role in the region should be seen in 
terms of ‘public goods’ provision, rather than simply a part of a grand US design.296
Thai scholar Khamchoo (1988: 248) argues that private Track II contacts maintained a 
Japanese presence in Vietnam after its official withdrawal of ODA. That the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) did not move to outlaw Japanese firms’ contact with Vietnam
9Q7
is an indication of tacit approval of such contact. The Japanese trading firm Nissho 
Iwai, for example, carried on in Vietnam after its personnel recognized Ho Chi Minh as 
a nationalist betrayed by the US after WWII. In their view, Roosevelt’s untimely death 
allowed the “red scare” faction in the US State Department to win the day and spoil 
history.298 In general, such unofficial ties are crucial in building confidence between
nations. It can be said that MOFA succeeded in bringing its vision of Vietnam to bear
/
within ASEAN, and that Tokyo adopted a long-term policy superior to the ideologically 
moribund US view, which instead led to the killing of over three million Vietnamese.
In the 1990s, the Japanese also supported the inclusion of Myanmar/Burma in ASEAN. 
Learning from the Japanese approach, which allowed Vietnam’s entry into ASEAN, 
regional leaders invited Rangoon to the association, upsetting distant Western powers. 
Subsequent ASEAN expansion suggests that Japan’s Vietnam policy has been
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successful in contributing to security. However, unlike in the case of Vietnam, it 
appears Tokyo has played only a minor role in the case of Myanmar/Burma. In any case, 
Myanmar/Burma’s tough State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) is 
dependent on Beijing, whereas Hanoi is a bitter enemy of China. However, the pro- 
China stance of SLORC is no indication of the future. Myanmar/Burma has entered 
ASEAN, and its major foreign investors are still Western.299 Continued MITI 
guarantees for Japanese firms in Myanmar/Burma, along with renewed ODA flows 
(under MOFA), suggest that there is significant bureaucratic consensus that 
Myanmar/Burma is important for Tokyo. With Japanese aid and investments gradually 
increasing in the 1990s, as pointed out by Mason, and given the unpopularity of the 
SLORC regime, it is not unreasonable to suppose that Rangoon will eventually conform 
to ASEAN modes of behaviour.
Significantly, Japan has also been at the forefront of the North Korean issue.300 In 1991 
the Economist noted that countries in the region of Eastern Asia, including China and 
the Soviet Union, were “delighted that Japan has taken the initiative in trying to get 
North Korea, bankrupt but still belligerent, to end its isolation.”301 Progress was slowly 
being made according to the Economist, “thanks to Japanese persistence and the hint of 
hard currency and soft loans.” An early indication of success was North Korea's 
decision to apply for membership of the United Nations despite South Korea’s 
membership to the organization, which represented a reversal of its previous position 
that separate memberships would perpetuate the peninsular division. In addition, the 
Economist noted that Japan could also claim credit for North Korea's decision to accept 
the UN's nuclear-safeguards accord. Though it signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty in 1985, North Korea had refused to accept the mandatory safeguards that 
accompany it. However, in 1991 it finally agreed to sign the accord that provides for 
international checks of its nuclear plants, and no longer insisted that US nuclear 
weapons kept in South Korea also be inspected.
7.1.3 The realities of Japanese military expenditure: self defence only
Japanese military expenditure, while being very high, is nonetheless spent for self 
defence purposes, as offensive capabilities are minimal thus assuring its neighbours and 
leading to the provision of ‘global public goods’ in security. There is a great deal of 
speculation about Japan’s military capability, with many citing Japanese expenditure in
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this area as reason for alarm. Japan’s military expenditure is by now well known for its 
ceiling figure of 1% of GDP (see Table 14).
Tabl^4^aganes^Iilitarj^udge^reakdow^l987^2001
FY
Budget of De 
(F.Y. 1987-20
fence Related Expenditures 
OO)302 (million JPY) Defence303
GNP-GDP304
(%)
Defence305 in 
General 
Account 
(%)
Defence
related
expenditure
Defence
Agency
Defence
Facilities
Admin.
Agency
Security 
Council of 
Japan
1987 3,507,832 3,149,435 358,228 169 1.004 6.50
1988 3,728,257 3,356,690 371,392 175 1.013 6.53
1989 3,969,868 3,563,882 405,800 187 1.006 6.49
1990 4,254,090 3,813,376 440,515 200 0.997 6.28
1991 4,439,975 3,978,406 461,360 210 0.954 6.23
1992 4,577,817 4,089,749 487,851 217 0.941 6.30
1993 4,618,124 4,099,113 518,794 217 0.937 6.41
1994 4,651,821 4,111,742 539,859 230 0.959 6.41
1995 4,733,996 4,167,218 566,555 223 0.959 6.65
1996 4,849,085 4,269,537 579,315 234 0.977 6.45
1997 4,953,564 4,363,075 590,241 248 0.959 6.39
1998 4,960,691 4,368,213 592,197 281 0.950 6.36
1999 4,915,422 4,310,584 604,560 277 0.994 6.03
2000 4,935,801 4,336,349 599,154 298 0.989 5.81
[Source: Ministry o f  Finance and Defence Agency.]
The re-arming of Japan took place gradually over the post-WW II period such that by 
the 1990s the country had one of the most technologically advanced militaries in the 
world, even though it was for all intents and purposes not suitable for offensive 
operations overseas. For those considering the facts while assessing Japanese military 
power, the reasonable conclusion is that the SDF really is a “self-defence” with no force 
projection capabilities that powers such as the US even Britain and France posses.
Japanese expenditure has climbed steadily, and given the sheer size of Japan’s economy 
it is indeed very substantial. In 1960, military expenditure amounted to JPY 157,900 
million, but by 1995 it had become JPY 4,723,600 million, a 2.76% average annual 
growth rate over 35 years (Asahi Shimbun 1996: 64-66). Japan ranked fourth in the 
world in terms of total defence expenditures in 1997, according to Military Balance 
(1998-99). By the year 2000 Japan spent approximately $50 billion a year for defence, 
which is one-sixth of the US military budget.
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Although Japan spends less on defence as a share of GDP, because of the size of its 
economy it ranks second among all states in sheer USD terms and is seventh in the 
world in PPP terms, as shown in figures for 2002 in Table 15.
Table 15: Defence set
Ranking
(USD) Country Size (B$)
World
(%)
Ranking 
(PPP USD)306 Country Size (B$)
1 USA 335.7 43 1 USA 335.7
2 Japan 46.7 6 2 China 142.9
3 UK 36.0 5 3 India 66.5
4 France 33.6 4 4 Russia 55.4
5 China 31.1 4 5 France 36.8
Sub-ttl top 5 483.1 62 Sub-ttl top 5 637.3
6 Germany 27.7 4 6 UK 34.0
7 S. Arabia 21.6 3 7 Japan 32.8
8 Italy 21.1 3 8 Germany 31.0
9 Iran307 17.5 2 9 Saudi Arabia 28.8
10 South Korea 13.5 2 10 Italy 26.9
Sub-ttl top 10 584.5 75 Sub-ttl top 10 790.8
11 India 12.9 2 11 South Korea 24.3
12 Russia 11.4 2 12 Turkey 23.0
13 Turkey 10.1 1 13 Brazil 22.8
14 Brazil 10.0 1 14 Iran 20.2
15 Israel 9.8 1 15 Pakistan 14.2
Sub-ttl top 15 638.7 82 Sub-ttl top 15 895.3
[Source: Military expenditure: SIPRI Yearbook 2003. appendix 10A; PPP rates: World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 2002 (World Bank: Washington, DC, 2002).]
(US $b., at constant 2000 prices and market and PPP exchange rates. Figures in italics are percentages.)
On first glance Japanese expenditure seems vast. However, PPP calculations give a 
more accurate picture of the true place of military spending in the economy. In this case, 
Japan drops out of the top five spenders. After considering the situation in still greater 
detail, the Honolulu Star Bulletin, noted:
Japan spends more than 40 percent of its budget on personnel and another 10
percent to support US forces in Japan. Thus, the Japanese have spent half of
their military budget before they have bought the first bullet, tank, or airplane.
In addition, they get few economies of scale in arms production because they
procure weapons in small lots. In some cases their costs are nearly twice
those in the United States. In sum, in military power, it's not what you spend
308but what you buy, and the Japanese don't get much for their defence yen.
Still, after prolonged spending, the SDF is formidable compared to the militaries of post 
colonial states in the region as most of their equipment is older while Japan’s equipment 
is of the latest variety (see Table 16). Critics of Japan’s military strength make the case
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that to raise the quality of its defence capability, Japan must devote a significant 
proportion of its defence spending to improving equipment.
Table 16: Equipment of the Japanese Self Defence Forces
AIRCRAFT Aircraft Type Purpose Number
LR-1 Liaison and Reconnaissance 14
LR-2 Liaison and Reconnaissance 2
AH-IS Anti-Tank 88
OH-6J/D Liaison and Observation 183
Ground Self-Defence Force OH-1 Observation 7
UH-IH/J Utilities ( 148
V-107/A Transport 3
CH-47J/JA Transport 44
UH-60JA Utilities 10
P-3C Patrol 100
Maritime Self-Defence Force HSS-2B Patrol 30
SH-60J Patrol 68
MH-53E Minesweeping and Transport 10
F-15J/DJ Combat 203
F-4EJ Combat 104
F-l Combat 46
RF-4E/EJ Reconnaissance 27
Air Self-Defence Force C-l Transport 27
C-130H Transport 16
E-2C Early Warning 13
E-767 Early Warning 4
CH-47J Transport 16
GROUND EQUIPMENT Main Equipment Number
Recoilless Guns 3,250
Mortar 1,800
Field Artillery Pieces 790
Ground Self-Defence Force Rocket Launchers 120
Anti-aircraft Guns 110
Tanks 1,070
Armoured Vehicles 690
SHIPS Main Ships Number
Total 144
Destroyers 55
Submarines 16
Maritime Self-Defence Force Mine Warfare Vessels 32
Patrol Combatant Crafts 3
Landing Ships 9
Auxiliary Ships 29
Source: Defence of Japan. Defence Agency, Tokyo 1997.
However, the share of defence expenditures on equipment upgrading dropped in the 
1970s, falling from 24.9 % in fiscal 1972 to 17.1 % in the 1978 fiscal year as the 
inflation that followed the first oil crisis drove up personnel costs. This figure 
rebounded to about 28 % in the 1980s with foreign equipment becoming cheaper as the
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yen gained in strength. However, with the end of the Cold War, the cost of purchasing 
equipment dropped again to 19.6 % of total defence-related spending in the fiscal 1999 
budget. By 2001, the JDA reported that the GSDF had 1,090 tanks in addition to an 
improved Hawk missile, short surface-to-air guided missiles, and Stinger missiles. The 
MSDF had 437 ships totalling approximately 386,000 tons and 214 aircraft, including 
42 antisubmarine aircraft, while the ASDF has 363 fighters. When one also considers 
Japan’s superior command, control, co-ordination and intelligence gathering capabilities, 
the SDF is effective. Although in formal terms Japan’s intelligence community is said 
to be non-existent, Tokyo has other channels to gather intelligence. For example, as a 
result of its extensive military relationship with the US, Tokyo has access to key 
information. Equally, if not more important is the Eastern Asian network built by the 
Japanese sogo sosha or trading houses with unparalleled reach.309
Given the superiority of technology and the industrial strength backing the SDF, and 
given that modem warfare has comparatively little to do with personnel, Japan should 
be considered one of the more powerful military nations in Eastern Asia, as argued by 
Samuels (1994) and Calder (1996: 84-88). However, the JSDF is exactly that: a self- 
defence force with minor offensive capability unable to project its power either on to the 
mainland or into ASEAN nations (see Table D again). The materiel Japan has 
accumulated are not useful for any foreign incursion: the country has no aircraft carriers, 
few landing craft, no long range bombers or troop transports in adequate numbers, etc. 
At best, the Japanese SDF is formidable against an attack on the home islands, and we 
should expect it to hold off an attack by all but the US armed forces, though not a 
nuclear attack by any minor force, including North Korea.
While Japan is not capable of deterrence, its own nuclear potential should not be 
overlooked. Harrison (1996: 8) finds evidence that Japanese leaders had a nuclear
i
option in mind when they initiated a plutonium-based autonomous nuclear fuel cycle. 
Further suggesting nuclear capabilities, Japan continues to import 30-40 tons of 
plutonium from reprocessing plants in France and Britain. It is estimated that by 2010, 
some 90 tons of plutonium will likely have been accumulated in Japan.310 Confirmation 
of nuclear potential comes from official levels as well. During the Sato cabinet in the 
1960's, it was reported that Japan had secretly studied the development of nuclear 
weapons. On 17 June 1974, Japanese Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata told reporters “it's
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certainly the case that Japan has the capability to possess nuclear weapons but has not 
made them.” Since then, Japan's nuclear power program based on reprocessed 
plutonium has aroused widespread suspicion that the country is either secretly planning 
to develop nuclear weapons or is indeed already in possession of them. It is also 
possible that in times of crisis Japan’s civilian nuclear and space programs could be 
used for military and intelligence purposes—despite claims that advanced institutional 
mechanisms prevent such liaisons. 311 Clearly, Japan's nuclear technology and 
ambiguous inclinations provide scope for a considerable nuclear potential. Certainly the 
Japanese would not have material or technological difficulties in making nuclear 
weapons: the country has the raw materials, technology, and capital for developing such 
weapons.312 According to experts, Japan could possibly produce functional nuclear 
weapons in as little as a year's time (Wilcox 1995). To complete its arsenal, Japan 
would require a reliable delivery system. On February 3, 1994 Japan launched just such 
a system: an H-2 missile built entirely of Japanese technology. The H-2, capable of 
deploying satellites into orbit, was built partly in order to wean Japan's space program 
from dependence on US technology and expertise, and it is not commercially viable. 
Arguably, the H-2 would make an excellent ICBM, providing the country with a secure 
launching platform for nuclear weapons.
On the strength of its nuclear industry, its stockpile of weapons-useable plutonium, and 
with its rocket programme, Japan might be treated more or less as a nuclear weapons 
state. While there is much interest in, and controversy over the matter, it must 
nevertheless be noted that in effect Japanese policy has only made certain that Japan has 
become a latent nuclear power incapable of deterrence by itself, the stated purpose of 
nuclear weapons. The looming possibility of nuclear weapons provides Japan with some 
of the international respect accorded to nuclear powers, and conceivably acts as a hedge 
against abandonment by the US. However, as it does not have first-strike capability, 
Japan has carried out this policy without being an offensive threat to any state, and 
hence it has maintained its ‘global public goods’ role. Yet, the limit of the respect Japan 
can gain is apparent by the North Korean nuclear capability and this regime’s ability to 
create fear, as with its missile tests over Japan in recent times. Thus Robyn Lim in a 
special article to The Japan Times, asks, “Why does Japan choose to remain naked to 
the threat of North Korean missiles?”313
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7.2.0 Legitimation of Japanese hegemony: attaining legitimacy from pacifism
Japan has chosen pacifism as a means to provide ‘global public goods’ in security and 
thus improve its relations in Eastern Asia. For those studying domestic politics in Japan, 
it is difficult to overlook the country’s pacifist structures and society.314 The roots of 
pacifism were laid down in the 1947 constitution and were unwittingly nurtured by 
Japan’s first post-war prime minister, Yoshida Shigeru, who emphasized economic 
revival over rebuilding the military. Pacifism has since grown into an important societal 
phenomenon upon which leftist political parties rely for their very existence, thus 
disallowing any significant amendment of the constitution. Indeed, some argue the 
Yoshida Doctrine’s emphasis on pacifism is so deeply ingrained in Japan’s national 
psyche that only an attack on Japan would allow re-armament commensurate with its 
economic might (Hook 1996). Such reluctance to re-arm has significant normative 
implications, and can be seen in terms of contributing to the legitimation of Japanese 
power in Eastern Asia. Japan’s civilian controls ensure the military remains away from 
decision-making process (Katzenstein 1996). Under these circumstances the Japanese 
military is able to do little without civilian consent, making any move towards 
militarisation contingent on active civilian collaboration.
Subsection 7.2.1 considers the unintended effects of constitutional pacifism that led to 
the rise of societal pacifism. Subsection 7.2.2 examines how Japan successfully 
legitimates its power through both its own pacifism and concurrent support for policies 
that have encouraged regional self-defence. Finally, subsection 7.2.3 provides the 
evidence on Japan’s expensive soldiers, whose numbers are declining due to reasons of 
demography as well as the unglamorous reputation of the military.
7.2.1 Unintended effects of constitutional pacifism: the rise of societal pacifism
The unintended effect of the Yoshida Doctrine’s tactical pacifism in the 1950s through 
to the 1970s was the emergence of this idea as a general norm within Japan. Indeed the 
Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and Japan Communist Party (JCP) have depended upon the 
pacifist platform to win votes, going further in the early post-war era to propose the 
abolishment of the SDF altogether and the abrogation the US-Japan Security Treaty. If 
not for their anti-military stance, these parties might not have managed to maintain their 
presence in the Diet on the basis of their outdated economic manifestoes alone.
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Confirming the pacifist drift in Japanese policy, in Cultural Norms and National 
Security: Police and Military in Post-war Japan (1996: 204) Katzenstein argues that 
“Japan’s security policy will continue to be shaped by the domestic rather than the 
international balance of power.” He argues that societal and economic norms regarding 
Japanese military forces have created a stalemate within the bureaucratic institutions 
with few signs that the hawks can prevail. Katzenstein (1996: 208) proposes that there is 
evidence to suggest that even in the face of abandonment by the US, Japan’s culture of 
non-violence would lead to an exploration of all other options before the last resort of 
“normal” defence. This view is consistent with those of Hook (1996), who sees the 
norms of a pacifist state as encouraging Japan’s security policies to comply with a 
civilian internationalist role centred on the UN and multilateralism. According to him, 
the expanded use of the JSDF abroad will only be legitimised within Japan’s pacifist 
culture, and therefore within the context of participation in UN and support for 
multilateral initiatives. He argues the US-Japan alliance and the international balance of 
power are lesser factors in determining Japanese defence policies, making the case that 
Japan should be integrated into a multilateral regional collective security regime in Asia, 
moving away from the US-centred security policy.
Japanese civil society has developed a veto in military matters as a result of the public’s 
unique position as the only population to have suffered a nuclear holocaust. Indeed, this 
horrific event has led to the formation of a vibrant peace-lobby that maintains close 
watch over the SDF in order to ensure that Japan’s peace constitution is not violated. 
The multilateral civilian power arguments of Hook (1996) are based on a clear 
recognition of the deep-rooted aversion to the use of force in Japan’s post-war political 
culture.315 Even Green (1998), a realist proponent of the US-Japan relationship, 
confirms that multilateralism has a strong following in Japan, and that it is not 
unrealistic to expect Japan to continue channelling its power in multilateral directions, 
as it has been doing with parts of its Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). He 
argues that economic multilateralism, while not necessarily the only outlet for an 
expanding Japanese security role in Asia, nevertheless constitutes the main method. He 
points out that even though in the 1990s a multilateral dialogue exists in Asia, 
multilateral security is still an illusion, with ARF and APEC forums creating the 
impression of international activism on the part of Japan without the risk attendant to its 
international actions.
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Domestic norms opposing militarism are firmly grounded in Japan, as argued by Seki 
(1986), Katzenstein and Ogawara (1992), Katzenstein (1996) and Hook (1996). Anti­
militarism in Japan and Tokyo’s active projection of peace-oriented economic power 
has gone far to inspire confidence in Eastern Asia. Indeed, anti-military grassroots 
movements in Japan have placed even civilian users of atomic energy on the 
defensive.316 Japan’s peace-oriented security structure is further enhanced by local level 
contacts within Asia, encouraged by the Ministry of Home Affairs.317 At the formal 
level, these connections take place via local governments, government funded non­
governmental organisations, privately funded voluntary organisations, and even annual 
school trips and other exchange programmes in high schools and universities.318
With majority support for the continuation of this pacific security policy, Japan has 
challenged realist predictions of a return to military assertiveness (Katzenstein 1996 and 
Hook 1996). Katzenstein (1996) and Hook (1996) argue that this is because traditional 
neo-realist theory fails to appreciate that political culture can change—that new norms 
can take hold within a state to constrain its military behaviour even when the external 
environment appears hostile and the state amasses economic power. Although the 
continuation of Japanese pacifism is seen as naive by some international relations 
scholars of the realist school, missing the realities of Japanese policy is also to miss the 
significance of conditions crucial for a more peaceful international order. Peace is a 
public good essential for economic growth, which in turn makes societies more content 
and states more accepting of the international system. Given that Japanese policy is 
firmly rooted in domestic cultural norms, we must be open to the possibility that 
Tokyo’s policy to Eastern Asia may be neither coercive nor manipulative. Instead, it 
may merely represent an attempt to maintain historical boundaries and co-exist 
peacefully with neighbouring countries.
7.2.2 Japan’s legitimacy: encouraging regional self-defence
Military security is such that it is most effectively provided by a powerful state when it 
does not by itself impose order, but instead is able to enable militarily weak states to be 
strong enough to protect themselves. Indeed, any hegemonic state that allows 
postcolonial states to enhance their military capability will achieve higher levels of 
legitimation. The steady military spending of the smaller countries such as South Korea,
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Thailand and Indonesia, in the face of substantial Chinese increases (see Chart 16 
below) has been possible with Japan’s economic support via ‘global public goods.’
Chart 16: Military Expenditure in Eastern Asia (USD millions)
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The increases in Eastern Asian military spending as a result of the foreign currency 
earned for them by Japanese firms enhances Japan’s position. When we consider the 
data from Eastern Asia, is clear that there is a strong relationship between military
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spending and economic growth. According to the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI), defence spending among minor state South Korea, Taiwan, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines in 1980 was nearly half that of 
1990.319 In 1991 the countries of Asia and the Pacific accounted for 35% of world 
imports of large weapons, more than any other region, including Europe or the Middle 
East. After China bought $1.8 billion of weaponry from Russia in 1992, including 24 
advanced Su-27 fighters, the US lifted a decade-old ban on the sale of modem fighters 
to Taiwan, offering 150 F-16s, and in addition the Taiwanese negotiated with France for 
60 Mirage 2000s. In the same year, Indonesia bought almost a third of the former East 
German navy.320 Arms purchases are one of the best indicators of the region’s defence 
capability, as there is little evidence that Asia’s developing countries have used 
Japanese dual-use technology for their own military technological advancement, though 
the potential remains high.321
While the IMF talks of a notional spending limit on defence of 4.5% of GNP, its leading 
members, barring Japan, sell advanced weapons around the world.322 Japanese officials 
dealing with the IMF refuse to fully endorse the IMF position, even though Japan itself 
follows a policy of rejecting the lucrative arms trade, much to the chagrin of the sogo 
sosha.323 By choosing not to strictly enforce the limits for weapons purchases stipulated 
in its ODA policy, Tokyo has tacitly supported regional arms spending from what 
amounts to a fungible budget that includes Japanese ODA monies.324 Indeed, given the 
foreign exchange earnings Japanese firms bring to Eastern Asian states, it appears that 
this approval is more than simply tacit. Thus, in military terms Japan has gone beyond 
curtailing its own military to allow Eastern Asian nations to provide viable defences for 
themselves. With ideas of self-defence supported by Japan, Tokyo has been careful to 
delay development of a blue water navy and armed forces capable of offensive 
operations, and therefore is able to present itself as non-threatening to its neighbours. 
Instead, Japan relies on Eastern Asia militaries and naval forces even for the safety of its 
own shipping, via its govemment-to-govemment contact.325
While the restraint of the Japanese military for over fifty years has assured the region 
that Japan does not represent a threat, it is Tokyo’s quiet encouragement of strong 
militaries in Eastern Asia via economic assistance that is the lynchpin of its legitimacy. 
As noted by Maull (1996: 14), apprehension in Tokyo about the depth of US military
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commitments explains Japan’s silence on Eastern Asian military procurement. 
Tokyo’s actions demonstrate the degree to which it is prepared to rely on the nations of 
Eastern Asia for the safety of its own commercial fleet, and even for its supply of oil, of 
which it has only a six months reserve (Table 17).
T abl^T ^aganes^O i^eserve^n^h^him be^^D a^^^uivalence
End of fiscal year OO reserve (10,000 kl)
Day’s equivale 
oO reserve/avg
nee:
daily consumption
Total Public Private
1990 8,278 142 54 88
1995 8,953 150 76 74
2000 9,080 163 85 78
2001 9,023 166 89 77
Change, 2000-2001 -057 003 04 -01
[Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.]
The US Library of Congress Country Study on Japan notes it lacks significant domestic 
sources of energy except coal, and thus relies on imports of crude oil, natural gas, and 
other energy resources, including uranium. In 1990, the country's dependence on 
imports for primary energy stood at more than 84 %. Japanese firms expect that Eastern 
Asian states would safeguard the sea-lanes for vessels plying the waters of the region on 
their way to and from the oil fields of the Middle East and Japan.327 Tokyo’s reliance on 
Eastern Asia’s maritime forces makes the original abeyance of the Self Defence Forces 
(SDF) even more credible. A de facto security alliance with clearly demarcated zones of 
responsibilities has emerged between ASEAN and Japan, suggesting that there is a joint 
provision of ‘global public goods’ in security in the region.328
7.2.3 Japan’s expensive soldiers: unglamorous work and declining numbers
All Japanese uniformed personnel are voluntary recruits, who need to be paid highly to 
be part of an unglamorous occupation. Japan abandoned conscription after WW II. In 
the 1990s the GSDF was reduced from 350,000 to 180,000. While thirteen divisions 
suggest a significant military force, it appears that the troop strength of the SDF has 
reached its zenith and that its numbers will continue to decline dramatically within the 
next 20 years.
Japan’s armed forces are clearly expensive to maintain and also its future growth looks 
bleak. As of March 1999, the SDF had a total of 236,368 uniformed personnel in its
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three national defence services—ground, maritime, and air (Table 18 below)—not 
including Japan’s considerable civilian police force.
Table 18: The Japanese SDF Personnel
Branch of SDF Uniformed Uniformed reserve
The Joint Staff Council 1,379
Ground Self-Defence Force 145,928
(organised into 5 armies 
and 13 divisions.)
47,900
Air Self-Defence Force 45,223
Maritime Self-Defence Force 43,838
[Source: Federation of American Scientists and Japan Defence Agency, 
(www.fas.org/irp/world/japan/jda.htm)]
The Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) statistics from 1998 indicate that the 
overall male youth population entering the workforce will decrease by 35% from 1998 
to 2018 as shown in Chart 19.
Chart 19: Dynamics of Population Statistics for Men of Military Age
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[Data in thousands. Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare 1998 statistics data.]
Analysis by Akiji Yoshida, a member of Research Committee, DRC, suggests that the 
present difficulty recruiting for the SDF will grow worse. Parents tend to be over 
protective as the number of children per family decreases. In Japan this is particularly 
true given the rise of single child family, with more children pursuing higher education. 
Japan faces a labour shortage in “blue collar” jobs with young Japanese loathe to do 
work deemed dirty, dangerous or difficult. Even when one considers the public sector, 
the SDF faces intense competition from other government agencies (Diagram 6 below).
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Diagram 6: Japanese Public Service Personnel
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[From Management and Coordination Agency 1996]
Over the long run, Japan has gradually built up its armed forces such that it is now in a 
better position to handle any signs of weaknesses in Washington resulting from the 
vagaries of politics in the US. Thus, operationally, Japan's defence policy is a result of 
its initiative to build a moderate capability under its post-WW II constitution in
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accordance with the fundamental principles of maintaining an exclusively defence- 
oriented policy of not becoming a military power that could pose a threat to other 
countries.
Conclusion THE ‘GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD’ OF JAPAN’S PACIFISM
Ruben P. Mendez (1999) argues that we see “Peace as a Global Public Goods.”330 
Security is intrinsically useful for everyone, moreover it is connected to economic 
development, which in turn has been the raison d'etre of the post colonial state. In the 
context of the insecurity facing post colonial states and, arguably, causing their weaker 
economic development, this chapter suggests that Japan’s policy on Eastern Asia is 
particularly illuminating. Japanese policy has steadfastly conformed to the idea that any 
Eastern Asian security agenda must also address economic needs so as to stabilise the 
region at the level of civil society, the “roots of conflict.” This approach is rarely 
mentioned in the “security studies” literature, which tends to focus mainly on redundant 
forms of deterrence. Given that Japan has not posed a threat to Eastern Asia and has not 
enticed other regional actors into an arms race, Eastern Asia has remained more stable 
than it might otherwise have been, to consider the counterfactual. Japan’s non­
threatening and co-operative role constitutes a ‘global public good,’ as military forms of 
insecurity would have directed scarce resources away from economic development, thus 
thwarting investment in education, infrastructure, etc.
In not pursuing a “normal” military security strategy commensurate with the world’s 
second largest economy, Japan’s continued pacifism and reliance on another power (the 
US) for security against the Soviet bloc is unprecedented for a major power. Thus far, 
attempts to militarily “normalise” Japan by successive US administrations as well as 
right-wing elements in Japan itself have been stymied by left-wing parties. Furthermore, 
built-in institutional mechanisms dating from the post-WW II constitution and the 
bureaucrats who “know best” for Japan have served to keep Japan pacific. In addition, 
Tokyo has had to react to the security concerns of the region and maintain a defensive 
military posture. Ultimately, Japan’s pacifism has served to legitimate its hegemony in 
Eastern Asia.
In practice, legitimation has meant Japan’s accession to substantive demands from its 
public and from the region’s post colonial states, resulting in relative gains for these
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states vis-a-vis Japan. Reflecting the fact that security policy must ultimately be focused 
on society, Japanese policy of the post-war era has addressed the issue of security via 
bilateral and multilateral co-operation in Eastern Asia that takes societal needs into 
account. Arguably, Tokyo has left few stones unturned in its effort to ensure Eastern 
Asia remains peaceful, with the result that more and more countries in the region move 
in this general direction. Tokyo has co-operated with all the nations it has signed formal 
treaties with and also with most of the nations it has not; indeed it has co-operated even 
with ideological opponents, including Vietnam and China, both of which practice forms 
of totalitarianism. Reflecting the goals of international and regional legitimation 
guaranteed by policies consistent with the normative standards of legitimacy, Japanese 
policy changed in the late 1970s. After an era of policies that can best be described as 
based on state-centric realism that paid very little attention to domestic politics either at 
home or abroad, Japanese bureaucrats designed new policy that reflected a willingness 
to fulfil regional and domestic demands. Given that these new policies finally met 
regional demands for relative economic gains consistent with post-WW II claims of 
reparations, they served to assure the legitimation of Japanese hegemony in Eastern 
Asia. This policy change, confirmed by MOFA’s goals as enunciated via the 1977 
Fukuda Doctrine and its operationalisation over the 19780s and 1990s, provides 
evidence of Japan’s ‘global public goods’ provision in the military security area.
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Conclusion
Legitimation of Japanese Hegemony in Eastern Asia From the 1980s: 
Provision of ‘Global Public Goods’ for “Catch-Up” Growth
How did Japan improve its relations in Eastern Asia in the period following the 1970s 
after being humiliated in the region earlier that decade? This question, which is related 
to Robert Gilpin’s (1989) query regarding the place of Japan in the international system, 
cannot be adequately explained within the dominant strands of international relations 
theory, including works pertaining to hegemony by Keohane (1983a), Gilpin (1987) and 
Cox (1987). This dissertation builds an interpretive theory of the legitimation of 
hegemony, based on the work of Gramsci (1937) and Habermas (1976) and utilises the 
framework of international political economy developed by Strange (1988a). It finds 
that within the broader context of global US hegemony, Japan’s positively changed 
relations in Eastern Asia in the last two decades of the 20th century, compared to the 
post-WW II period up to the 1970s, is a result of the legitimation of its regional 
hegemony via the provision of so-called ‘global public goods’ to ensure the success of 
“catch-up” economic development undertaken by post colonial states in the region.
The ‘global public goods’—noted by Kindleberger (1986) and re-interpreted by Kaul, et 
al (1999) for the UNDP to reflect the needs of post colonial states—are understood here 
metaphorically as those idealised goods needed to promote the stability of the capitalist 
system to also benefit post colonial states. At the structural level, such goods are 
essential for post colonial states if they are to achieve rapid economic development 
within capitalism in order to avoid the vagaries of the market. Japan provided these 
idealised ‘global public goods’ because of its interest in legitimating its own regional 
hegemony, consistent with the notion that powerful actors seek to justify their power, as 
discussed by thinkers such as Weber (1962) and critically amplified by Habermas 
(1974). In accordance with the demands of post colonial states, ‘global public goods’ 
provided by Japan have enabled rapid growth of their economies with the role of the 
state central in education, targeting of key industries, managing labour relations, 
protecting domestic market and encouraging export-led regional economic development. 
From South Korea in Northeast Asia to Indonesia in Southeast Asia, there is evidence of 
degrees of rapid development, as each of these states have shown that they are on the 
road to industrialisation, while their populations have also enjoyed improvements in
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quality of life. The evidence of Japan’s role in the provision of a metaphorical ‘global 
public goods’ needed by Eastern Asia consists of:
• promoting and supporting the ideas of developmentalism by contesting ideas of 
laissez faire promoted by the global hegemonic power, the US
• its actions in bringing financial structure stabilisation by making available ODA 
funds for countries to use for balance of payments crisis and other development 
projects
• ensuring that Japanese surpluses are recycled to the world, including the region, 
by carrying out the necessary policies that release such funds from domestic 
investment only
• ensuring market access to regional manufactured products, consistent with the 
notion of a “market for distressed goods”
• providing infrastructure, technical training and transfer of lower-end technology 
well suited for post colonial states
• military abeyance bordering on pacifism that helps prevent an arms race thus 
maintaining stability in the region.
While some of these actions meet the criteria of a stricter understanding of ‘global 
public goods,’ most do not. All of the Japanese actions do however fall within the 
metaphorical meaning of ‘global public goods,’ especially in terms of what is needed by 
post colonial states, as suggested by the UNDP version of ‘global public goods.’ In line 
with Mancur Olsen’s (1971) predictions ‘public goods’ are generally provided for 
reasons of self-interest, Japan’s peaceful engagement in the region has helped the 
country’s own private sector to expand regionally and to regain its pre-war dominance 
of market share. With foreign direct investment (FDI) leading the way into creating a 
vibrant manufacturing sector in Eastern Asia, it is obvious that post colonial states in the 
region have gained. Thus, in keeping with Olsen’s suggestion that other actors would 
benefit from this process, Japanese actions were also crucial to the success of the 
export-led growth that constituted the basis for economic development in the countries 
of Eastern Asia. Each of these states was reliant on Japanese firms operating on their 
shores in order to ensure the continuation of the “East Asian” miracle and thus meet 
expectations for rapid development in the region, as was the case, for example, with 
Malaysia.
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In policy terms, the turn to regional engagement—enabled by ample Japanese ODA 
monies and accompanying initiatives noted above—was preceded by a commitment to 
military abeyance. This line of engagement, devised during Fukuda’s tenure as Prime 
Minister, went on to become known as the Fukuda Doctrine. Significantly, this doctrine 
was promulgated in response to regional anger at Japan in the 1970s for its neo­
imperialist policies during the post WW II era, which centred on capturing regional 
markets for Japanese firms whilst paying lip service to demands for economic 
development. The success of the Fukuda Doctrine in improving Japan’s relations has 
led several Japanese Prime Ministers to continue this formula under their own banners, 
and it is now hard to imagine Japan deviating from this route of constructive 
engagement in the region of Eastern Asia, which is well captured by its delivery of 
metaphorical ‘global public goods.’ Below, we consider the implications of these 
findings as well as the contributions which this research has made to the literature.
I METAPHORICAL ‘GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS’ IN ASIA: 
HEGEMONIC LEGITIMATION CRISIS AND COMPETITION
The major implication of this dissertation is to fit Japan into the international system 
and show how it plays the key role in determining the fate of the region of Eastern Asia, 
even while the US has more power and China is fast emerging as the main contender for 
Japan’s role. For the US, the legitimation successes of Japan in Eastern Asia will be 
hard to replicate, as Washington’s overwhelming power is no longer focused on 
stabilising the region economically, and it has it instead turned “boastful” as noted by 
Krugman (1998), even though it gains a degree of consent given to a distant power 
balancing a near threat, as with China. It will be even more difficult for China to 
legitimate its growing hegemonic role in the region given its aggressive military posture. 
With Japan’s regional hegemony legitimated, and given the uncertain roles of the other 
major powers, the tussle for influence in Eastern Asia came into sharp contrast with the 
Asian financial crisis, which provides the counter factual to the 1977-1997 period of 
relatively stable growth that is covered in this dissertation.
The usefulness of the notion of the metaphorical ‘international public goods’ is not 
limited to looking at the past: it can also be employed when anticipating crisis in the
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future, as suggested by Charles Kindleberger (1986) in his original construction of the 
notion. In this it was Gilpin (1987) who worried about future problems of making US 
hegemony reliant on Japanese support. This worry about future stability was more 
forcefully propounded in the work of Susan Strange (1986 & 1997), and also with her 
push for the US to lead with a broader understanding of the interests of other countries 
in its own enlightened self-interest (Strange 1988a and 1988b).332 Meanwhile Japan was 
more or less seen as an “enigmatic” power “without purpose”, even though it had been 
successful in pushing ahead with its ideas of political and economic organisation for 
Eastern Asia. With all the attention on the US, the continuing importance of Japan as 
regional leader in providing ‘global public goods’ were underestimated by the Japanese 
themselves, as became clear with the onset of the 1997 financial crisis and the solutions 
that were proposed and finally implemented.
This section assesses the US, Japan and China in light of the Asian crisis: its genesis, its 
effects and the aftermath. The metaphor of ‘global public goods’ with its focus on the 
needs of post colonial states at the structural level is helpful in characterizing those 
policies of the major powers that enable regional economic development and so help us 
to assess their role in Eastern Asia, telling us how the US, Japan and China are to be 
perceived in Eastern Asia. The UNDP’s Global Public Goods provides the set of issues 
to be assessed with Susan Strange’s (1988a) framework of structural power, 
streamlining the analysis of the policies of the major powers. Following the warnings of 
Strange (1986, 1988a & 1997), when considering the counterfactual to provision of 
‘global public goods,’—that is, when these goods are withdrawn by the leading powers, 
we should expect crises.
The first sub-section shows the weakness in Japanese elite thought. The second sub­
section shows that crisis occurred in Eastern Asia as the ‘global public goods’ needed 
by the region’s post colonial states failed to be delivered as the US withdrew from 
safeguarding the region, leaving China’s emerging power to negatively affect the region. 
It was followed by Japan’s pro-market reforms that allowed Japanese capital to be 
managed by the global private sector, which then set the stage for the crisis as this 
money was no longer governed by the MOF. In the third sub-section, it is shown that 
Japan redoubled its efforts to lead the region out of crisis via the Miyazawa Plan in 
response to regional demands and Japan’s own interest in preserving the gains it had
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made. Then in the fourth sub-section, it shown that Japan’s leadership has induced 
China to compete for regional legitimation in its own version of ‘global public goods’ in 
contrast to its previous mercantilism, which undermined the economic and political 
security of post colonial Eastern Asia.
(1) Weakness of Japanese elite thought: total faith in governing the market
Elite Japanese thought, having matured over a century of government intervention, has 
tended to overestimate the efficacy of the elite in the face of globalisation. Mark Berger 
(1999) argues that overlapping Japanese and US visions for the Asia-Pacific, which 
developed against the backdrop of ongoing friction over trade and other issues, now 
represent an exceedingly fanciful set of expectations regarding the future of the region. 
He concurs that the Japanese elite was unable to predict the coming of the Asian crisis, 
as was also the case with their neo-liberal counterparts, both of which focused on the 
domestic level of analysis. With such focus on the domestic level of analysis, Berger 
(1999) points out that prior to the onset of the Asian crisis in 1997, the Japanese 
approach assumed that the various forms of authoritarian ‘developmentalism’ in the 
region were basically similar to the “politics of productivity” which the conservative 
political coalition in Japan had presided over since the 1950s.
At the domestic level, Berger (1999) finds that regardless of variations between 
countries, authoritarian ‘developmentalism’ is grounded in the exclusion and coercion 
of the majority of the population, and this, combined with rapid and uneven capitalist 
development, leads almost inexorably to some form of participatory crisis. He notes that 
in Japan, a major participatory crisis occurred and was resolved during the US 
occupation, prior to Japan's era of high-speed growth. He adds that South Korea, 
Taiwan and even Thailand may also be said to have passed through crises of 
participation by the mid-1990s, which involved a greater or lesser degree of political 
and economic liberalisation. However, as the financial crisis loomed, it was not at all 
obvious that other authoritarian developmental regimes would respond similarly without 
considerable social and economic upheaval that would in turn undermine the economic 
dynamism of the region.
The Japanese elite failed to anticipate the 1997 financial crisis and was unprepared for 
the wider crisis of authoritarian ‘developmentalism’ in parts of Southeast Asia, such as
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Indonesia (or the much more contained version in Malaysia), which the crisis helped 
precipitate, but did not cause. Writing before the onset of the crisis, Takashi Shiraishi 
(1996) argues that if, or when, these sorts of crises come it would be better for the 
Japanese government to address them collectively with the US as the senior partner 
rather than making it an ‘imperial’ issue to be resolved by Japan alone. With the 
Japanese government so inclined, it has however found itself at odds with the post Cold 
War policies of the US. In fact, the US has reasserted its hegemony in the region to such 
a degree that it is doubtful if the role of the Japanese government can even be 
characterised as that of junior partner. While the US aggressively pursues liberalisation 
to allow its financial sector firms access to the region, the Japanese have been proposing 
that such liberalisation is too going too far and too fast.
In face of a faltering Japanese elite, the Asian crisis provided the opportunity for the US 
to attempt to bring an end to state-centred ‘developmentalism’ in Japan itself, as well as 
in most of the rest of the region, barring China, which was simply interested in 
maintaining a grip on the economy, given the lessons from the Russian experience. In 
the second half of 1997, the IMF attempted to restore financial stability to the region via 
its own formula of a range of austerity measures and thus a drastic adjustment to the 
governments of Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea. Following the US policy elite, 
its overall approach was premised on the view that the crisis flowed from the distortions 
and inefficiencies characteristic of state capitalism, and not surprisingly, 1998, the IMF 
was increasingly seen as having failed, having merely aggravated a worsening situation. 
A growing number of policymakers and economists—including writers such as Jeffrey 
Sachs, who played an important role in the spread of neo-liberal ideas and policies— 
then were heard with their argument that that the crisis in East Asia was the result of a 
“financial panic” which fuelled a dramatic and unnecessary shift in investor confidence 
and market expectation that led to the rapid movement of capital out of the region and 
the resultant currency collapses. In the end, what became obvious to those seeing crisis 
over the long run, was how the US reneged on providing ‘global public goods’ to 
prevent crisis by not intervening at its onset along with the Bank of Japan to shore up 
confidence. With the failure of US leadership, it was Japan that gradually took over the 
economic leadership in the area, albeit very quietly.
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(2) Crisis: post Cold War withdrawal of ‘global public goods’ from Eastern Asia
The Asian Crisis has been analysed by several authors suggesting both agency and 
structure presented problems. Those concerned with agency, mainly from the neo­
liberal “Washington Consensus,” blamed each Eastern Asian country—Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and South Korea—for following improper macro- 
economic policies. Those concerned with structure focused mostly on the nature of 
globalised capital enabled by the same “Washington Consensus” that was concerned 
with liberalisation of finance as well as trade much to the chagrin of even free traders 
such as Jagdish Bhagwati (2001). While winning the debate—judged by the policy 
imperatives imposed on nations by the IMF orthodoxy—has been important for those 
claiming a triumphalist “end to history,” as with Fukuyama (1993), the resentment in 
the Eastern Asia towards those advocating further liberalisation has not been fully 
appreciated as pointed out very early on by Higgott (1998). At the heart of this 
resentment is an insight into international relations often forgotten by functionaries at 
the core of capitalist accumulation: “mutually beneficial” laissez faire, according to 
Carr (1939) is typically in the interest of the dominant power:
In economic relations, the assumption of a general harmony of interests was 
made with even greater confidence; for here we have a direct reflection of the 
cardinal doctrine of laissez-faire economics, and it is here that we can see 
most clearly the dilemma which results from the doctrine. When the 
nineteenth-century liberal spoke of the greatest good of the greatest number, 
he tacitly assumed that the good of the minority might have to be sacrificed 
to it. This principle applied equally to international economic relations. If 
Russia or Italy, for example, were not strong enough to build up industries 
without the protection of tariffs, then—the laissez-faire liberal would have 
argued—they should be content to import British and German manufactures 
and supply wheat and oranges to the British and German markets. If anyone 
had thereupon objected that this policy would condemn Russia and Italy to 
remain second-rate Powers economically and militarily dependent on their 
neighbours, the laissez-faire liberal would have had to answer that this was 
the will of Providence and that this was what the general harmony of interests 
demanded.333
In a post Cold War atmosphere dominated by notions of laissez faire , the 
‘developmentalist’ model that relied on the ‘global public goods’ provided by the US 
and Japan faced crisis. In contrasting actions Washington pushed for laissez faire at any 
cost while Tokyo defended the practise of ‘developmentalism’ by its post colonial 
neighbours. In the early 1990s the Japanese vision prevailed with even the World Bank 
tempering its pro-market approach. However, with the Washington Consensus 
mounting its economic challenge from within the Clinton Administration, and with the
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crisis in Asia, the Eastern Asian call for Tokyo to stand up against Washington was not 
without reason.
The major shift in the nature of the regime that underpinned ‘global public goods’ over 
the Cold War years of ‘embedded liberalism’ (Ruggie 1992) had come to an end, 
forcing many post colonial countries in Eastern Asia to the economic brink. Over the 
course of the late Cold War the US became a reluctant leader, its burden becoming 
heavy as it focused on mirages of communism everywhere whilst being corrupted by 
narrow and parochial issues of special interest groups, with its academics uncritically 
repeating the myths of lost hegemony.334 In this mythological world of lost US 
hegemony soon after collapse of the Soviet bloc, Washington removed its guarantees to 
Eastern Asia, in essence withdrawing all but the military security aspect of ‘global 
public goods.’ With Washington interested in using the end of the Cold War to 
withdraw the economic part of its ‘global public goods,’ we should (theoretically) 
expect crisis. This is particularly the case in Eastern Asia, as the regional 
‘developmentalist’ model was reliant on a metaphorical ‘global public goods,’ and 
further, China a fast emerging challenger to the US and Japan, was pursuing policies 
without adequate consideration of their structural level effect on the smaller countries in 
Eastern Asia.
In this post Cold War context of confusion, as Higgot (19980 notes China devalued its 
currency by approximately 50% in 1994. This caused a significant shift in FDI towards 
China and severe competition from its cheaper goods of the same category from other 
Eastern Asian states such as Indonesia. Even as Japanese firms shifted to China with 
their FDI, in 1996 Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto announced major cuts to Japan’s 
ODA programme to Eastern Asia, thereby undermining the ODA^FDI regime for the 
ASEAN nations, who were deemed to have graduated from aid-recipient status.335 To 
make matters worse, under the pressure of neo-liberal ideology and a stagnant economy 
Tokyo removed more financial sector regulations whilst also cutting down on 
administrative guidance (Laurence 1996). In the process it left Japanese finance—with 
large pools of savings managed by a growing band of young, City trained, British 
bankers in burgeoning foreign owned banks in Tokyo—to act in accordance with 
incentive structures such as those given by the Chinese devaluation over Thailand and 
Indonesia. The collective force of these market ideology assaults on the ‘global
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public goods’ needed by post colonial states in the region and provided by Japan and the 
US was to affect the most vulnerable first. It began with Thailand, which was losing 
Japanese capital—including promised FDI, upon which the current account was to be 
balanced—to China, and also back to Japan (with Japanese banks seeking to address its 
bad loans crisis and the Basle Accord requirement for an 8% capital adequacy
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requirement for new foreign lending). In this context, currency speculators, seeing a 
vulnerable economy open to the world, sold the bhat. The attack became a full blown 
crisis as the US Federal Reserve Bank refused to join the Bank of Japan in intervening 
to stabilise the regional currency regime. Thus, rather than being contained to Thailand, 
the crisis spread to Indonesia eventually to even to South Korea, an OECD member and 
a ‘frontline state.’ The US intervened at the behest of Defence Secretary William Cohen, 
who understood that war might result across the 38th parallel if South Korea convulsed 
in the manner of Indonesia, reminding the US administration that the Cold War was not 
actually over in Asia.
The crisis in Eastern Asia clearly suggests that withdrawal of US and Japanese financial 
guarantees from the region undermined their respective ‘global public goods’ roles, 
putting hard won gains of the Cold War at risk. This failure, represented by the Asian 
Crisis, provides the counter factual to Cold War US and Japanese activism in the region 
that included the Fukuda Doctrine. The crisis in Asia in 1997 provides a sharp contrast 
to the 1977-1997 period of more or less steady catch-up growth that was the core trend 
identified by this research as having contributed to improved relations for Japan. The 
counterfactual vindicates the approach taken in this dissertation to focus on structural 
level policies represented by metaphorical ‘global public goods’ affecting Eastern Asia 
in order to understand improved relations between hegemonic powers and post colonial 
states. However, even though it failed to fulfil its ‘global public goods’ role during the 
crisis, Japan’s reputation in Asia suffered relatively little, as not only was it obvious that 
Tokyo did a great deal to remedy the situation, but it was clear that it had to do so 
despite US pressure to allow the IMF the lead role. The US, long believed to be the 
instigator of the turn away from ‘global public goods’ in Eastern Asia, was seen as the 
boastful ‘new imperialist power’ interested in buying Asian property at fire sale
„  338prices.
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The financial crisis in Asia certainly prompted scholars to question the direction of the 
region and to question if the ‘developmentalist’ experiment had ended (Bevacqua 1998). 
Early on the negative writing about the region from a liberal perspective led it being 
dismissed along with its ‘developmentalist’ ideals for post colonial states (Foot & 
Walter 1998). However, rather than the doomsday forecasts of the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ camp, others saw opportunities and transitions (Bello 1998 & 2000). Even 
some voices in favour liberalisation, saw it only as means. Leading scholars such as 
Bhagwati (2001) favoured the trade liberalisation as a means to open industrialised 
markets to assist post colonial economic development, whilst leaving the capital 
account closed to sudden movements of money by speculators. As Eastern Asia 
recovered quietly, the debate seemed to the settled that the region needed to move closer 
together to meet the challenges of the future, and in this Japan plays a central part.
(3) Japan leads again: ending the crisis in Asia and ‘global public goods’
A perspective that considers the nature of the system in its totality—which includes 
‘developmentalism’ and the tolerance ‘embedded liberal’ order of the Cold War, with 
both acting metaphorically as ‘global public goods’ enabling rapid economic growth by 
keeping the market at bay—suggests that crisis was inevitable as the Cold War came to 
an end. The belief of the end of the Cold War removed the last obstacle to US 
withdrawal of ‘global public goods’ to pursue narrow economic goals and abandon its 
commitments to former allies. The first sign of the new US policies came as the new 
domestically focused US administration under President Clinton became interested in 
treating Beijing as more important to Washington than Tokyo. In the wake of this 
Nixonesque shock, and confident that the region was secured—as proudly announced 
by Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto at the International Studies Association meeting 
in Makuhari 1996—Japan also began to abandon its commitments to minor allies and 
follow the logic of laissez faire in their dealings with post colonial states.340 The 
ensuing Asian financial crisis of 1997 reminded everyone of the importance of the US 
and Japanese metaphorical ‘global public goods’ roles in the economic realm where the 
post colonial Eastern Asian states were concerned.
In leading to the final stages of the Asian crisis Japan’s low interest rates coupled with 
loosening regulations allowed money to flow easily into de-regulated economies such as 
Thailand, where the ‘easy money’ undermined ‘developmentalist’ practices in the realm
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of the economy, and instead led to real estate speculation and other domestic private 
sector excesses.341 This serves to remind us that without the ‘administrative guidance’ 
of MITI serving Japan’s interest of a rapidly growing Eastern Asian economy, the 
market would but hold sway over vulnerable emerging capitalist economies powerless 
to govern capital movements. Indeed, the effect of liberalising Japanese finance failed to 
consider that young market-oriented fund managers would shift money to more 
lucrative locations in a global casino (Strange 1986 & 1997). The hasty and unwise 
unleashing of the market via liberalization of the capital account of each of these states 
in the context of a withdrawal of ‘global public goods’ by the US and Japan, meant that 
post colonial Eastern Asian states, long dependent on these goods in finance to achieve 
the Asian Miracle, quickly suffered financial sectors crisis. Left to the vagaries of the 
market for too long—as the US ignored Japanese overtures during the crisis for an 
Asian Monetary Fund (AMF)—the crisis permeated into the real economy causing 
disastrous bankruptcies among the high debt firms at the core of the ‘developmentalist’ 
drive, which led to spiralling unemployment and social and political unrest. The 
countries affected by the crisis were set back a decade at least.
With regional alarm signals readily apparent with motorcades of Eastern Asian leaders 
visiting Tokyo, Japan received the message that it had to lead. The responsive 
Miyazawa Plan helped to stabilise Eastern Asian domestic economies, given Japan’s 
understanding on how to help each country, as was the case with Thailand’s needs.342 
The quiet re-emergence of the Eastern Asian economies was made possible by Japanese 
provision of what are, metaphorically speaking, ‘global public goods,’ especially, with 
its lender of last resort type Miyazawa Plan. The tens of billions made available to the 
region by the Japanese via this plan allowed countries in the region to re-finance and 
emerge from the crisis in better shape than predicted by scholars who wondered what 
had happened to the Asia Pacific century (Walter & Foot 2000). After repaying the 
banks from Japan and other creditor countries’ banks with the money from the 
Miyazawa Fund, these countries have remerged with much talk of change from the old 
‘developmentalist’ model, but with very little to show for it in terms of market reforms 
(Hughes 1999). With the end of the financial crisis, Japanese power has become more 
apparent, particularly in the economic sphere, as it pursued in creating a regional 
stabilisation fund after first having been pressured by the US to abandon the more 
ambitious Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) to provide ‘public goods’ for the region. The
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swap agreement singed at Chang Mai also includes a more contrite China—with its 
pledge to not devalue its currency again—and is only the first step for Tokyo 
bureaucrats interested in a larger financial architecture for the region.343
In comparison to the Latin American laissez faire  model, Eastern Asia, with its 
‘developmentalist’ structure, has recovered better and faster with growth back over the 
5% mark for most economies. Japanese FDI has also returned, as shown by a 2002 
white paper on international trade. As shown in Diagram 8 in the second half of the 
1990s, even after accounting for the fall in JFDI in 1996, Japanese investment to the 
ASEAN nations has increased nearly two fold along with a similar increase to China, 
while NIEs have remained constant. Meanwhile, Chinese investment in the NIEs 
reveals how it too has become a sender.
Diagram 8: Foreign Direct Investment Flows in Eastern Asia
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As the Asian crisis recedes into the distance, astute observers of the region pointed out 
to the resilience of the ‘developmentalist’ model, and how it was not changing (Hughes 
1999 & Weiss 2001). Others provided commentary that gave a more profound historical 
understanding grounded on the work of Polanyi and Gramsci (Birchfield 1999), thus 
giving more credence to idea of history as a social science.344
Even though Eastern Asia has largely recovered from the crisis of 1997, the actual focus 
on Japan’s role has been sketchy, with only a few leading scholars noting the role of
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Japan (Hughes 1999, Higgott 2000 & Rapkin 2001). With scholarly focus on global US 
hegemony, the Japanese response to the economic situation in Eastern Asia has been 
under-emphasised within international relations and even within international political 
economy, despite the reality that such economic matters are issues of importance in the 
long term, especially for post colonial states seeking to catch-up with the industrialised 
core. Even with Japan’s quiet leadership gaining more credence in Eastern Asia as 
noted by Rix (1989), it remained the invisible centre of Eastern Asia’s emergence as the 
most dynamic economic region in the world, even after the recovery from regional 
political and economic crisis in 1997. While Tokyo has focused on Asia, Japan’s 
positive role is well recognised in Africa. 345 African nations had a window of 
opportunity in this respect in the early 1990s when Japan shifted its focus away from 
Asia, however, with the financial crisis in 1997 the focus has again shifted to Asia.
(4) Competing hegemonies: the legitimation game of the US, Japan and China
In this context of a recovering Asia, fast learning China is the main challenger to at least 
regional order. The US, as a result of the global hegemony established by its power and 
role in setting up the post W W II order, retains its power in the security realm, even as it 
finds its economic lead narrows, with leading voices questioning if the US can stay on 
top.346 While many who saw US power on the wane have pointed to a decline in US 
hegemony, Gilpin (1987) has shown us that US hegemony has been prolonged because 
of the country’s crucial alliance with Japan. The nichibei economy is such that both 
countries have become heavily reliant on the each other. The US has needed Japan’s 
economic power to subsidise its military spending and extravagant tax cuts. This was 
possible so long as the Japanese government maintained regulations and used 
“administrative guidance” to continue to buy significant quantities of US Treasury bills 
with its surplus US currency.347 Meanwhile, Tokyo has held on to Washington’s 
security guarantees based on the US nuclear deterrent. This arrangement has worked 
well enough to stabilise Eastern Asia, such that even the Chinese challengers of 
Japanese regional hegemony and US hegemony in Eastern Asia have found it useful, in 
the way that peace as an ‘international public good’ usually is.
Despite the closeness of the nichibei alliance and guarantees of US protection, self- 
interested Japanese policy towards post colonial states since the Nixon shock and anti- 
Japanese outbursts of the 1970s has focused on legitimating aspects of its hegemony,
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facilitating the country’s return to the regional fold. In so doing, it has provoked 
disagreement with Washington on the method of economic development of post 
colonial states. While Japan found the Eastern Asian economic development was in its 
interest, successive US leaders have not considered this important in light of their 
preference for using military force to overcome resistance to US neo-imperialism. US 
leaders, especially those concerned with promoting narrowly self interested policies of 
carte blanche liberalisation, have found in Japan a formidable opponent committed to 
keeping a version of ‘developmentalism’—focused on “catching up”—on track within 
Eastern Asia.
By the end of the 20th century, Japan’s relatively responsible use of power in the 
international system, focused on regional Eastern Asian economic development in the 
manner prescribed by Murakami (1996), has improved its relations with post colonial 
states to such an extent that Japanese culture is no longer a prohibited item even in 
South Korea. Barring North Korea, which is led by a despotic regime that actually 
requires confrontation with Japan for domestic regime maintenance, and China, which 
is directly in competition with Japan for regional hegemony, most leaders in the region 
see Japan as a useful major power that can be called upon even for peacekeeping 
missions. In this context of more normal relations, this thesis speculates that China, long 
seen as the contender for regional hegemony, has begun to follow Japan’s lead in the 
realm of ‘global public goods’ provision for the region.
The People’s Republic of China is now in direct competition with Japan to provide 
public goods to improve its prospects for legitimation, which suffered badly when it 
devalued the renmibi in 1994 and severely affected FDI flows into its regional 
competitors in addition to also undercutting their exports.348 Since its feeble offer of one 
billion USD to Indonesia during the crisis, China has taken its regional role very 
seriously. Rather than oppose the public good of a regional financial architecture led by 
Tokyo, it has joined with Japan in the Chang Mai initiative with Beijing pledging to not 
devalue the renmibi (CHY) again. China has gone further to allow other Eastern Asian 
countries access to its market. In the security arena China is showing a new willingness 
to discuss disputes over territory with its neighbours, including the key constituency of 
ASEAN. In essence, Beijing has had to adapt an approach to international relations and 
trade that considers the demands of the smaller states in the region, as it too has had to
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legitimate its power, consistent with the idea expressed in this dissertation that all 
hegemonic powers must do this by heeding the goals of smaller states.
In suggesting the important role played by smaller states in making even hegemonic 
powers justify their power, this work has deliberately departed from the usual focus on 
the rivalries of the larger states to the exclusion of the interests and agency of post 
colonial states. The focus on the major actors, long a tradition of international relations 
scholars, renders invisible both the presence of post colonial states and their ability to 
bargain. Indeed, those from outside the discipline of international relations, were they to 
consult mainstream work produced under the banner of “IR,” might be forgiven for 
coming to believe that that post colonial states do not matter at all. However, the reality 
is that with the advance of history, self-proclaimed “Great Powers” that first become 
brutally imperialist, and then hegemonic, have gradually lost their ability to ignore the 
preferences of post colonial states and societies. Indeed, these post colonial states and 
societies have gradually made their presence felt, at times in concert with each other, as 
with their demands via the weak G 77, and today with the more powerful G 20, and at 
other times by withdrawing their consent or by resisting via actions of non-state groups, 
such as guerrilla activity or even terrorism.
n  Contributions TO CURRENT SCHOLARSHIP:
RECONCILING POST COLONIAL AND HEGEMONIC INTERESTS
This dissertation, by contributing to a number of important debates in international 
relations and international political economy, offers several points of departure for 
future research on relations between post colonial states and hegemonic states. While by 
no means revolutionary in thought along the lines of Thomas Kuhn (1962), these 
contributions are still significant enough to only have been produced by an outsider to 
the mainstream of both international relations and international political economy.349 
This dissertation does address some of the issues of a divided discipline by dealing with 
some the key terms with “IR” and “EPE” in a manner that suggests the important 
contributions of each of the three main pillars of thought could together offer a more 
wholesome understanding.350 In terms of contributions to method and theory within 
international relations, this work validates critical theory via the direct input of the work 
of Gramsci (1937) on hegemony and Habermas (1976). Showing that “IPE” is fast
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becoming the teacher to “IR,” as suggested by Robert O’Brien (1995), this work ties 
international relations to international political economy, showing the relevance of 
economic history as considered by both Kindleberger (1986) and Murakami (1996). In 
this it remains true to the intentions and systematic approach to questions of power 
espoused by Susan Strange (1979), who argued for more multi-disciplinary work. By 
addressing the issues of ‘developmentalism,’ this dissertation also contributes to the 
field of economic development by comprehensively tying agency of post colonial states 
to the structural level influences of hegemonic powers. In doing so, this work 
contributes to two areas of Japan studies: international relations and history. The most 
significant contribution of this dissertation is to demonstrate that Japan’s relations with 
Eastern Asia have improved. This is shown by paying attention to history, and framing 
how Japan has managed its relations ever since Meiji by following international norms 
of the times, moving with imperialism through to fascism and international citizenship.
(1) Critical theory: agency and praxis for post colonial states
In terms of international relations, this dissertation contributes directly to critical theory 
by bringing in the key debate of hegemony from international political economy, and it 
does so in a manner suggesting that “IPE” has a great deal to teach “IR.” By 
synthesising the international political economy work of Kindleberger (1986), 
Murakami (1996) and Strange (1988a), with the critical tradition of Gramsci (1937) and 
Habermas (1976), it challenges realist (Gilpin 1987) and also neo-Marxist (Cox 1987) 
constructions of hegemony in the face of liberal neglect of the use of power in history 
(Keohane 1984 & Sally 1997).351 This work demonstrates the importance of critically 
understanding consent to be an explicit part of hegemony (in addition to the focus on 
manipulation/coercion) by returning to the ideas of Gramsci (1937), and by further 
emphasising that consent is critical through the application of Habermas’s (1976) notion 
of a legitimation crisis. While Gramsci is known for being part of the critical work 
within international political economy, led by Robert Cox (1983), and leading to the 
creation of the neo-Gramsci school, this work is a departure from those ideas, as it deals 
with the “original” Gramsci. The interpretive method and criticism of Jurgen Habermas 
serves to further distance this work from the neo-Marxist focus on production and social 
forces of Cox (1983), such that there is adequate emphasis on both agency and structure, 
including that of capitalism.
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While certain interpretations of Gramsci’s work have been applied by his students such 
as Robert Cox, it also clear, as Roger Payne notes, that a surprisingly large number of 
scholars are now applying the highly abstract theoretical ideas of Habermas to the study 
of international relations. Indeed, as this work suggests, Habermas has become 
influential in this discipline because his work is useful in identifying interests, their 
communication, and also how societies can through reason arrive at understandings to 
ease differences.353 As Harrington (2001: 20) argues, for Habermas, critical theory, 
represented by the paradigm of Marxian-ideology critique, showed how interpreting the 
beliefs and world-views of other ages and cultures often required exposing the 
suppressed material interests that regulated ideas in favour of the hegemony of 
particular classes. However, as this work has done, it has gone beyond this to fully 
consider how, once the material interests are recognised, we must consider the agency 
of post colonial actors. In this way it has given full treatment to hegemonic crisis, as 
those observed by the Japanese in the early 1970s in Eastern Asia. Such attention to 
agency of the post colonial agitators is consistent with Habermas’s Theory of 
Communicative Action (1984 & 1987), where he foresees a time when human 
communication will be free of domination, enabling rational citizens to act positively, 
politically, and freely in society. In making this case, he has moved away from Hegelian 
Marxism and its foreclosure on the possibility of realising the emancipatory potential of 
critical theory through communicative practice.354 Recognizing the need to be on guard 
against “critical theory lapsing into a new objectivism that simply dictates the truth of 
subjects deeds’ from the outside,” as noted by Harrington (2001: 20), this work follows 
Habermas, away from the more deterministic approach of Cox (1987), to allow a form 
of communicative action seen in the original Gramsci (1937).
Payne (2000:1) argues many of the international relations scholars who apply 
Habermasian ideas to their own work are themselves critical theorists, as with Linklater 
(1998), Samhat (1997), and Dryzek (1990). This work has followed the work of these 
scholars’ in seeking to broaden the critique of modem social and political systems to 
include contemporary international relations by revealing global forms of dominance 
and injustice, but has gone beyond this to show how justice might be delivered via 
‘global public goods.’ Arguably, current structures and processes dominated by the US 
have “perpetuated poverty, widened material inequalities, increased ecological 
degradation, sustained militarism, fragmented communities, marginalized subordinated
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groups, fed intolerance and deepened crises of democracy” (Scholte 1996:53). As Payne 
(2000:1) notes, in light of this situation much attention is devoted to explaining the 
illegitimacy of egoistic states and their traditional pursuits, such as power, security, and 
deterrence. This dissertation goes a step further by showing that Japan has acted 
differently by paying attention to development and security needs of other states and has 
thus acted to legitimate its power.
Critical theory goes further than merely pointing to what is wrong, as Habermas has 
developed and defended a form of social and political decision-making based on 
communication underpinning agency and praxis. Payne (2000) notes that for Habermas, 
democratic deliberation is grounded in “discourse ethics” which are essentially 
procedural norms that can purportedly assure genuine public accountability in modem 
socio-political settings such as the “public sphere” of Calhoun (1992) and Lynch (1999). 
As Dryzek (1990) shows, sound arguments and ideas, advanced and refined in an 
appropriately open and inclusive discussion process, should lead participants to 
construct mutually agreed upon, and thereby authoritative, answers to fundamental 
questions about truth and justice. In other words, members of a given community 
engage in what Habermas calls “communicative action” that creates the possibility of 
communicative, or what Risse (1999) calls “argumentative” rationality.355
Whilst Habermasian discourse ethics are highly abstract, critical international relations 
theorists—as represented by this dissertation—embrace this line of thinking, agreeing 
that legitimate normative order is “arrived at through communicative action in which 
participants seek consensus” (Crawford 1998:129). Therefore, Payne (2000:1) argues, 
ideally, the world community's members should develop and identify their shared views 
by deliberating over publicly presented arguments and evidence, probing and 
challenging them in a broadly participatory process. This process can only take place 
however if a hegemonic power facilitates the discussion paying strict attention to the 
goals and aspirations of post colonial states, as has been and continues to be the case 
with Japan in Eastern Asia, where for example it has led in creating APEC (Wood). 
Additionally, Payne (2000:1) notes that critical international theorists explore the 
possibility of radically transforming world order, thus making them amenable to agency 
by post colonial states, the discussion of which has been one of the larger goals of this 
work. Emancipation and global justice require, as Andrew Linklater's work (1998:8)
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seeks to make clear, that “dialogue and consent replace domination and force” as the 
central causal mechanisms in international relations. This has been the main mode of 
international relations in Eastern Asia, at least with respect to Japan and the region.
Interestingly, the opportunity for building a democratic community, according to the 
critical argument, is actually found in the immanent contradictions of the current 
political order. Despite the eloquent sceptics of liberal persuasion (Foot & Walter 2000), 
legitimation itself is a process of building community, even in Eastern Asia, where such 
notions are still at their infancy, given how late regional order has arrived (Akrasanee 
2003). As such, any normative structure not grounded in legitimate authority may well 
prove untenable, ultimately inviting disobedience and change.356 Invoking an explicitly 
Habermasian standard for international politics, Crawford (1993: 52) notes that “norms 
established through coercion, imposed by a hegemon, lack legitimacy.” Somewhat more 
broadly, Linklater (1998: 17 & 43) finds that the contemporary international political 
order has a “tenuous existence and precarious legitimacy,” because decisions “are taken 
without considering their likely effects on systematically excluded groups.” This is in 
contrast to what happens when norms developed by post colonial states are embraced by 
hegemonic states, thus ensuring that hegemony is legitimated, as is the case with Japan 
with its response to the normatively understood drive of rapid economic development in 
Eastern Asia.
Habermas’s (1998) argument for the inclusion of “the other” in understanding ones’ 
own interest, as displayed by Japanese foreign policy-makers since Fukuda, has a strong 
relationship to Carr (1939, 1942 & 1945), as the latter’s genuinely termed realism 
contends with the interests of the other, and in particular the interests of the weaker
'IC 'J
party, making him, as Wilson (2001) would have it, a radical with a conservative end.
In this sense, it diverges from Groatian conceptions of an artificially constructed liberal 
international society, as the fundamental problem with the world today is exclusion of 
the “other.”358 This exclusion would lead to increasing hegemonic power, leading in 
turn to commensurate increase in resistance as suggested by Michael Cox (2002) in his 
discussion about US power after the collapse of the World Trade Centre towers, and it 
requires that “IR” and “IPE” theorists be more concerned than they are now about 
resistance from post colonial states.
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(2) Contribution to the political economy of hegemony and post colonialism
Within the field of international relations/international political economy, this 
dissertation offers insight into why hegemonic powers, although unwilling to continue 
with the burden of ‘global public goods’ when the costs are too high, will however bear 
the costs when other interests—particularly those of legitimating hegemony—become 
more important. To reach this conclusion first it is found that the costs incurred would 
deter hegemonic powers from providing ‘global public goods,’ as was the case with the 
US which had the military means to coercively establish order (Keohane 1983a). Even 
as the international capitalist order has triumphed with US hegemony over Europe and 
parts of Eastern Asia, the costs incurred by the US forced it to discontinue particular 
aspects of ‘global public goods,’ especially in the arena of trade. The “new 
protectionism” of the US in the 1970s meant that the problem of ‘global public goods’ 
for post colonial states became more pronounced. The cost-benefit calculus performed 
by the US meant that post colonial states were not to benefit from the Cold War 
pressure to maintain these goods as the US preferred military instruments of foreign 
policy. Even “frontline” Eastern Asian states, which received ‘global public goods’ 
through the Cold War, have had these goods withdrawn since its end. Thus abandoned 
many Eastern Asian states that had emerged from colonial under-development to a 
newly industrialised status—a movement from less equal less developed (LELD) to 
more equal more developed (MEMD) status—began to face problems that ultimately 
led to the crisis which swept the region, and then the world, in 1997. Following the 
victory in the Cold War, without any real interest in legitimating its power vis-a-vis post 
colonial states, the US was no longer interested in maintaining the ‘global public good’ 
of an open market for the NICs of Asia with the end of the Cold War. It instead imposed 
the harsh “Washington consensus” free market reforms that only served to undermine 
the region in the manner suggested by Carr (1939). With laissez faire imposed on post 
colonial states, consistent with Carr’s reasoning on the false notion of a “general 
harmony of interests,” problems with legitimation of hegemony were unavoidable.
Interestingly, this work shows that despite economic disadvantages, hegemonic states 
might continue to provide particular forms of ‘global public goods’ when the costs 
incurred are justifiable to improve relations with post colonial states. This work 
contributes to the idea that meeting the economic goals of post colonial states is the best 
way of fulfilling the historical obligations of colonial/imperial and current hegemonic
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states, and thus a sustainable approach to building international peace. This is in 
contrast to much thought of a Kantian bent that relies on absolute gains from following 
the doctrine of laissez faire. Such a peaceful order has to be understood better in the 
present context of several players, including non-state actors. Historically, threats from 
post colonial societies have amounted to little as the level of technology available to 
these states and their citizens rendered them powerless. Under those circumstances, 
more powerful states such as the US and those in Europe could afford to pay lip-service 
to post colonial goals without actually addressing grievances. However, with the advent 
of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons that greatly improve the strike capabilities 
of small groups, it becomes important for hegemonic powers not to leave cause for 
disaffection in post colonial spaces. It would seem that, at the very minimum, attacks 
from societal groups might be best prevented by Japanese-style ‘global public goods’ 
policies focused on enabling rapid economic development policies, thus mitigating to 
some extent the brutal excesses of past empire.
(3) Contribution to development studies
Operating mostly at the system level, the discipline of international relations neglects 
issues of economic development. As the post “9/11” world shows, international 
relations specialists have ignored the problem of economic development at the risk of 
not understanding how these issues have related to insecurity over the decades. This 
state of affairs is unfortunate, because such issues can easily be addressed using 
modified versions of Kindleberger’s (1986) ‘international public goods’ as undertaken 
by Kaul, et al (1999) on behalf of the UNDP. While the work by the UNDP does offer a 
map of the structural level needs of for economic development, this work does not 
explicitly address the international structure itself and the nature of power exerted by 
hegemonic actors. Importantly, it does not consider hegemonic responsibilities. Thus 
this dissertation employs Strange’s (1988a) framework of structural power to organise 
the ‘global public goods’ required for economic development in the manner Mendelev 
organised the periodic table. Thus another important result of this work is a broader, 
better organised understanding of the challenges of economic development, arrived at 
though consideration of both the agency of post colonial states and the structural factors 
under the control of hegemonic states such as the US and Japan.
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Whilst similar ideas are emphasised in the dependency literature (Cardoso & Feletto, 
1979), it is in terms of what went wrong at the structural level. Also, such work does 
not focus adequately on role of domestic institutions, and thus offers little agency for 
post colonial states. At the other extreme is the sole focus on the agency of the post 
colonial state in leading economic development, either from the liberal market 
perspective of Anne Krueger (1974) or the statist view offered by Wade (1990) and 
Haggard (1990), with neither sufficiently engaging agency and structure to understand 
the rise, consolidation, crisis, and rejuvenation of Eastern Asian economic development
' I C Q
as a historical and regional phenomenon associated with Japan. This problem is still 
not rectified in Atul Kohli’s (2004) work, as there the focus is still only on domestic 
institutions, even though he has acknowledged Japan’s historical role in the formation 
of institutions leading development, thereby arriving at an explanation as to why some 
geographical areas grew, while others stagnated.360
This dissertation contributes to the development literature by moving beyond the 
debates in dependency theories, the pro-market ‘Washington consensus’ and also 
institutional literature. It is now poised to suggest that it is the continuing actions of 
hegemonic powers in providing ‘global public goods’ that will allow states with 
developmentalist institutions to succeed, thus suggesting how important it is to consider 
agency and structure together with the same research design. Following the 
acknowledgement of both agency and structure, this work indirectly contributes to the 
increasingly tenable idea of an Eastern Asian form of capitalism, debunking Max 
Weber’s early dismissal of the region as having no potential for capitalism given the 
prevalence of Confucianism, and finally laying to rest the Orientalist story of the Asian 
Drama.361 With its analysis of ‘developmentalism’ in the tradition of Murakami, this 
research suggests the promise of ideas of an Eastern Asian form of capitalism, 
suggesting fruitful links to related work.362 These developmentalist paths were not 
accidental or inevitable or merely a result of domestic origin, but as Atul Kohli (1994) 
writes, they were reliant on the Japanese colonial roots, as with Taiwan and South 
Korea. However, they have also continued into the present with a highly active Japanese 
foreign policy advocating ‘developmentalism’ for the region, which is an ‘international 
public good’ in knowledge terms. In the case of most of Southeast Asia, 
‘developmentalism’ was successful because of the direct encouragement by Japan’s 
numerous agencies implementing ODA and technical development. Following the
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Japanese example with Tokyo’s active help has put these countries on course to ‘catch 
up’ with industrialised nations, as exemplified by Korea’s entry into the OECD and also 
by the ASEAN vision of achieving industrialised status by 2020 (Saiji 1995).
This is not to argue that the ‘silver bullet’ has been found for development theory. 
“Defensive modernization,” the precursor to the ‘developmentalism’ of Meiji Japan as 
well as many developing nations (including Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and Indonesia), 
illustrates how the state promotes a particular ideology in order to legitimate the 
modernisation project and mobilise (both human and material) resources. As, Berger 
argues, it was premised on the idea that the state is not just an important factor in 
economic development, but that “its capability, defined as the ability to undertake and 
promote collective actions efficiently,” had to be “increased.” Berger goes on to argue 
that the World Bank's 1997 study defined an ‘effective state’ in such a way that it 
“remained inoculated from historical and political questions, while the wider social 
context was sidestepped and the authoritarian character of most of the developmental 
states in East Asia was given implicit, if not explicit, legitimacy.” While Berger 
confirms the importance of the Japanese contribution and the role of the state in Eastern 
Asian development, he questions the tepid reception given to democracy in the region. 
The issue of democracy is the Achilles’ heel of ‘developmentalism’ as preached by 
Japan. One way out of this problem is to fully recognise the importance of structure in 
the Eastern Asian success, while appreciating the veracity of the dependency critique in 
Latin America. That is, while the issue of democracy has been a problem in the Eastern 
Asian region, it also seems that economic growth led to the growth of middle classes 
demanding more rights and representation, and so we have seen some movement along 
these lines in the region. This means that ‘developmentalism’ could be practised by 
democratic regimes, which are supposed to be better at avoiding uneven distribution. If 
‘global public goods’ are delivered at the structural level, there is no reason that the 
developmentalist miracles cannot spread west to Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, home 
to the majority of the world’s poor. South Asia, like East Asia, has the necessary 
domestic institutions to succeed. The implications of this conclusion leave much room 
for optimism, though it does mean halting the ‘Washington Consensus’ in its tracks in 
order that ‘developmentalism’ be allowed for poor countries such that middle classes 
emerge to demand democracy. This argument is strengthened by evidence that as 
economic growth has halted with crisis, we have also seen democracy under siege along
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with regional tolerance for cooperation. Thus it would seem that the best way to bring 
about democracy is to allow ‘developmentalism,’ with ‘global public goods’ maintained 
by the hegemonic power(s) in question.
(4) Contribution to Japanese international relations
Not long ago Paul Kennedy wondered about Japan as a “Twenty-First Century Power?” 
generally supporting the hypothesis that it was a “New Kind of Superpower.”363 While 
Japanese scholars and policy makers certainly had a sense of their own power, they only 
expressed it with profound silence, contrary to those expecting much “noise.”364 Aside 
from bold leadership debates led by scholar-practioneers such as Sato Hideo (1995, 
1996a, 1996b and 1996c), Japanese policy has quietly aimed to encourage regional 
economic development in Eastern Asia such that Japan improves its relations with its 
neighbours, in particular since the late 1970s as this work has shown. The success of 
Japanese policy in improving relations with Eastern Asia over the 1980s and 1990s has 
led to increasing demands from the region for Tokyo to lead more boldly. For example, 
Tokyo has been pressed into service to represent the region in the G7.365 In such forums 
it has been able to shield the region from outside demands, allowing Eastern Asia to 
maintain the “Asian way” with focus on easing tensions via “Track II” type work over 
confrontation, whilst gradually increasing regional economic cooperation by easing 
domestic polities o f ‘developmentalism.’
Despite Japanese successes, much of the literature on Japan (and Asia for that matter) 
has typically been descriptive, and facts have been interpreted and re-interpreted in an 
ad hoc manner. This dissertation challenges interpretations of recent Japanese agency as 
weak or non-existent. To the literature on Japan’s role in Eastern Asia, this research 
adds the suggestion of a strategic partnership along the lines very cautiously envisaged 
by Donnelly and Stubbs (1996). However, it posits that there is more to the relationship, 
suggesting that Japan is responding to regional demands for what are essentially 
idealised ‘global public goods.’ Furthermore, the Japanese response can be understood 
within the terms set by the historical international relations/international political 
economy of Carr (1936), Murakami (1996), Kindleberger (1986), and Strange (1988a) 
among others. It is suggested that the works of Rix (1989), Drifte (1983a, 1990, 1996, 
1998 & 2000) and Hughes (1999 & 2000) point in the correct direction; and the 
theoretical focus of this research consolidates their views within a more general research
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programme that is cognisant of other states in the international system, including those 
with post colonial histories. The thesis thus challenges the work of Nester (1989a, 
1989b), Orr (1990), Arase (1995), and Hatch and Yamamura (1996) from the academic 
community and Van Wolfren (1993), Fallows (1994), and Fingleton (1995) from the 
observer-joumalist community, by pointing to the demand for and delivery of ‘global 
public goods’ in a liberal capitalist order and proposing that this assists deeply desired 
development in Eastern Asia, which in turn leads to improvements in Japan’s relations 
with post colonial states.367
The dissertation contributes to the study of Japanese foreign policy by showing that 
another core problem for the practice of Japan’s international relations has been 
bringing about the country’s re-entry to the region of Eastern Asia for long term 
stability, whilst also ensuring its security in the short term. This work highlights the 
importance of the solutions offered by Prime Minister Yoshida at the beginning of 
Japan’s post war period and contrasts this with Prime Minister Fukuda’s policies. 
Arguably, both strategies were devised to meet the needs of the times. However, the 
Fukuda Doctrine was able to successfully engage post colonial Asia in a manner 
consistent with the aspirations of these countries. Thus this work brings Prime Minister 
Fukuda to the centre stage, comparing him with Prime Minister Yoshida in terms of his 
importance to Japanese foreign policy.
Certainly, it is through enabling Eastern Asia to ‘catch up’ in terms of economic 
development that Japan has been able to succeed in legitimating its hegemony. However, 
improvement of relations via legitimation of regional hegemony does not mean that 
horrific memories are forgotten or forgiven, only that these are no longer an impediment 
to better relations. It also means that Japan has been able to better its relations in the 
region to an extent unimaginable without such an effort. That is, while there are several 
problems still to be settled between Japan and its former colonies and occupied areas, 
relations have improved because of Tokyo’s commitment to providing ‘global public 
goods’ to enable regional economic development. This dissertation is perhaps the first 
to recognise the improvement in Japan’s relations, the veracity of which is strengthened 
by attention to a body of critical theory that would otherwise normally find post colonial 
states in conflict with hegemonic capitalist powers.
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The implications of the finding that Japan has improved its relations with post-colonial 
states is profoundly important for the 21st century. This research suggests that Japan has 
embarked on a form of international relations never before observed post-Westaphalian 
era: the Japanese approach is a dramatically different answer to Western, especially US, 
notions of hegemony. Its rationale may be to maintain the position of Japan, but its 
methods are superior to those crudely adopted by the victorious “Great Powers” after 
W W II when, in the name of anti-communism, they devised neo-colonial policies which 
aimed to eliminate numerous nationalists and their armies in tragic post colonial spaces 
such as Vietnam, Algeria, and Nicaragua where the wretched of the earth attempted to 
be free.
(5) Contribution to understanding Japanese history
As the research does not specifically address Japanese history, its contribution to 
understanding this matter has been one of its most welcome surprises. This work 
suggests that to fully understand the depth of Japan’s commitment to Eastern Asian 
peace, one must also understand that country’s history in terms of why it contributed to 
the region’s wars in the first part of the 20th century. This is also to say that despite the 
furore in the 20th century over Japan’s militarism, the country has historically not been 
at war with other states, with the exception of two forays into Korea in the fifteenth 
century. This underlying sense of Japan as a relatively “quiet” island making few 
European-type demands on Eastern Asia prior to the late 19th century should not be 
under-emphasised in favour of over-emphasising its role as an aggressive colonial state 
in early 20th century. Understanding this somewhat isolationist bent in Japanese 
thinking over long periods allows us to better comprehend the vehemence of its 
engagement when under threat from without and the dogged defence of its place in the 
world today as a post imperialist power.
When considering the insights into Japanese history that have emerged as a result of this 
dissertation, the first which comes to mind is the observable tendency in post Meiji 
Japanese policy to adhere to the international norms of the times. This tendency is
fhdiscemable from Japanese imperialism in the late 19 century through the fascism of
tlithe early 20 century to the international co-operation later that century. Each of these 
epochs is marked by Japan’s vigorous participation, suggesting a steep learning curve 
and an adjustment to the world after its forced “coming out” in 1863. Hence the
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extraordinary attention given to Washington’s role in Tokyo’s cooperative efforts 
slights Japan’s adherence to international norms (whether for good or evil, to put it in 
the stark and simplistic terms of today). Such attention to the US also overlooks both 
Japan’s pre-WW II tendency to democracy, which lost out to the fascism of the day, and 
the US role in provoking first Japan’s imperialism and then its fascism. Therefore, 
when beginning to understand Japanese policy in the post-WW II era, it is useful to bear 
in mind the tendency for Japanese policymakers to conform to international norms, 
while remembering that its civil society element has grown stronger over the last 100 
years. Indeed, these two factors have increasingly shaped Japanese policy towards 
Eastern Asia to the extent that researchers can no longer afford to ignore their 
importance it they are to fully appreciate Japan’s place in the international system, 
where it has earned a respected space even its own region, where memories still run 
deep with anger over the past.
The past, thankfully, is over: one can only hope that future generations will read, and 
learn from history, continuing to ask the most crucial question “Why?” In this they 
would be well advised to read carefully E. H. Carr, without neglecting his work 
Conditions o f  Peace and Democracy in International Affairs. While not being an 
abstract theorist of the order of Gramsci or Habermas, he still saw the conditions of 
peace would entail a system that is more accountable than the one we have today.
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38 See also C. Kay, Latin American Theories o f Development and Underdevelopment. London: Routledge, 
1989, and “Relevance of Structuralist and Dependency Theories in the Neoliberal Period: A Latin 
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Studies, University of Toronto-York University, 1995), pp.36.
101 His Two Treatises of Government (1690) were written to justify the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89, 
and his Letter Concerning Toleration (1689) is one o f the canonical English-language texts in the history 
of the idea of toleration. The other significant contribution of the Enlightenment in the field of social and 
political philosophy, was Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Du contrat social (1762, The Social Contract), which
264
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The Renaissance political philosophies of Machiavelli, Bodin and Hobbes had centered on the absolute 
power of kings and rulers. But, the Enlightenment theories of Locke and Rousseau turned instead to the 
freedom and equality of citizens.
102 See for example Alice Ormiston, Rousseau and the Project o f  Autonomy, CPSA Annual Conference, 
June 2003, Halifax.
103 Though mistaken as such, he was thus no democrat in the modem sense and was mainly concerned to 
make the poor work harder in order that a higher surplus could be taken by capitalists. It was the threat of 
attack on the laws, property, and the Protestant religion that had roused resistance to James II. Locke was 
expressing the concerns and interests of the landed and moneyed men by whose consent James's 
successor, William III, came to the throne, and his commonwealth is strictly conservative, limiting the 
franchise and the preponderant power to the propertied classes.
104 See C. Matheson, “Weber and the Classification of Forms of Legitimacy,” British Journal o f  
Sociology 2 (1987), 199-215, for more.
105 Some domestic level interpretations along these lines: Pete Bell, New Party, New Politics: Gramsci's 
Democratic Socialism. London: Clause 4,1986. However there are more radical interpretations from Carl 
Boggs, Gramsci’s Marxism. London: Pluto Press 1976 and The Two Revolutions: Antonio Gramsci and 
the Dilemmas o f  Western Marxism. Boston: South End Press 1984.
106 Political also crises occur that will undermine the stability of global capitalism as suggested by Karl 
Polanyi’s idea of a “double movement” in The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic 
Origins o f Our Time (1944:12). See also Beverly J. Silver and Giovanni Arrighi, Polanyi's "Double 
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Community and its periphery in the nineteenth century: a balance of political power, the international 
Gold Standard, a self-regulating market system, and the liberal state. The SRM (self-regulating market) 
was "the fount and matrix of the system," the "innovation which gave rise to a specific civilization" (p. 3). 
Polanyi differentiated between economic systems in which there were markets and the "starkly utopian" 
SRM of the nineteenth century. Markets are places or networks in which goods are bought and sold; they 
are human interactions organized by price, quality, and quantity of traded goods and services. The SRM 
was a society-wide system of markets in which all inputs into the substantive processes of production and 
distribution were for sale and in which output was distributed solely in exchange for earnings from sales 
of inputs. The second crucially distinct feature of Polanyi's analysis is his argument that the SRM could 
not survive—not because of the distributional consequences that play the major role in Marx's 
explanation of the inevitable collapse of capitalism—but because the starkly utopian nature of the SRM 
gave rise to a spontaneous counter movement, even among those enjoying increased material prosperity. 
Society is vital to humans as social animals, and the SRM was inconsistent with a sustainable society.
1071 would like to thank Tom Keating for this insight.
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imperialism.
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Pinter Publishers, 1988.
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(http://www.jef.or.jp/en/jti/200305_025.html) address the controversy over Fukuzawa.
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151 See B. C. Koh. Japan’s Administrative Elite (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989) p.256 
about the subordination of the national interest to rivalries at the bureaucratic level. This detailed work at 
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82).
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Southeast Asia, but with a greater focus on Japan than in other places. The ethnic Chinese were frequent 
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MOFA, Tokyo 1998).
155 While Prime Minister Fukuda did not last long even as Japanese prime ministers go, the shift in policy 
power to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from MITI after the anti-Japanese sentiments in the region came 
just before the prime minister’s start. With the Keidanren having to rely on MOFA for protection for 
Japanese investment in Eastern Asia, it was easier to seek concessions from business. Thus the long 
sidelined Institute of Developing Economies (IDE), a dependent of MITI, had allies in MOFA as the 
strategy changed from realism to legitimacy-seeking behaviour.
156 Speech given by Ambassador Owada Hisashi “ Japan-ASEAN Relations in East Asia, 16 October 
2000, Hotel New Otani, Singapore Organized by Singapore Institute of International Affairs and the 
Embassy of Japan, http://www.jiia.or.jp/report/owada/singapore.html
157 PAFTA, PECC and APEC were terms used to refer to some form of community in the disparate region 
with no regional consciousness. See Drysdale (1988: 60-61).
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legitimation of power. This brings him closer to critical theory as suggested by Linklater (2000) “E.H. 
Carr, Nationalism and the Future of the Sovereign State,” in M. Cox, ed. E. H. Carr: A Critical 
Appraisal. London: Palgrave and “The Transformation of Political Community: E.H. Carr, Critical 
Theory and International Relations,” Review o f International Studies (1997) 23 (3): 321-338. Further, 
Peter Wilson, “The Revolutionist's Realist,” The Global Site, N.p, 2000, pp. 1-16, points to E. H. Carr’s 
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critical leanings, as did Gramsci or Habermas, I have chosen to use his insights sparingly.
159 The first time the word “miracle” was used in an economic sense after WW II was in reference to the 
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interests. See Rajan Menon, “The Once and Future Superpower: At Some Point Japan Is Likely to Build a 
Military Machine that Matches Its Economic Might,” The Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientist 53, no. 1 
(January/February 1997): p. 34, quoted in Green (1998).
161 In fact, despite having the capacity and ample technological resources, Japan has refrained from 
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Japan could produce up to 30 atomic weapons annually and deploy 100 nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles 
in the 1970s, according to a declassified U.S. government report made available to Kyodo News. "It could 
test its first nuclear device as early as 1971 without violating existing reactor safeguard provisions, 
thereafter producing an estimated 10 to 30 weapons annually," said the report titled "Japan's Prospects in 
the Nuclear Weapons Field."” Japan Times 5/12/04, http://www.iapantimes.co.ip/cgi- 
bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20040512b5.htm See also Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, U.S. Policy Toward Japan 
and Korea (New York: Praeger, 1982). This activity is described to some degree in the available Japanese 
records, Kiyomiya, Ryu, Fukuda-seiken 714-nichi [Fukuda Administration 714 Days] (Gyosei mondai 
kenkyusho shuppankyoku, 1984).
162 See Ambassador Owada Hisashi, “Japan-ASEAN Relations in East Asia,” Speech made on 16 October 
2000 .
163 ASEAN Council o f Japan Alumni, 19 July 2001, in Makati City.
164 Speech by Mr Lim Hng Kiang, Minister for Health and Second Minister for Finance, Republic of 
Singapore, "Japan's Role in Regional Growth and Stability," 8 June 2001, at the International Conference 
on the Future o f Asia 2001, Tokyo's Imperial Hotel on June 7 and 8, sponsored by the Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun. The conference was marked by discussion of economic cooperation as a means of assuring 
regional stability and peace.
165 In addition to the loans and equity investment by the OECF, there are also Japanese semi-official aid 
organisations. One is the Japanese International Development Organisation (JAIDO), which was founded 
in 1989, for the purpose of making equity investments in industrial co-operation-related projects. JAIDO 
is a corporation jointly owned by the OECF and 80 Japanese private companies. Basically its role is to 
marshal the private sector to play a stronger role in coordination with Japanese aid efforts. See Robert 
Orr, The Emergence o f Japan’s Foreign Aid Power. New York: Columbia University, 1990, p. 63.
166 Policy communities are frequently identified in national policy making. More recently, it has been 
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the Asia-Pacific. See Richard Higgott (1994) "Introduction: Ideas, Policy Networks and International 
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